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Since 1999 UK employment programmes (known as welfare-to-work programmes) 
have been delivered through the procurement of services from organisations 
outside of the public sector. Managed by contractual arrangements and arranged in 
a quasi-market system controlled by the state, private and third sector organisations 
compete to secure contracts predominantly based on payment-by-results and 
competitive tendering processes. This thesis used an instrumental case study to 
analyse the impact of the welfare-to-work quasi-market on a third sector 
organisation based in Scotland. Using a qualitative mixed-methods research 
strategy including 20 in-depth interviews, 150 documents, an ethnographic study 
and financial analysis of the organisation’s accounts, the thesis presents an in-depth 
insight into the development of the welfare-to-work market and its changes over 
time and the impact this had on instigating organisational change in a third sector 
organisation. Drawing on transaction cost theory, neoinstitutional theory and 
resource dependency theory the study found that activities, structure, and 
management processes changed in line with changes in its organisational field in 
order to attract and maintain resources and gain legitimacy. Furthermore, the 
organisation under investigation faced financial management tensions as it sought 
to balance its involvement in service delivery with transaction costs associated with 
market participation. The thesis found that the dependence on resources from 
complex quasi-markets relations creates new power asymmetries between delivery 
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C HAP TER  1  -  I NTR O DU C TI O N  
 
Since 1997 consecutive UK governments have introduced and administered 
employment programmes aimed at moving individuals into the labour market 
through a series of welfare reforms and a range of “welfare-to-work” programmes 
(Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008; Finn, 2008). In most cases welfare-to-work 
programmes involved the provision of government funded support services to 
benefit claimants and jobseekers delivered by non-public sector organisations that 
competed to secure service delivery contracts and outcome payments (Finn, 2005a; 
Finn, 2010). This approach to welfare service administration created a welfare-to-
work quasi-market based on programme tendering and competitive bidding 
processes between a range of organisations which differed in size, history, sector 
and legal arrangement. Due to the use of competitive contracting process the 
quantity and the size of private sector organisations, (which viewed public services 
as a commercial opportunity with profit-making possibilities) involved in the 
delivery of front-line employment services and in newly created supply chain 
management positions rapidly increased between 2000 and 2010. At the same time a 
range of non-distribution organisations (which are referred to throughout this thesis 
as third sector organisations), became involved in these tender competitions to 
secure public service contracts for the provision of employment services to citizens 
in receipt of out of work benefits.   
 
Prior to the introduction of the quasi-market, employment services were delivered 
predominately by the public employment service (PES), or through a myriad of 
organisations commissioned to provide specialist support or training (Finn, 2005b; 
Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008).  The creation of the welfare-to-work quasi-market and 
the use of competitive tendering, which replaced the previous policy and 
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programme delivery arrangements, were described by the UK government at the 
time as innovative and efficient (DWP, 2007a; DWP 2008a). By 2010 the quasi-
market dominated the administration of welfare services and was heralded by the 
incoming Conservative led coalition government as an example of best practice for 
other areas of public service delivery (HM Government, 2012).   
 
This thesis explores the impact of the introduction of the welfare-to-work quasi- 
market on a Third Sector Organisation (TSO) based in Scotland. It explores issues of 
organisational change within the shifting policy context of the delivery of 
employment programmes during the late 1990s and 2000s. For ethical reasons 
(relating to commercial confidentiality), the organisation which is the subject of this 
research is known throughout the thesis under the pseudonym ‘Albase.’ The 
organisational history and background of Albase is covered in detail in chapter five 
but briefly introduced here.  
 
Albase was established in 1983 in central Scotland and delivered employment 
programmes aimed at providing temporary employment for long term unemployed 
people. Albase was involved in regeneration and local employment programmes 
since the 1980s, although over time it diversified its activities into other policy areas 
including the environment and sustainability agendas. Whilst it continued to 
operate its traditional activities, and diversified into other related policy areas from 
the late 1990s, Albase also became involved in the delivery of welfare-to-work 
programmes and competed for contracts against private and public sector 
organisations.  
 
At the time of writing this thesis Albase is a registered charity limited by guarantee 
and as such, it does not have shareholders, pay dividends or generate private and 
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personal profits. Since the mid-2000s it considered itself a social enterprise. To 
provide some indication of the size of the organisation studied in this thesis, in the 
first recorded accounts Albase registered ten employees and a turnover of 
approximately £600,000 per year. In the accounts for 2010 Albase recorded an 
income of over £32million and employed 871 people in the delivery of employment, 
regeneration and environmental programmes1. 
 
Whilst the thesis traces the development of the organisation over its life course 
(from 1983 to 2010), the focus of this research is on the interaction between Albase 
and their organisational field, in particular the introduction of the welfare-to-work 
quasi-market in 1999. Using a longitudinal qualitative case study of Albase the aim 
of the thesis is to explore how the organisation changed over time, and how this was 
affected by the changes occurring in their organisational field. As such, the thesis 
provides a descriptive account of changes in the policy field and the welfare-to-
work quasi-market, and analyses Albase’s organisational change in this context. The 
remainder of this chapter provides the policy context and background information 
for the thesis and outlines the thesis structure. It concludes by discussing the key 
findings from this research, and the implications of these findings.   
 
1.1 Research context  
Service delivery arrangements and the relationship between the state and delivery 
organisations (from both the third sector and the private sector) experienced 
considerable reform during the 1990s. Successive government policies led to an 
increase in the use of contracting and service purchasing from non-public sector 
organisations. Whilst this was prominent in welfare-to-work and employment 
                                                     
1 Anon Doc 60, 2010 
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support provision, it was also a dominant policy in a number of other public service 
areas. As such, TSOs became increasingly involved in the delivery of a range of 
public services in the UK over the 1990s and 2000’s. 
 
A number of commentators (Carmel and Harlock, 2008; Alcock 2010b; Billis, 2010; 
Macmillan, 2010) noted that the increased role for TSOs in public service delivery 
was associated with the Labour government’s agenda to ‘modernize’ public services 
in the UK (Cabinet Office, 1999). According to this literature the consecutive Labour 
governments (from 1997-2010) focussed on the development of the sector’s role in 
shaping and delivering public services as part of their broader public service reform 
programme (Billis, 2010). As such, the government’s approach to reform 
incorporated an emphasis on the role of TSOs in the delivery of public services and 
included an endorsement of TSOs across a wide range of policy areas.  
 
As part of the agenda to increase contracting out and the role of TSOs in this context 
the UK government researched, promoted and published a number of policy papers 
and programmes. This included the publication of a major review (HM Treasury, 
2002) to explore the ‘‘value added’’ aspects of the third sector. According to 
Osbourne and McLaughlin (2003, p. 577) the review stated that the third sector may 
have comparative advantage in terms of, “specialist skills/ knowledge, the ability to 
involve people in service delivery; their independence and ability to innovate; their 
lack of institutional baggage; and their flexibility, responsiveness and (again) their 
ability to innovate”.  The government also sought to increase partnership working 
(across government and within the sector) and published a Third Sector Action plan 
in 2006 which called for departments to consider investing in the capacity of the 
sector and facilitate the involvement of the broadest possible range of suppliers in 
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commissioning exercises (McDonald et al., 2007). Notably, the government also 
formed The Office of the Third Sector (OFTS2) in 2006 to ensure that the increase in 
public service out-sourcing across policy areas was underpinned by TSO 
involvement (Macmillan, 2010).   
 
With the increase in public service contracting to organisations outside of the public 
sector the Labour government developed policies and programmes aimed 
specifically at developing and funding TSOs to organisationally adapt to the 
requirements of public service markets, service delivery programmes and 
competitive contracting systems. According to Carmel and Harlock (2008) and 
Macmillan (2010) the availability of financial resources and support (including small 
grants and capacity building funds) was an attempt by the government to ensure 
that TSOs were able to compete against private sector contractors to secure the 
contracts to deliver public services. For example the Capacity Building Programme 
was introduced (Home Office, 2004) to encourage TSOs to become more 
organisationally capable of delivering services and to adopt specific business-
derived quality systems; to set up and then achieve performance targets; to replace 
volunteers with paid staff; and to ensure that both staff and board members were 
trained to standards acceptable to government and other funders (Cairns et al, 2005; 
Kelly, 2007; Carmel and Harlock, 2008).  
 
As part of the OFTS and the drive to support organisational adaptation to the new 
contracting environment there was also a policy emphasis on a relatively new term 
and organisational form- the ‘social enterprise’. The government actively promoted 
the ‘social enterprise’ term and concept to both policy makers and delivery partners 
                                                     
2 The OFTS was replaced in May 2011 by the coalition government by the Office for Civil Society 
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(see Brown, 2003; Teasdale, 2010a). According to Alcock (2012) through a concerted 
effort between 1997 and 2010 the UK Labour government and the devolved 
administrations managed to instil the key concepts of the third sector and social 
enterprise into the discourse of both public policy contexts and wider society. 
Government policy stressed that, “social enterprises are part of the “third sector”, 
which encompasses all organisations which are nongovernmental, principally 
reinvest surpluses in the community or organisation and seek to deliver social or 
environmental benefits” (OTS, 2006, p. 10).  
 
1.2 New Public Management reforms 
Whilst the focus on the role of TSOs covered a number of policy areas and 
government departments, the delivery of employment and welfare services was one 
policy area where the government introduced New Public Management (NPM) 
delivery reforms (based predominately on contractualism) alongside an emphasis 
on the third sector (Finn, 2005; 2007). Contracting-out employment services to non-
public agents was a popular NPM approach pursued by a number of countries (see 
Considine, 2001; Bredgaard and Larsen, 2006; Sol and Westerveld, 2005) with some 
proclaiming that its advantage as an administrative method was because it puts 
competitive market forces directly at the service of government (Metcalfe and 
Richards, 1990).  
 
At the same time as the introduction of contracting approaches to service delivery, 
employment and labour market policy was experiencing ideological and political 
reforms. ‘Activation’ policies were introduced in a number of countries, but 
particularly in the UK, based on the belief that individuals are better off in work and 
that support programmes would help the long term unemployed re-enter the labour 
market (DWP, 2002). In this context reforms carried out under the Labour 
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government between 1997 and 2010 were underpinned by the rationale that the 
welfare state should offer, “work for those who can; security for those who cannot” 
(HMSO, 1998 p. iii) and based on the ideological belief that “the best welfare policy 
of all is work” (DWP, 2006a, p.iv).  
 
Part of the activation reforms involved the introduction of ideas of reciprocation 
welfare reform through “matching rights with responsibilities” (DWP, 2006a, p.iv). 
Some have argued that the link between rights and responsibilities was part of a 
larger agenda to transform the conception of citizenship, which focused on 
activation, self-responsibility and labour market participation (Betram, 2010; 
Prabhaker, 2002). Similarly, it has been noted that the rise of ‘contractualism’ led to 
radical changes in the relationship between the unemployed person and the state. 
This was because part of the design of activation and conditionality measures 
involved jobseekers entering into ‘welfare contracts’ with the state to receive benefit 
payments and services (Finn, 2005). Furthermore, it has been argued that the use of 
contractual relationships in the provision of welfare services ensured that rights and 
obligations were legally imposed on both parties involved in the agreement (Sol and 
Westrveld, 2005) and as Carney and Ramia (2002) contend, this reflected the 
emergence not merely of the use of contractual ideas as policy tools, but the ascent 
of broader social organisation principles based on reciprocity. Whilst the 
introduction of contractualism affected a number of aspects of the delivery of 
employment and welfare services, it is the reform of the administration of services 
and the use of competitive processes for external organisations which is the focus of 
this research.   
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1.3 The UK welfare-to-work quasi-market 
This thesis adopts Le Grand and Bartlett’s (1993) definition of a quasi-market which 
distinguishes it from a pure market by three characteristics. First, in a quasi-market 
competition need not necessarily be driven by the profit motive, because non-profit 
and public organisations may also be competing. Second, a quasi-market for social 
services is based on public funds which are made available by the government. 
Third, the purchasing power in a quasi-market does not lie with the individual 
client, but with an organisation that acts as a client on behalf of the ultimate client, 
in this case the Department of Work and Pensions.  
 
According to Struyven and Steurs (2005, p.212) in a context such as welfare-to-work, 
“contracting-out means that the former public-sector function is subject to private-
sector competition, where the public provider can continue to act as one of the 
competing actors – in this sense contracting-out stands for a quasi-market 
arrangement.” Furthermore, the introduction of NPM reforms and the quasi-market 
arrangement led to a change in the purpose and management of the public 
employment service in the UK. Not only did the quasi-market create a new 
institutional arrangement for the design and delivery of employment programmes 
but due to the inclusion of market principles it also involved the introduction of 
new ways of monitoring and managing service delivery.  As Finn (2010, p.289) 
argues, “reforms have involved radical change in the bureaucracies and institutions 
that deliver employment services and in unemployment and social assistance 
benefits. Many national governments have decoupled agencies from central 
Ministries, with policy makers now steering their systems through performance 
targets and agreements.”  
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1.4 The Department of Work and Pensions 
Since 1997 the Employment Service (which was replaced by the Department for 
Work and Pensions  in 2000) has acted as the commissioning body and managed 
and monitored the delivery of welfare-to-work programmes across the UK (DWP, 
2008a). It promoted a NPM inspired contracting process involving the introduction 
and delivery of welfare-to-work programmes which not only developed the 
activation agenda, but provided resources to build the capacity and number of 
providers in the market (Wright et al, 2011). It also favoured the growing use of both 
private sector and third sector organisations based upon the rhetoric of superior 
client knowledge and innovative delivery methods, claiming that, ‘these 
organisations can bring a distinctive approach to service delivery, based on their 
specialist knowledge, experience and skills’ (DWP, 2006a, p.74) and ‘they [the 
independent sector] can also offer more scope for innovation, developing new and 
creative ways of working with customers’ (DWP 2008a, p.7).  
 
Often considered as ‘independent providers,’  (DWP 2008a) private and third sector 
organisations competed to deliver short-term employment programmes ranging 
from two to five years in length in specified localities and to particular claimant 
groups throughout the UK. Contracts included specified targets and outcomes and 
providers often competed on lowest cost in tendering processes (Finn, 2011a). In this 
arragenment the government agreed to provide financial resources and the transfer 
of unemployed claimants, whilst the delivery organisations agreed to provide 
services which moved a target number of individuals into the labour market. 
Contracts emphasised and were underpinned by the requirement to fulfil 
performance measurements and be reimbursed through a targets for  results 
approach (see Struyven and Steurs, 2005).  
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Involvement in the quasi-market offered TSOs access to large financial resources.  
Between 2000 and 2005, the DWP spent on average £1.1 billion annually on 
employment programmes, including annual spending of about £400 million on New 
Deal programmes alone (DWP, 2006b). In the DWP’s accounting for 2010-2011 the 
DWP recorded expenditure of £2.3 billion on employment programmes alone, the 
majority of which is spent through the welfare-to-work quasi-market (DWP, 2011d). 
This market-based approach for the delivery of employment programmes played a 
key part in the UK welfare reform agenda of both the previous Labour 
administrations, and continued to operate under the Conservative-led coalition 
Government which took over and continued with the welfare-to-work quasi-market 
policy in 2010 (see Davies, 2008; DWP 2010).  
 
The existing literature suggests a number of reasons why welfare-to-work policies 
were favoured by consecutive governments and all three major political parties in 
the UK. Both Domberger (1998) and Finn (2011d) outlined a number of reasons why 
public agencies subcontract with external providers and why the delivery of 
employment services was transferred to non-public sector organisations. According 
to Domberger (1998), the benefits of contracting are: specialization (the government 
concentrates on specifying and controlling performance measures), market 
discipline (transactions take place under contracts), flexibility (the governments can 
use a wide range of public and private providers), and cost savings (the government 
can purchase service at the same level of quality, but at a lower price).   
 
Finn (2011d) contends that contracted employment services may complement public 
employment services and utilise specialist skills and/or additional capacity by 
expanding the pool of potential providers, and that subcontracting also enables 
public authorities to expand or reduce service delivery capacity without assuming 
the long term commitments involved in public sector employment. Finn also 
 23 
contends that contracting out allows governments to introduce and terminate 
policies and programmes with providers by redesigning tenders and entering a new 
bidding phase when they feel necessary. Despite the literature by these authors 
there remains relatively little information and empirical research on the welfare-to-
work quasi-market in terms of the organisations involved, how cost savings were 
made at the organisational level and the impact of contractualism on policy 
administration and organisational delivery. 
1.5 Research aim and main research questions 
This thesis is based on a single case study and adopts a qualitative mixed-methods 
approach including unstructured interviews, documents analysis, accounts analysis 
and a short ethnographic study period.  As previously discussed the ‘case’ for the 
research is an organisation referred to throughout as ‘Albase’. This research is a case 
study of third sector organisational change, with particular consideration of the 
introduction of the welfare-to-work quasi-market into their organisational field. 
 
Research question one: How and why has Albase’s core activity (the delivery of ILM 
programmes) changed and adapted to the introduction of competitive contracting into the 
organisational field? 
 
Research question two: To what extent has the introduction of a competitive contracting 




1.6 Thesis structure 
There are nine chapters in this thesis inclusive of this introduction chapter. The 
remaining eight are outlined below. 
 
Chapter two provides a critical discussion of the existing literature on the third 
sector in the UK welfare-to-work quasi-market. It discusses the dominant 
approaches to researching welfare-to-work and contends that the existing 
knowledge and published research on the involvement of third sector organisations 
is extremely limited. As such, the chapter reviews the literature on the role of third 
sector organisations in public service contracting and quasi-market arrangements in 
other policy contexts and in other countries. The purpose of casting the net wider is 
to identify the common themes and trends in third sector research and to gain a 
better understanding of the main arguments regarding the impact of public service 
contracting on third sector organisations. This chapter concludes with a discussion 
of the methodological approaches adopted in the extant literature. 
 
Chapter three proposes a theoretical framework for exploring organisational change 
in Albase. It offers an ontological and epistemological discussion based on major 
debates from organisational studies regarding how organisations and change can be 
conceptualised. This chapter also presents the theoretical contributions which 
framed this thesis. The approach adopted explores the “adaptational mechanisms” 
theories; resource dependency, neoinstitutional sociology, and neoinstitutional 
economics (transaction cost economics).  The three theories are discussed with 
particular attention given to how these theories explain organisational change and 
the outcomes of change. Whilst there are some interrelated themes in these theories 
there are key differences in how they explain change in quasi-market contexts. The 
purpose of this approach was to create a research study whereby the exploratory 
nature of the case study method would provide new empirical knowledge due to 
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the unusual access to the case study and the limited existing knowledge on welfare-
to-work delivery organisations, and due to the policy context the thesis could offer 
exploratory theoretical too. 
 
Chapter four provides a detailed discussion of the methodological approach. The 
case study strategy is presented and details of the qualitative mixed methods data 
collection approach are discussed. This chapter demonstrates that the case study 
strategy involves a range of methods including interviews, document analysis, 
financial analysis, and ethnographic research. The research was supported by the 
ESRC CASE programme based on a partnership between Albase and the Social 
Policy subject area at the University of Edinburgh. This chapter provides further 
details on this arrangement and a reflection of the ethical considerations.  
 
Chapter five is the first of four empirical chapters. It is a descriptive chapter which 
traces the changes to Albase from 1983 to 2010. The chapter discusses three key 
aspects; the background and historical aspects of Albase; the shift in the delivery of 
employment support activities from the Intermediate Labour Market approach to 
the welfare-to-work programmes, the descriptive changes over time including the 
change in finances, the size and number of employees, the outcome of the financial 
analysis and provides a number of diagrams to help the reader visualise the 
organisation which is being studied. The chapter concludes by presenting a diagram 
in which the change process of Albase between 1983 and 2010 has been grouped 
into three change phases. The first, consolidation, the second, transformation, and 
the third, growth. The purpose of this chapter is to provide detail to the following 
three empirical chapters which have more of a theoretical consideration. The 
remaining chapters focus predominately on the transformation and growth phases. 
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Chapter six focuses on research question one. It traces and discusses the traditional 
activities of Albase (ILM) programme and through the theoretical framework 
considers the reason for their decline and the rise of welfare-to-work programmes in 
Albase. These discussions are situated within the concept of the organisational field 
and as such they go further than the descriptive outline of change presented in 
chapter five, and the chapter contends that there have been four interrelated shifts 
in the field which impacted on the delivery of traditional activities. The chapter 
concludes that ILMs became less well supported in the political (and consequently) 
funding environment for a number of reasons and this led Albase to secure 
alternative funding sources, which was welfare-to-work.   
 
Chapter seven concentrates on research question two and focuses on how welfare-
to-work involvement has led to a number of organisational changes in terms of 
structure and management practice. It is argued in this chapter that the welfare-to-
work quasi-market that developed post-1997 became increasingly divergent from 
the organisational field which Albase had previously operated in. In particular, the 
DWP’s expectations of their delivery partners created a set of new rules and 
regulations which Albase had to comply with to continue to gain resources from 
this policy area and funding source.  
 
This chapter focuses on how, between 1999 and 2010, key organisational 
characteristics of Albase (structure, activities, management style and financial 
management) changed to become more ‘business-like.’ It is argued throughout this 
chapter that due to the administration of resources via the welfare-to-work quasi-
market Albase experienced this type of organisational change. Whilst the 
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organisation remained a charity limited by guarantee3, operationally core activities 
and behaviours shifted towards the required characteristics of the welfare-to-work 
quasi-market. 
 
Chapter eight highlights the problems and difficulties experienced in some of the 
aspects of the change process, and suggests that these difficulties can help our 
theoretical understanding of the change processes. The chapter contends that the 
exchange relationships became less favourable for Albase but despite this Albase 
continued to adapt and invest in becoming the desired organisation to win 
contracts. It is argued that this occurred because Albase was both committed and 
dependent on the DWP contracts, and because they had become less powerful in the 
exchange relationship and the control of their external resources. Whilst there were 
some efforts at a resource diversification strategy, drawing on neoinstitutional 
economic theory it appears that diversification was restricted as resources were 
consumed in welfare-to-work participation. The resource diversification that did 
occur was Scottish Government reliant which offers an interesting aspect to this case 
study and is discussed in more detail in the conclusion chapter. 
 
The conclusion is presented in chapter nine. This chapter provides a recap of the 
findings and considers the main contributions of this thesis. It offers a number of 
possible future research projects based on this finding.  
 
                                                     
3 Anon Doc 60, 2010 
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1.7 Limitations 
The limitations to the findings from this research are acknowledged here and 
discussed in more detail in the final chapter. This research is based on a single case 
study of a TSO in Scotland. Whilst efforts have been made to position this research 
in the wider policy and theoretical contexts, the findings cannot be generalized or 
aggregated to represent other TSOs in the policy context or geographical locality. It 
was not the intention to produce generalizeable findings from a single case study. 
Instead it was always the intention that a well executed case study could provide 
much knowledge to a relatively unexplored area of public sector contracting and the 
impact of the complexities of the welfare-to-work quasi-market on a third sector 
organisation. 
 
There are also methodological limitations. As discussed in more detail in chapter 
four the data collection process was complex, messy and due to the nature of data 
storage in Albase, there will be documents, individuals and change processes which 
may have been missed. As with all longitudinal organisational research that is based 
on qualitative research there is a danger that the stories, voices, records and 
experiences collected during the fieldwork may be contested by some employees 
who possessed a different view. Efforts to minimise this impact were taken through 
triangulating data sources and this is discussed in more detail in chapter four.  
 
1.8 Contribution 
This thesis explores organisational change in Albase using the concept of the 
organisational field. It seeks to understand the impact that changes to the 
administration of employment programmes and the introduction of the quasi-
market approach had on Albase’s activities, structure and ways of organizing. Using 
a novel theoretical framework, and a qualitative mixed methods data collection 
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strategy, this research is able to contribute to the wider discussion on the impact of 
public service markets on TSOs and in the welfare-to-work context more 
specifically. 
  
C HAP TER  2  -  L I TER A TURE  RE V IEW  
 
This chapter has two aims. The first is to critically review the existing literature on 
the UK welfare-to-work quasi-market. The second is to provide an overview of the 
existing literature which examines the role of Third Sector Organisations (TSOs) in 
public service contracting. The purpose of this chapter is to identify gaps in the 
extant literature and to locate this study within the wider public policy debates.  The 
chapter demonstrates that there is very little existing literature on the role of TSOs 
in the UK welfare-to-work context, and the impact of contracts and quasi-market on 
TSOs is unexplored. 
 
Due to the limitations in the existing literature this chapter is structured as if to 
answer three questions. First, what do we already know about TSOs in welfare-to-
work contracting in the UK? This section demonstrates that there is little existing 
literature on TSOs in welfare-to-work contracting, and this has recently been 
identified by some commentators as an empirical weakness in terms of academic 
knowledge on this policy context. As such, the second question asks - what do we 
know about the involvement of all types of delivery organisations in welfare-to-
work contracting? This section identifies that issues of provider behaviour and 
perverse incentives are recurrent themes in welfare-to-work and quasi-market 
literature more broadly. Whilst this literature is large, it is argued that there is little 
differentiation between types of delivery organisations, or the way that 
organisations create and operate processes in response to the quasi-market 
structure. The following section turns to the broader literature on the role of TSOs in 
a range of public contracting contexts to explore the impact that public service 
contracting has on TSOs. This literature has been segregated into three groups based 
on the approaches used by researchers. The first group is concerned with the impact 
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of contracting on the third sector landscape, the second group emphasises the 
impact on the relationship between TSOs and the state, and finally the third group 
is concerned with the impact of policy reforms on the structure, activities and 
management of TSOs. Collectively there are a number of existing studies (some 
based on welfare reform in the US or Australia) which highlight third sector issues 
such as mission-drift; the professionalization of organisations; and the marketisation 
of TSO activities.  
 
However, whilst all of the literature covered in this section has provided 
information on sector-level issues or a snap-shot of issues at a particular point in 
time, there are very few in-depth studies of how TSOs experience organisational 
change in relation to public service markets. During the literature review search it 
was not possible to find a longitudinal case study exploring the organisational 
change processes in a TSO in a public-contracting environment. Instead, much of 
the third sector literature is based on large-n surveys or interview based 
comparative studies which focus on a small number of organisations in a particular 
policy context. The final section of this literature review briefly looks at the existing 
literature on organisational change in third sector organisations in relation to their 
involvement in public service markets from a management perspective. It contends 
that in the US there is  a growth in managerial texts and literature from a 
management perspective for implementing organisational change in TSOs. Drawing 
on Parsons (1960) conceptualisation of an organisation, it is argued that these texts 
focus on the technical or managerial level rather than the institutional. Therefore in 
both ‘camps’ of literature (public policy and management) there is a lack of detailed 
case studies focussing on how TSOs change in response to their institutional 
environment.  
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2.1 Third Sector Organisations in the welfare -to-work quasi-market 
The literature on the role of TSOs in the UK’s welfare-to-work quasi-market is 
extremely limited.  At the start of this research project in 2008 there was very little 
written about the third sector in welfare-to-work programme delivery. As the 
research has progressed the issue has begun to gain attention from academics and 
research institutes.  A recent evidence review by Damm (2012) for the Third Sector 
Research Centre (TSRC) specifically focussed on the role of the third sector in the 
delivery of employment services. Damm (2012) managed to bring together a 
number of articles outlining the involvement of the third sector in the welfare-to-
work quasi-market and he focussed on providing an overview of the involvement of 
TSOs in welfare-to-work contracting between 1997 and 2012. The aim of this review 
was to pull together some knowledge on this relatively unexplored aspect of the 
UK’s welfare reform process and identify where there were gaps. Echoing the point 
made at the start of this section, it found that, “the third sector’s involvement in 
employment services has been neglected both in academia and policy circles” 
(Damm, 2012, p.2). As such, the review relied mainly on ‘grey literature’ such as 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) reports and evaluations, and material 
from a range of organisations (such as interest groups or associations) involved in 
the welfare-to-work quasi-market. Some of these documents are also discussed later 
in this chapter.  
 
As outlined in chapter one, the DWP manages, monitors and organises the 
contracting of welfare-to-work programmes. Before discussing the academic 
publications on this policy area, consideration is given first to the publications by 
the DWP on the involvement of TSOs in the quasi-market arrangement. By 
searching DWP publications for specific references to the role of TSOs in 
programme delivery, it appeared that DWP research and publications rarely focus 
on or mention TSOs. Whilst there have been many DWP publications since the 
initiation of the quasi-market in 1997, the majority of DWP evaluations have 
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focussed on the performance of specific programmes or initiatives, such as the 
Employment Zone evaluation by Hales et al (2003); the evaluation of Pathways to 
Work by Bewley, Dorsett and Haile (2007); the New Deal Young People Evaluation 
by Beale et al (2008); and the Flexible New Deal Evaluation by Vegeris et al (2011). 
These studies employed surveys of jobseekers in order to provide an estimate of the 
impact of each programme in terms of additional employment.  
 
In all cases there is no differentiation between public, private, and third sector 
organisations. In these studies the ‘impact’ of specific programmes was defined 
purely in terms of employment outcomes, and the cost of generating these 
outcomes. Between the late 1990s and 2010 the focus of DWP research was on the 
content and delivery of welfare-to-work programmes in terms of efficiency, service 
quality, and often labour market outcomes. As such, whilst the welfare reform 
agenda of the Labour Government involved both new policy measures for 
jobseekers and new administrative systems to deliver welfare-to-work programmes 
(the introduction of the quasi-market), arguably DWP evaluations were primarily 
concerned with the former. What we know about TSOs in welfare-to-work 
programmes from the majority of DWP welfare-to-work evaluations is therefore 
extremely limited. 
 
Although there was little information published by the DWP when this research 
project began, the DWP has published information on the organisations involved in 
the quasi-market more recently. The only DWP report which provides any 
information on the involvement of TSOs was published in 2010. The study by 
Armstrong et al (2010) was commissioned by the DWP to explore the administration 
of welfare-to-work programmes in order to gain knowledge on the organisations 
involved in the quasi-market. It is the only DWP publication which researches the 
quasi-market and the arrangement and relationship of organisations delivering 
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welfare-to-work programmes. Armstrong et al’s (2010) research, which was focussed 
on the contracting process for the Flexible New Deal (FND) programme, sought to 
identify the market structure in terms of sector composition (split between public, 
private and third sector); size and number of employees in bidding and contract 
winning organisations; and the value of the contracts won in each sector. The 
research was based on two ‘provider surveys’ sent to bidding organisations for the 
FND, although the authors note that as there was no collective DWP database 
covering all programmes and dating back to the introduction of welfare-to-work 
programmes, there was no way of generating exact numbers. Arguably, this also 
meant that the authors could not generate a longitudinal understanding of previous 
organisational involvement and the quasi-market structure prior to the survey 
(which commenced in 2009). From this report it emerges that prior to 2010 there had 
been no systematic efforts within the DWP to record and better understand the 
arrangement and involvement of contracted delivery organisations in the delivery 
of welfare-to-work programmes.  
 
Armstrong et al’s (2010) evaluation was the only report published by the DWP 
which attempted to map, measure and gain knowledge on the number and type of 
organisations involved in the welfare-to-work quasi-market. The authors found that 
whilst they considered the market ‘mature’ with low levels of market entrance, 
there was a high level of market exit by third sector providers. The authors stated 
that the reason for the market exit figures were contractual in nature, that is: “either 
the size of contract areas were too large or the contractual requirements themselves 
were too demanding” (p.3). The report does provide some indication of the size of 
the welfare-to-work quasi-market and the numbers of TSOs involved in this 
institutional arrangement.  The evaluation estimated that in 2009 there was 
approximately 447 organisations involved in delivering welfare-to-work services for 
the DWP, but estimated that the quasi-market involved in the region of 556-677 
organisations. The researchers estimated that approximately 46 per cent of delivery 
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organisations were from the third sector, although it is shown in the data that only 
30 per cent of welfare-to-work organisations defined the nature of their business as 
charitable and only 4 per cent as social enterprise. It is unclear from the study how 
the remaining 12 per cent of TSOs defined their activities and this was not explored 
any further in the report.  
 
The report demonstrates that there was much variation in the financial position of 
TSOs involved in DWP contracting. Of those which were classified as TSOs the 
research found that 50 per cent recorded their 2009 revenue as over £1million. 
Furthermore, the top 22 per cent (40 organisations) stated that their 2009 revenue 
was more than £5million, whilst 29 per cent of TSOs recorded revenue of less than 
£500,000 for the same period. As such, whilst the report demonstrates that 
organisations from the third sector were operating in the quasi-market, there was 
much disparity between the activities, size, and revenue levels of the TSOs 
surveyed.  
 
Data from the report suggests that many of the TSOs involved in welfare-to-work 
contracting operated in other policy and funding environments as 74 per cent of 
TSOs felt that DWP contracts represented less than 50 per cent of their 2009 revenue.  
Some TSOs appeared to be more reliant on DWP funding - 17 per cent felt it made 
up 51-75 per cent of their revenue and 9 per cent identified it as comprising over 75 
per cent of their 2009 revenue. These findings suggest that some TSOs operated 
welfare-to-work programmes as part of a larger portfolio of activities, whilst a 
sizeable number of TSOs stated that the majority of their revenue was DWP contract 
dependent. The findings suggest that in 2009 in the welfare-to-work quasi-market 
there was much variation in the role and experience of the TSOs involved in the 
delivery of DWP programmes, and the research provides some indication of the 
composition of the welfare-to-work quasi-market at this time. However the nature 
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of the activities, the types of TSOs involved, and the way in which they are 
structured or managed are not discussed in this research. Excluding this report, 
there has been no DWP commissioned research into the involvement or behaviour 
of TSOs in welfare-to-work contracting.  
 
2.2 Academic approaches in welfare-to-work research 
If we turn to the academic literature to fill this knowledge gap we are arguably left 
disappointed. There is little published work to draw on which specifically examines 
the role of TSOs in the welfare-to-work quasi-market in the UK. In some discussions 
in the UK and beyond, it is possible to identify issues and activities which may 
affect TSOs, or which TSOs may be involved in. Whilst this only provides a partial 
understanding of the topic, these are discussed here. Much of the literature on 
welfare-to-work contracting in the UK is by Finn (2000; 2005a; 2005b; 2008; 2010), 
and in an Australian context by Considine (1999; 2001; 2003; Considine and Lewis, 
1999). The literature published from these two authors is well-cited and both 
authors provide detailed accounts of policy changes and contracting procedures in 
welfare-to-work quasi-markets. To date, the approach adopted by these authors and 
those working within the same framework has tended to consider changes and 
developments at the policy level or the content of welfare-to-work programmes, 
such as the type of jobseekers targeted or the specific locations of new programmes. 
It has also tended to examine the quasi-market using a national comparative 
methodology whereby the programmes and policies in the UK are discussed in 
regards to welfare reforms in other countries.  
 
This is a strong trend in welfare-to-work research and a number of studies outline 
the welfare reforms in the UK alongside countries which also use welfare-to-work 
quasi-markets such as the Netherlands and Australia (see Bredgaard and Larsen, 
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2007; Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008; Finn, 2008; Mabbett, 2009 ). These studies focus 
on the implementation or process design for the delivery of welfare services, 
including the role of quasi-market mechanisms. However, whilst they provide some 
information on the way in which public administration systems have changed, there 
are also some limitations to understanding the involvement of TSOs. In these 
studies the delivery organisation is often conceptualised as a fixed-entity (an object 
that does not change over time) or a collection of equivalent organisations which are 
simply a unit through which policies are enacted but which do not get affected by 
the policy itself. Arguably,  this approach can be attributed to how these researchers 
consider the administrative reforms processes. For them the focus is not on the 
delivery organisation per se, but on how the contracting systems represent broader 
changes to governance structures and processes in different countries or policy 
settings.  
 
Building on Finn’s work in particular, many authors have researched and written 
about particular UK welfare-to-work programmes with some, although limited, 
reference to a broader welfare-to-work quasi-market and context. To date this 
research into welfare-to-work contracting in the UK can be divided into two 
principle types: those taking a public policy perspective; and those that focus on the 
underlying economics. According to Domberger (1999) public policy questions 
include a consideration of the proper role of the state; the problems of accountability 
when non-public organisations deliver public services; and issues concerning 
citizens’ rights in a contracting framework. The economic perspective has tended to 
focus on the behaviour of agents and organisations within the market, in particular 
the ‘agent-principal’ relationship and the reduction of transaction costs involved in 
the contracting process. For example, Bregaard and Larsen (2007) in their research 
on contracting employment services to non-public organisations concentrated on 
whether the quasi-market model delivers on the promises of higher efficiency, cost 
reductions, and innovation. Those academics taking an economic perspective have 
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tended to focus on the composition and arrangement of government quasi-markets, 
focussing their attention on issues such as contracting processes, the transfer of risk, 
and the costs associated with quasi-market management. From this perspective 
Bredgaard and Larsen (2007, p.289) contend that, “the general objective of the 
employment policy is to find the quickest possible way back to ordinary 
employment, thus easing the pressure on social security spending.”  
 
2.3 Gaming behaviour 
Studies from both approaches have criticised the way in which the administration of 
public services through quasi-market systems may facilitate organisational 
behaviour that conflicts with the traditional welfare state ethos of: “the entitlement 
of service users to equitable treatment” (Finn, 2010, p.291). Many have argued that 
the use of contracts as public policy administration tools in the quasi-market 
structure has induced ‘gaming behaviour’ (Courty and Marchke, 1997; Bredgaard 
and Larsen, 2008; Finn, 2011), whereby contracted service providers reduce services 
for individuals considered less likely to enter the labour market due to the design of 
the quasi-market and the focus on economic incentives. In regards to ‘gaming 
behaviour’ the literature demonstrates that due to the need for contracted providers 
to meet contract performance targets, they may operate a business model in which 
resources are targeted at those service users most likely to meet their required 
targets (Finn, 2010). This, the literature contends, is an outcome of the quasi-market 
system based on targets and performance related payments. As Bredgaard and 
Larsen (2008, p.346) note: “increased performance pay carries the inherent risk of 
more open and generally accepted classification of target groups into investment 
worthy and investment-unworthy jobseekers”.  Critics argue that this leads to an 
increasing inequality in the provision of public services as market-type mechanisms 
produce market niche-seeking behaviour which can create conditions of social 
exclusion (Mackintosh, 1997; Larbi, 1999).  
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Studies which have focussed on provider behaviour in quasi-market systems have 
predominately identified ‘creaming,’ ‘parking’ and ‘churning’ (see Bredgaard et al, 
2005, Grub, 2006; Jahn and Ochel, 2007; Struyven and Steurs, 2004) as the main 
outcomes of gaming behaviour. ‘Creaming’ is defined by Le Grand and Bartlett 
(1993, p.32)  as discrimination against more ‘expensive users’ and occurs when 
contracted delivery organisations favour those closest to the labour market over 
those which require more support and would prove more costly (see Considine, 
2003). The term ‘parking’ derives from the idea that these individuals would have 
their paper work ‘parked’ in the system and therefore receive little support (Davies, 
2008). The issue of ‘churning’ dominated the early evaluations and critical 
discussions of welfare-to-work programmes which sought to move a large number 
of individuals into the labour market as quickly as possible, without regard to the 
employment positions jobseekers were accepting (Finn, 2009; Finn, 2010).  
 
Some research on the outcome of jobseekers has identified that many individuals 
moved from the benefit register into unstable and insecure employment for short 
periods before returning swiftly to the benefit register. For example, papers by 
Theodore and Peck (2001) and Finn (2000) contend that in some cases welfare-to-
work programmes rewarded delivery organisations for job outcomes for moving 
individuals into employment. However, these papers suggest that the programmes 
did not ultimately reduce the unemployment figures as individuals regularly 
returned to the register. Some also maintain that: “creaming and parking of 
jobseekers is almost unavoidable within a framework of a market-economic logic, as 
outcomes of activities are uncertain and these jobseekers have a host of complex 
problems requiring long term and cost heavy initiatives” (Bredgaard and Larsen, 
2008, p.350). Whilst there is limited research where the delivery organisation is the 
object of the study, there is an implicit assumption within this area of welfare-to-
work research which acknowledges that due to the use of market mechanisms 
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delivery organisations may impact on the way policies are delivered through 
participation in gaming behaviour. Again, however, there is no differentiation of the 
organisations involved in these market based discussions. 
  
The concerns regarding the gaming behaviour of contracted delivery organisations 
have led researchers and commentators to criticise the government’s championing 
of the contracting-out system for welfare-to-work programmes more generally 
(Bredgaard and Larsen, 2007). This is a separate area of welfare-to-work research 
which gives slightly more attention to TSOs than the previously mentioned 
literature. TSOs and private sector organisations are given more consideration by 
these authors because they have tended to focus on the distinction between public 
sector delivery and contracting-out to non-public sector organisations. For example, 
Davies (2008)  argues that the premise of contracting out (that it is more efficient 
and will save costs) does not hold up to examination, and that the assumptions of 
improved service provision standards in contracted delivery organisations does not 
hold true.  Through a critical review of the government’s evaluation documents and 
evaluations of welfare-to-work programmes delivered by contracted organisations, 
Davies claims that there is no evidence that: “either the private or third sector has a 
consistently better record in the provision of employment services than in-house 
public sector staff” (2008, p.158).  
 
In Davies’ (2008) review of the role of contracted non-public sector providers in the 
delivery of welfare-to-work programmes he also refers to the work by Casebourne 
et al, (2006) who reviewed a welfare-to-work programme called Action Team for 
Jobs (ATFJ). The ATFJ programme was delivered in 64 locations in the UK, led 
predominately by Job Centre Plus with 20 of the ATFJ teams being private sector 
led. Their study into the delivery of the programme found that those users who had 
been unemployed for a relatively short period, “are likely to be relatively easier and 
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quicker to help place into work, and under the funding arrangements more “cost 
effective” to work with (p.65). Due to the payment structure whereby providers 
received the same outcome payment for each jobseeker regardless of their needs, 
Casebourne et al (2006, p.67) noted that “the longer a client has been out of work, the 
less likely they were to be helped into work by the private sector led teams.” The 
outcome related funding system was identified as the reason for this behaviour as it 
incentivized, “working with easier-to-help clients” (p.94), and the authors noted 
that this worked against the purpose of the programme which was to work with 
those most in need of support to enter the labour market.  
 
Davies (2008) used this research to strengthen his argument that not only is there no 
evidence that private and third sector organisations perform better than public 
sector organisations in moving individuals into employment, but also that the 
market structure and the associated incentive structures support gaming behaviour. 
It appears therefore, that the idea that contracted delivery organisations in a quasi-
market setting may succumb to ‘gaming’ behaviour, and that the government’s 
efficiency claims are incorrect, are ideas which have been well voiced in academic 
research of the welfare-to-work context (Theodore and Peck, 2001; Bredgaard and 
Larsen, 2007; Thornton and Marsden, 2009; Finn, 2010).  
 
These themes have become the dominant discussions in welfare-to-work research. 
As mentioned previously, the accepted view from most commentators is that the 
major problem resulting from the welfare-to-work incentive structure is creaming 
and parking (Bruttel, 2004, p.13). Whilst there is some support from the existing 
literature to suspect that this gaming behaviour is occurring in welfare-to-work 
contracting, excluding the work of Casebourne et al (2006) and Considine (2003), 
there are relatively few empirical studies which have identified the extent to which 
this occurs and in which situations or by which type of delivery organisations in the 
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UK context. In fact, the study by Griffiths and Durkin (2007) found no evidence of 
creaming and parking in the delivery of the Employment Zone programme. Part of 
the reason for this lack of empirically grounded evidence may be that there is no 
research within delivery organisations which specifically shows these processes in 
action. Instead, most of the literature which identified creaming and parking as an 
outcome of payment and target structures in welfare-to-work contracting have 
arguably drawn on economic actor models to explain this. From this perspective it 
appears that there is an assumption that the policy and welfare-to-work quasi-
market system cannot be differently interpreted by providers, which all (regardless 
of history, experience and background), will act in this economic rational actor way 
due to the incentive structure of the contracting process (Considine, 2003) .  
 
2.4 The advantage of Third Sector Organisations 
Whilst this body of research does provide some acknowledgment of the role of 
providers in the administration of welfare-to-work policy, it rarely differentiates 
between private and third sector organisations (for example Davies, 2008, 
Armstrong et al., 2011, Hudson et al., 2010). Despite this, there are a number of 
discussions in similar contexts that contend that delivery organisations from the 
third sector are preferential to those from the private sector. This research tends to 
be based on the assumption that TSOs with social service missions and experience 
would provide a better service to their users as they would not possess the same 
perverse behaviours as private sector organisations. For example, according to 
O’Regan and Oster, (2000) there are two main advantages that TSOs possess over 
private organisations. First, as a consequence of the non-distribution constraint (the 
fact that TSOs do not have profit targets and a requirement to primarily satisfy 
share-holders), TSOs are thought more trustworthy by consumers and thus are 
better able to supply the market with complex, hard-to-judge goods and services 
(Hansmann, 1980). Although for-profit organisations can and do provide some 
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complex goods (e.g., legal and consulting services), in these cases, some 
commentators argue that these organisations typically must expend resources to 
prove their trustworthiness to the commissioning body and wider society.  
 
Drawing on economic perspectives this literature argues that in contracting 
situations where information is imperfect, for-profit organisations may have to 
provide incremental monitoring and/or guarantees to demonstrate that they are not 
exploiting their positions and are in fact trustworthy. In this sense, it is argued that 
TSOs have a natural advantage in competition with for-profit organisations as the 
principal in the exchange relationship may favour a relationship that involves lower 
transaction costs. Second, some commentators contend that TSOs possess 
organisational advantages for competitive situations. For example, Young (1981, 
p.230) contends that the, “ideological charter of the nonprofit allows them to attract 
mission-driven workers” who, according to Preston (1989) will often accept lower 
wages. O’Regan and Oster (2000, p.122) argue that this is particularly the case when 
“the ability to sharply reward managers is less important than the ability of those 
managers to keep focused on matters of long-term reputation and goals and to 
balance the interests of various constituents who have a stake in the operation”.  
 
Hogg and Baines (2011, p.346) note that TSOs claim to have a “greater ability to 
engage with and understand the needs of individual service users and communities 
than statutory or private sector providers”. This claim is also present in some of the 
grey literature in the welfare-to-work quasi-market. For example, the Third Sector 
Task Force conducted a survey of members of the interest group ACEVO (the 
Association of Chief Executives in Voluntary Organisations). The aim was to set out 
the contribution that the third sector makes to welfare-to-work programmes and 
outline how TSOs could participate in future welfare-to-work contracting. Evidence 
was gathered from over 50 TSOs, “and supplemented by an ACEVO survey of 430 
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members delivering a variety of services” (Third Sector Task Force, 2009, p.3). The 
report argued that TSOs possess a number of characteristics beneficial in welfare-to-
work contracting, such as the ability: “to build up trusting relationships with 
communities, to utilise excellent local knowledge and links, to deliver innovative 
approaches in reaching those furthest from the labour market and those with 
complex needs, to contribute to policy development through an independent voice 
and advocacy are all strong indicators of the role it can play in meeting the growing 
challenges of welfare-to-work” (Third Sector Task Force, 2009, p.3). Whilst the 
report makes a number of claims regarding the advantages of TSOs in welfare-to-
work contracting there is no reference to empirical research to substantiate these 
normative assertions. 
 
There is little academic research in the UK context which focuses on the added 
benefit of TSOs compared to public or private sector organisations in public service 
quasi-markets. More is however known about TSOs in the quasi-market and 
contacting systems in the countries that are often the comparative case in the group 
of literature mentioned earlier.  Considine’s (2003) study on nonprofits in the 
Australian system produced the most detailed evidence to date on whether TSOs 
are affected by the quasi-market system. Considine used survey data at two points 
during the 1990s of nonprofit organisations involved in the delivery of welfare-to-
work programmes in Australia. The purpose of the research was to find out whether 
TSOs made a distinctive contribution to the services delivered, and whether their 
role changed as the sector underwent policy-driven structural changes.  
 
Considine aimed to understand what effect programme involvement had on how 
TSOs behaved. His research found a number of interesting results. Firstly, over time 
nonprofit organisations became increasingly similar to their competitors from other 
sectors. This he argued was due to a decline in the TSO service delivery 
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characteristics, such as an ethical mission to provide a service for all. In fact 
Considine identified that over time the nonprofits surveyed had become involved in 
creaming activities in order to deliver their contracts. He also noted an increase in 
workloads for front-line advisors, a shift in how these employees viewed service 
support and jobseekers goals, a reduction in time spent with jobseekers, and an 
increase in sanctioning. He concluded that: “the increased level of competition 
among different contractor types results in the distinctive role of the non-profits 
being eroded over this time period. This appears to be because the incentive system 
created by the quasi-market requires that they take on the financial strategies and 
service-delivery methods used by their competitors” (Considine, 2003, p.74-75).  
 
In the US, Riccucci and Meyers (2008) examined the differences in the quality of 
service provision amongst public, third sector, and for-profit organisations in the 
delivery of work-based welfare reform services. The authors surveyed employees in 
a range of welfare delivery organisations in US states. The surveyed sought the 
opinions of employees on jobseekers, and these responses were conceptualised as a 
measure of service quality. They considered whether front-line workers delivering 
employment services to welfare clients in public, third sector, and for-profit 
agencies differed systematically in their attitudes about welfare reform and welfare 
clients. This research shows that there are some differences in worker attitudes 
toward welfare across public, nonprofit or private organisations.  
 
Although it is not clear from this research if these views impacted on job support or 
attainment, it does highlight that the delivery organisation in welfare-to-work 
programmes can impact on service provision, even in a tightly controlled 
contracting system. Nevertheless, Riccucci and Meyers (2008, p.1451)  claim that: 
“there is a paucity of research examining whether welfare clients fare better in 
public, nonprofit or for-profit agencies”. Similarly, Seddon (1999, p,30) observed 
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that regarding guarantors of ‘quality’ with contracted social services, “this aspect of 
the contract tends to be neglected because rigorous monitoring of the way in which 
case managers deal with job seekers - the human element - is practically impossible 
or else prohibitively expensive to monitor, let alone enforce.”  
 
Others have argued that it has proven difficult (even after the service has been 
provided) to determine the quality of service and what the contractor has 
contributed as welfare services may not lend themselves easily to performance 
standards because key measures of quality tend to be qualitative rather than 
quantitative in nature (Sainsbury and Kennedy, 1996, p.117-118). Davies (2008), 
through a review of policy documents and publications from welfare-to-work 
organisations, contends that there was little empirical evidence to back-up the 
claims within these documents that private or third sector delivery organisations 
achieve higher outcomes or provide better services than the public sector.  On 
completion of a detailed literature review of existing research into the delivery of 
UK public services by the third sector Macmillan (2010, p.3) also noted that, 
“whether third sector services lead to better outcomes and impact for service users 
has been the source of some debate and controversy.” It appears that it is difficult to 
demonstrate from the existing literature that front-line services delivered by TSOs 
differ from those delivered by private sector organisations, particularly if this issue 
is considered alongside the earlier literature which emphasises the rational 
economic actor in quasi-market systems and the findings by Considine (2003).  
 
In sum, it is evident that the existing research, comment and criticism on the 
marketisation of welfare-to-work services has predominately centred on the impact 
of welfare reforms and the quasi-market system on job seekers and services users. 
Very little is known about the involvement of TSOs, their behaviour in the quasi-
market system, and how they adapt to the contracting processes. Commentators 
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have continually noted the limitations in the research evidence on the UK third 
sector’s role and experiences in the welfare-to-work context (Aiken, 2007; Third 
Sector Task Force, 2009; WPC, 2011). Furthermore, after the completion of a detailed 
review into TSOs in the UK welfare-to-work quasi-market, Damm (2012, p.21) also 
stated that the lack of TSO research is an ‘empirical blind-spot.’ As yet the extent to 
which this interest in TSO involvement has transferred into academic and research 
literature has been limited. How TSOs operate in, adapt to and manage the 
contracting process and their interaction with private sector organisations in quasi-
market systems is absent from the academic literature.   
 
2.5 Third sector organisations in public service markets  
In order to understand the possible issues affecting TSOs in welfare-to-work 
contracting the following section draws on other policy areas of public service 
contracting. As third sector research is substantial, the literature covered in this 
review is limited to those studies associated with public service quasi-markets. In 
the process of sifting through this literature it has been possible to identify three 
approaches in third sector research. The first type of research approach aims to try 
and map the involvement of TSOs and understand ‘the landscape of the third 
sector’. This has involved for some authors an attempt to create categories for TSOs 
involved in public service delivery. The second group of research has tended to 
focus on the impact of NPM reforms in public service delivery on the relationship 
between the state and the third sector. In the UK context much of this research 
centres on the relationship between the state and the third sector as a whole, 
focussing particularly on the concept of ‘governance’ (Carmel and Harlock, 2008). 
The third approach to TSO research considers the impact of public service markets 
and contexts on individual TSOs or small numbers of cases. To date, this is the area 
with the least literature and research, yet as outlined above, part of the missing 
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empirical data which would enable further insight into the impact and experience of 
TSOs in public service contracting. Each of these categories are discussed below.  
 
2.6 Landscape of the third sector 
One research approach for exploring the role of TSOs in public service delivery 
focuses on the ‘landscape’ of TSOs (Macmillan, 2010). By this term authors are 
referring to the composition of the macro-level (or sector level) in particular contexts 
by identifying the number, size, and type of TSOs involved. Researchers have 
tended to be concerned with defining and mapping the sector in order to ask 
questions about the dynamics of TSO participation in service markets, including 
how to measure the sector, and how to identify broad changes to the sector as a 
whole (Evers and Laville 2004; Alcock and Kendall, 2011). 
 
In the UK this research is arguably driven by the fact that there are a number of 
different types of organisations which are not traditionally considered part of either 
the public sector or private sector, and which have been grouped under the ‘third 
sector’ term although little is known about their collective activities and similarities. 
According to Billis (2010) organisations differ in their legal structures, organisational 
design, purpose and activities, and over time they have come to be been grouped 
under a number of terms such as: non-profit, not-for-profit, or collectively as the 
Voluntary and Community sector (VCO). Many commentators have noted that the 
various terms have tended to ignore the diversity of the organisations they are used 
to describe, or that they exclude those which do not fit under their narrow 
definitions. For example, Salamon and Anheier (1997, p. 17) stated that, “defined in 
legal terms, the UK nonprofit sector is a bewilderingly confused set of institutions 
with poorly defined boundaries,” and Whitelaw (1995, p.45) described the 
voluntary sector as “a wild garden, a rampant display of plants of all shapes and 
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size”. As such there are a number of research studies which simply try to map or 
describe the types of organisations involved in the sector.  
 
There are a number of differences regarding the key definitions involved in third 
sector research and arguably this creates difficulties in terms of the generalizability 
and applicability of findings from separate research sources. For example, the third 
sector is used by some in reference to any organisation that does not have profit as 
its primary motive (Westall, 2009). In this context TSOs may be non-profit (of which 
charities are a subset) or they may be seeking to make surpluses, but use these 
surpluses for social goals (which could include some legally defined private sector 
organisations). Others such as Rifkin (1995) consider sectors based on outcome. As 
such, Rifkin defines the third sector as the sector that creates social capital, and in 
Wilson and Charlton’s definition (1997) the third sector is taken to mean the 
community and its representatives, self-help groups, voluntary and not for profit 
organisations, and professional organisations. In contrast, academics who consider 
public service markets to have created the ‘social economy’,  such as Evans (2002), 
Amin (2009) and Pearce (2003), divide the third sector in terms of economic 
activities that are informal and in the ‘shadows’ and those activities that are more 
formal and apparent.  Teasdale (2010a) provides a detailed discussion on the 
divergent definitions of the third sector and social enterprise. 
 
There are also differences in definitions used in the grey literature. For example, the 
Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations (SCVO), the umbrella body for 
voluntary organisations in Scotland, argued that the term the ‘third sector’ can be 
used to emphasise the distinction between the sector and the private and public 
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sector (2001b). Conversely, Communities Scotland4 (2002), the former executive 
agency responsible for homelessness, communities and regeneration, stated that the 
notion of a third sector as entirely distinct from the public and private sectors is ‘too 
crude’, and that the importance of social enterprise means that the boundaries 
between the private and third sectors are less distinct. Unlike UK policy discourse, 
Scottish policy documents have tended to emphasise the term ‘social economy’ 
rather than referring to the third sector or social enterprises as outlined above. By 
doing so they seem to create a further distinction within the definition of the third 
sector of two sub-categories: those which form part of the Social Economy (Social 
enterprises, social firms, social businesses, and hybrid organisations); and those 
which align themselves with the voluntary sector (such as charities with high levels 
of voluntary employees) and grassroots community groups (Dacombe and Bach, 
2009; Westall, 2009).  
 
Correspondingly, for many years there has been difficulty mapping and defining 
the third sector due to the complexity of policy boundaries and the variety of 
definitions employed by researchers. According to Clark et al. (2010) the most 
comprehensive data source is the National Council for Voluntary Organisations’ 
(NCVO) annual Civil Society Almanac, which includes information about the sector 
across the UK, although some of the information in the Almanac comes from the 
Charity Commission register and applies only to England and Wales. According to 
Clark et al. (2010, p.43) the Almanac reveals that the size of the sector has been 
growing across the UK over the last decade, “and that this has been fuelled to a 
significant extent by a growth in public funding for third sector organisations, 
which grew from £8 billion in 2000 to £12.8 billion in 2008, 36 per cent of total 
                                                     
4 Communities Scotland was abolished on 1 April 2008. On that date, most of its non-regulatory functions were 
transferred to the Scottish Government's Housing and Regeneration directorate. The work of Communities 
Scotland's Regulation and Inspection division has been transferred to the new Scottish Housing Regulator. 
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income.” Focussing on Scotland, Smallbone et al., (2001) note that in 1998 whilst the 
Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) estimated that 
approximately 450 social enterprises were trading in the UK, Community Enterprise 
in Strathclyde (a support service for social enterprises) estimated that in lowland 
Scotland alone there were 3,700 community enterprises in 1997.  Depending on the 
definition, Communities Scotland (2002) identified between 10,000 and 44,000 social 
enterprises active in Scotland, and shortly afterwards Dacombe and Bach (2009) 
suggested that there were 45,000 formally-organised organisations contributing £4.7 
billion to Scotland’s GDP. It appears therefore that there is an abundance of grey 
material which has aimed to measure or quantify the role of TSOs in public service 
contracting, and the economy more broadly.  
 
Some literature, particularly in public service market contexts, has acknowledged 
the vast differences between organisations grouped under the TSO title. First, 
according to Macmillan (2010, p.25) there is a concern regarding the third sector as a 
whole, “becoming polarised between those organisations who are successful in 
winning contracts to deliver services, and those which are not”. This body of work 
has highlighted the segregation amongst TSOs between those which are service 
delivery organisations, and those which are categorised as civil society (see Westall, 
2009; Rathgeb Smith and Smyth, 2010). Some have noted that there are moral 
conflicts associated with creaming and parking which are more acute for some 
TSOs. In their study of welfare service providers in the US, Sommerfield and Reisch, 
(2003, p.69) contend that “community-and faith-based organisations with a 
commitment to service delivery based on need rather than demand are experiencing 
a mission conflict that is difficult to resolve. This study suggests that the capacity of 
these faith based and community-based nonprofits to continue as the last safety net 
for families in distress may be in question”.  Sommerfield and Reisch (2003, p.69) 
also contend from their research that, “organisations of all types found their public 
service character threatened by the “marketization” of the public sector”.  They note 
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that the larger, more established nonprofit organisations “continued along a 
trajectory of business-oriented practices while community and faith-based 
organisations struggled to adopt this new tack”. Community and faith-based 
organisations indicated that they often lacked the financial and human resources to 
adopt the management orientation required to meet the expectations of government 
contracts and which they felt were necessary to compete with private service 
providers. 
 
Wright et al’s (2011) article on the role of TSOs in employment service delivery in the 
UK and Australia is an example of this approach. The article contends that, “the use 
of non-state organisations represents limits to government’s traditional 
accountabilities to the public and deflects political risks inherent in human services 
delivery away from the state and onto civil society and non-profits in particular” 
(p.300). Drawing on the Australian case the authors also contend that, “the principle 
of competition has to some extent muted the social advocacy role of third-sector 
organisations and church groups” (p.314). However, the extent to which this is a 
valid point for TSOs more broadly, or even TSOs working in the quasi-markets 
discussed, is not clear. Arguably, this is because the data is limited on the third 
sector composition in these quasi-markets and the associated characteristics of TSOs 
which are delivering welfare-to-work contracts prior to and during service delivery. 
If TSOs involved in welfare-to-work contracting are not mission-led organisations 
or originally comprised of volunteer workers, ideas that they are losing the civil 
society and mission focus are less relevant. 
 
More convincing is Fyfe and Milligan’s (2003) study of voluntary sector 
organisations in Glasgow, which found that the availability of regeneration, social 
exclusion and welfare funding impacted on the spatial distribution of TSOs across 
the city. In terms of the impact on TSOs and organisational change, the authors 
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argued that there were also important contrasts between, on the one hand, grass-
roots groups committed to non-hierarchical structures and maximizing the decision-
making inputs of service users and, on the other hand, more ‘corporatist’ groups 
characterized by processes of bureaucratization and professionalization. Their 
findings, based on a survey of TSOs and interviews with TSO employees, 
demonstrate that a distinction existed between TSOs that displayed a clear 
commitment to empowering citizens by allowing service users to identify their own 
needs, and “organisations with much sharper internal divisions of labour and 
asymmetrical power relations between welfare professionals, volunteers, and 
clients” (p.2081).  The authors concluded that the policy context in which TSOs in 
their study operate had, over time, led some TSOs to change. They stated that, “it is 
clear that organisations that do work more closely with the state are under pressure 
to professionalize and restructure their services and that this runs the risk of 
disempowering citizens, both within the organisation as a result of developing a 
hierarchical structure with clear divisions between volunteers and paid staff, and 
outside the organisation, by reproducing the bureaucrat-client relationship 
characteristic of state organisations” (2003, p. 2083).  
 
Similar findings were identified by Buckingham (2009) in her research on 
homelessness services. This research stressed that tendering processes brought 
about greater competition between organisations and impeded the types of informal 
personal collaboration which had previously helped to integrate services at the local 
level. Buckingham (2010) highlighted the differentiation between types of TSOs on 
the basis of their responses to contracting, with the biggest division being between 
‘comfortable contractors’ and ‘community based non-contractors’ (p 13).  
 
Some authors have questioned whether the ‘new welfare landscape’ is eroding and 
changing the nature of the ‘third sector’ by altering those organisations involved in 
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competitive relations with private sector organisations in order to enter contractual 
arrangements with the state. For example, Billis (2010) argues that “they [TSOs] 
have entered into a Faustian pact in which the sector gains resources, possible 
influence and the opportunity to deliver more services at the cost of those 
fundamental attributes which made it an attractive proposition in the first place: its 
mission, values and voluntary contribution” (p.10). Brown et al. (2000, p.201) also 
contend that whilst increasing professionalization may allow organisations to 
provide more complex services, it may also limit the opportunities for volunteering, 
and the relation between organisations and ‘clients’. What they refer to as 
‘corporatist’ voluntary organisations they argue have very different implications for 
the development of citizenship than more traditional ‘grass-roots’ or ‘activist’ 
organisations.  
 
2.7 Organisational types 
As part of these debates academics have incorporated research on public sector 
contracting by identifying and creating new organisational types. For example, Billis 
(2010) identified ideal types based on defined sectors and suggests that all 
organisations have broad generic structural features or elements (such as the need 
for resources) but that their nature and logic or principles are distinctly different in 
each sector. These principles, Billis (2010, p.47) argues, have a ‘logical 
interdependence’ and provide a coherent explanation for meeting objectives and 
solving problems. Together they represent the ‘rules of the game’ or ideal type for 
each sector. Billis acknowledges that there will be a varying degree to which 
organisations fully match the ideal model and that individuals within organisations 
will encounter tensions between the ideal type and reality. According to Billis (2010, 
p.48), “notwithstanding the wide variations in structures, organisations within each 
sector appear to derive their strength and legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) from the 
characteristics and rules of the game of their own distinctive ideal type”. Similarly, 
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there are debates about how to analyse and categorise the new organisational types 
created by public service contracting. This large area of research has involved the 
creation of models, spectrums and categories intended to differentiate between the 
types of TSOs involved in public service markets (Evers and Laville, 2004; Westall, 
2009).  
 
These debates focus on whether changes to the sector are indicative of the 
transformation of individual organisations changing in response to the 
environment, or whether there are new TSOs entering the sector and affecting the 
established characteristics of the sector as a whole. What this has arguably led to is a 
range of academic research which concentrates on particular types of TSOs and the 
impact of contracting on specific characteristics which the authors consider 
fundamental to TSOs. For example, Salamon (1995) identified the need to preserve 
the advocacy role of nonprofit organisations, especially their strength in serving as 
social critics of government policies and market sector forces, as well as innovative 
thinking in policy development. Others have asked whether the profit-motive which 
underpins government’s assumptions of performance in quasi-markets and the 
centrality of cost reduction (or containment) may marginalize mission driven TSOs 
(see Finn, 2009; Wright et al, 2011).  
 
Drawing on these discussions it is therefore difficult to say for certain whether all 
TSOs are being ‘squeezed out’ (Damm 2012, p.3), or what type of organisations were 
previously and continue to be involved in public service contracting. The findings 
from sector level studies are inconclusive in terms of the size and nature of TSOs in 
general, and therefore there is a limited amount of empirical data on the impact of 
public sector contracting on the sector as a whole. Furthermore, it appears that some 
research has generalized findings across the unknown group of organisations 
involved in a particular contracting context, whilst others have directed their 
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attention towards identifying different types of TSOs based on their contracting 
behaviour. It is not clear as to whether there are a collection of divergent 
organisations which provide a service better (or even different) from the public or 
private sector organisations, and it is even less clear whether TSOs in public service 
contexts are experiencing the same, or similar, impacts from change in their 
environment and quasi-markets.  
 
2.8 Relationships and networks 
With the conceptual problems of definitions and organisational differentiation in 
mind, the second area which has attracted much academic attention is the need to 
understand the relationships (and how these change) between the state and TSOs. 
Whilst there is some overlap with the research themes in group one, the main 
difference in these studies is that the authors tend to focus on individual case 
studies, contexts or specific areas of contracting and use their findings in this way. 
Whereas the research in group one have tended to focus on mapping, 
understanding macro systems or sectors, and generalising amongst TSOs, it is 
argued here that the authors in this group focus on particular contexts or types of 
TSOs.  
 
During the late 1990s and 2000’s a number of academics focussed on the 
relationship between the third sector and the government.  Particular attention has 
been given to the policies of New Labour in the late 1990s and 2000’s ( see Fyfe, 
2005; Haugh and Kitson, 2007). Carmel and Harlock (2008, p.157) contend that over 
the past fifteen years the ‘third sector’ has been ‘instituted’ by the New Labour 
government as a ‘governable terrain’ in order to pursue its policy goal of 
transferring public service delivery to TSOs. Similarly, Haugh and Kitson (2007, 
p973) note that “since 1997, the third sector has received significant government 
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support and has gradually moved from the economic periphery towards the centre 
such that it is now instrumental in the delivery of a range of government policies.” 
Carmel and Harlock (2008) argue that the shift in relationship between the state and 
the third sector was being used in particular to encourage third sector organisations 
to take over the delivery of public services.  
 
Although only briefly discussed here, in this literature there is an occupation with 
understanding the process of reform as a neoliberal agenda. Those focussing on the 
governance arrangements have stressed that the shifting relationship has led to the 
re-labelling of voluntary organisations delivering public services as social 
enterprises (Di Domenico et al., 2009) and the institutionalisation of social enterprise 
in England may be bound up in the privatisation of public services (Haugh & 
Kitson, 2007).  
 
Young (2000), drawing on rational choice economic theory, contends that 
government and non-profit sector relations must be understood as a multilayered 
phenomenon. Young  (2000) contends that there are predominantly three types of 
relationships between the state and the third sector. The first is ‘supplementary’, 
where TSOs deliver a service or are meeting a demand for a public good not met by 
government resources. The second relationship is referred to as ‘complementary’, 
where TSOs are and funded by and partners to government, helping to carry out the 
delivery of services. The third is the adversarial view, where nonprofit organisations 
lobby to effect policy and create change. In this understanding, governments can 
influence TSOs through regulation and responding to initiatives. However, Young’s 
research does not explore how or why organisations move from one type of 




Deakin’s (1996) study of contracting with voluntary organisations in the UK’s 
provision of social care (including health services, social care and local government 
services) focussed on the impact of the introduction of competitive contracting on 
the relationship between the public sector and voluntary sector organisations 
involved in service delivery. Deakin (1996, p.35) noted that voluntary organisations 
involved in social care contracting in the 1990s complained of the, “ever-present risk 
of compromising what are seen as key elements in their overall mission 
(campaigning, and innovation in service delivery).”  
 
Austin (2003) explored the impact of welfare reform policies on service delivery 
agencies in the USA. Focussing on the relationship between the social service 
agency and community based nonprofit organisations involved in service delivery, 
he argues that the pressures for change in the nonprofit sector, “emanate from 
increased competition and government accountability” (p.101). He contends that the 
increased role for nonprofit organisations in the delivery of public services has led 
to these organisations, “pay[ing] more attention to marketing, changing political 
environments, assessing the viability of collaborative programming, and in 
strengthening internal operations” (p.102). His work focuses on the changes to 
relationships in order to identify the impact on organisational change. Likewise, 
other authors have argued that, “the emphasis on competition within the 
government-contracting process threatens nonprofit interorganisational networks” 
(Alexander, Nank, and Stivers, 1999, p, 462).  
 
In the UK context the relationship between the third sector and the state received 
much attention during the time of the previous Labour government. The emphasis 
on the relationship between the state and TSOs brings attention to the way in which 
the expectations of TSOs and the part they play in both society and the economy 
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shifted during the 1990s and 2000’s, particularly in terms of the provision of public 
services. 
 
2.9 Impact of the environment on third sector organisations  
In the existing research which comprises this final group, researchers have sought to 
better understand how contracting environments impact on the way that a TSO is 
organized or managed. A number of authors contend that due to the use of markets 
in provision of public services, delivery organisations are becoming more 
commercially orientated which is leading to the ‘marketisation’ of TSOs. According 
to Dart (2004, p.414) the term marketisation is used to refer to nonprofits becoming 
“more market driven, client driven, self-sufficient, commercial or business like” 
(Dart, 2004, p. 414). Drawing on this definition, McKay et al (2011, p.4) contend that 
this means that TSOs are “adopting the languages, practices and funding 
mechanisms of the private sector”. The authors explain that this may involve the re-
labelling of charitable activity as social entrepreneurship (see Dees, 2007) and a shift 
in TSO funding arrangements, moving from grants and donations to commercial 
revenue.  
 
McKay et al (2011) explore the shift in funding arrangements use a large panel data 
set of registered charities between 2002-2007 in order to ascertain whether ideas 
about marketisation (explicitly the transfer from grant to commercial funding) can 
be empirically supported by their model. They argue that their findings reveal that 
“charities in England and Wales are increasingly dependent on commercial revenue, 
and that this is an inelastic substitute for grants and donations” (p.16). They also 
conclude that charities are succumbing to market forces in England and Wales. 
However, as their study focused exclusively on the funding arrangement, it did not 
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provide support for their earlier statement that TSOs are adopting the characteristics 
of the private sector.  
 
In the US context, Frumkin and Galaskiewicz (2004, p.285) argue that “government 
action, or more generally state intervention, has consistently been conceived as 
playing a central function in initiating the structural transformation of other 
organisations…[and] as legal and regulatory pressures increase, non profit and 
business organisations respond with increasing levels of institutionalized rules and 
procedures.” Some claim that non-profit organisations are being profoundly 
transformed (Juillet et al, 2001, p.22) and some have found that “as the main 
provider of resources to organisations, the government forces them [independent 
providers] to conform to its norms of bureaucratic behaviour…In this way, these 
organisations may even become like governmental agencies themselves, contrary to 
the interests of the Government and the clients” (Schmid, 2003, p.319-320). In their 
study of US nonprofit organisations contracted to provide employment and related 
services to welfare clients, Hasenfeld and Powell (2004) found that contractors were 
placed in difficult task environments which ultimately weakened their autonomy. 
As they point out, “funding requirements, performance evaluation criteria, controls 
over the flow of clients and normative, coercive and mimetic pressures from their 
organisational network converge to limit the capability of these agencies to fully 
exercise their distinct set of values, organisational capabilities, and service 
practices”(p.109).   
 
Juillet et al’s (2001) study of eight national non-profit organisations in Canada 
concluded that there was evidence of increased professionalization and 
bureaucratization but no substantial changes in the board and governance of the 
organisations and that there were less dramatic shifts in operations than anticipated. 
In this study, organisational change did not indicate that organisations were 
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crossing or merging sectoral boundaries. However, using 200 interviews with 
leaders of nonprofit organisations in the San Francisco Bay Area, Suarez (2011, 
p.308) argued that the implementation of standard management strategies for 
achieving a mission is increasingly relevant for procuring government grants and 
contracts. He contends that “nonprofits that rely on paid staff for service 
implementation and nonprofits that partner with multiple agencies are more likely 
to receive government funding, and nonprofits that collaborate also are likely to 
receive greater amounts of government funding” (p.308). Suarez’s research 
suggested that those organisations which acquired resources did employ behaviour 
more akin to the contractual environment. Therefore organisational survival in this 
context may have required the transformation of internal TSO processes.  
 
However, in the UK there is little research which specifically considers how TSOs 
are becoming more ‘marketised’ over time and similarly even less which consider 
the process of organisational change in the context of welfare reforms. Some 
academic literature seeks to address the issues of the impact of markets on TSOs 
through adopting what is considered here as a ‘shallow’ approach. Aiken and Bode 
(2009) wrote one of the few existing articles on the role of TSOs in the UK welfare-
to-work context. Through a comparative study of UK and German organisational 
arrangements for the delivery of employment support, they argued that “the 
emerging managerialist partnership structures are tending to convert third sector 
organisations into ‘just in time’ deliverers” (p.209). They contend that this is due to a 
shift in the policy context for employment support, whereby contractualist 
approaches to policy delivery influence and change the activities of TSOs involved 
in the provision of support.  
 
Whilst Aiken and Bode predominately discuss the field-level organizing of TSOs 
within the welfare-to-work quasi-markets in the UK and Germany, they also present 
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two organisational case studies, one from each country, to illustrate their 
arguments. Their UK case study described how one organisation’s activities had 
been influenced by the introduction of managerialist practices in employment 
support programmes. They found that the organisation had experienced a number 
of changes including a diversification of activities and a move towards placing 
individuals in the labour market in a shorter timescale than their mission and 
previous activities intended. Aiken and Bode (2009, p.219) argued that the 
organisation faced pressures to become a ‘creaming organisation’ as the 
requirement to meet contract targets reduced the services provided to those 
requiring long term support. Thus, they argued that the use of TSOs in 
contractualist modes of delivery can create tensions at the organisational level 
between the desire to meet contract obligations, and the organisation’s mission and 
ethos to provide support for all who need it.  
 
Although Aiken and Bode (2009) use a case study approach to describe the impact 
of reforms on a TSO, their article provides only a limited view of the processes 
involved in organisational change as it neglects the how and why questions. 
Arguably, as it does not cover an extended time frame, it only provides a superficial 
descriptive account of change within their case organisation. Whilst their findings 
provide some indication of the impact of welfare reforms on TSOs, it arguably 
provides only a ‘shallow account’ based on a limited number of interviews with 
employees at one point in time. As such it is not able to provide details on the extent 
of change within the organisation in terms of structure, culture and activities which 
would provide a more detailed exploratory understanding of the extent of 
organisational change and the relationship with the contractualist approach to 
welfare delivery. It does not provide much detail on the processes of organisational 
change over an extended period of time, and it only provides limited evidence that 
welfare-to-work contracting is, as they contend, “killing the golden goose” (p.220).  
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2.10 Mission drift 
Critics of government contracting more broadly often express concern that TSOs 
compromise their original service mission in the process of responding to 
government priorities (see Flynn, 1996; Lewis, 1996; Scott and Russell, 2001; 
Macmillan, 2010). ‘Mission drift’ is one of the most popular concerns in the 
literature on how TSOs may change due to their policy context. The idea of ‘mission 
drift’ is often linked to Weisbrod (2004) who argued that if TSOs (as he termed 
nonprofits) were involved in commercial activities it would lead to a diversion of 
their time, energy, and money away from their core mission. Weisbrod (1998) also 
argued that TSOs guided by flexible mission statements are particularly susceptible 
to drifting from their core services when financially appealing projects arise. This is 
because TSOs may be attracted to financially stable yet politically neutral projects 
which deliver direct services rather than projects that deliver or advocate social 
change and alternative practices, as outlined in their mission statements.  Even if a 
TSO’s goals are compatible with those of government, Lipsky and Smith (1989) 
argued that contracting requirements may alter TSOs’ approaches to services and 
clients: “in essence, they may be forced to conform to standards imposed by 
contracting policy at the expense of their home grown notions of what constitutes 
effective service delivery” (p.638).  
 
Despite the popularity of the idea of ‘mission drift’ in TSO research, it is somewhat 
contested. Sommerfeld and Reisch’s (2003, p.312) study of 90 US nonprofit 
organisations found that, “nearly all respondents remarked on how their agencies’ 
programs have become more outcome-based, although their overall mission has not 
changed”. Similarly, according to a study by Chavez et al (2004) government 
funding has no negative affect on non-profit political activity and organisations with 
government contracts do not necessarily become politically neutral and lose their 
commitment to a distinctive mission. Others have noted that what may be termed 
‘mission drift’ may in fact be a resource diversification strategy (see Froelich, 1999).  
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Macmillan (2010, p.22) provides a comprehensive coverage of the issue in UK TSO 
research. After mapping the findings on ‘mission drift’ from the small number of 
academic articles on TSOs involved in public service contexts he argues that the 
research findings on ‘mission drift’ are “ambiguous and even contradictory” (p.21). 
He notes that whilst respondents in some studies have expressed concern about 
‘mission drift’ (Packwood, 2007, Rees, 2008), other studies have found that a flexible 
mission might be desirable and more sustainable for TSOs (Bennett, 2008). Whilst 
Cairns et al (2005) contend that ‘mission drift’ exists, Chew and Osborne (2009) claim 
that TSOs may demonstrate flexibility in organisational structures and operations 
but missions remain essentially unchanged over time. After reviewing the limited 
amount of evidence Macmillan (2010, p.23) contends that, “in the absence of focused 
empirical research on the maintenance or elasticity of third sector organisation 
missions over time, we are left with some concern about the potential for mission 
drift, but no clear indication of its prevalence or the causes and consequences of 
drift.” In fact, whilst the issue is the subject of much research in the US, there is very 
little research in a UK context which provides a detailed exploration of ‘mission 
drift’ and the relation with public sector contracting quasi-markets.  
 
In terms of public service contracting much attention has been given to the impact 
on TSOs, particularly in terms of how TSOs organize their activities, manage and 
deliver services, and whether these shifts in organisation demonstrate mission-drift, 
support concepts of marketisation, and demonstrate that third sector as a whole is 
becoming increasingly polarised in terms of those organisations which transform in 
this way, and those which do not. Whilst there is much existing research on this 
topic, findings are varied, often contested, and conceptual definitions differ widely. 
As such, transferring the findings from other policy contexts and types of TSOs onto 
the welfare-to-work context has some limitations, although without further 
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empirical research into TSOs in welfare-to-work contracting in the UK, there is little 
other research to draw on.  
 
2.11 Organisational change in third sector organisations  
It is worth noting that thus far, this review has predominately drawn on literature 
from the public administration field. Whilst welfare reforms have predominately 
attracted the attention of social and political policy theorists and researchers, the 
marketisation of the third sector has also attracted business and management scholars 
turning their attention to analysis of how TSOs adapt to their new commercial 
environment (Dey and Steyaert, 2010). As Fernandez and Rainey (2006, p.168) note, 
“articles reporting research and theory with titles containing ‘organisational change’ 
and with that theme as a focal topic, appear with much less regularity in public 
administration journals than in research journals focusing on general management 
and organisation theory”. Within the context of this review undertaken here, this 
point remains apt in regards to public sector contracting studies. Whilst the 
previously discussed literature on welfare-to-work programmes and TSOs was 
predominately undertaken by those involved in public administration departments 
and published in associated journals, empirical research into organisational change 
and related theories and approaches to its study remain rooted in approaches more 
akin with business and management doctrines.  
The discussion of this area of literature is framed by drawing on the work of 
Parsons (1960, p.105) who argued that organisations tend to become differentiated 
vertically into three (somewhat) distinctive levels or layers:  
“The technical level, that part of the organisation carrying on the production 
function that transforms inputs into outputs; the managerial level, that part 
of the organisation responsible for designing and controlling the production 
system; and the institutional level, that part of the organisation that relates 
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the organisation to its wider environment, determines its domain, establishes 
its boundaries, secures its legitimacy.”  
 
This idea is used in order to further understand the way in which the existing 
literature conceptualises, measures and presents research findings on TSO 
organisational change in public service contracting. Drawing on the three 
distinctions by Parsons (1960) it is demonstrated below that business and 
management research in the context of public service contracting has tended to 
focus on the technical and managerial levels of TSO involvement, rather than the 
institutional approach. At the managerial level the literature reviewed had a 
tendency to advise employees of TSOs how to avoid dependence on grants and 
donations by increasing their share of commercial revenue and become more 
efficient through the imposition of market discipline (see for example Dees et al, 
2001). At the technical level, research has focused on the implementation of 
management techniques in service delivery situations or the training of front-line 
employees. Again, there is an empirical gap in research at the institutional level and 
limited literature which explores the impact of public service quasi-market 
environments on organisational change.  
 
In terms of the managerial level, a vast amount of literature on organisational 
change exists from management based academics , the majority of which appears to 
adopt a normative approach to understanding organisational change. The dominant 
approach identifies how an organisation has changed, whether this was a positive 
or negative change process, how this can be enacted in other organisations and what 
is ‘best practice’ (see Carnochan and Austin, 2002). The premise of these studies is to 
demonstrate to managers how to enact organisational change. This literature 
contends that  managers should undertake a sequential process of change, based on 
‘best practice’, replace the status quo with the implementation of a change 
programme, and complete the change process by fusing the changes into the new 
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organisation. Research adopting this approach often involves multi-phase models 
which agents within organisations can follow in order to implement change (see 
Kotter 1995; Galpin 1996). As such, it appears that often these studies draw on the 
work of Lewin (1947) and his model of change based on an idea whereby the 
organisation experiences unfreezing, changing, and refreezing (see Armenakis and 
Bedeian, 1999).  
 
Research findings from these studies tend to present a ‘how to’ approach when 
discussing their understanding of organisational change in service delivery 
organisations. Arguably this approach to organisational change is viewed as a 
rational, linear process which can be effectively managed by following a prescribed 
checklist. For example, Kanter et al (1992), discuss organisational change in terms of 
leadership and planned change and provide checklists for readers to follow and 
implement. In terms of welfare reform this approach has been used by Carnochan 
and Austin (2002) who produced a ‘management note’, published in a journal aimed 
at social work managers. The piece discussed their exploratory study on the impact 
of US welfare reform on internal operations of delivery organisations, focussing on 
human resources (job redesign and expanded training); fiscal and information 
systems (performance-based budgeting and outcome assessment); and community 
partnerships (p.62). Their study focused on the experiences of ten service directors 
and sought to identify a set of perceptions and impressions on the implementation 
processes.  
 
Their findings highlighted a number of issues. Firstly, directors identified a need to 
change the culture of their organisations, moving from what the authors describe as 
an ‘insular bureaucratic organisation’ to ‘an open community based agency’ (p.64). 
The respondents discussed a resistance to change from some employees and 
identified the tactic used by managers to reduce resistance, such as staff training 
 69 
and coaching programmes. They also found that respondents noted difficulties with 
organisational departmental restructuring, increased community involvement in 
service design, and service integration. The authors put forward the ‘lessons 
learned’ by their directors in a section aimed at other mangers experiencing similar 
change processes (see p.71). Whilst this is a useful study as it is one of the few which 
have sought to gain information about the implementation of change processes in 
delivery organisations to meet the needs of reform policies, due to this management 
implementation approach, the study has its limitations in understanding the 
institutional environment.  
 
Instead of focussing on the institutional environment, or researching the policy 
process and change, these studies focus on implementing change and the way in 
which this occurs in public service delivery organisations. For example, adopting a 
‘practice-oriented’ research approach, Jager and Beyes (2010) used a longitudinal 
case study of a cooperative bank in Switzerland to explore the interplay between 
mission focus and commercial activities. They focussed on the internal processes 
which organisations experience when enacting change, in particular the process of 
how strategic change is translated into organisational action. To conduct strategic 
management research they used a ‘practice-perspective’ which focuses on how 
people go about the process of making strategy. Their work produced a “thick 
description of how strategy-as practice ‘works’” (Jager and Beyes, 2010, p.85). 
Through using this approach the research seeks to produce findings which can be 
used by managers and those directing internal organisational change to improve the 
change process. As such, over the past twenty years a notable amount of research 
has been published on the implementation of change and the strategic management 
of change in public service delivery organisations (from both the public and third 
sector). For example, popular topics include managers’ business planning processes 
and change management in NHS reforms (such as Currie, 1999; Learmonth, 2003; 
Hoque et al, 2004; Carney, 2006); the changing nature of managers’ jobs and 
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management effectiveness in the public sector (Worrall et al, 2000; Bamford and 
Daniel, 2005;); and performance management in public services (Ballantine et al, 
1998; Holloway et al, 1999; Butterfield et al, 2004).    
 
Dominant themes have occurred in the literature which builds on this approach. In 
particular, ideas of the ‘Learning Organisation’ (Senge, 1990; Pedler, Burgoyne and 
Boydell, 1991) and ‘strategic management’ (Chew, 2006).  As Ferlie (1992) argues, 
the reforms of the public sector have led to an increase in managerialism and an 
emphasis on strategies to achieve organisational change. From the perspective of 
strategic management, the “public sector management needs to move out of its 
public administration tradition to engage with quite different questions of market 
structure and process” (Ferlie, 1992 p.90). Echoing the earlier discussion on ‘mission 
drift,’ Austin (2003, p.107) argues that the, “strategic management in the nonprofit 
arena involves the challenge of maintaining ‘a distinctive sense of organisational 
mission’ that binds all stakeholders together. The internal and external tensions 
need to be managed in such a way as to ensure that new resources/contracts do not 
distort the historical values and priorities of the organisation”. There is some 
research from the strategic management perspective that acknowledges the 
institutional heritage of the TSO in regards to the implementation of change 
processes in public service market contexts. 
 
The underlying assumption is that managers and actors can plan and control the 
way an organisation changes, that planned changed is good and that organisations 
which change in a way which is detrimental do so because of poorly planned 
change. Whilst this is a simplified discussion of the position of these studies, it 
demonstrates that due to the position of the researcher and the anticipated outcome 
of the findings (i.e. to provide advice on the linear process) there is little emphasis 
on the impact of the wider environment. 
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2.12 Methodological approach to researching TSOs in public service 
markets 
The existing literature into the involvement of delivery organisations in public 
service markets has been undertaken in three main ways. First, document analysis is 
the dominant research strategy in the literature which provides a policy 
commentary on the change to TSO funding, political support, and contractualism 
(such as Finn, 2007; Davis 2008). Second, one of the most popular approaches is to 
undertake a small survey of key respondents from TSOs to explore a particular 
contracting issue. For example Martikki (2008, quoted in Macmillan, 2010) used the 
findings from 20 VSOs to investigate contract success and relationships. 
Cunningham’s (2008) study of 24 VSOs providing social services in Scotland 
investigates pay and conditions in contracted services. He identified three types of 
organisations from his study in terms of their management of employment 
conditions. Sommerfeld and Reisch (2003) undertook a survey of 90 nonprofits 
involved in the delivery of welfare services in the USA. They analysed their 
changing services, staffing, and budgets over a four year period from 1996-2000. 
Their study sought to assess the extent to which there was a relationship between 
these changes and welfare reform. They found that welfare reform programmes 
provided opportunities for organisational growth for nonprofit organisations. 
However, their respondents felt that organisational change (particularly increases in 
staffing responsibilities and pressures) attributed to welfare reform programmes, 
“encouraged organisations to resemble businesses” (p.306). The third approach is to 
use a large survey of organisations. These studies attempt to provide data on the 
sector as a whole, or use their findings to create typologies of organisations 
operating in particular service markets. For example, Bennett (2008) conducted a 
survey of 246 large service providers.  
 
Where case studies have been used in management doctrines they have focused on 
the internal and technical processes of implementing change without a wider 
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consideration of the institutional level, or the interaction with the environment (see 
Austin and Carnochan, 2002). Public administration research has only used cases 
studies as part of a comparative case study approach (see Cairns et al, 2005).   
 
2.13 Research questions  
Whilst the existing literature on the role of TSOs in public service contracting is vast, 
there are a number of limitations in applying this to the welfare-to-work context. 
First, the literature which seeks to identify and type TSOs demonstrates that there 
are a range of diverse organisations involved in public sector contracting. 
Furthermore, the exact numbers, organisational characteristics and types of 
relationships are not well known. This means that whilst research examining TSO 
involvement in public service contracting has highlighted a number of issues, such 
as mission-drift, contracting difficulties, and the professionalization of staff, these 
findings are not applicable to the whole of the third sector as many organisations 
did not experience these issues, nor share the same organisational qualities which 
have been affected in others. Furthermore, whilst the US examples do provide some 
information on what the impact of contracting might be on TSOs, it is limited in its 
transferability due to the different societal roles and types of TSOs historically in the 
provision of welfare services (see Smyth 1997).  
 
Second, there is very little existing research which has focussed on the impact of 
quasi-markets on whole organisations over time. Instead the dominant approach 
has involved surveys or questionnaires of a range of organisations at a specific point 
in time to understand their opinion on the impact of their environment. Whilst these 
studies do provide some indication of the issues affecting a sample of the sector as a 
whole at a specific point in time, they do not provide the detail into the impact of 
their environment and the processes involved. In short, they do not address the 
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‘how’ questions. Finally, the largest problem with the existing literature in terms of 
welfare-to-work is that, as Macmillan (2010) notes, there is little research which 
specifically focuses on the role of TSOs in the UK welfare-to-work quasi-market and 
how these organisations adapt and operate within this setting.  
 
As such, it appears from the literature review that a well-executed detailed case 
study of a TSO in the welfare-to-work context would provide knowledge on an area 
of public policy reform which is, as yet, somewhat unknown. In order to understand 
how the TSO has changed over time, and how these changes impacted on core 
aspects of the organisation, the following research questions are suggested:  
 
Research question one: How and why has Albase’s core activity (the delivery of ILM 
programmes) changed and adapted to the introduction of competitive contracting into the 
organisational field? 
 
Research question two: To what extent has the introduction of a competitive contracting 
environment affected organisational change (structure, culture, ways of organizing) in 
Albase? 
 
2.14  Summary  
This chapter has outlined the existing literature on TSOs in welfare-to-work 
contracting and in public sector contracting more broadly. It appears that whilst the 
third sector is well studied, the existing knowledge on the role of TSOs in the 
delivery of public services is limited, particularly in the context of the UK welfare-
to-work market. From the literature reviewed there is evidence that TSOs are active 
in welfare-to-work contracting, but the extent to how much, and how this has 
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changed over time is unclear. The grey literature from this policy context suggests 
not only that TSOs are heavily involved in the delivery of welfare services but also 
that this involvement has been affected by changes to welfare-to-work contracting 
over time. However, out with the DWP’s market evaluation documents from the 
FND, it is unclear as to what types of organisations are involved, in which aspects of 
welfare-to-work contracting, and how indeed this has changed over the past ten 
years. This is clearly one area which those researchers who focused on the 
‘landscape of the third sector’ have identified and in some cases sought to address, 
although there are parallel debates regarding the characteristics, categories and 
types of organisations involved in public service contracting which increases the 
complexity of mapping and measuring activity.  
 
The literature on welfare-to-work policies has also demonstrated that in terms of 
comparative and policy level research there is little differentiation between external 
providers and the impact they have, as delivery organisations, on the delivery of 
welfare-to-work policies. Whilst there is limited knowledge on this area of the 
market and the organisations involved in delivering welfare services, a large 
amount of welfare to work literature from this camp contends that the market 
mechanisms encourage providers to employ ‘gaming behaviour.’  This subject 
occupied most of the literature on welfare to work in the early 2000s and whilst the 
empirical evidence for this is again somewhat limited, there is a well-held 
assumption that market mechanisms encourage acts such as creaming and parking 
of jobseekers. If this is the case, further information is needed on how this process 
occurs within organisations and what impact such practices have on the 
management of contracts held by TSOs. As noted, many hold the assumption that 
the benefit of contracting to TSOs is that they do not have this imperative unlike 
private sector organisations. However this conflict with those who contend that 
gaming is a rational outcome of performance based outcomes, which suggest that it 
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is characteristic of the context, rather than the organisation. Again, this issue has not 
been explored in terms of the UK welfare-to-work market. 
 
This chapter has also noted that many researchers have focussed on the relationship 
between the state and third sector organisations in quasi-market arrangements, and 
evaluated the shifting ways of communicating, working, and delivering social 
service programmes. This has tended to involve case studies and small-n studies in 
comparison to other research areas which have focussed on sector level surveying or 
a small number of interviews with senior employees in a range of organisations. 
Across the board it appears that there a number of research areas in welfare-to-work 
contracting that are lacking in detail and evidence, none more prevalent than the 
role of TSOs and the impact of welfare-to-work quasi-market rules and regulations 
on their activities, behaviour and organisational change. The impact of quasi-market 
arrangements (both positive and negative) on TSO characteristics is as yet 
unknown. From the research in other areas (although with the caveat that there are 
various types and histories to these organisations, and there are different policy and 
contracting contexts) there is a suggestion that TSOs may experience ‘marketisation’ 
whereby internal structures such as their HR recruiting process, the way they 
organize daily tasks, their priority of outcomes, and their mission led activities, 
could be affected by involvement in a quasi-market contracting system. Some have 
suggested that TSOs will experience isomorphic behaviour, leading them to look 
more like private or public sector organisations, whilst others have suggested that 
TSOs may shift to meet the needs of the market due to their reliance on these 
resources, and as such lose their independence, ability to advocate for their service 
users, and increase their vulnerability at the same time. Others have suggested that 
the involvement in quasi-markets provides positive outcomes for TSOs as they 
develop key contract and bargaining skills in market contexts which could increase 
their future resource opportunities and improve their innovation and productivity. 
These findings leave a number of questions for research into the involvement of 
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TSOs in the welfare-to-work context, in particular the impact of welfare-to-work 
contracting on organisational change. 
 
Whilst this research provides some knowledge on understanding organisational 
change in TSOs, it was clear that the context of the quasi-market was not often cited. 
Instead there is a growing trend towards research in this setting which seeks to 
explain organisational change through institutional theories and ideas of 
isomorphism. Instead of change being associated with economic decision making, 
or simply resource dependency problems, this research has suggested that 
organisations experience normative, regulative and competitive pressures which 
affect the way they behave, organize, and ultimately change, depending on their 
context and wider environment and their organisational field. In sum, further 
knowledge is required on the TSOs in the welfare-to-work context, in particular 
there is a need for more detailed research into the involvement of TSOs in the 
delivery of employment services, the interaction with the environment and quasi-
market setting, and the way in which this affects the change process.  
C HAP TER  3  -  THE ORE TI CAL  
FR AME WO R K  
 
This chapter introduces the theoretical approach used for exploring the 
organisational change experienced by Albase.  It was stated in the literature review 
that there is little known about welfare-to-work contracting and the way Third 
Sector Organisations (TSOs) change in response to the introduction of contracting-
out approaches to public service delivery. As such it was argued that a detailed 
exploratory case study would be beneficial. Furthermore, it was suggested that in 
order to understand change and the impact of an environment on an organisation 
the exploratory case study would need to consider organisational change at the 
institutional level. In the process of understanding change over time in Albase this 
chapter proposes an exploratory theoretical framework and adopts an “adaptational 
mechanism” approach which assumes that organisations change due to their 
adaptive responses to changes in their environment (Barnett and Carroll, 1995, 
p.217). Theories typically placed in the adaptational camp include resource 
dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, Burt, 1983), institutional theory 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and transaction cost 
economics (Williamson 1975, 1985). Guided by the theoretical discussions the final 
section of this chapter provides a table outlining how the framework was put into 
practice.  
 
To study organisational change in the welfare-to-work context this research adopts 
an “adaptational mechanism” (Barnett and Carroll, 1995, p.217) approach which 
explores a number of competing hypothesis to potentially explain organisational 
change. It is not a theory testing thesis, and it does not seek to generate theory from 
its findings (generalizability and the case study strategy is discussed in more detail 
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in chapter four). The purpose of this theoretical approach is to identify 
organisational change and explore the reasons for change. The aim is to better 
understand whether TSO organisational change can be explained by any of, or a 
combination of, the theories put forward in the framework. It is the intention that 
due to the limitations of the existing literature this approach may assist the 
facilitation of future research into organisational change in the welfare-to-work 
quasi-market.  
 
The reason for the three theories put forward is outlined in detail later in the 
chapter. In short, much research into organisational change and environmental 
pressures adopts a neoinstitutional perspective that focuses on how organisations 
change due to the social framework of norms, values, and assumptions about what 
constitutes appropriate behaviour in their field. This is a popular theoretical 
approach for exploring organisational change, although there is little published 
research on third sector organisational change through this lens. More common in 
explaining change in third sector research is resource dependency theory (RDT). 
According to this work, organisations change in order to access and maintain 
resources in their environment. This theory contends that by changing to the 
demands of the resource provider TSOs can become dependent and lose autonomy 
and power in their own decision making. RDT theorists have argued that TSOs 
experience change due to the demands from their funders, or as part of an effort to 
diversify their resources to reduce dependency and increase their power in 
exchange relationships. Finally, as outlined in chapter two, much of the research on 
the welfare-to-work quasi-market has used an economic perspective to understand 
how delivery organisations make decisions about service provision, therefore 
neoinstitutional economics (in particular transaction cost theory) has been put 
forward alongside the other two theoretical approaches as a theoretical position for 
understanding organisational change in the context studied here. 
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Before discussing the theoretical framework employed for the analysis of the 
empirical findings, the following section presents the ontological position and the 
key concepts of this research; what is meant by organisational change and how will 
this be measured? 
 
3.1 Organisational change 
The need to understand and research organisational change has a long tradition 
within the social sciences (see Weick and Quinn, 1999). Debates in organisational 
research centre upon two main issues: how to study organisations and how to 
conceptualise and adopt research methods to study organisational change. These 
debates have tended to position organisational theorists and researchers in two 
distinctive groups based upon an ontological distinction about the essential nature 
of organisations. The distinction, according to Tsoukas (2005), reflects the two 
versions of the social world: one, a world made of things in which processes 
represent change in things (social entities); the other, a world of processes in which 
things are reifications of processes (social processes). The choice of research 
methods is directly linked to how the researcher conceptualises their understanding 
of both, “organisation” and “change”.   
 
I. What is understood by ‘organisation’? 
II. What is understood by ‘change’? 
III. How can the relationship between Albase and the welfare-to-work market be 
framed and conceptualised? 
 
The research strategy is underpinned by the conceptualisation of three main areas, 
the first two are linked to Tsoukas two versions of the social world (organisation 
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and change), whilst the third question draws on a concept from institutional theory- 
the ‘organisation field’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
 
There is some debate in organisation studies regarding the definition of 
organisations. Tsoukas (2005) distinguishes between organisations as nouns, or 
verbs.  Van de Ven and Poole (2005, p.1379) illustrate this point through the 
following quote: 
 
“Process is fundamental: The river is not an object but an ever changing flow; 
the sun is not a thing, but a flaming fire. Everything in nature is a matter of 
process, of activity, of change” (Rescher, 1996, p.10, quoted in Van de Ven 
and Poole, 2005, p.1379). 
 
However, Whetten (2006) argues that organisations should be studied as nouns 
(social entities), rather than as verbs (social processes) in order to focus on concepts 
such as identity, structure, culture, and performance. This debate is detailed and 
complex and whilst there are arguably two ‘camps’ of scholars conceptualising what 
an organisation is, and therefore how it should be measured, they are not mutually 
exclusive camps. In this thesis the view adopted is somewhat on the middle ground 
of these discussions. It is accepted that organisations are made of processes and 
constantly ‘in flux.’  
 
However, in order to discuss organisational change it is necessary to discuss 
organisations as tangible objects of study, as nouns. By doing so, this thesis is able to 
draw on the most commonly used definition for organisations used by 
neoinstitutional scholars provided by North (1990) who uses a social entity 
approach to distinguish between institutions and organisations. North considers 
institutions as the "rules of the game," consisting of both the formal legal rules and 
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the informal social norms that govern individual behaviour and structure social 
interactions (institutional frameworks). Organisations, are those groups of people 
and the governance arrangements they create to coordinate their team action against 
other teams performing also as organisations. As such, organisations can be 
conceptualised and formed into an object of study.  
 
3.2 Conceptualising change 
In organisational studies the distinction between viewing organisations as nouns or 
verbs is accompanied by an epistemological debate of organisational change. 
According to Poole et al (2000) the noun/process distinction leads to two definitions 
of change. The first displays observed differences over time in an organisational 
entity on selected dimensions (variance theory). The second produces a narrative 
describing a sequence of events on how development and change unfold (process 
theory). This distinction was originally introduced by Mohr (1982), who argued that 
where variance theories explain phenomena in terms of the relationship between 
and among dependent and independent variables, process theories provide 
explanations in terms of patterns of events, activities, and choices over time.  
 
From the process theory perspective it is presupposed that an organisation is 
comprised of a set of processes that maintain the organisation by continuously 
breaking down the organisation and its boundaries. Change (or on the other hand 
stability) are considered not as real things, but as judgements because, “the 
organisation is a process that is continuously being constituted and reconstituted” 
(Rescher, 1996). Therefore, adopting a process theory perspective means that the 
researcher considers change as a basic constituent of organisations- in some way a 
main characteristic of all organisations. Key characteristics of process studies (see 
Pettigrew et al, 2001) have tended to incorporate several different types of effects 
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into their explanations, including critical events and turning points, contextual 
influence; formative patterns that give overall direction to the change, and causal 
factors that influence the sequencing of events (Van de Ven and Poole, 2005, p.1384). 
As a result, sequence and ordering become critical for producing outcomes such as 
links between an event (change action or critical juncture) at a particular time, and 
information and understanding on who was involved and what happened next.  
 
Unlike the process approach, “variance methods seek explanations of continuous 
change driven by deterministic causation, using independent variables acting upon 
and causing changes in dependent variables” (Van de Ven and Poole, 2005, p.1381). 
As such some academics argue that variance research, with its focus on the 
conditions necessary to bring about an outcome, is more able to contribute to wider 
theory making and generality. The focus would be less on the process of change and 
more on the content and outcome of change and according to Van de Ven and Poole 
(2005) variance methods have tended to dominate studies of organisational change, 
particularly in studies investigating differences in innovation and entrepreneurship 
(see Kanter, 1984; Hosking and Anderson, 1992; Ferlie et al, 2005), an area which this 
research has some relevance. Despite its dominance in organisational research, 
critics of the variance approach argue that the deterministic nature has serious 
limitations to understanding the nuances and details of organisational change. It is 
argued that this is because the variance approach does not give enough 
consideration to the aspects of the change process and the way in which change 
occur (Van de Ven and Poole, 2005).  However, these approaches do not have to be 
mutually exclusive, particularly in situations such as this where there is little known 
about the policy context. Whilst variance methods have been strongly associated 
with statistical analyses it is anticipated that the detailed exploratory findings of this 
research project could at a future date prove useful for researchers attempting to 
adopt a variance approach to understanding change within the welfare-to-work 
context or other public service quasi-markets. 
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3.3 A weak versus strong approach? 
Within the ‘process’ literature debates continue regarding the ontological position of 
research into organisations and change. Within these debates this research could be 
considered as conforming to a ‘weak’ process view. According to Langley (2009, p.3-
4) this is because emphasis is placed on the change and development of existing 
structures, as opposed to the ‘strong’ process ontology, “which is grounded in the 
thinking of process philosophers such as Bergson (1946) and James (1996), where 
things are considered to be subordinated to and constituted by process (Chia and 
Langley, 2004; Van de Ven and Poole, 2005)”. These two views are linked to the 
earlier ontological debates regarding whether organisations are viewed as entities or 
processes. For example, while adherent of the weak process view might look at 
organisational change in terms of movement from one state to another, a strong 
view would look at change in terms of the ongoing microprocesses that contribute 
to constituting and reproducing the organisation as a stable entity (Tsoukas and 
Chia, 2002).  
 
In practice empirical researchers often exhibit varying degrees of hybridity between 
variance and process research as is the case here. Researchers collect process-
oriented data about temporally evolving phenomena, but end by generating 
variance-based theoretical formulations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ferlie et al; 2005; Maitlis, 
2005). Chia and Langley (2004) also state that often in organisational research, “it is 
very tempting to reduce them to “things” that can be described as variables (e.g. 
decision processes are more or less “rational”, more or less “political,” more or less 
bureaucratic”), or as static states that can be compared” (Chia and Langley, 2004). In 
this respect this thesis is no different. The data is qualitative and longitudinal but 
the theorizing derived from it may not always be processual in the sense of deriving 
temporally ordered explanations (Langley, 1999). Due to the complexities of data 
reduction and practicalities of drawing and verifying conclusions from a large 
quantity of qualitative data, there was a tendency to conclude by identifying or 
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presenting outcomes which could have developed into comparable themes. The 
reduction of processes to tangible variables or moments in time was also a necessary 
part of the writing up and presentation process and difficult to avoid in the 
production of the PhD thesis where the complexity of multiple policy and 
organisational change processes was difficult to articulate. 
 
In sum, Van de Ven and Poole (2005) developed four approaches to studying 
organisational change taking into account the epistemological and ontological 
positions outlined above. The four approaches, visible in Table 3.1, result from the 
aforementioned distinctions between the ontology of organisations as consisting of 
things or processes, and epistemologies of variance or process methods for studying 
organisational change.  
 
Table 3.1: A typology of approaches for studying organisational 
change. 
Source: Van de Ven and Poole, 2005, p.1387 
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The thesis explored the process of change and the influence of the external 
environment. Using Tsoukas (2005) definition of strong and weak process research, 
this approach would fall into the weak category, placing priority on substance over 
process. Using this typology of understanding organisational change, the approach 
that is most akin to this research strategy is Approach I, although the thesis also 
incorporates a narrating approach based on the identification of phases of 
organisational change in Albase. Measuring organisational change in Albase 
involved the identification of a number of organisational characteristics which were 
considered to collectively determine that changes had occurred, although as 
previously mentioned there is an acceptance that all organisations are continually 
changing. As such, the purpose of the indicators is to demonstrate whether changes 
appear to be greater or more different than the established (and continual) processes 
which collectively make-up Albase. The indicators were determined based on 
studies from the literature review and from the theoretical approaches discussed in 
more detail later in this chapter. A measurement for change was based on: size 
(number of employees, financial income,); activities (types of employment support 
offered; range of activities and policy contexts); structure (type and size of 
departments, ways of organizing), and culture (mission, employment processes, 
image) (Barnett and Carroll, 1995).  
   
This section has presented the ontological and epistemological position and outlined 
how this translated into how change was conceptualised and measured. In sum, it 
has outlined that the organisation, Albase, is viewed as an entity which can change 
over time. It is acknowledged that there are continual processes of change occurring 
within the entity and when changes are identified in the empirical chapters, they are 
discussed in a narrative way in order to explain how these changes have come 
about. However, the variance method is also employed in order to suggest lineages 
with events and variables within Albase’s environment.  
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The theoretical framework employed draws on organisational theory and as 
outlined in the previous chapter, aims to fill the gap in empirical research which 
focuses on the institutional level of organisations and the interaction with their 
environment. The intention is that by using the concept of the organisational field 
this can be achieved. 
 
Scott (2008, p.179) states that “organisations are major actors in modern society, but 
to understand their broader significance, it is necessary to see their role as players in 
larger networks and systems”.  Drawing on DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Scott 
(2008, p.181), contends that the concept of the field usefully incorporates important 
previous levels of analysis employed in organisation studies, including individual 
organisations, organisation sets, and organisation populations. It includes: 
 
 A diverse array of organisations working within a given arena or domain; 
 Attention not only to producer organisations, but to their exchange partners, 
customers, competitors, intermediary actors, regulators, and funding agents- 
their organisation set; and 
 Recognition that organisations are particularly attentive to and influenced by 
the existence of organisations exhibiting the same general features and 
competing for the same resources- their organisation population 
 
According to (Scott, 2008) prior to this for many years the passive framing of “the 
environment” led investigators to envisage a random collection of resources and 
other organisations that might be of use (or a threat). Within organisation theory the 
concept of organisation field is associated with authors working in institutional 
theory that saw the interaction of units within the environment as something more 
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than a random collection of activities. DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.148) defined 
the organisation field as, “those organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute a 
recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, 
regulatory agencies, and other organisations that produce similar services or 
products.” Their conception places an emphasis on “the totality of relevant actors” 
and not simply to competing firms or networks. As DiMaggio (1986, p.337) asserts, 
“the organisation field has emerged as a critical unit bridging the organisational and 
the societal levels in the study of social and community change.” The field concept 
fulfils a vital role in connecting organisation studies to wider, macrostructures- 
sectoral, societal, and transnational.  
 
Influential to the development of the idea of the organisation field was the work of 
Bourdieu (1971, 1984), who employed the concept of field to refer “to both the 
totality of actors and organisations involved in an arena of social or cultural 
production and the dynamic relationships among them” (DiMaggio, 1979, p.1463). 
Bourdieu suggests that, “to think in terms of field is to think relationally” (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992:96; italics original), and he employs the analogy of a game with 
rules, players, stakes, competition, and contestation, to depict its central features 
(Swartz, 1998). According to Scott (2008, p.183), “for Bourdieu, fields are not settled 
social spaces, but arenas of conflict in which all players seek to advance their 
interests; some are able, for longer or shorter periods, to impose their conception of 
‘the rules of the game’ on others”.  
 
Scott (2008) states that fields are institutionally defined and the process of 
institutional definition, or ‘structuration’, consists of four parts: an increase in the 
extent of interaction among organisations in the field; the emergence of sharply 
defined interorganisational structures of domination and patterns of coalition; an 
increase in the information load with which organisations in a field must contend; 
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and the development of a mutual awareness among participants in a set of 
organisations that they are involved in a common enterprise (DiMaggio, 1982).  
 
Whilst some key factors have already been identified, the remainder of this chapter 
draws on the three theories outlined at the beginning of this chapter to create a 
framework for the case study. It draws on these three theories in order to generate a 
number of possible hypotheses which may explain the changes observed and 
documented in the empirical chapters.  
 
3.4 Why do organisations change? 
Research into how organisations change in response to their environment has 
attracted attention from a number of theoretical camps which explain the reason for 
organisational change of ways. As the focus of this research is to understand how 
Albase experienced organisational change and whether this change was associated 
with the introduction of the welfare-to-work quasi-market into the organisational 
field, three alternative (although as argued complementary) theoretical perspectives 
are discussed. Due to the nature of the research area and the limited existing 
empirical and theoretical research on the topic of organisational change in a TSO in 
the welfare-to-work context, the purpose of this approach is to explore how change 
can be interpreted and explained from these viewpoints. The explanations for 
organisational change differ in each of the theories, for example, whilst resource 
dependency theory speaks to how competitive pressures drive organisations to 
change depending on their resource relations, neoinstitutional theory explains that 
organisations change due to the influence of the social framework in which the 
organisation is embedded. Neoinstitutional economics (transaction cost theory)  
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As outlined in the literature review there is also literature which explains 
organisational change in public service markets by drawing on economic theories of 
behaviour and these are considered by drawing on neoinstitutional economics.  The 
three theoretical approaches presented are often considered as incorporating an 
“adaptational mechanism” (Barnett and Carroll, 1995). The position is that 
organisational change involves the behaviour of actors within Albase, who respond 
to their environment. Researchers have used some of these theories together before, 
for example resource dependency theory and coerceive isomorphism (from 
neoinstitutional sociology) were utilised by Verbuggen, Christiaens, and Milis 
(2011) in their research into nonprofit organisations’ compliance with reporting 
standards. Similarly both theories have been combined to explain differences in 
strategies between for-profit and nonprofit organisations (Schmid, 2001) as well as 
nonprofit governance (Guo, 2007) and administrative structure (Tolbert, 1985). 
Neoinstitutional theory and resource dependency have also been used to explain the 
behaviour of organisations involved in public-private partnerships (Steijn et al,2011).  
 
These three theoretical positions for understanding organisational change are 
discussed in this section.  
 
3.5 Neoinstitutional theory- sociological approach 
This section begins by discussing the sociological approach to neoinstitutional 
theory, in particular the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who argued that 
organisations active within a particular field are likely to change in response to the 
pressures and influences from the social framework. Whilst institutional theory 
originally argued that organisations would homogenize, as particular formats and 
behaviours are deemed legitimate within their environment, recent theorists such as 
Scott (2002) have argued that diversification and change can also occur. 
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Neoinstitutional theory presents ideas that field level rules and norms can impact 
on the structure and behaviour of organisations operating within them.  
 
The effect of the introduction of new environmental pressures upon independent 
providers is mainly discussed by commentators of organisational theory. Through 
this lens, it is argued that the dynamics and decisions affecting organisational 
change may not “stem from economic, technical or material imperatives, but rather 
from cultural norms, symbols, beliefs and rituals” (Suchman, 1995, p. 571). From 
this perspective institutional forms and procedures used by organisations were not 
adopted simply because they were most efficient for the tasks at hand, in line with 
ideas of economic ‘rationality’. Instead, the view is that many of these forms and 
procedures should be seen as “culturally-specific practices, akin to the myths and 
ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into organisations, not 
necessarily to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as a result of the kind 
of processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices more generally” 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.953).   
 
Contrary to economic theories where organisations are often conceived as ‘rational 
systems’ basing decisions predominately on financial transactions, neoinstitutional 
sociologists suggest that organisations are influenced by the dominant norms and 
practices in their organisational field. Organisations are subject not only economic 
pressures, but also to social and cultural pressures that arise from interactions 
between organisations in their institutional environment (Scott, 2008). As a result, 
organisations often act in ways that are not necessarily ‘rational’, but are consistent 
with the ‘rules, norms and ideologies of wider society’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, 
p.84). Organisations operate within a social framework of norms, values and 
assumptions about what constitutes appropriate behaviour (Oliver, 1997; Scott, 
1995). Decisions are made not so much according to technical or economic criteria, 
 93 
but on the basis of what is acceptable and legitimate within a particular 
environment or ‘‘organisation field’’ that typically moves toward common 
structures and processes due to coercive, imitative, and normative expectations 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Consequently, for TSOs in public service markets the 
change may not be attributed decision made based on the transaction costs, or in 
direct response to resource acquisition, cultural norms and expected behaviours 
which are considered legitimate may be adopted, bringing about organisational 
change.  
 
According to Hall and Taylor (2006, p.953) often research by sociological 
institutionalists seeks explanations for why organisations take on specific sets of 
institutional forms, procedures or symbols. They contend that this work emphasises 
how such practices are diffused through organisational fields. For example, Meyer 
and Rowan (1977) argue that institutionalized structures and practices can be used 
in the accounts that managers provide to external constituencies. They observed that 
using econometric analysis to justify organisational projects is an institutional norm, 
and that "such analyses can also provide rational accountings after failures occur: 
managers whose plans have failed can demonstrate to investors, stockholders, and 
superiors that procedures were prudent and that decisions were made by rational 
means” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p.350).  
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.149) describe isomorphism as a: “constraining 
process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other unit that face the same 
set of environmental conditions.” Following Meyer (1979) and Fennell (1980), 
DiMaggio (1991) maintains that there are two types of isomorphism: competitive 
and institutional. Correspondingly, Hatch (1997, p.91), explains how this distinction 
can be understood. Firstly environments “may make technical and economic 
demands that require organisations to produce and exchange their goods and 
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services in a market or a quasi-market. [And], secondly, they may make social and 
cultural demands that require organisations to play particular roles in society and 
maintain certain outward appearances.” Focussing solely on institutional 
isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell (2001) identify, three mechanisms through 
which institutional isomorphic change occurs, each with its own circumstances: 1) 
coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of 
legitimacy; 2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to 
uncertainty; and 3) normative isomorphism, associated with professionalization5.  
 
As Meyer and Rowan (1991) demonstrate the concept of isomorphism provides 
valuable concepts to studying organisational change in TSOs as,  ‘isomorphism with 
environmental institutions has some crucial consequences for organisations: (a) they 
incorporate elements which are legitimated externally, rather than in terms of 
efficiency; (b) they employ external or ceremonial assessment criteria to define the 
value of structural elements; an (c) dependence on externally fixed institutions 
reduces turbulence and maintains stability’ (p.49).  Consequently, the authors argue 
that institutional isomorphism in fact promotes success and survival of 
organisations. ‘Incorporating externally legitimated formal structures increases the 
commitment of internal participants and external constituents. And the use of 
external assessment criteria- that is, moving toward the status in society of a subunit 
rather than an independent system- can enable an organisation to remain successful 
by social definition, buffering it from failure’ (1991, p.49).   
 
Drawing on neoinstitutional theory, organisational isomorphism (the tendency for 
organisations to acquire the attributes of other organisations upon which they 
                                                     
5 They also state that this typology is an analytic one and as such the three types are not always empirically distinct.  
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depend) can occur through mimetic processes in which TSOs tend to resemble their 
funders (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Neoinstitutional theory bases its arguments 
on the notion that organisations are socially rewarded by legitimacy, resources, and 
survival based on their acceptance of coercive, normative, and mimetic institutional 
pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1991; Fernandez-Alles 
and Valle-Cabrera, 2006). In regards to organisational change chgne,  “mimetic, 
normative and coercive processes come into play strongly when a new 
organisational form is legitimated by powerful actors, leading organisations, 
professional associations and interest groups” (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988, 
p.807). 
 
Coercive isomorphism results from political influence and legitimation (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). DiMaggio and Powell (1982, p.150) state that “coercive isomorphism 
results from both formal and in-formal pressures exerted on organisations by other 
organisations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the 
society within which organisations function. Such pressures may be felt as force, as 
persuasion” (p.150) 
 
Whilst coercive isomorphism may be the result of highly formalised and structured 
environments, mimetic isomorphism occurs when organisations are faced with 
uncertainty. DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.151) contend that, “uncertainty is also a 
powerful force that encourages imitation. When organisational technologies are 
poorly understood (March and Olsen, 1976), when goals are ambiguous, or when 
the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organisations may model themselves 
on other organisations.” 
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Normative isomorphism is the third source of isomorphic pressure and according to 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.152) it stems primarily from professionalization and 
the rise of formal education for professions which span across organisations. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also contend that there are two types of isomorphic 
change that come about for different reasons. Competitive isomorphism is the type 
of change proposed by population ecologists in which optimal forms of organisation 
are selected out of a population (Slack and Hinings, 1994, p.804). They suggest that 
this view assumes, “a system rationality that emphasises market competition, niche 
changes and fitness measures” (1983, p.149-150). It is a view most relevant for 
organisations which operate in a relatively free and open competitive market. For 
organisations which do not operate under such conditions, but compete for 
‘political power and institutional legitimacy’ as well as for social and economic 
fitness’, the idea of institutional isomorphism is more relevant (Slack and Hinings, 
1994, p.804).  
 
Slack and Hinings (1994, p.805) argue that it is necessary to examine the extent to 
which any given organisation models itself on other ‘leading’ or ‘legitimate’ 
organisations in the sector (mimetic isomorphism); whether labour markets/pools of 
expertise are created which produce professionalized labour force (normative 
isomorphism); and how far there are powerful organisations which can force other 
organisation to adopt particular organisational forms (coercive isomorphism). 
Importantly, they contend that these processes are not exclusive but may all operate 
within an institutional sector as a ‘set’ (p.805). 
 
3.6 Legitimacy  
A major contribution of NEI for this research is the concept of legitimacy.  Whilst 
institutional theory suggests that organisations may adopt practices and behaviour 
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dominant in their field, according to Suchman (1995) the concept of legitimacy helps 
to explain why. What do actors within organisations seek to gain from the adoption 
of particular practices?  According to Suchman (1995, p.574) legitimacy is “a 
generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions”. Acquiring legitimacy depends on meeting the expectations, 
often taken-for-granted, of the environment in which the organisation functions 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). According to Pfeffer and Salancik, (1978, p.194), 
“legitimacy is conferred when stakeholders- that is, internal and external audiences 
affected by organisational outcomes- endorse and support an organisation’s goals 
and activities. And an organisation can be described as legitimate when it is 
endorsed and supported by a segment of society large enough to ensure it 
effectiveness and survival”. 
 
The theory suggests that there are many different reasons why an organisation may 
seek legitimacy. First, legitimacy affects how people act towards and understand 
organisations. A legitimate organisation is seen as more worthy, meaningful, 
predictable and trustworthy (Suchman, 1995). Second, organisations that are 
perceived to be legitimate will find it easier to attract resources and support, both 
social and political. Third, failure to comply with the expectations of society may 
lead to withdrawal of support and the limiting of donations and government 
assistance. Organisations exist to the extent that society considers they are legitimate 
(Deegan, 2002).  
 
Why is the concept of legitimacy important for understanding how organisation’s 
change? Institutional theory posits that organisational change (and isomorphic 
behaviour in particular) is most induced where organisations see legitimacy in their 
environment as essential to their success. As Leiter (2008) argues, ‘isomorphism may 
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also arise out of the pursuit of legitimacy without regard for effectiveness and 
efficiency, but rather for the sake of survival, advantage, or approval’ (p.67). In 
doing so, organisations may adopt practices and symbolic structures in order to 
satisfy the need for compliance in the organisational field. Many institutionalists 
propose that the pursuit of legitimacy would therefore promote homogenization 
amongst organisations within field with highly visible rules and expectations. 
Arguably, the welfare-to-work quasi-market is such a field as contracts, welfare 
reform policies, and market documents create and enforce norms, expectations and 
practices for organisations seeking to deliver welfare contracts.   
 
Acquiring legitimacy involves a range of different legitimation techniques that can 
be employed depending on whether the organisation is attempting to gain, maintain 
or repair legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Neilson and Rao, 1987; McLarney, 
2002). New organisations and those undergoing restructuring or launching a new 
product will need to gain legitimacy and will generally use a proactive approach 
(Suchman, 1995). Managers wishing to gain legitimacy have the benefit of advance 
knowledge of their plans and can assess their needs for legitimacy. An established 
and well regarded organisation may have already gained legitimacy and therefore 
maintaining legitimacy should be less problematic. However legitimacy cannot be 
taken for granted. Community expectations change and what was once deemed as 
acceptable may no longer be tolerated, or in quasi-market settings values and 
expectation from the Principal may shift over time. Organisations therefore need to 
perceive changes in society’s views and their organisational field, and protect their 
past accomplishments (Suchman, 1995).  
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Drawing on neoinstitutional sociology, the organisational change experienced by 
Albase can be hypothesised as:  
 
H1: Albase has adopted the dominant rules and regulations of the organisational 
field. This is due to the introduction of highly formalized rules and regulations of 
the contracting market into the organisational field. 
 
H2: Albase, through isomorphic pressures, has adopted a structure reflective of 
other organisations operating in the organisational field. 
 
3.7 Resource dependency theory  
Research into organisational change in TSOs has tended to be dominated by 
resource dependency theory (RDT). Similar to NEI the advantage of this theory is 
the emphasis placed on understanding change through exploring the environmental 
context in which the organisation operates. The principal notion of the major text for 
this school of thoughts is Pfeffer and Salancik’s The External Control of Organisations: 
A Resource Dependence Perspective (1978). In this work the authors claim that, “to 
understand the behaviour of an organisation, you must understand the context of 
that behaviour” (Pfeffer &Salancik, 1978; p.1). As the extract below demonstrates:  
 
“How an organisation learns about its environment, how it attends to the 
environment, and how it selects and processes information to give meaning to 
its environment are all important aspects of how the context of an 
organisation affects its actions” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p.14). 
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Resource dependency theory explains change by focussing on the exchange 
relationships which the focal organisation engages in with others in the 
environment (Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). RDT focuses on a firm’s 
need to access resources from other actors in the environment and describes how 
resource scarcities force organisations to pursue new innovations that use 
alternative resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Sherer and Lee, 2002). The most 
problematic constraints affecting organisations stemmed from their relationship 
with resource providers.  
 
Three central tenets underscore resource dependency theory. First, the environment 
is critically important for understanding what decisions get made in organisations. 
Second, organisational actors do something about environmental pressures and 
constraints – or in other words, the environment is not entirely deterministic and 
therefore the possibility of strategic choice (Child, 1972) exists; and third, power is 
critically important construct for understanding both intra- and inter-organisational 
behaviour (Pfeffer, 2003, p.xii).  
 
According to resource dependency theorists’ organisational survival relies on the 
continued exchange between the organisation and its resource providers. The 
general belief is that, “organisational success is based on the amount of access and 
control organisations had over the resources they needed to produce outputs, and 
consequently, on the degree of control, or power, they wielded over resource 
providers” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p.2). Most organisations depend on the 
resources traded in these exchanges for survival, and they will make the necessary 
accommodations to guarantee exchange relationships with other organisations. 
Thus, changes in organisational structure or behaviour may reflect accommodations 
intended to secure a stable flow of resources from the environment (Oliver, 1990) 
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and they are, “constrained by the environment as a consequence of their resource 
needs” (Froelich, 1999, p. 247). 
 
Due to the dependency of organisations on resource providers in competitive 
environments, Pfeffer and Salancik argued that organisations can not only change 
the nature of their relationship with resource providers, they must do so, as 
organisational survival depends on it (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). They argued that 
organisations could reduce the power they bestow upon resource providers by 
being less dependent on the resource relationship in order to maintain control over 
their own development and decision making. They proposed possible strategies that 
organisations can call upon to reduce dependence: 
 
I. Reducing or eliminating the need for the resource question 
II. Finding a substitute for it 
III. Gaining control over the resource provider (through acquisition for example) 
or over a resource the resource provider needs (through competition for 
example), or finding ways of gaining countervailing power (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Emerson, 1962) 
 
According to (Froelich, 1999, p.248) effective organisations recognize and modify 
the, “locus of their dependence”. Major approaches to dependence management 
include complying with the demands of important resource providers, avoiding 
controlling demands via co-optation or acquisition of countervailing power, and 
avoiding dependence by maintaining alternative sources of key inputs. However, 
some have argued that for TSOs the danger of resource diversification is that they 
become prone to enacting organisational change once more, with TSOs involved in 
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contracting or commercial activities becoming more akin to the private sector. 
Froelich (1999, p.262) argues that revenue diversification can be seen as a double-
edged sword as “it reduces concentrated resource dependence and preserves 
organisational autonomy, yet blurs the distinctions between the nonprofit and other 
sectors, eroding legitimacy in the process”. 
 
Consequently, RDT facilitates a consideration of the relationship between the 
organisation and its environment. It questions whether changes that occur can be 
linked not only to the transaction processes of the market, or the rules and norms of 
the contracting approach, but also due to the dependency of TSOs on resource 
acquisition from particular relationships, and whether questions of dependency can 
explain how accommodating TSOs are to changing in line with the requirements of 
the welfare-to-work market.  
 
Drawing on RDT, organisational change in Albase can be hypothesized as: 
 
H3: Albase’s organisational change processes occurred as actors sought to gain 
control over resource providers and guarantee exchange resources. 
 
H4: Albase adopted a diversified strategy to reduce resource dependency issues  
 
3.8 Neoinstitutional Economics and Transaction Costs Economics 
The contracting-out of public services has introduced new governance structures 
based on markets and contracting processes. Public-sector contracting, in which 
organisations compete to deliver services on behalf of governments, has long been 
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championed as a way to save costs (Savas, 1974, 1977), and the existing research on 
welfare-to-work delivery organisation’s behaviour has specifically identified 
economic choices, and that providers behaviour is affected by rational-decision 
making. Oster (2000) suggests that the change in governance structure may offer an 
efficiency gain as public agencies seek to off-load tasks into the less political and 
more single-minded corporate sector. However, as O’Regan and Oster (2000) note, 
there are costs in managing a contractual relationship and in the creation of 
competitive markets. These issues and discussions are commonplace in the 
literature on public service contracting although there is little connection between 
these ideas and organisational change in service delivery organisations. In order to 
explain organisational change in Albase from an economic viewpoint, the third 
theoretical approach considered is that of neoinstitutional economics (NEI), in 
particular the transaction costs literature.  
 
Neoinstitutional economists are concerned with the rule and governance systems 
that develop to regulate or manage economic exchanges. Some (such as Hall and 
Taylor, 1996) have also linked this approach up understanding institutional and 
organisational change to a related area of work titled ‘rational choice 
institutionalism.’  According to Hall and Taylor (1996, p.45), rational choice 
institutionalists employ a characteristic set of behavioural assumptions and they 
“posit that the relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes (usually 
conforming to more precise conditions such as the transitivity principle), behave 
entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment of these preferences, and 
do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation” (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996, p.945). 
 
In terms of organisation’s neoinstitutional economic theorists contend that an actor’s 
behaviour is likely to be driven, not by impersonal historical forces, but by a 
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strategic decision which will be affected by the actor’s expectations about how 
others are likely to behave as well. Their view is that the coordination of economic 
activity is not simply a matter of market-mediated transactions, but involves many 
other types of institutional structures. Before looking in detail at how NEI is used in 
this research study it is worth briefly looking at NEI theory more broadly.  
 
There are three main contributors to NEI which are of relevance to this research 
study. According to Scott (2008) the article by Coase (1937) “The Nature of the Firm” 
is accredited with the underpinnings of much neoinstitutional economic thought. It 
asked why some economic exchanges are carried out within firms under a 
governance structure involving rules and hierarchical enforcement mechanisms, 
rather than being directly subject to the price mechanism in markets. Coase (1937, 
p.389) suggested that the reason must be that “there is a cost of using the price 
mechanism,” namely “the costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract 
for each exchange transaction which takes place in a market.”  
 
Since the 1970s Oliver Williamson developed Coase’s ideas and argued that 
“transaction costs increase when individual rationality (which is bounded) is 
confronted by heightened complexity and uncertainty, and when opportunism- 
some actors propensity to lie and cheat- is coupled with the absence of alternative 
exchange partners” (Scott, 2007, p.30). Under such conditions, exchanges are likely 
to be removed from the market and brought within an organisational framework, or 
to stimulate the development of more elaborate controls (Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
Williamson (1991, p. 103) defined transaction costs as “the ex ante costs of drafting, 
negotiating and safeguarding an agreement and, more especially, the ex post costs 
of maladaptation and adjustment that arise when contract execution is misaligned 
as a result of gaps, errors, omissions, and unanticipated disturbances; the costs of 
running the economic system.” According to Scott, (2008, p.28) Williamson 
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extended Coase’s arguments by pushing them beyond the market versus firm 
comparison to consider a wide variety of alternative “governance systems” 
including markets to hybrid organisational forms (Williamson, 1985, 1991).  
 
For Williamson (1994) organisations were institutional forms and conceptualised as 
governance systems devised to reduce transaction costs. However, the influential 
work of Douglass North adopted a slightly different approach to the study of 
organisations (see North, 1989, 1990; Meramveliotakis and Milonakis, 2010).  North 
(1990, p.5) directed attention to the wider institutional frameworks, or “rules of the 
game.” He viewed “organisations as ‘players’ attempting to devise strategies to win 
the game” (Scott, 2008, p.30). According to Scott (2008) North’s approach attempted 
to get beyond the technical construction of the firm as production function, to 
consider the firm as a governance structure (an organisational construction). These 
authors and their work were extremely influential on the developments in NIE and 
studies of organisational behaviour, particularly in terms of transaction cost theories 
and contractual relations.  
 
The crux of transaction cost economics is that the principal has an incentive problem 
in trying to ensure that an agent acts in its best interest. The solution to this problem 
is not costless as expenditures must be undertaken to structure, administer and 
enforce contracts (see Smith, 1989; Brown and Potoski, 2004). Furthermore, as 
O’Regan and Oster (2000, p.121) note, operating across governance boundaries may 
exacerbate contracting problems, “as organisations struggle to understand one 
another’s incentives and corporate cultures” and as such incentive and transaction 
costs may increase.  
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Research from this theoretical position suggests that governance decisions depend 
on the interaction between two main assumptions of human behavior (bounded 
rationality and opportunism) and two key exchange attributes (asset specificity and 
uncertainty) (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1999). Bounded rationality can be thought of 
as intentionally rational behavior that is limited because decision makers recognize 
only a limited number of alternatives and are aware of only a few consequences of 
these alternatives (Tsang, 2000). Opportunism on the other hand occurs when 
management behavior is not in the best interest of the firm (Rasheed and Geiger, 
2001).  
 
In terms of the impact of organisational change from the quasi-market arrangement 
it appears that neoinstitutional theorists would focus on how a firm’s organisational 
structure is explained “by reference to the way in which it minimizes transaction, 
production or influence costs” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.456).  According to Steijn et 
al (2011) the most important argument from the NEI framework is the view that the 
act of organizing, whether by extensive contracts or organisational structures, is 
costly in that it implies significant transaction costs (Williamson, 1996). As such 
organisational behaviour (including change) is dependent on costs. From this 
perspective diversification of resource inputs may be limited due to the transaction 
costs involved in new relationships and monitoring the behaviour of partners.  
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Drawing on NEI, organisational change in Albase can be hypothesized as: 
 
H5: In efforts to become more economically efficient, decision makers in Albase 
changed and adapted the ILM programmes.  
 
H6: Albase changed as the principal sought to minimise transaction costs and 
opportunistic behaviour. Change occurred due to opportunistic behaviour  
 
The theoretical framework has been drawn from the competing explanations for 
change. It is summarised in Table 3.2.  
 108 
Table 3.2: Theoretical Framework 









Collection of exchange relationships 
 
Transactions and players in a game 
Assumptions Organisations operate within a 
social framework of norms, values, 
and assumptions about what 
constitutes appropriate behaviour 
Organisations make active choices to 
achieve objectives. Organisations 
respond to demands made by other 
actors in the environment. 
 
Organisations try to minimize their 
dependence on resources which they 
are heavily dependent on 
The principal has an incentive 
problem in trying to ensure that an 
agent acts in its best interest. The 
solution to this problem is not 
costless but rather expenditures 
must be undertaken to structure, 
administer and enforce contracts 
(Smith 1989). 




Key Concepts Neoinstitutional theory sociology Resource dependency theory Neoinstitutional economics 
 
Reasons of change 
 
Organisations adopt practices that 
are considered acceptable and 
legitimate in their organisational 
field 
 
Firms need to access resources in 
their environments. Organisations 
change as actors respond to 
pressures and constraints 
 
Principal shifting contracts to 
diminish opportunistic behaviour 
Survival Achieving legitimacy Continued exchange and resource 
diversification 
Firms devise strategies in an attempt 
to win the game. 
Indicators Changes mimic other organisations 
in the field perceived as more 
legitimate (mimetic). 
 
Increase in new organisational 
processes and systems which 
appear to be from regulatory 
requirements (coercive). 
 
Preoccupation with ideas of 
legitimacy. 
Change attributed by respondents to 
discussion of power. 
 
Increase in lobbying or strategic 
positioning to gain power. 
 
Resource diversification efforts. 
Explanation of change processes 
attributed to exchange relations. 
 
Decrease in Albase’s transaction 
costs. 
 
Albase sought to adapt to the rules 
of the game and undertake 
opportunistic behaviour. 
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How and why has 
the organisation’s 
core activity (the 
delivery of ILM 
programmes) 
changed and 
adapted to the 
introduction of 
competitive 
contracting into the 
organisational field? 
 
Due to cultural changes, the 
continued provision of ILM 
programmes reduces legitimacy 
within the organisational field. 
As the competitive pressures of the 
organisational field increase, the 
organisation has adopted a 
mimetic strategy and reduced ILM 
provision. 
Neoinstitutional pressures in the 
organisational field do not favour 
ILM activities and as such they are 
no longer pursued 
 
ILM programmes were transformed 
in order to attract and maintain 
resources from external parties.  
Albase became involved in Welfare-
to-work programmes to diversify 
resource due to a dependence on 
ILMs. 
Due to resource dependence ILMs 
were transformed on request of the 
funding bodies. 




In efforts to become more 
economically efficient, decision 
makers in Albase changed and 
adapted the ILM programmes.  
Due to changes in the marketplace in 
which Albase operated, the delivery 
of ILM programmes in their former 
manner was considered inefficient. 
Due to the introduction of 
competitive contracting and 
alternative ‘products’ the transaction 
costs of ILMs were considered 
inefficient. 
The introduction of a competitive 
contracting environment has 
incurred many new transaction costs 









To what extent has 







culture, ways of 
organizing)? 
 
Albase, through isomorphic 
pressures, has adopted a structure 
reflective of other organisations 
operating in the organisational 
field.  
In order to acquire resources 
Albase has adopted institutional 
practices, cultural norms, 
behaviour and structures obtain 
legitimacy within the 
organisational field and ensure 
approval from resource holding 
institutions 
 
Changes to the structure of Albase 
are due to the needs of a resource 
supply which the organisation was 
dependent on. 
Changes to the structure of the 
Albase enabled the organisation to 
become less dependent on a single 
resource. By making a structural 
change the organisation could enter 
new markets and diversify its 
resource supply. 
Organisational change occurred as 
actors sought to gain control over 
resource providers and guarantee 
exchange resources. 
 
Albase’s structure has changed in an 
attempt to act more efficiently in the 
competitive environment.  
To minimise new transaction costs in 
the competitive contracting 
environment, Albase internally 
restructured. 
The introduction of a competitive 
contracting environment has 
incurred many new transaction costs 
and as such the organisation has 
restructured. 
Albase changed as the principal 
sought to minimise transaction costs 
and opportunistic behaviour. 




The purpose of this chapter was to outline the theoretical framework based on the 
use of three “adaptational mechanism” theories. The three theories were employed 
as part of the exploratory case study approach in order to better understand how 
organisational change can be understood in the quasi-market context. 
 
This chapter has outlined the ontological and epistemological position of the 
research strategy. Drawing on Tsoukas (2005), and Van de Ven and Poole (2005) the 
chapter considered the different approaches to conceptualise both ‘change’ and 
‘organisation’. Using Tsoukas (2005) definition of strong and weak process research, 
the approach adopted for this thesis be considered as belonging to the weak 
category, placing priority on substance over process. However, it was noted that the 
position of this research is that all organisations are comprised of processes which 
are always changing. As such, Albase would experience change regardless of its 
involvement in the welfare-to-work quasi-market. Whilst this thesis is not designed 
to be one which offers theory testing and it does not identify dependent and 
independent variables, it does seek to evaluate organisational change in Albase in 
terms of the effect that welfare-to-work contracting had on the change processes in 
Albase.  
 
In order to evaluate the impact of the welfare-to-work quasi-market it was stated in 
this chapter that a number of organisational features would be considered as 
indicators of change.  The purpose of the indicators is to demonstrate whether 
changes appear to be greater or differ from the established (and continual) processes 
which collectively make-up the organisation. The indicators were determined based 
on studies from the literature review and from the theoretical approaches presented. 
A measurement for change was based on: size (number of employees, financial 
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income,); activities (types of employment support offered; range of activities and 
policy contexts); structure (type and size of departments, ways of organizing), and 
culture (mission, employment processes, image), and these features directed the 
data collection process.  
 
The discussion of the three theoretical perspectives for explaining organisational 
change introduced a number of key concepts and themes used in this thesis. The 
concept of the organisational field enables this thesis to look beyond the immediate 
exchange relationships and to consider institutional isomorphic pressures alongside 
the competitive isomorphic pressures from the quasi-market system. The purpose of 
drawing on this concept is to ensure that the change process is understood on a 
number of different levels; the exchange, the relationship with the environment, and 
the broader cultural influences of public service contracting. The inclusion of 
neoinstitutional economics is an experimental approach to understanding 
organisational change in TSOs, as it is more commonly used in relation to private 
sector organisations in open markets (not quasi-markets).  
 
The following chapter discusses the methods employed to operationalize the 
theoretical framework.  
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C HAP TER  4  -  R ESEA R CH S TRA TE GY  
A ND ME THO DS  
 
This chapter discusses the methods employed to answer the research questions 
outlined in chapter two. This thesis is based on a single case study and adopts a 
qualitative mixed-methods approach including unstructured interviews, document 
analysis, financial accounts analysis and a short ethnographic study period.  Whilst 
the previous chapter outlined the theoretical framework, this chapter provides a 
reflexive account of issues with which the researcher engaged throughout the 
research process. It takes into account important practical limitations and 
methodological issues experienced in this study. Furthermore, bearing in mind that 
researching in and about organisations is difficult due to commercial sensitivity, 
confidential work areas and restricted information (Buchanen and Bryman, 2009), 
this chapter also contends that there were complex social and institutional 
arrangements within Albase which the researcher negotiated in order to access the 
required information.  
 
As previously discussed the ‘case’ for the research is an organisation referred to 
throughout as ‘Albase’. Albase is a case study of third sector organisational change, 
with particular consideration of the introduction of the welfare-to-work quasi-
market into their organisational field. Case selection was determined on the 
understanding that a case study is not a method but a research strategy (cf. e.g. 
Hartley, 2004; Titscher et al., 2000,) and it cannot be defined through its research 
methods, but rather in terms of its theoretical orientation and interest in individual 
cases (Hartley, 2004; Stake, 2000). Or, put differently, “a case study is not a 
methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied. By whatever methods, 
we choose to study the case" (Stake, 2000, p.435). Specific case selection (i.e. the 
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organisation which is the object of this study) was therefore determined by the 
research purpose and theoretical context as well as issues of accessibility and 
resource requirements.  
 
The research was supported by the ESRC CASE programme based on a partnership 
between Albase and the Social Policy Department at the University of Edinburgh. 
At the beginning of the partnership a broad research topic for a PhD research 
project was agreed, although this changed during the studentship due to issues with 
the original data set. The original research project was based on an analysis of 
Albase’s database of jobseekers it had supported into employment since the early 
1980s. Unfortunately, when it was cleaned this data was not useable. This led to a 
reconsideration of the research project with the outcome being the research 
questions presented in this thesis. Positive outcomes from the CASE arrangement 
included access to the organisation and their data from an early stage of research 
design, and an additional PhD supervisor employed by the organisation with a 
responsibility to the project and a commitment to attend a number of supervisions 
during the course of the PhD programme.  As such, the data collection process was 
agreed with the organisation early in the PhD process including access to other 
individuals and internal data. Documents and interview respondents were 
identified and agreed on before fully entering the data collection period during a 
research design phase.  
 
As discussed later in this chapter Albase is an ‘instrumental’ (Stake, 1995) case study 
as the organisation was operational in the delivery of employment services over a 
period of time that spans both pre and post welfare-to-work contracting (this is 
discussed in more detail in chapter five). As such, the organisation’s experience 
provides a large amount of complex data based on both the issues of localised 
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employment programme delivery, and the affects of competing in the welfare quasi-
market and contracting context.  
 
The scope of the case study is connected to the concept of the ‘organisational field’ 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) outlined in the previous chapter. It is the belief that 
the particular significance of this type of case study approach is that it is able to 
cover a comparatively large period of time (25 years) exploring the shifting 
relationships, the introduction of new institutions and the changing organisational 
structure of an established organisation in this policy area. The case study is 
bounded by time (1983-2010) and place (only areas in which the organisation has 
operated) (see Miles & Huberman, 1994; Creswell, 2003). 
 
The chapter is in four parts. It begins by outlining the case study approach. 
Following this, section two examines each of the methods employed, discussing 
both the strengths and weaknesses. Section three describes the data collection 
arrangement and reflects on the limitations of organisational research in this 
context. The chapter concludes with a section on ethical considerations. 
 
4.1 The case study approach 
Whilst case studies provide the benefit of ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973), there are 
also numerous advantages of the case study approach to this research strategy. The 
approach has a number of strengths in organisational research particularly when the 
subject is embedded in complex contexts, and when a historical perspective can be 
included (Buchanen and Bryman, 2009; Langley, 2009). According to Gerring (2004) 
a case study can provide depth rather than breadth. Unlike some survey or 
qualitative research covering a number of cases, the single case study approach is 
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well suited to the incorporation of longitudinal data to enable the study of processes 
over time (Langley, 2009). As previously mentioned in chapter two, research into 
welfare-to-work contracting and TSOs is limited in terms of detailed description 
and understanding of the role of TSOs and the impact of the introduction of 
competitive contracting. According to Yin (1994, p.13) one notable strength of a case 
study is that it, “investigates a contemporary phenomena within its real life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident”. As such it is anticipated that this case study research can offer useful 
approach to understanding organisations as the case study strategy is well suited to 
both the relatively uncontrolled and dynamic conditions of organisations, and 
relatively new policy contexts (Suddabyand Greenwood, 2009). 
 
It is argued below that a single case study approach is the most appropriate research 
strategy for this work for a number of reasons. First, the marketisation of 
employment programmes created new relationships and institutional arrangements 
(Finn, 2009). However, as outlined in chapter two there is a lack of existing detailed 
investigations into this policy area, particularly on the effect of the contracting 
environment upon TSOs.  According to Eisenhardt (1989) situations such as these 
are well suited to the introduction of case study research due to the limited existing 
knowledge. 
 
Particularly well suited to new research areas or research areas for which existing theory 
seems inadequate. This type of work is highly complementary to incremental theory building 
from normal science research. The former is useful in early stages of research on a topic or 




Second, according to Pettigrew, (1973) a significant strength of the case study 
compared to other research methods is that case studies seek to study phenomena in 
their contexts, rather than independent of context providing deeper insight. As such 
the case study approach compliments the theoretical framework presented in 
chapter three due to the focus on the concept of the organisational field and the 
interaction between an organisation and their operating or resource environment. In 
organisational research case studies are often used to explore an organisation and 
the characteristics of its context because the researcher is able to obtain a more 
holistic perspective as the case study can facilitate learning about the organisation’s 
process than may otherwise be gained from different methodological approaches 
(see Remenyi et al.1998; Fitgerald and Dopson, 2009). An in-depth single case study 
also has the benefit of providing rich, complex data which is manageable in a PhD 
research programme. As Lijphart (1971, p.691) states, “the great advantage of the 
case study is that by focusing on a single case, that case can be intensively examined 
even when the research resources at the investigator's disposal are relatively 
limited.”  
 
Before exploring the strengths of the case study approach further, consideration is 
given in this section to address some criticisms. There are several common critiques 
of case studies including; “a lack of rigor, a lack of basis for generalisation, and the 
suggestion that they are too time consuming and unwieldy to analyse and present” 
(Yin, 1994, p.10-11). Others ask how studies can be designed to take history, 
temporality, and institutional configurations seriously, yet still be committed to the 
‘generation of useable knowledge’ in other contexts (see also Mahoney, 1999; 
Abbott, 2001; Hall, 2003; Pierson, 2004, p.174).  
 
Most criticisms do however, centre on the generalizability of case study research 
and whether the findings are able to add to or refute existing theories. This has led 
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case study researchers to adopt different views, some such as Gerring (2007) have 
stressed the benefit of the single case in providing evidence for (or against) a general 
causal proposition. In particular, Gerring draws attention to the use of the critical 
case study for confirming theories, on the basis that, ‘the more a theory attains the 
status of a causal law, the easier it will be to confirm or disconfirm using a single 
case’ (p.235). The focus of these arguments are specifically on the role of the single 
study case in relation to theory, disconfirming where a theory is deterministic and 
re-shaping or readjusting the theory where the case study provides evidence of 
deviation.  Stake (2000) argues that, generalization is not the only purpose of 
research. He contends that whilst, “generalization may not be all that despicable, 
particularization does deserve praise. To know particulars fleetingly of course is to 
know next to nothing. What becomes useful understanding is a full and thorough 
knowledge of the particular, recognizing it also in new and foreign contexts” (Stake, 
2000 p. 22). This research does not attempt to generalize nor test theory. As 
previously mentioned due to the limited existing research into TSOs in welfare-to-
work contracting the purpose of this research is to explore the change process of 
Albase, and to correspondingly explore the theoretical approaches that may explain 
organisational change.  
 
Whilst a single case study research may be vulnerable to concerns regarding its 
theoretical contribution, it can provide the necessary knowledge and influence other 
research strategies. It is clear that, “sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes 
open and look carefully at individual cases - not in the hope of proving anything, 
but rather in the hope of learning something” (Eysenck, 1976, p.9 quoted in Flyvberg, 
2006, p.224) as insights gleaned from case studies can directly influence policy, 
practice, and future research (Merriam, 1998). Furthermore, as Flyvbjerg (2006) 
argues, ‘a scientific discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case 
studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and a discipline 
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without exemplars is an ineffective one. Social science may be strengthened by the 
execution of a greater number of good case studies’ (p.219).  
 
Stake identifies case studies as intrinsic, instrumental or collective. This research 
uses an instrumental case study approach (Stake, 1995). According to Cousins (2005) 
in instrumental case study research, the researcher explores a case as an instance of 
a class in order to shed light on an issue concerning the class. In this thesis, the aim 
is to explore the organisational change process of a third sector organisation 
delivering welfare-to-work programmes. What is happening to this TSO that could 
tell us something about TSOs and welfare-to-work contracting more generally? 
Baxter and Jack (2008) contend that the instrumental case study is used to 
accomplish something other than understanding a particular situation. It provides 
insight into an issue or helps to refine a theory. Drawing on (Stake, 1995), these 
authors contend that, “the case is often looked at in depth, its contexts scrutinized, 
its ordinary activities detailed, and because it helps the researcher pursue the 
external interest. The case may or may not be seen as typical of other cases” (2008, 
p.549).   
 
Due to the CASE studentship arrangement the researcher spent a total of five years 
accessing and communicating with individuals within the organisation. The first 
year involved a reconnaissance process including an extensive period of time within 
the organisation to ensure a better understanding of their structure and activities. 
This assisted the research design process by providing a detailed insight into the 
structure and culture of the organisation. The findings from the first year are not 
directly referenced in this research, and no formal recorded interviews took place 
during this time. This element of the fieldwork included informal conversations, a 
work induction, job shadowing of some individuals, meetings with employees, and 
attending work events. It also involved a period of searching through documents 
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and filing systems. The recorded fieldwork took place over two years period and 
involved interviews with twenty employees, the collection of 150 internal 
documents and external-facing documents, and 20 years worth of accounting texts. 
 
The approach is a qualitative mixed-methods strategy as it does not involve a 
statistical/quantitative analysis. The mixed-methods approach adopted has many 
advantages for organisational and case study research (Bryman, 2009). First, it 
allows the complex interactions and relationships which occur within organisations 
to be investigated. Second, by adopting a qualitative mixed-methods approach some 
of these limitations associated with each of the data collection methods can be 
reduced. Third, the approach is a pragmatic one, acknowledging and manoeuvring 
around the access and data restriction problems. These points are elaborated upon 
during the discussion of the multiple sources and methods employed in the 
following section.  
 
4.2 Methods 
The study draws on extensive and multiple sources of data collection in order to 
provide a detailed, in-depth understanding of the case and the relationship with the 
organisational field. There are a number of reasons for this. Methodologically, the 
use of a number of data sources strengthens the case study and enables it to achieve 
its purpose of detailing the relationships and effects of the environment (Yin, 2003). 
Ontologically, the diversity of data reflects the concept of the ‘organisational field’ 
and the complex institutions, rules and regulations which create this field.  
 
This section discusses each method in turn. The first data collection method 
discussed is the use of interviews. It begins with a discussion of how respondents 
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were identified and follows with a consideration of the advantages of interviewing 
for this research strategy. After interviewing, the section outlines the role of 
documents and document analysis, followed by financial accounts, and finally, 
ethnography as a data collection method.   
 
4.3 Interviews 
This research relied on identifying and interviewing individuals associated with 
Albase. The respondents were required to provide necessary information on 
particular periods and events in the organisation’s history. Interview respondents 
were identified in a number of ways. First, key positions within the organisations (at 
different time periods) such as the CEO and Director of Operations/Development 
were identified as possible respondents and were interviewed first. In most cases 
these individuals were contacted and interviewed. Working through the 
organisation starting at the current time and working backwards it was also 
possible to identify and interview individuals from key decision making and 
delivery positions, such as the directors and deputy directors of delivery and 
development. These individuals were also interviewed. The anonymised list of 
respondents is available in Appendix One. 
 
A difficulty with this approach was the lack of an organisational structure chart at 
the time and, for identifying those respondents who had left the organisation, a lack 
of structure charts for previous periods.  This would have made the identification of 
the relevant individuals much easier. However, the researcher moved between 
individuals in the senior management roles and asked them to identify which 
employees were relevant. The associated document analysis discussed later in this 
chapter unearthed authors of strategies, business plans and financial accounts 
whose authors were then considered as key respondents from the respective time 
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periods. These were added to the interview schedule. Another practical tool for 
identifying respondents was through the official financial records that every TSO is 
legally obliged to submit to Companies House each year. The annual returns listed 
the board members, and the CEO and Director of Operations. This approach 
worked well as respondents could be identified through their responsibilities as 
well as their position within the organisation.  
 
Starting from the present team and working backwards in time was the only way to 
identify and locate respondents from previous years. This was more difficult as the 
organisation had experienced a number of restructuring processes and, as such, a 
clear line between individuals with the same responsibilities at a previous stage was 
not possible (i.e. the development team is a mutation of the funding and contracting 
team but with more diverse responsibilities and without contract management 
duties). Furthermore, an element of compromise had to be worked into the research 
design for the interview schedule as key individuals were unavailable. For example, 
for one key period it was not possible to gain an interview with the CEO from that 
time. A concession was accepted that the interviews from the key financial manager 
and the operation manager from that period would suffice, albeit breaking the 
desired linear decision-making opinions from the CEOs. 
 
Two respondents were also identified and utilised as they had been with the 
organisation for the longest duration of time. One had been with the organisation 
for over 25 years and the other over 20 after originally partaking in a job-seekers 
programme themselves. These individuals provided useful insight and 
understanding into the descriptive operational and organisational changes as well 
as details on other respondents and the roles they played. Their interviews were 
very informal and their responses are not directly presented in the later chapters. 
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However, their descriptive input was extremely useful in framing other data 
sources and triangulating information from other respondents.  
 
Whilst this approach worked well for this research there are limitations to the 
method in that an individual respondent cannot fully represent a particular time 
period or department’s views. The respondent’s subjectivity of the previous events 
and issues is obviously influenced by their role, personal views and experiences 
with the organisation and knowledge of the organisational environment. This is an 
accepted limitation which could not be avoided as conducting interviews with all 
previous employees would still present issues of memory bias (Schacter et al, 2003) 
and there would clearly be analytical difficulties with data overload (Dubois and 
Gadde, 2002). The research acknowledges that this is a limitation - albeit one that is 
minimised by using other research methods alongside the in-depth interviews. 
 
The use of selected respondents in this research adds to the conceptual 
understanding of the organisation and the organisational field as one which will be 
defined from within, as the fluid natures of the boundaries and activities of the 
organisation are understood and defined by those creating and recreating the 
organisation at different points in time. Interviews were included within the 
research design for a number of reasons; first to supply information that was not 
available through document analysis, second to learn about the experiences and 
decision-making strategies of those respondents within the organisation and across 
time. Finally, interviews ensured that the organisational field was defined by the 
organisation’s actors and activities.  
 
The interviews utilised in this research were primarily aimed at gathering in-depth 
data and understanding processes of change. Each interview schedule was uniquely 
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designed. That is, not all respondents were asked the same and their responses 
cannot be directly compared. Instead, interview schedules reflected the 
respondent’s area of work, time period with the organisation, job role and 
responsibilities, and experiences. As such, some interviews lasted little over an hour 
whilst others lasted up to three hours. All of the interviews were conducted face-to-
face and in total over 25 hours of data were collected through interviews from ten 
respondents. All interviews were transcribed, but where quotes have been used 
through the text, the responses have been anonymised. Each respondent was 
provided with information on the research project including the research question, 
and they were able to ask questions about the purpose of the research and how their 
responses would be used prior and after the interview. A number of respondents 
discussed broader political views on employment programme policies and 
afterwards asked for these to be stricken from the record, which was executed post-
transcription.  
 
An interview schedule was designed prior to the interview and used as a simple 
prompt in most cases to ensure that discussion flowed. This approach encouraged 
interviewees to talk (sometimes at length) about the topic or issue put before them. 
Interviewees took an active role in constructing the nature of the interview, albeit 
somewhat bounded by the broad areas of discussion listed in the schedule. Most of 
the interviews included key questions that each respondent was asked relating to 
their views of pressures and change from the environment onto the organisation; 
their understanding of external relationships and how that impacts on the running 
of the organisation; factual information about their role and activities; and, an open 
question regarding what they felt the biggest threat to the organisation’s activities 
were. In this sense the interview schedules loosely followed a life-history approach 
(see Musson, 2004) for the opening part, allowing respondents to talk about their 
role and experience over time within the organisation, moving onto key areas of 
concern in the second half of the interview.  
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In some interviews respondents were also asked how they managed the threats and 
processes they had identified. This approach proved beneficial in a number of ways. 
First, the life-history approach provided useful background information about the 
organisation for the researcher’s general understanding of the processes and people 
involved. It also allowed respondents to become at ease within the interview itself. 
The second half allowed the main topics to be covered whilst the inclusion of an 
open ended question provided information for reflection on the identification of 
issues and the processes and impacts of change (Langley, 2009). During the 
reconnaissance phase and latterly the ethnographic research fifteen interviews were 
conducted although these were informal and not transcribed. The purpose of these 
interviews was to gain context, relevant knowledge regarding specific employment 
programmes and relationships with other organisations within the field. 
Collectively, the respondents built a picture of their role in the organisation, and 
their view of the organisation in the field, as well as how they understood changes 
to the organisational field and the policy contexts.  
 
Mason (2002, p.64) contends that the interview method is heavily dependent on 
people’s capacities to verbalise, interact, conceptualise and remember. These are 
important factors for understanding the quality and reliability of the evidence 
presented and drawn upon in the findings chapters of this thesis. Where most of the 
interviews began with a short ‘fact-finding’ session involving specific details of job 
roles, project delivery and views of the employment policy at that time, the rest of 
the interview was dedicated to asking explicitly how the organisation negotiated 
their organisational field. As such, many of the respondents could only talk for the 
areas of work they were involved in, but for those who had left the organisation a 
number of years ago, their responses were also limited as they could only talk about 
the areas they remembered they were involved in. The impact of this limitation was 
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reduced through the use of document and financial analysis which could prompt or 
redirect the memory of the respondent based on the facts presented.  
 
The main advantage of using interviews as a data collection method in this research 
project was the detailed views that could be gathered from respondents. Where 
documents allowed the researcher to understand the events at particular times and 
the structure of activities, interviews provided an insight into what impact these 
events actually had on individuals within the organisation. Interview responses 
have been interwoven with findings from other data sources in the analysis and 
findings chapters, and have been treated as a component of a complex research 
context (Cassell, 2009).  
 
4.4 Documents 
When researching the behaviour of the organisation prior to the introduction of the 
welfare-to-work policy context, documents were a key source of information used to 
reduce memory bias of interview respondents, and as a way of gaining information 
about the decision making process of actors within the organisation in previous 
years.  
 
According to Dunkerley (1988, p.88) the problem with historical interpretation from 
documentary evidence is that often, “there is no way of the researcher knowing the 
meanings that the producer of the documents attached to them.” While the use of 
documents is always limited by the fact that the documents have been produced for 
another purpose (Bryman, 2009), this was moderated by being able to follow up on 
issues in interviews.  In terms of identifying the organisational field, secondary 
sources were a key resource. These included documents and analyses published by 
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government departments, academics, research institutes, policy organisations, and 
the media. In total 150 documents were analysed. The anonymised list of documents 
is available in Appendix One. The different categories of documents are discussed 
in more detail. They have been groups into four categories; policy, market, internal, 
external.  
 
I. Policy documents: House of Commons (HOC) reports, policy publications, 
committee minutes and evidence 
II. Market documents: Invitation to Tender (ITT) issued by DWP, Bidding and 
procurement guidance issued by the DWP, 
III. Albase6 Internal facing documents: business plans, strategy documents, 
reports, programme management reports, management and HR policies, 
IV. Albase External facing documents: consultation responses to government 
policy, media and press releases, website information, presentation at external 
conferences and meetings,   
 
Each is discussed in detail below. 
 
I. Policy Documents 
All policy documents were accessed via Government websites, namely the DWP, 
House of Commons Library and House of Commons legislative minutes (Hoc 
                                                     
6All of the internal facing and external facing Albase documents utilised in the course of this research are listed in 
the anonymised database. 
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reports) and the Scottish Government website (including the archives from previous 
administrations).  
 
II. Market Documents:  
The title ‘market documents’ is used to refer to all texts relating to the 
commissioning and procurement of welfare-to-work programmes, EU programmes, 
and Local Authority commissioned projects. These were mainly sourced on-line 
through the DWP portal, search engines, Local Authority and Scottish Government 
websites, and in some cases through contact with the relevant Government 
Departments. Some guidance documents which were provided from the 
commissioning body to Albase were acquired during the fieldwork phase. 
However, this information would have been available through contact with the 
relevant department (i.e. it was not commercially restricted). As a number of the 
programmes covered in this thesis are no longer operating in the UK, some market 
documents were not readily available from government agencies and as such there 
was a reliance on the documents held by individuals within Albase to gather this 
information.  
 
III. Internal facing documents:  
‘Internal facing documents’ is a term used here to refer to documents produced by 
Albase intended for employees and which formed part of the everyday processes of 
the organisation and the delivery of their activities. For example internal documents 
registered in the data collection database included strategies and board papers. 
There are also documents aimed at front line staff such as guides to services, and 
organisational processes for jobseekers registered onto specific welfare-to-work 
programmes. Most of these documents were acquired through discussions with 
employees and the CASE studentship contact at Albase. As previously noted, it was 
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not possible to gain internal documents for every year, or every programme and as 
such their contribution is at times sporadic, depending on the documents which had 
been maintained for each programme or project, and whether I could gain access to 
them.  
 
IV. External-facing documents: 
‘External-facing documents’ is a term used here to refer to documents produced by 
Albase intended for an external audience. For example, policy consultation 
responses submitted to government departments, tender and bidding documents 
for specific programmes, the website and other publicity material provided at 
events or to jobseekers. Some of these documents were sourced within the 
organisation, however the majority were sourced from government websites 
(responses to consultations); search engines (media responses and press releases), 
and Companies House (for accounting and board membership texts).  
 
4.5 Document and interview analysis process  
Document analysis followed a qualitative content-based analysis, defined by 
Bryman (2001, p.180) as an approach where there is an emphasis on allowing 
categories to emerge out of the data and on recognising the significance for 
understanding meaning in the context in which an item is being analysed (and the 
categories derived from it) appeared. The process for the analysis of documents was 
undertaken through the use of Nvivo, the qualitative analysis software program. 
This allowed for the multitude of documents and transcripts from the interviews to 
be collected and stored in one place, arranged and assessed more easily, and a 
number of themes to be identified.  
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4.6 Financial analysis 
Accounts analysis was an important method as it allowed a consideration of factors 
associated with resource dependency and the impact of financial decision-making 
on organisational change. Financial analysis was also included as part of 
triangulation efforts. In contrast to both document and activity recording, the 
registering of financial information is a legal requirement throughout the 
organisation’s existence and as such is the only dependable recorded medium 
through which consistent annual longitudinal change could be evidenced. It was 
also easily accessible through Companies House, the on-line database where the 
annual financial statements of all limited companies in England, Wales, Northern 
Ireland and Scotland are registered. The analysis of financial accounts was guided 
by accountancy information, procedures and guidelines provided by the 
Accounting Standards Board in their publication, “Accounting and Reporting by 
Charities: Statement of Recommended Practice” (2005).  
 
Before discussing the benefits and methods employed in analysing the accounts, it is 
worth acknowledging that financial accounts cannot reveal everything about an 
organisation’s management or activities, and in this case provided only a limited 
view of organisational effectiveness or change. The researcher is aware that many 
aspects of a social enterprise’s activities will not be visible from account analysis 
alone, as only those events to which a monetary value can be easily attached appear 
in accounts (i.e. the money measurement concept). It is also acknowledged that due 
to the matching and periodicity concepts employed in the accountancy profession, 
the profit and loss of each year does not always reflect the true cost of operations in 
that year (Banerjee, 2010). This made it more difficult to always identify which 
accounting period benefited or was negatively affected by certain types of expenses 
and situations. Nevertheless, the accounts analysis proved beneficial to the phasic 
analysis where they were considered alongside other sources to identify periods of 
change (see chapter five). 
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Financial analysis identified key financial changes, and also informed the document 
collection processes and interview questions. The analysis of the accounts revealed 
changes to the organisation’s sustainability, liquidity and ability to continue its 
operations at particular times in its existence. Such research methods and analyses 
are advantageous to understanding the extent and impact of resource dependency 
discussed in chapter eight and the broader questions regarding the pressures for 
organisational change. Three strategies presented below were used in the analysis of 
the accounts. 
 
The information gleaned from the financial accounts revealed changing patterns 
and trends within the organisation’s financial activities. Using the financial accounts 
from 1986 to 2008, an excel spreadsheet was created covering each available year. 
Figures were inputted from the associated costs in the financial accounts, and 
adjusted for inflation for ease of comparison. First, by using common size or 
horizontal analysis (Banerjee, 2010) the accounts were compared, line by line with 
those of previous years. This allowed for trends to become visible in the resulting 
line diagrams. Second, the analysis also considered more complex financial ratios 
regarding how the organisation was coping financially over the time period. This 
approach draws on vertical analysis where each item in the balance sheet is 
expressed as a percentage of the total. This provided an indication of structural 
changes to the financing of the organisation i.e. whether there has been an increase 
in borrowing to finance new investment or whether the trading operations in each 
year were viable. Third, the analysis focussed on four indicators: change to total 
income; current ratio analysis; trading cost ratio; and asset turnover ratio. 
 
The guidance for this part of the data collection and analysis came from financial 
accounting texts (Shim and Siegel, 2008; The Institute of Financial Accountants 
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[IFA], 2007). The ‘total income’ figure for each year time periods were identified 
where there was a noticeable increase or decrease in total income for Albase. The 
‘total income’ figure is comprised of money generated through ‘sales’ and other 
income generated through grants and contracts, or through donations and gift aid. 
This provided a simple depiction of the financial history of the organisation. 
However, this is not the whole story and the ratio analyses assisted in 
understanding the more complex picture of company/charity finances. Knowing the 
annual current ratio helped identify time periods when the organisation had 
difficulty with its liquidity and ability to pay short term debts. The current ratio is a 
way of knowing whether a company can meet its day to day payments and as such, 
was able to provide information on whether the organisation’s liquidity 
management had changed due to or during the changes to their environment. The 
current ratio evaluates the current assets against the current liabilities and although 
there is no ideal number that companies must score, it is generally understood that 
an organisations assets should outweigh their liabilities by 2:1 (IFA, 2007). If the 
figure is above one it means that short term debts can be paid. Ideally figures should 
also not exceed three which would mean that the company can cover its debts three 
times over and may be an indication that they are not using their assets as 
effectively as they might.  
 
Albase’s trading cost ratio provided an indication of whether their activities were 
more costly to run in particular time periods than others, providing a richer picture 
of the financial situation during changes to the resourcing of their activities in the 
organisational field. The trading cost ratio identified the costs associated with 
trading and compares the profitability of trading. For commercial purposes, the 
ratio score should be greater than 1 (IFA, 2007). Finally, the asset turnover ratio 
identified the relationship between turnover and assets. In short, a higher number 
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shows that the company is performing better7. This ratio is generally used to 
measure the performance of a company in generating sales from the assets available, 
and along with the other ratios used, this proved useful in this research for gaining 
an understanding of the organisation’s financial situation over time8. 
 
The purpose of including financial analysis was to ensure that the study of the 
organisation and the complexities of the interplay within the organisational field 
were fully understood. In particular, it is one way in which the impact of changes in 
the field can be clearly seen and where possible explanations for changes in 
organisational behaviour could be based drawing on the theoretical position 
outlined in chapter three.  The following section outlines the final method 
employed, ethnography. Whilst accounts analysis helped to define or describe 
phases of change within the organisation, ethnographic methods helped to provide 
answers for the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. 
 
4.7 Ethnography 
Despite part of the original research design including a prolonged period of time in 
the organisation (3 months), agreed with the original supervisor from Albase 
(termed here as the ‘access agent’) this proved unachievable once this individual 
had left the organisation and the department was restructured. After a period of 6-8 
months (during the second year of the PhD) without formal access into the current 
organisation at that time, through perseverance the researcher was able to interview 
a new senior manager who subsequently offered the researcher a part-time 
employment position with the organisation in their development and research team. 
                                                     
7 Although the number needs to be understood alongside the sector or industry that the organisation is operating in. 
8 The descriptive charts from the financial analysis can be found in chapter five 
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This proved to be extremely beneficial to the data collection strategy and within a 
number of weeks all internal interviews had been completed and all accessible 
internal documents gathered.  There are however a number of ethical and 
methodological concerns discussed later in this chapter. 
 
This period of employment (6 months from August 2010-March 2011), also added a 
new dimension to the research, that of organisational ethnography. Adopting an 
ethnographic approach to studying organisational behaviour is not new. There is 
also a trend in organisational research to adopt an under-cover or concealed 
participant observation approach. As Beynon (1973) discusses, this is particularly 
the case in research projects investigating working behaviour on the factory floor. 
He notes that difficulties in accessing data and the problems with the control and 
restriction of research data have encouraged a number of academic researchers into 
adopting research strategies based on concealed participant observation (see Pfeffer, 
1979 and Westwood, 1985 during their research on factory workers). However, the 
researcher’s role within the organisation as the Research Executive was not a 
concealed participant observation role, all colleagues were made aware of the PhD 
research and all interview respondents during this time were recorded and 
transcribed in the same manner as those prior to the employment position. 
Furthermore, due to the previous arrangement and reconnaissance period, many 
employees within the organisation were already aware of the dual roles (of 
researcher and employee).  
 
This period of ‘in-house’ research enabled data to be collected without the need for 
gate keepers and re-interpreters of the research process. For example, the researcher 
witnessed which individuals had responsibility for what data and could see first 
hand what activities were involved in contract bidding and management, and what 
documents were produced. On reflection this was an important part of the data 
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collection process, although the direct employment of the researcher within the 
organisation was unintended in the original design. Along with the reduction of 
practical access issues, the main benefit of this approach was that the organisational 
field could be widened as the impacts of the welfare-to-work environment could be 
witnessed firsthand and the partnerships, relationships and knowledge by 
employees of other actors within the field was clear to see. 
 
After undertaking the ethnographic research it became evident that there were a 
number of limitations to the original research strategy which sought to look into the 
organisation. There appeared to be a lack of adequate recording systems that logged 
what day-to-day and longer term activities individuals did. This became visible 
during the ethnographic research and meant that some items on the original data 
collection plan did not exist. For example, one of the intentions was to create lists of 
the contracts which Albase bid for, won, and delivered each year over the 28-year 
period. The intention was to create the basis for the discussions of organisational 
change and resource reliance. Where the researcher originally believed that perhaps 
gatekeepers refused access to this information or that it had unknowingly been 
destroyed it was possible to see that for a number of years this data was unavailable 
due to a number of reasons. First, it appeared that there was a culture of 
independent working by staff which meant that there was no central data recording 
system. Second, for many of the years covered, an organisational culture which 
supported activities such as organisation-wide data recording was lacking. Third, as 
discussed in greater detail in chapter five, for a number of years Albase was 
fragmented as individual contracts and projects recorded their work tasks 
separately from other departments. Finally, there was a lack of human resource 




In terms of the ethnographic data collection processes when in the field the 
researcher (deliberately) did not collect some ethnographic sources such as post-its, 
staff board notices or make descriptions of places or the mannerisms of individuals 
(See Schwartzman, 1992). However memos, meeting notes and minutes, formal 
written discussions and circulated material were collected and the researcher made 
minutes and notes in team meetings, took bid and contracting details from recorded 
systems, and made informal notes of day to day discussions ‘at the desks’ between 
staff members working on welfare-to-work contracts. These were collected in 
notebooks and used to increase the researcher’s knowledge of both the welfare-to-
work industry and the organisation, as well as improve the contextual 
understanding of the organisation and provide supporting evidence for some of the 
findings from documents and interviews. If explicitly referenced in the thesis these 
notes and documents have also been anonymised.  
 
So far this chapter has outlined and discussed the research strategy and the methods 
employed in the data collection. It has argued that the case study strategy is suited 
to understanding organisational change and for providing detailed information on a 
somewhat unknown aspect of welfare reform. It has described the method which 
have been utilised to ensure that the case study possessed depth, and was based on 
a number of cross-referenced data sources.  It is now appropriate to move to the 
next section which presents reflexive comments on the data collection and fieldwork 
experience.  
 
4.8 Collecting data on organisational change: some reflections  
A number of context-specific issues were experienced during the course of the data 
collection process. These predominately centred on gaining access to texts and 
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individuals, negotiating gatekeepers and locating historical records. Each is 
discussed in turn below. 
 
Securing research access to organisations and data is a frequent issue in 
organisational research (Fine, Morrill and Surianarain, 2009). In this research study 
the data collection process was occasionally problematic as access to information 
and research data required regular (re)negotiations involving both formal and 
informal control agreements with Albase.  However, unlike most of the research 
undertaken within organisations (see Prabha Unnithan, 1986; Langley, 2009), access 
to individuals, documents and the activities of the organisation was agreed prior to 
the identification of research questions and the formation of the research design 
template. The arrangement was  unusual for both PhD research and organisational 
research projects more generally yet it has been an essential factor in the provision 
of the rich and complex quantity of data collected during the PhD process. The 
arrangement was made possible by the ESRC CASE programme. The organisation 
originally provided a desk, work I.D, intranet and email access and an induction 
programme to ensure independent navigation of the company and employees in 
2008. Had those in supervisory roles been less accommodating and helpful at this 
stage, it is likely that the data would have been less rich and the findings less 
beneficial to the welfare-to-work literature.  
 
Whilst this agreement and sponsorship by the organisation removed some of the 
early access issues faced by many researchers, some issues persisted and other 
ethical complexities arose. It is also worth noting that this access arrangement was 
not consistent and changed when the original supervisor and part-instigator of the 
PhD project left the company in 2009. It also became more difficult in the following 
year when the policy and research department was restructured and the PhD 
arrangement was not identified and maintained within the work-streams of relevant 
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managers. Although this had a negative impact on the speed and ability to collect 
the agreed data, it highlights the multitude of complexities in organisational 
research regardless of the original access and support negotiations and agreed 
arrangements. Consequently, whilst the original access agreement was beneficial to 
the instigation of the research project, in practical terms researchers require, “more 
than simple access alone; you require some kind of commitment to the project from 
management, employee associations and respondents themselves” (Crompton and 
Jones, 1988, p.70). As outlined above this level of commitment to the project was 
difficult to maintain as is an important practical consideration for researchers 
undertaking organisational research over an extended period of time.  
 
The second major issue in terms of data collection for organisational research is the 
role of gatekeepers. In most organisations gatekeepers play an important role in 
accessing data, particularly company information that could be considered as 
commercially sensitive. In this research, the gatekeeper role was complex and 
involved a range of individuals with different interests or agendas and the use of 
contracts and control mechanisms. The experience seems to reflect what Lee (1999), 
has previously noted that, “gatekeepers often allow researchers into a setting, but 
use formal agreements and procedures in order to control their activities” (p.124).  
Furthermore, although the company had few formal, and accessible data recording 
systems, there  were  informal processes about how to access information which, at 
each stage, needed renegotiating with different individuals, and involved 
navigating new procedures. For example, each department employed their own 
recording systems (spreadsheets, paper systems, electronic filing systems, etc.) and 
the responsibility for maintaining and sharing these systems was not consistent 
across departments. Some departments included an individual (such as an 
administrator) who had broad knowledge and responsibility across the department, 
whilst in other work areas each individual established and maintained their own 
records. The range of, and various types of gatekeepers  alongside the complex 
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procedures for accessing information both hampered the data collection process and 
increased the time involved in the fieldwork stage.  
 
A further issue regarding gatekeepers was based on how gatekeepers sought to 
redefine research requirements. In some occasions when gatekeepers were 
approached about accessing documents or files and discussing particular projects, 
instead of providing them, they attempted to figure out and select documents based 
on what they thought the researcher wanted. By doing this they provided data that 
differed from that requested or prioritised what they believed was more important. 
This type of behaviour has been the focus of much organisational research (Hartley, 
2004) and in this research it occurred more frequently than expected. At times, 
despite explaining what documents were required, gatekeepers chose to ‘re-cast the 
net’ when attempting to find them. This hindered the data collection process on a 
number of occasions; whilst trying to access the archive, whilst looking for internal 
organisational documents and bid or tender documents, whilst locating interview 
respondents both past and present, and in the responses from some of the 
interviews.  
 
Collectively, these main issues experienced by the researcher briefly outlined above, 
highlight the need for organisational researchers to possess a number of fieldwork 
skills. Researchers need to not only learn the methodological and analytical 
processes of particular methods, but also develop negotiation, communication and 
social skills in order to navigate gatekeepers who re-interpret what it is the 
researcher is actually looking for and understand complex social arrangements 
within organisations. Despite the fortunate set-up of the PhD research which 
allowed the essential access arrangement, two ‘types’ of gate-keepers can be 
identified which impacted on this research project: 
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1) The ‘access agent’ or ‘outer gatekeeper’- these individuals provide basic 
entry to the data collection site but do not hold the information required to 
form part of the substantive data collection. They are vital contacts to ensure 
access is gained to the wider organisation and to improve the chances of 
gaining the sought-after information from the appropriate people or 
departments.  For example, the original supervisor based within the 
organisation could be considered an access agent, helping to facilitate the 
research but not able to provide the information required for analysis.  
2) The ‘power gatekeeper’. These are individuals within the organisation who 
have responsibility for an area of the data required (such as a specific 
programme or contract manager); as such the researcher has been signposted 
to them through the access agent to acquire the necessary data. However, 
receiving the information requires time for a relationship to be established as 
this individual may limit the amount of information they provide. From the 
experience here, there appeared to be a lack of understanding as to what was 
required, a mismatch in information as to what was recorded in the first 
place, and an unwillingness to relinquish information from within their 
control.  
 
The third complexity of the gatekeeper role centres on the limited number of well-
informed power gatekeepers. This proved time consuming and problematic 
throughout the collection process. One of the main problems was that the overall 
contact for the organisation (the original access agent), ‘signed-off’ on the original 
data collection process, assured that the texts, documents, accounts and individuals 
existed and the data was accessible. In practice, this was not always the case and 
after a little digging within departments or with individuals it was clear that there 
was the ‘appearance of empires’. That is, many departments and gatekeepers 
publicised their ability to control and manage certain areas of work. Any problems 
or shortfalls they experienced were somewhat hidden from those outside of their 
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department and as such, many documents or data sets were simply assumed to exist 
and operate in a particular way, when in practice this was not the case (unless they 
were required by the funders and auditors). Whilst some programme information 
was therefore well collected and recorded, organisation documents, management 
files, and internal processes were not.  
 
Finally, whilst there were issues for the researcher in developing relationships with 
each type of gatekeeper, for process-based research there was a further difficulty as 
individuals fulfilling these roles also change over time. Data collection processes 
were affected as gatekeepers entered or left the organisation recording processes 
changed. In organisations such as the one studied in this research one of the main 
problems was that the restructuring of processes and departments meant that new 
gatekeepers (and access) had to be constantly renegotiated or discovered. With 
regard to the longitudinal aspect of this research there were difficulties in accessing 
formal documents and reports from restructured departments as it was unclear who 
would now have responsibility for them and how or when data would have 
previously been recorded.  
 
Although gathering information from individuals and the organisation as a whole 
was a largely positive experience (and without the original consent none would 
have been possible) there were a number of hindrances to the ideal research design 
process initially developed during the planning stage. Whilst the PhD arrangement 
and commitment was outlined by the organisation at an early stage (which is 
considered to be best practice in organisational research-see Clegg and Hardy, 
1996), undertaking process-based research in organisations continued to present 
difficulties during the fieldwork, which were particularly time-consuming and 
involved a continual refining of the research plan. Due to such pragmatic access, 
regulation and data storage issues (alongside the conceptual approach to studying 
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organisational change), the research strategy employed a number of data collection 
methods. The intention was to not only ‘fill in the gaps’ but to also provide 
comprehensive evidence and triangulating the information gathered from 
documents and interviews. This was particularly important when consistent sources 
of data (such as a full set of board reports, or access to all of the previous CEO’s) 
were not available. 
 
4.9 Ethical considerations 
The remaining part of the chapter evaluates and discusses relevant ethical issues. 
Although ethical considerations are only discussed here in a sub-section of this 
chapter, ethical considerations underpinned both the data collection process, and 
the handling and presentation of findings as, “ethics encompass a set of empirically 
and theoretically driven issues that permeate the entire research process” (Bell and 
Wray-Bliss, 2009, 83). This was deemed particularly necessary due to the unusual 
relationship of this study where the researcher and the organisation (subject of the 
study) had both formal and informal relations during the research period. 
Consequently, this relationship required ethical considerations to be continually 
(re)considered throughout the research process.  
 
The research was broadly guided by the ESRC Research Ethics Framework (ESRC, 
2006), although with an acknowledgment of the concerns from some organisational 
researchers regarding the potential of the Ethics Framework to restrict the ability of 
researchers to critically examine organisations. Bell and Bryman (2007) argue that 
under this framework organisations are constituted as participants, or individuals, 
and as such, should be the subject of ethical considerations. However, Bell and 
Wray-bliss (2009, p.87) claim that the framework provides protection to 
organisations from critique, and collectively organisational researchers should be 
 145 
wary of the impact of ethics requirements on research questions and findings. 
Nevertheless, in practical terms the Ethics Framework provided a useful guidance 
for initiating the basic ethics process and legitimating the research process 
employed. This research adheres to the University of Edinburgh’s Research Ethics 
Framework and the Research Ethics Checklist was completed during the research 
design stage. This research complies with all the ethical considerations suggested in 
the Frameworks, in particular in terms of the anonymisation of respondents and 
data.  
 
Ethical concerns were not restricted to the completion of standard ethics reports (i.e. 
adhering to the formal bureaucratic rules governing the ethical relationship), but 
drawing on Bell and Wray-Bliss, (2011, p.89), throughout the research “ethics were 
viewed as a matter of beliefs, thoughts and values as well as actions”. As such, 
alongside well-known issues of anonymisation and the confidentiality of 
respondents, the approach adopted in this study included a consideration of the 
position of the researcher and the interrelationship with existing organisational 
power structures, including between the organisation and control of the research 
project as discussed below. There are three main ethical considerations for this 
research project which are provided with further coverage below. The first centres 
on the issue of informed consent, the second on the anonymisation process, and the 
third on the role and dynamics of researcher and subject relationship.  
 
First, in order to ensure that the interviewees participated voluntarily in the 
research, free from any pressure and threat, it was vital to gain their consent 
throughout their involvement in the project (David and Sutton, 2004). Respondents 
were provided with an informed choice about their participation which included an 
option to withdraw from the research at any point (ESRC, 2006, Marvasti, 2004). The 
original research design agreement included consent by the organisation to access 
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documents, individuals and records. Consent was also provided by all respondents 
on an individual basis. Information on the purpose of the research was provided 
during interview arrangements and at the beginning of each interview. Informed 
consent did however become more complex when the researcher became part of the 
daily participation and the routine appearance in the lives of those in the 
organisation. The position of the researcher could have encouraged participants to 
forget that their interactions and conversations are the subject of study (Bell and 
Wray-Bliss, 2011, p.85). Employees within the organisation were fully informed of 
the research prior to and during the ethnographic period to reduce the effect of the 
relationship. 
 
Second, while in organisational research there are many instances where 
organisations that authorize research access are not anonymised in publication (Bell 
and Wray-Bliss, 2011), ethical considerations in this research study also included a 
commitment to maintain the privacy of research subjects, ensuring confidentiality 
and anonymity of data where appropriate. Bulmer (1988, p.156) argues there is, “an 
obligation in any material that is published to safeguard the organisation from 
revelations that could be harmful to its commercial activities or its reputation.” 
Bulmer suggests the use of anonymity in naming the organisation and, “possibly 
not too closely identifying the locality in which it is situated” (ibid). This advice was 
accepted and the organisation was given a pseudonym. This was viewed as a 
requirement due to both the commercial aspects of the data sources and the detailed 
examination of the actions and behaviour of the organisation.  Documents were 
anonymised to ensure that the name of the organisation or department was not 
compromised during the referencing procedure. Both internal and external 
documents were renamed within a source database based in an Excel spreadsheet. 
The existence of the database ensures that the references used in the findings are 
traceable and verifiable. Those documents and texts which have been referenced 
exclusively at specific points in the thesis are included in the database along with 
 147 
other sources which were necessary for background information and research 
framing. In order to improve the readability of the thesis, all anonymised sources 
are noted in the footnotes throughout the chapters.  
 
4.10 Summary 
This chapter has presented the research strategy and outlined the methods 
employed in the data collection process. It has outlined that a case study strategy 
based on a mixed methods approach involving interviewing, document analysis, 
accounts analysis and ethnography, was utilised to operationalize the theoretical 
framework presented in chapter three.  
 
Each research method employed has been discussed in this chapter, with particular 
attention given to the contribution of a qualitative mixed methods approach. 
Furthermore, detailed reflections on the data collection process and how these 
contribute to wider discussions of organisational research methods have been 
included. The chapter concluded with a discussion of research ethics and particular 
attention was given to the rare funding situation which created this PhD 
arrangement.  
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C HAP TER  5  -  T HRE E  P HA SES  O F 
C HA NGE  
 ALBASE 1983-2010 
This chapter provides a description of Albase’s activities and its involvement in the 
delivery of employment services from 1983-2010. It also discusses Albase’s main 
activities, their organisational structure and their resource profile to demonstrate 
how it changed over the time period studied. The purpose of this chapter is to 
describe the detail and context to the organisation and provide the required 
background knowledge for the discussions in the following chapters. The following 
three chapters focus on particular aspects of change in more detail and connect to 
the theoretical discussions presented earlier.   
 
The chapter begins with a detailed discussion of the traditional activities of Albase 
and how these were financed and delivered. Following this, there is a detailed 
discussion of the welfare-to-work quasi-market and the introduction of market 
mechanisms and programmes between 1999 and 2010. Whilst much background 
detail is provided in order to demonstrate the policy changes within the 
organisational field, the quasi-market development is discussed from the 
perspective of Albase and the ways in which it interacted with the introduction of 
and delivery of welfare-to-work programmes.  Following these organisational field 
discussions there is a short section which outlines briefly how Albase changed in 
terms of their resources and the number of employees to provide some illustration 
of the basic development of the organisation. It also outlines the other areas of work 
outside of employment support that Albase were involved in. The final section of 
this chapter pulls together the narrative of how the organisation changed over time 
and contends that three phases can be identified based on the data gathered.  
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The purpose of this chapter is not to argue that these changes are the sole or direct 
outcome of Albase’s involvement in welfare-to-work quasi-market. This chapter is 
for description and illustration purposes as issues of association and the theoretical 
explanations are considered in the following three chapters.  
 
5.1 A brief background to Albase 
According to the information gathered during the course of this ESRC research 
project, Albase has a distinctive history and association with its policy context and 
locality. The organisation was established in the 1980s in central Scotland, originally 
as a small location based regeneration and employment project. In its early days  
Albase was comprised of only two or three employees (one of which was a  
previous city council employee who gained the role as the founding CEO). Albase 
spent most of its early years linked to and supported by the city council. Many of 
the board members were also council representatives, and much of the early 
support from 1983 to 1990 (both financial and organisational) came from council 
employees, council members and local resident and community groups. As 
discussed in more detail throughout this chapter and chapter six, the origins and 
development of the organisation are intrinsically linked to the availability of 
European funding, the increase in male unemployment in certain parts of the 
region, and a drive from the then Labour led city council to create temporary 
employment opportunities in the local area9. 
 
                                                     
9 Anon Doc 10; Anon Doc 57; Respondent Hamilton 
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From the interviews with some of the early employees in Albase there appears to 
have been two main drivers for the creation and development of the organisation: 
the desire of local representatives and community members, and the drive from 
those original employees to create and design an organisation that could effectively 
negotiate the funding and community opportunities. Whilst it appears that there 
was an interest by and link to Labour Party members and the local branches of the 
party during the 1980s and early 1990s, Albase was founded as a charity and as an 
organisation which was not specifically politically affiliated. Over time there was a 
range of actors from other political parties involved in the management of the 
organisation including board membership and many of the original actors were not 
affiliated or associated with any existing political groups10.  
 
As Albase grew and changed the charity’s mission and values continued to centre 
on poverty reduction, environmental improvement and community development, 
albeit as discussed throughout the thesis the ways in which Albase has achieved 
these goals has shifted over time. Unlike many charities which are often the focus of 
change research, Albase’s activities were not focussed on lobbying the government 
departments in line with its missions and goals. However, there is some evidence 
that it has previously been involved in consultation responses, feedback responses 
to both local and central government departments, and employees have previously 
attended policy committee meetings and advocated for or against particular policy 
changes.  
 
It is important to note these aspects of the organisation in order to establish the 
boundaries for change and the possible impact that contracting had on change in 
                                                     
10 Anon Doc 58; Respondent Stein; Respondent McMahon; Respondent Sutton; Respondent Dalglish 
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Albase as much of the existing research on third sector change has drawn on ideas 
of mission drift and the loss of accountability or flexibility for criticism from third 
sector organisations involved in public service contracting. In the case of Albase 
whilst there was clearly some link to individuals and organisations more critical of 
government policy in the 1980s and 1990s (and it was arguably borne out of this 
alternative political view during this time), as an organisation its activities have 
been directed towards the delivery and creation of projects and programmes to 
achieve its goals rather than lobbying and criticising at the policy level. In chapter 
six there is a detailed discussion of the political context in which Albase was 
established and in chapters seven and eight there is further discussion of the shifting 
culture of the organisation in terms of the provision of employment support and the 
convergence with government and policy ideas. 
 
5.2 Albase’s traditional activities –  ILM Programmes 
The first organisational characteristic discussed is Albase’s main activity. By this I 
refer to the work which occupied the majority of Albase’s time and resources, and 
which provided the majority of income for the organisation. It is worth noting that 
Albase’s changing activities and resources over the time period covered here were 
extremely complex and some simplification has taken place in order to discuss and 
describe the organisational change which occurred.  
 
Between 1983 and 2001 Albase’s main activities involved the delivery of 
Intermediate Labour Market programmes (ILMs). In the 1980s and 1990s ILM 
programmes were popular with some policy makers, Local Authorities (LAs) and 
third sector organisations (TSOs) as local actors sought to reduce unemployment in 
post-industrial areas in the UK. The ILM approach was used in areas of high 
unemployment where long term unemployed (LTU) people in receipt of 
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employment benefit (predominately those claiming out for work benefits for over 12 
months), were offered, often through a programme managed by a TSO, temporary 
employment positions in order to gain training and work experience (Finn and 
Simmonds, 2003; Aiken and Bode, 2009).   
 
ILM programmes were not part of a national employment programme (Finn, 2003). 
Instead local-level organisations (typically TSOs established by or supported by 
public sector organisations) across the UK developed individual ILM projects 
through drawing on a number of available resources. Whilst this ILM approach was 
often associated with employment policy, due to the nature of the funding and the 
emphasis on participants undertaking paid work, many ILM projects also involved 
regeneration, environmental and community development work (Dench et al, 2006). 
According to Finn (2003, p.5) organisations delivering ILM projects,  “typically rely 
on a combination of funding streams and most stress the importance of the 
contribution they make to physical and social regeneration. Their primary focus is, 
however, on improving employability through also providing training and personal 
support”.  
 
In terms of creating employment the aim of the ILM programme was to improve the 
likelihood of labour market entry for jobseekers that had been out of work for a 
prolonged period of time11. Marshall and Macfarlane (2000, p.5) argued that the ILM 
concept was, “based on the premise that there are people so far removed from the 
mainstream labour market that they do not participate in it and have little influence 
on it”. As outlined in Figure 5.1 below, they argued that employers draw labour 
from the shorter term unemployed, and as such, “the objective of an ILM 
                                                     
11 Anon Doc 5  
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programme is to provide a parallel (intermediate) labour market, within which the 
long term unemployed can gain enough ‘employability skills’ to compete effectively 
in the mainstream labour market” (ibid). This was the same view adopted by Albase 
throughout most of the 1980s and early 1990s.12  
 
“The rationale behind the adoption of the ILM approach is to engage with 
those individuals who are so far removed from the mainstream labour market 
that they play no role within it.13” 
 
Figure 5.1: Marshall and MacFarlane’s perception of the ILM in 
relation to the labour market 
 
Source: Marshall and Macfarlane (2000, p.5) 
 
                                                     
12 Anon Doc 20   
13 Anon Doc 19 
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Through Albase’s ILM projects job-seekers developed work-based skills, undertook 
job-training and gained work experience in order to move nearer to the labour 
market14. Albase’s approach to ILM project design supposed that the LTU needed an 
extended period of real work experience in a real job setting and some sort of 
training and qualifications to access jobs in the labour market15. In many ILM 
projects, participants (who may have also been tenants where work was 
undertaken) were trained and supervised to deliver services to other job seekers and 
were hired on a temporary basis as employees for Albase16. From the evidence 
collected it appears that ILMs operated by Albase emphasised training and human 
development as requisite to ensuring longer term labour market attachment17. 
Furthermore, the ILM model replicated normal workplace discipline, including 
support with induction and training and most ILMs involved the option of working 
towards a vocational qualification dependent on the level of job18. The intention was 
to instil work place behaviour into ILM trainees, and at the same time improve the 
housing and shared spaces in deprived neighbourhoods. As such, whilst 
employment support was a key part of the ILM model, Albase also recorded and 
promoted the social and environmental benefit of the ILM programmes. For 
example,   
 
“Draught proofing and loft insulation have been the core business of Albase 
since the organisation began. A total of 110,000 houses were insulated (with 
draught proofing, loft insulation, pipes and tank jackets) between 1983 and 
1997.”19  
 
                                                     
14 Anon Doc 20; Anon Doc 29 
15 Respondent Hamilton 
16 Respondent McMahon; Anon Doc 21 
17 Anon Doc 18  
18 Respondent: Stein 
19 Anon Doc 22, 2000  
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5.3 The Community Programme 
Albase was established in 1983 and its first activities began in 1984 insulating homes 
in deprived areas with poor housing, using funding from the Local Authority and 
the national employment programme of the day, the Community Programme (CP), 
which is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Albase’s ILM programmes 
initially focussed on combining issues such as fuel poverty, poor housing and 
deprived neighbourhood spaces, with policy aims of reducing unemployment and 
improving community development. As such, their operations straddled a number 
of policy contexts such as housing, poverty, public space, environment, and 
employment20.  
 
Most ILM programmes operated by Albase in the 1980s provided temporary 
employment for male job seekers from the immediate localities of the 
neighbourhood project, employed for 52 weeks on projects simulating real 
workplace conditions21. Whilst these early ILM projects focused on a narrow range 
of work areas (home insulation and environmental upgrading associated with 
housing renewal), later versions of the ILM model in the 1990s included call centre 
and childcare training which attracted a number of female participants22. The ILM 
model was Albase’s main approach to employment support and organisational 
activities for the first ten years of operation and, despite much organisational 
change, it remained one work stream in the organisation’s larger work portfolio in 
the 2000’s.  
 
                                                     
20 Anon Doc 20; Anon Doc 22; Anon Doc 27  
21 Anon Doc 28 
22 Respondent: Quinn; Anon Doc 35 
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The organisation’s original activities were limited to the areas in which ILM 
agreements and projects had been designed. Finn (2003) found that this was also 
true of most ILM programmes which are not only region specific (due to the 
availability of funding sources) but also local authority or neighbourhood specific. 
As such, the number of participants involved in an ILM project was often limited to 
relatively small groups (compared to the figures associated with national 
employment programmes). For example, the major UK survey of ILMs carried out 
by Finn and Simmonds (2003, p.I) estimated that there were only 14,000 ILM places 
in 2001/2. For Albase many individual ILM projects involved only between 12 and 
30 participants, although collectively there were years (such as 1995) where there 
were 793 ILM participants across a range of ILMs23. As such, the ILM model cannot 
be compared directly with national programmes and ILM projects did not always 
feature in national employment programme statistics (Finn and Simmonds, 2003; 
SEU, 1999). Nevertheless, the ILM approach was funded in part by national 
employment programmes and (as discussed in chapter six) was ubiquitous in the 
political ideology of the time.   
 
5.4 ILM funding design 
For the delivery of ILMs, Albase drew funding from a range of policy fields and 
funding bodies. Collectively, this funding was structured into ‘project-based’ ILMs 
delivered in local neighbourhoods and public spaces. Government funded 
employment support programmes (such as the CP) only paid amounts to Albase 
similar to weekly benefit rates of the claimant. In order to provide training and 
undertake the work involved in the ILM, Albase ‘match-funded’ (McGregor et al, 
1997) with other resources to cover the cost of providing training, equipment, and 
                                                     
23 Anon Doc 10 
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supervision. For example, the funding for equipment came from an environmental 
source as the outcome of the work in some ILMs was environmental improvements 
(see Figure 5.2). Albase applied to EU sources such as the European Social Fund 
(ESF) which sought to fund projects which improved green spaces in cities. The 
funding to cover training costs and supervisors was sourced from specific training 
pots such as the Scottish Government’s Training for Work (TfW) fund. Further 
funding to cover project costs was gained through agreements with the project 
location’s landlord, which in most cases was the Local Authority or a Housing 
Association (Mcgregor et al, 1997; Finn, 2003;). A Service Level Agreement (SLA) 
was often made between the landlord and Albase agreeing to pay for the outcome 
of the project, such as insulation improvements to their properties. Finally project 
costs would be completed with funding from employment support sources linked to 
programme participants (the ‘trainees’), and as such the temporary position on the 
programme (lasting from 6 to 12 months) attracted funding from national and 
regional government employment support/job creation funds. Collectively, this 
approach created temporary employment, paid benefit recipients a wage, provided 
training and work experience (McGregor et al, 1997).  
 
The original ILM programmes delivered by Albase were supported in Scotland by a 
range of organisations, including local authorities, European Structural Funds, 
Scottish Enterprise and the UK employment service through programmes such as 
the CP. Later versions in the 1990s and 2000’s were funded by similar sources but 
the CP was replaced by the Employment Training programme, and then in the late 
1990s by the New Deals (Finn, 2003). From the data gathered it appears that the role 
of TSOs in the delivery of ILMs was predominately the outcome of funding 
eligibility rules from EU funding24. It was also due to the regulations attached to 
                                                     
24 Respondent: Sutton 
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public sector funding pots which would not support job creation in industries that 
may lead to job displacement. As such, attached to most ILM funding was a 
requirement that the work undertaken provided community or environmental 
benefit (Maxwell, 1989). 
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Figure 5.2: A simplified diagram of a typical environmental ILM project  
 
Source: Author’s own  
(Based on information compiled from Finn, 2003; McGregor et al, 1997; anon doc 10; anon doc 19; anon doc 20). 
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Albase’s ILM model was originally designed in alliance with the local City Council 
in 198325. Whilst the first few years for Albase centred on developing ILM projects in 
specific city neighbourhoods, once the design and funding sources was identified 
and understood, employees in Albase replicated the model in a number of other 
locations that had access to EU funding, the national CP funds and support and 
funding from the Local Authority26. Over the past thirty years, Albase operated the 
ILM model by predominantly replicating it across neighbourhoods in Scotland and 
the North East of England. Each ILM programme (or regeneration project) operated 
by Albase was relatively small in scale and operated within specified 
neighbourhoods involving the physical regeneration of shared public spaces in 
residential areas. Further amendments to the model included home insulation and 
heat improvement projects in Local Authority owned housing27.   
 
Example A provides an example of an ILM project funding structure. In this 
example, Albase created an ILM project in a residential location working in 
partnership with the Housing Association (a third sector organisation which 
provided social housing and acted as the site landlord). The project sought to create 
12 jobs each lasting 52 weeks. Due to the turnover of participants the project 
provided employment for 27 people over this time period; 19 were funded through 
TfW (an employment support programme funded by the Scottish Government) 
whilst 8 were funded by the New Deal (a UK employment programme discussed in 
more detail later in this chapter). The project sought to improve the shared outdoor 
space in the residential area by upgrading the fencing and landscaping, and by 
                                                     
25 Respondent: Hamilton 
26 Respondent: McMahon; Respondent: Hamilton 
27 Anon Doc 5; Anon Doc 11 
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improving the rubbish storage area. The participants received training and support 
towards gaining relevant qualifications associated with the work involved. Figure 
5.3 below displays the funding arrangement for this project.  
 
Figure 5.3: An example of an ILM funding arrangement 2006 
Source Amount
City Council 101,400£ 
Communities Scotland 119,157£ 
Housing Association 8,511£       
ESF 53,864£    
Scottish Government 12,666£    









Source: Author’s own adapted from Anon Doc 1128  
 
The organisation grew by replicating the ILM model in a number of locations29. 
Consequently, Albase grew over time from single localised projects into one 
organisation with a small number of core (permanent) staff30. By 1999 a report by the 
University of Glasgow for the European Commission described Albase as, “the 
largest Intermediate Labour Market organisation in Europe31.” Between 1983 and 
                                                     
28 This information is not commercially sensitive and the source document is publicly available 
29 Respondent: McMahon 
30 Respondent: Sutton 
31 Anon Doc 26, 1999, p. 172 
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2010 Albase continued to deliver ILM projects. However, since the early 2000’s 
Albase’s main activity shifted from the delivery of ILMs to the delivery of welfare-
to-work programmes. The ILM activity gradually reduced during this time, in terms 
of the proportion of its activities, but also the number of ILM participants in real 
terms. A discussion of the reasons for the decline of ILM activities is the focus of 
chapter six.  The introduction of welfare-to-work programmes in the late 1990s is 
discussed in the following section.  
 
5.5 Welfare-to-work activities 1997-2010 
Albase became involved in welfare-to-work programme delivery in the late 1990’s. 
As discussed in more detail in chapter six, this involved a move towards providing 
jobseekers with other types of support than previously included in the ILM 
approach. Instead of temporary employment and training, the welfare-to-work 
programmes focussed on the role of personal advisors in assisting jobseekers into 
employment through a range of job search and support options (Millar, 2000). 
Albase’s involvement in welfare-to-work contracting is integrated into the following 
section which describes the development of the welfare-to-work quasi-market over 
four phases. It is demonstrated in the next section that each phase represents a new 
step in the development of the quasi-market based on the contracting system, the 
payment structure and third sector involvement. Where the details could be found 
during data collection, Albase’s involvement in programme delivery in each phases 
is also included.  
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5.6 Phase One: Partnerships, the New Deals and competitive 
contracting.  
Whilst Albase was delivering a large number of ILM activities in the late 1990s, the 
Labour Party were elected into power and introduced a number of new 
employment programmes (Finn, 2003). This led to the initiation of a competitive 
quasi-market for employment services at a national level, which began with the 
introduction of the New Deal employment programmes in 1998 (Harari, 2010). The 
six New Deal programmes focused on population groups which were considered 
more difficult to help, including lone parents, young people, the long term 
unemployed (18 months or longer), the disabled and older workers (Nickson et al, 
2003). According to Webb (2003) the purpose of these programmes was to provide 
job seekers with guaranteed intensive employment assistance after a period of 
unemployment32. At the time, the use of independent providers was promoted as an 
innovative approach for the delivery of public services (DWP, 2006).  In order to 
achieve local flexibility, it was decided not to deliver the New Deal programmes 
exclusively through the national employment service, but rather to develop a 
collection of provider partners from the public, private and third sector (White and 
Riley, 2002). As there was only a limited history of contracting such services to non-
public sector organisations, the government did not have a large number of possible 
delivery organisations to select from for these early welfare-to-work programmes. 
The government worked with local authorities, established new delivery 
organisations and created partnerships to form a new delivery system (Finn, 2007). 
 
Over a period of approximately 6 years Albase was involved in the delivery of a 
number of the New Deal Programmes. The New Deal Young People (NDYP) was 
                                                     
32 Prior to the New Deal employment programmes were either administered through the job centre or benefit 
claimants could access localised employment programmes funded through local authorities or regional funding 
sources. 
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the largest of the six New Deal programmes, both in terms of numbers of 
participants and in terms of the programme budget (Millar, 2000; White and Riley, 
2002;). Across the UK there were 144 local programmes, with design and delivery 
entrusted to partnerships of agencies, companies and organisations. In each local 
'unit of delivery' the managers of the local offices of the public employment service 
had responsibility for forming a partnership with interested and appropriate 
agencies (Martin and Sunley, 2001). As part of a consortium Albase was awarded a 
contract for the delivery of the NDYP in a large Scottish city. Through the New Deal 
contracts, Albase was introduced to a new way of receiving resources as all 
providers were paid a weekly ‘on programme’ fee for each jobseeker referred from 
the Job centre, and some of the New Deals involved out-put based payment 
schedules (Beale, 2005). 
 
At this point, Albase did not compete with private sector organisations as only a 
small number of private sector organisations were exclusively involved in the early 
delivery stages, and many of the localities established public-private-third sector 
partnerships, involving input from the local public employment service, local 
authorities and in many cases established TSOs delivering small scale employment 
support programmes (DWP, 2006). The delivery of these programmes gradually 
involved competition with private sector organisations. In 2002 the early New Deal 
contacts were renewed and more districts were added which meant that about 10 
per cent of New Deal provision for the unemployed was delivered through the 
independent providers (Finn, 2003). 
 
Albase was also granted a contract to deliver the New Deal Disabled People 
(NDDP) programme which the Government introduced in 1998. When it was 
introduced, there were two main elements to NDDP: a personal adviser service and 
a series of pilot schemes to help sick or disabled people return to work. A system of 
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Job Brokers was introduced in July 2001 and rolled out nationally in October 2001 
(Webb, 2003; Hills et al., 2001). The first six pilots of the personal adviser service 
launched in 1998 were run by the Employment Service. A further six, managed by 
private sector, local authority and voluntary sector led consortia, started operating 
in April 1999. The Personal Adviser Service (PAS) Pilots were replaced by a national 
NDDP programme in 2001. In a synthesis evaluation of the programme published in 
2007, 42% of contract holders were identified as being from the third sector (Stafford 
et al., 2007).  
 
One of the first contracts which Albase received as part of the new welfare-to-work 
system was the contract for the operation of a Programme Centre for a region in 
Scotland. Programme Centres were introduced by the Labour Government to 
replace Jobclubs and Jobplan Workshops which were job search initiatives operated 
by the Employment Service under the previous government (see Gregg, 1991; Jones, 
1998). According to Webb (2003, p.72) Programme Centres were piloted in eight 
locations throughout Great Britain during 1997/98 and operated nationally from 
mid-1998 when "around 85% of ES [Employment Service] districts decided to move 
to Programme Centre provision.” External organisations were contracted to the 
Employment Service to run the Programme Centres which provided training and 
individual guidance in job search techniques, including telephone and interview 
skills and preparation of a CV and Jobseekers were obliged to agree a set of modules 
with personal advisers. Some of these modules were provided directly by Albase, 
whilst others were provided by partner or specialist organisations. As part of the 
Programme Centre contract Albase were also obliged to provide participants with 
access to facilities to support job search such as telephones, word processors and 
stationery (Webb, 2003). 
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An evaluation of New Deal Programmes by the DWP emphasised the importance of 
the flexibility afforded to organisations to design their services. As part of the push 
towards creating a market and encouraging organisations to develop innovative 
ideas, successful providers received additional payments for initial and sustained 
job outcomes amongst their clients (Hills et al., 2001). This phase allowed the 
government to gain information and knowledge about the capacity and success of 
external providers, whilst at the same time the range of programmes initiated 
provided a financial injection to develop or attract future delivery organisations. 
The importance of this phase for the development of the welfare-to-work quasi-
market (and for Albase) cannot be downplayed. Not only did the earlier 
programmes provide finance and guidance to help develop external providers such 
as Albase, it laid the foundations for a number of organisations to become involved 
as delivery partners and was a key period of change with the development of the 
DWP into a commissioning body (DWP, 2006).  
 
This period arguably represented something of a gear change in contracting policy 
with the initial development of a process for large-scale commissioning of 
employment programmes. Through the New Deal Programmes and the 
introduction of some contracted job support advice services, such as the Programme 
Centre and the New Deal Gateway the government was gradually creating delivery 
organisations for their future quasi-market. These programmes shifted the change 
process in Albase (discussed further in chapter seven). For Albase the New Deal 
contracts and the Programme Centre contract were their first experience of 
contracted job search and support delivery. As outlined in chapter six, whilst Albase 
delivered these contracts it also continued to deliver ILMs in its traditional way, 
running somewhat separate activities (although they incorporated some ILMs into 
the early New Deal contracts).  At this point Albase’s involvement was 
predominately through partnership arrangements with local government agencies.   
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5.7 Phase Two: Increasing capacity, competition and financial reward 
In this phase new welfare-to-work programmes were introduced and the 
institutional environment experienced a number of reforms. The creation of 
Jobcentre Plus in 2001 brought together the Employment Service and the non-
pension parts of the Benefits Agency to create a single point of delivery for benefits 
and welfare-to-work support (Finn, 2005). The creation of Jobcentre Plus (JCP) 
enabled the DWP to further extend welfare-to-work activity and the New Deal 
approach to other groups of benefit claimants apart from just JSA claimants (DWP, 
2006). Whilst the New Deal programmes were being delivered nationally, in 2000 
the government introduced the Employment Zone (EZ) programme in 15 areas of 
particularly high unemployment (Bruttel, 2005; Finn 2005). The prototype schemes 
emphasised a partnership approach and localized decision making. However, the 
Prototype Employment Zones also sought to increase the capacity of the market by 
providing experience and finance to established organisations and networks, with 
the explicit intention of enacting and attracting future providers to increase 
competition levels in the market (Haughton et al, 2000; Wiggan, 2009). This 
approach was also evident in the later EZs which were strongly influenced by a 
desire for more competition and outcome-related payment regimes.  
 
Griffiths and Durkin, (2007) contend that the government set about creating this 
quasi-market by introducing a tough funding regime, which rewarded providers for 
early employment results and resulted in a financial loss if a customer did not 
achieve a job outcome. The EZ contracts were the first to introduce the idea of a 
flexible job outcome payment with increased financial reward for quicker target 
achievement if they moved individuals into employment during the first 26 weeks. 
In terms of delivery structure this meant that these contracts varied from the New 
Deal programmes as the ‘on programme fee’ was removed and replaced with four 
staged payments, rewarding providers for a number of milestones (Finn, 2011).  EZs 
were a vital milestone in the development of the contracting paradigm as a whole, 
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as government command papers often cite the superior job outcome results and 
provider flexibility identified in the EZ evaluations as evidence in favour of 
contracting (DWP 2006a, DWP 2009a, DWP 2007a). However, Griffiths and Durkin’s 
(2007, p. 72) evaluation concluded that any performance benefits from Employment 
Zones “appears to be due to a highly incentivised funding regime in combination 
with their operation and financial flexibilities,” rather than the fact that delivery was 
through non-public sector organisations.  
 
Albase was not involved in the EZ pilots. However the EZ programme was 
expanded by the DWP in part to provide further employment services in areas of 
high unemployment, but arguably also to continue to develop the quasi-market 
system. A further addition to the contracting system at this stage was the 
introduction of new aspects of competition during the delivery of the contract by 
awarding two providers contracts in the same localities and introducing the 
possibility for jobseeker volumes to be switched to higher performing organisations 
(Hirst et al, 2006). The Multiple Provider EZs (MPEZs) were created in a number of 
urban areas with high unemployment, including in the locality of Albase. The 
introduction of the MPEZ contracts involved the use of increased competition as 
more than one contract was awarded per locality (Finn, 2005). Whilst in some areas 
there were limited moves to incorporate a level of choice for the user by awarding 
competing contracts in particular geographical areas such as in the MPEZ contracts 
where jobseekers originally had a choice between service providers (Griffiths et al, 
2006; Wiggan, 2009), in practice ‘user choice’ was on the periphery of welfare-to-
work contracting, and not central to the development of the practice. The contracts 
which Albase were involved in did not allow delivery organisations to advertise for 
jobseekers at the jobcentre and individuals were allocated randomly to each of the 
competing MPEZ providers. Aspects of choice, service content, delivery manner, 
location, and ‘product’ were not user choices as the DWP was the purchaser of 
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services not the jobseeker (DWP 2006a; DWP 2009a; DWP 2007a; Policy Research 
Institute, 2006; Hasluck and Green, 2007).  
   
In terms of market development, the financial arrangements for the EZ and the 
MPEZ initiated a noticeable development in the delivery of welfare-to-work 
programmes as a number of non-public sector organisations successfully won the 
contracts on offer (Hirst et al, 2006; Wiggan, 2009). The market also began to open up 
and attracted a number of new entrants outside of established partner 
arrangements, particularly from the private sector. The contracts for the MPEZ ran 
from 2004-2009 and Albase competed against Working Links, (a public/private 
partnership between the Employment Service, Manpower and Ernest and Young), 
and Reed in Partnership, an arm of the private sector Reed Recruitment company 
(Beale, 2005).  
 
Whilst the funding regime became outcome focussed, respondents stated that the 
payments received were relatively generous (compared to later programmes as 
discussed in chapters seven and eight). For the MPEZ, contractors received a 
number of payments. Firstly, Albase received a payment £300 for every mandatory 
claimant enrolled onto the programme with them. For each jobseeker between the 
age of 18-24 Albase received a payment of between £896 and £969. This amount 
increased to £1,288 and £1,738 if the jobseeker was aged 25 year or older. For each 
mandatory participant in multiple provider Employment Zones who stayed in 
employment for at least 13 weeks, Albase received a payment of £3,000 if the client 
entered employment at the end of stage 1, £2,000 if the participant entered 
employment out of a stage of the Employment Zone cycle other than stage 1, and for 
each lone parent voluntary participant who stayed in employment for at least 13 
weeks, Albase receive £1,200. As providers were also responsible for managing the 
benefit payments to jobseekers enrolled onto their service provision in the EZ, once 
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an individual entered employment, Albase received payments based on the 
equivalent of 21 weeks of JSA entitlement.  If contractors achieve pre-set contractor-
specific yearly targets they are entitled to a share of a yearly £1 million bonus in 
each Zone (Beale, 2005). 
 
Compared to previous location based employment programmes, the EZ 
programmes offered the potential for delivery organisations to access large amounts 
of financial resources. For example, it was estimated that in 2004/2005 alone the EZ 
received a total of £101million of funding (Beale, 2005, p.31). Beale (2005, p.32) also 
notes that the estimated the gross cost per job of EZ was £3,115 without benefit 
payments and £6,027 with benefit payments in 2005. Drawing on dominant ideas of 
NPM the distinctive features of EZs – payment by results, minimum regulation, 
operational and financial flexibilities, and provider competition– were, over time, 
intended by the DWP to drive through improvements in performance and service 
delivery in the quasi-market system it was developing (Davies, 2008). In order to 
understand the impact of the welfare-to-work contracts on Albase’s resources it is 
worth having a simplified snapshot look at Albase’s funding at the end of 2008. In 
the accounts for this year Albase recorded an income of approximately £9.2million 
from DWP contracts (NDDP, EZ and New Deal programmes) compared to only 
£245,000 from ESF, and including this figure, approximately £2 million in total from 
ILM related activities33.  
 
The MPEZ contracts ran concurrently with the New Deal Programmes throughout 
the UK, and other programmes introduced by the government such as Pathways to 
Work (PtW) a programme aimed specifically at health benefit claimants (see Barnes 
                                                     
33 Anon Doc 56 
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and Hudson, 2006), which Albase did not tender for nor deliver.  Arguably, phase 
one and phase two involved the introduction of welfare-to-work programmes 
which not only moved individuals into employment, but which also included 
funding and administration processes which developed the capacity of delivery 
organisations (including TSOs) so that a functioning quasi-market was developed 
that future welfare-to-work programmes could be competitively contracted-out in.   
 
5.8 Phase Three: Competition, large contracts and quasi -market reform 
With the introduction the Flexible New Deal (FND) programme in 2008 the quasi-
market entered a new contracting phase. Officially the FND replaced the existing 
New Deals and EZ provision, although in Albase’s experience there was some 
overlap as the FND commenced before the contracts for the EZ and NDDP were 
completed34. However, this phase of welfare-to-work contracting reflected a shift in 
the DWP’s approach to contracting welfare services. This was because the FND 
involved the introduction of prime-contractors, large contract regions and a 
growing emphasis on job outcome related funding (DWP 2008a; DWP 2009a).  
 
The DWP stated that overseeing only a limited number of contracts would save 
costs and allow organisations to invest in long term improvements to delivery 
(DWP, 2008a; Finn, 2010). These considerable changes to the administration of 
welfare-to-work contracts reflected the recommendations of the report by Freud 
‘Reducing Dependency, Increasing Opportunity: options for the future of welfare to work’ 
(2007). The report proposed a major restructuring of employment programmes and 
called for even greater private and third sector involvement in employment 
                                                     
34 Respondent: Evans 
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services, financed by savings to the tax payer from any job outcomes created (Freud, 
2007).  
 
The DWP envisioned a quasi-market in which 80% of its contracts were with a 
limited core of large prime organisations, with subcontractors ensuring local 
presence and specialist provision (Finn, 2010). According to Damm (2012, p.8) the 
reforms outlined in the report led to the introduction of, “a new lexicon based 
around the concept of ‘supply chains’, and in each district, ‘prime providers’ were 
commissioned to either provide services themselves, or subcontract delivery to 
other organisations”. The then Secretary of State for Employment, James Purnell 
MP, emphasised that the Government was “creating a market for the long term” 
that would “free” providers “from central control and allow them to innovate.”  
These performance based contracts represented “a major milestone in [the] welfare 
reform programme,” where “the rewards will be high, with longer contracts and a 
growing market” (Purnell, 2008) for successful providers.  
 
Arguably, the ‘multi-billion pound’ FND contracts encouraged larger for-profit and 
non-profit organisations to borrow and invest in service provision, based on an 
expectation of future income streams from outcome fees over an extended period 
(Finn, 2009; Vegeris et al, 2010; WPC, 2010). The contracting process for the FND also 
increased the amount of competition and customer choice beyond that seen 
previously by allowing prime contractors to secure a higher market share if they 
performed well. Arguably, as the contracts no longer sought to assist the 
organisational development of delivery organisations and develop the capacity of 
the quasi-market, some of the risks and expenditure associated with investment in 
employment assistance were shifted from the state to the contracted delivery 
organisations (Vegeris et al, 2010). 
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Albase competed for and secured a FND contract in 2008. It no longer applied for 
welfare-to-work contracts in partnership with other local agencies, although in the 
delivery plan for a number of welfare-to-work bids other third sector organisations 
were involved35. Albase’s experience reflected a larger trend in the quasi-market as 
by 2009 only 18% of 410 organisations in the evaluation by Armstrong et al (2010) 
delivered welfare-to-work programmes in partnership.  
 
Albase’s business model to secure the FND contract included a business loan from 
the bank to finance the first two years of service delivery.36 In 2009 they recorded a 
turnover of £2.8million from the FND contract; this figure grew to £12million for 
2010. Between 2005 and 2010 Albase received over £75.3 million in DWP contracts 
(Employment Zone, New Deals and Flexible New Deal). Figure 5.4 below outlines 
Albase’s income from these programmes between 2005 and 2010.  
 
                                                     
35 Anon Doc 15 
36 Respondent: Sutton 
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Source: Own working based on published annual accounts (the underlying data is 
included in Appendix Two. 
 
The delivery of the FND and the development of the FND phase two was halted by 
the election of the new Conservative-led Coalition government in 2010. The new 
government replaced the FND with the Work Programme and cancelled the second 
round of FND procurement scheduled for 2011 (Harari, 2010; DWP, 2011a). Given 
the amount that prime-contractors for the FND had reportedly invested in setting 
up the FND programme delivery and their supply chains, there was some 
disruption to existing contractors (including Albase) who had expected longer and 
larger contracts and more stability in the quasi-market (Mulheirn and Menne, 2008; 
Armstrong et al., 2011). 
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5.9 Phase Four: Increasing risk and the role of private sector  
In 2010 the introduction of the tendering round for the coalition government’s new 
employment programme signalled the arrival of phase four in the welfare-to-work 
quasi-market. The Work Programme incorporated all previous employment and 
welfare-to-work contracts37, including Albase’s contracts for the EZ, NDDP, and the 
FND. The contract size and value reflected the increased volume changes (as health 
benefit claimants are also subsumed into the programme) allowing providers to 
deliver larger contracts covering a ‘lot’ (equivalent to a UK region), and manage a 
series of sub-contractors across the region (DWP, 2011a; NAO, 2012). Prime 
contractors were expected to provide or subcontract individual, tailored support for 
eligible individuals requiring contractors to be both flexible in their approach and 
capable of managing the financial risk of investing in a payment by results model 
(Freud, 2010; DWP 2010d).  
 
Building on the reforms in the FND programme and the Commissioning Strategy 
(2008a), this phase further reduced the state’s financial responsibility and up-front 
contribution to the delivery of welfare-to-work programmes (Finn, 2011b). In 2010 
the new government claimed that the Work Programme, “represents a massive 
expansion of the payments by results principle, removing flat rate service fees and 
ensuring that we move to 100% outcome based contracts as soon as possible. For the 
first time, we will also be paying providers using the benefits savings that they help 
to generate, building value for money into these programmes in a way that hasn’t 
been possible in the past” (Grayling, 2011). Instead of funding programmes from the 
DWP’s own budget, known as the Department Expenditure Limit (DEL), funds 
came from the treasury managed benefits budget, called Annually Managed 
                                                     
37 Previous programmes had catered mainly for JSA with some separate programmes, such as Pathways to Work, 
focussing on health benefit claimants. The Work Programme includes JSA claimants, and a number of categories 
within the Employment Support Allowance benefit group.  
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Expenditure (AME) (WPC, 2012; Freud, 2010). This change centred on the idea that 
payments to providers for moving individuals into employment were made in lieu 
of savings to the treasury for the payment of out of work benefits.  The details of the 
funding model are discussed in chapters seven and eight. 
 
One of the most noticeable changes to the quasi-market structure was the 
introduction of a Preferred Suppliers Framework, commonly known as the ERSS 
Framework. The framework was designed to create a list of providers able to bid for 
the Work Programme as ‘Prime Providers’, taking the responsibility of managing 
supply chains in a given area (DWP, 2011b). The organisations on the ERSS 
Framework would have the option to bid for future welfare-to-work contracts and 
other public service contracts. Only organisations on the list could tender for future 
contracts in the prime provider role. The framework introduced a minimum 
turnover threshold for competing bidders of £20 million per annum, assessed at a 
pre-qualification stage (DWP, 2010b). Arguably, this aspect of the quasi-market 
reforms created higher entry barriers for delivery organisations as financial capital 
and specific organisational experience became necessary for market participation 
(see chapter seven and chapter eight).  
 
In 2010 Albase applied for and was accepted onto the ERSS in the two regions 
within the UK that it applied to be considered for. This meant that for future 
welfare-to-work programmes such as the Work Programme, Albase could tender to 
be a ‘prime provider’ (DWP, 2010c). Albase also applied to be a prime provider for 
the Work Programme in 2011 but was not successful in its bid. It was not part of the 
supply chain for the Work Programme and at the end of the research period covered 
the only welfare-to-work contracts it delivered were those which were coming to an 
end, such as the FND and the EZ contract that it still held at that point.    
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Despite the diversity of the size, structure and activities of TSOs involved in the 
delivery of previous welfare-to-work programmes, arguably TSOs became pigeon-
holed into the subcontractor role. The supply chain format encouraged private 
sector organisations with contract management experience (rather than employment 
support experience) into the prime contractor role and TSOs and delivery 
organisations further down the supply chain.  In 2009 (during the FND 
programme), a survey of DWP providers found that 44 per cent were from the third 
sector, compared to 25 per cent from the private sector and 31 per cent from the 
public sector (Armstrong et al, 2010, p.22). However, recent developments with the 
Work Programme saw a decline in the number of third sector organisations securing 
welfare to work contracts. In the Work Programme contract awards, approximately 
72 per cent of prime and subcontracting arrangements were awarded to the private 
sector, with the third sector acquiring only 19.4 per cent, despite many of the 
bidding TSOs in possession of welfare-to-work experience gained over the past 
decade (DWP, 2011c). In fact, 35 out of 40 (87 per cent) available prime contracts 
within the Work Programme were won by private sector organisations, with only 
three awarded to TSOs organisations38. Based on DWP volume predictions 
published in the tendering information for the contract, this equates to only 7 per 
cent of market share in prime contracting. It represents a significant decrease in the 
role of TSOs as contractual delivery partners with the DWP.  
 
In response to these contracting results, Chris Grayling the Minister for 
Employment stated that the third sector remained involved in welfare to work 
programme delivery, even if they were not represented at the new prime contractor 
level.  
 
                                                     
38 The remaining two were awarded to a public sector education organisation.  
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“The Work Programme will also mean a multi-million pound investment in 
the voluntary and community sector over the next five years. Our list of 
preferred bidders includes impressive third sector involvement with nearly 
300 third sector organisations involved in delivery of the Work Programme as 
sub-contractors, and two as prime contractors” (Grayling, 2011).  
 
This information from the DWP suggests that, although the proportion of third 
sector prime contractors declined, TSOs would still be involved in providing 
services through sub-contractor arrangements underneath the successful private 
sector prime providers. However, a further examination of the contracting awards 
revealed that only two private sector prime providers involved the third sector in 50 
per cent or more of their delivery strategy. In fact, of the 37 contracts awarded to 
private providers, 30 involve the voluntary sector in less than a third of sub-
contracting arrangements. Furthermore, 16 of these involve the third sector in 10 per 
cent or less. Subsequently, in this phase of welfare to work market development, the 
contracts were unequally distributed amongst private sector and third sector 
providers, suggesting that there has been a shift of resources within the market 
towards the private sector organisations. This is particularly noticeable in 
comparison to the higher level of involvement of the third sector in earlier phases on 
welfare-to work contracting (see Armstrong et al, 2010). 
 
Even for those organisations outlined in winning bids there were concerns that both 
the financial pressures of the programme, and the frequent position of third sector 
subcontractors as specialist providers, would only receive referrals for the 
individuals furthest from employment and who are least likely to trigger an 
outcome payment (Hudson et al., 2010, WPC, 2010). Furthermore, whilst the DWP 
created a financial structure to provide some funding to prime contractors at the 
referral stage (a one off small referral payment to the prime contractor), this was not 
always replicated in prime contractor supply chains. In 2010, the NAO reported that 
only three quarters of primes passed on the flat rate of payment even to specialist 
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contractors and over half of subcontractors were not in a position to cover all of 
their costs, especially small third sector organisations (NAO, 2010a). Although some 
relationships were rated as positive overall, only 38% of subcontractors claimed 
they would sign up to the same terms again.  
 
Between 1999 and 2010 the policy context and ‘rules’ of the market were constantly 
shifting. Through the four phases there was, arguably, a clear and intended 
development of the welfare-to-work market by the DWP as visible in Table 5.1 
below. Through the early phases this involved the creation of funding and support 
policies and programmes to develop TSOs and involved public-third sector 
partnerships (see Wiggan, 2009).  It also involved the design of contracts which 
would attract organisations operating in other markets and service delivery areas, 
this was most noticeable during the EZ contract which allowed the possibility for 
delivery organisations to generate a sizeable income39. The early phases sought to 
feed and grow the market to increase competition, and in the latter phases the 
market settled somewhat as providers become more established and experienced 
(Finn, 2011). The changes outlined in phase four reflected a move towards 
simplifying the market and reducing the transaction costs for the DWP of managing 
and monitoring a large number of complex contracting arrangements (see NAO, 
2011). Table 5.1 below summarises this information from this section of the chapter 
to show the development of the market, and the involvement of Albase in welfare-
to-work contracting throughout the period studied. 
                                                     
39 Respondent Madden 
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Table 5.1: Four phases on welfare to work contracting: the creation of a competitive market  
Phase Programme Institutional 
arrangement 









Public partnerships with TSOs,  
Small number of invited bidders and 
private sector organisations 
Programme Centre; New Deal 











Partnerships remain, but increasing 
competition between providers; increase 
in private sector organisations  
MPEZ; New Deal FTET; Continued 





Flexible New Deal  DWP Multiple 
contractor  (bypasses 
JCP) 
Medium sized sub-regional contracts; 
Private and Third Sector bidders 
FND1 (contracted until 2013) 
(continued EZ, NDDP) 
4: 
2010- 
Work Programme Prime Contractor 
(independent 
provider) 
Large contracts; Selected prime 
contractors and preferred bidders 
predominately private sector managing 
complex supply chains 
ERSS Framework; 
Failed WP bid; 
FND contract terminated; (end of 
previous contracts) 
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5.10 Identifying organisational change  
Ideally it would be possible to outline the exact number of ILM participants and 
welfare-to-work jobseekers involved in Albase programmes over time. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to generate this information from the data 
collected. It was also anticipated that through the information gathered in the 
accounts that the funding could be divided between types of employment 
programmes over time, unfortunately the data was not recorded in this way and 
this was also not possible. Appendix 1 provides an illustration of how Albase’s 
involvement in different policy contexts shifted over time. In these diagrams it is 
visible that Albase delivers some activities in policy areas which are not discussed in 
this chapter. This thesis focuses specifically on the delivery of employment 
programmes, however, some of the other policy contexts and activities are 
discussed in chapter eight as part of the consideration of resource diversification 
options.    
 
A number of structural changes occurred between 1983 and 2010. The early ILMs 
were undertaken by a number of organisations, linked, but structured as separate 
Intermediate Labour Market organisations.  In 2000 these were all unified under one 
organisation. Secondly, in the early days of the organisation (throughout the 80s and 
early 1990s) a number of spin-off organisations existed which were for-profit. These 
were either subsumed into the new unified organisation in 2000 or ceased their 
operations at this time. Albase were formally considered as one single organisation 
(although informally all the separate organisations had been operated by the same 
people and from the same offices. This period of change is viewed here as a 
consolidation process as the organisation became one unit.  
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Third, as outlined in the financial data below it is argued that the late 1990s and 
early 2000’s represented a transformational phase for Albase as the organisation 
became involved in welfare-to-work programmes and the delivery of new types of 
employment support. The third phase which was identified from the data collected 
is called the ‘growth’ phase. The section below describes the organisational changes 
experienced by Albase in terms of employee numbers and turnover (considered 
here as basic indicators of organisational size) in relation to these two phases. When 
Albase was established they had very few full-time and permanent employees. The 
first official records of the number of employees were from the first submitted 
accounts in 1986. The number of employees each year (as recorded in the annual 
accounts) is displayed in Figure 5.5. The graph shows that there was a gradual 
growth of employees up to 2004 before a reduction in 2008 and an increase in the 
final two years of this study. 
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Source: Author’s own based on the annual accounts. Data table available in 
Appendix Two. 
 
The ILM model involved projects with two or three permanent employees working 
with up to twenty ‘trainees’. Trainees in the early days of Albase were temporary 
participants on ILM programmes, the jobseekers. Therefore, the number of 
employees recorded in Albase’s figures also included ILM participants up to the 
2000’s. In order to demonstrate the changing structure of the organisation in terms 












































Source: Author’s own based on the annual accounts. Data table available in 
Appendix Two. (Data unavailable for 1988 and 1999). 
 
Figure 5.6 demonstrates that as the number of trainees reduced, the number of 
permanent staff increased over time. This demonstrates a shift in the human 
resource policy of the organisation and possibly a reflection of the changing 
activities in terms of employment service delivery as the ILM programmes 
decreased within the organisation and participants were no longer registered as 
temporary employees.  
 
So far, it has been described how Albase’s activities changed over the research 
period, and how elements such as the employee composition shifted over time. The 
final area covered in this chapter is a consideration of the shift in the financial 
income of the organisation, which involved a number of aspects. 
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Firstly, Albase’s ILM activities involved a number of funders and a range of policy 
context. Figure 5.7 outlines Albase’s total income over time. This graph provides a 
very basic idea of the organisation’s financial experience over the research period. It 
demonstrates that there were a number of years where Albase experienced a decline 
in income. From this data it appears that 1997 was a difficult year for Albase.  
Figure 5.7: Total Income 1986-2010 
 
Source: Author’s own based on the annual accounts. Data table available in 
Error! Reference source not found..  Adjusted to 2011 prices.  
 
It is suggested in this section that Albase was in a vulnerable financial position in 
the late 1990s and early 2000’s. If we look at the financial information in Figure 5.8 
below it is clear that post 1996 the organisation’s income began to increase and 
shows a healthy growth in line with the organisation’s involvement in welfare-to-
work contracting.  
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Figure 5.8: Financial Information 1986-2008 
 
Source: Author’s own based on the annual accounts. Data table available in 
Appendix TwoError! Reference source not found.. Adjusted to 2011 prices. 
 
However, whilst this information is useful, it only provides a limited understanding 
of the financial pressures. The following graphs therefore depict the findings from 
the account analysis and the ratio tests discussed in chapter four. According to the 
outcome from the current ratio test during the late 1990s and the first years of 2000’s 
Albase experienced some financial difficulty. These findings suggest that in 2000 
and 2001 Albase may have struggled to cover its liabilities when the figure fell 
below one. This means that their assets did not outweigh their liabilities by 2:1, 
which is the ideal score (ICA, 2008). If the figure is above one it means that short 
term debts can be paid, consequently this financial situation would have been a 
concern for the management team, as it suggests that Albase was experiencing poor 
financial health (although it was unlikely to be declared bankrupt). Since 2005 the 
figures for Albase have improved and they were in better financial health. 
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Figure 5.9: Current Ratio 1998-2008 
 
Source: Author’s own based on the annual accounts. Data table available in 
Appendix Two. 
 
Similarly, as visible in Figure 5.10 the Trading Cost Ratio suggests that in 1999 and 
2000 Albase’s activities scored low in terms of its profitability.  
 
Figure 5.10: Trading Cost Ratio 1998-2008 
 




These figures suggest that despite what initially looked like a steady (excluding 
1996) growth, there were more complex financial difficulties occurring at the 
organisation. These financial difficulties may have placed the organisation in a more 
vulnerable position. 
 
In fact from the financial data gathered it seems that since the early 2000s Albase’s 
finances were positively affected by their involvement in welfare-to-work funding.  
Respondents discussed the importance of DWP funds during this time as vital for 
the organisation’s continuation.  
 
“It turned out actually NDDP was probably, for a number of years, kind of a 
bit of a saviour for Albase, because it really kind of carried some of the 




This chapter has presented a simplified descriptive account of the changes which 
occurred in Albase in terms of the key organisational characteristics: activity, 
resource, and employees’ structure. Between 1983 and 2010 Albase’s funding and 
activities formed a complex arrangement which presented both data collection and 
description difficulties. Nevertheless, in a simplified form in Figure 5.11 the 
dominant story of organisation change for Albase is pulled together from the 
information presented previously in this chapter. It demonstrates that Albase’s 
development involved an early period of experimentation by the founders and 
                                                     
40Respondent Madden 
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original employees based on the ILM model and the availability of funding to 
support this approach. In the early 1990s when the various ‘strands’ of activity were 
brought into one organisation it is described here as a period of consolidation, in 
terms of organisational structure, activities and identity.  
 
Throughout the 1990s Albase remained dedicated to the ILM model and at the same 
time continued to grow through replication and expansion into new policy areas 
and geographical locations. The introduction of the welfare-to-work quasi-market in 
1999 instigated a transformation period in which Albase began to compete to deliver 
employment programmes which were less focussed on creating temporary 
employment based on training and work experience than the ILM approach. During 
this period of transformation Albase’s income from welfare-to-work contracts 
increased and the organisation began to grow in terms of permanent employee 
numbers and turnover. From the middle of the 2000’s Albase continued to grow and 
develop based on its involvement in welfare-to-work contracting, and its 
diversification of activities into environmental contracts alongside the continuation 
of some ILM activity. 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide the background to Albase and the 
foundation for the discussions in the following chapters. The empirical information 
presented here has told the basic (and somewhat simplified) story of Albase’s 
change over time. Due to the range of policies, programmes, and activities which 
the whole of Albase is involved in there has been some simplification in this 
chapter. The remaining chapters focus specifically on the transformation and 
growth period from the diagram and the role of the welfare-to-work quasi-market. 
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Figure 5.11: Organisational change in Albase 1983 to 2010 
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C HAP TER  6  -  S HI FT I NG A C TIV I TI ES   
THE DECLINE OF ILM PROGRAMMES AND THE 
RISE OF WELFARE-TO-WORK 
This chapter explores the transformation of Albase’s delivery of employment 
support from 1983 to 2010. It pays particular attention to the shift in activities in 
order to better understand the context in which Albase originated and developed. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the organisational field from this time and 
identify the institutional pressures which may have influenced organisational 
change. The chapter brings together the institutional development over this period 
with Albase’s transformation.  It traces the changing activities of the organisation 
and links these changes to the broader political and social shifts in the 
organisational field. In particular, it focuses on the institutional changes to 
employment support activities (as experienced by Albase) and outlines Albase’s 
move from primarily delivering Intermediate Labour Market (ILM) programmes in 
the 1980s and 1990s, to predominately ‘earning income’ through welfare-to-work 
programmes by 2010. It argues that the decline in ILM activities in the organisation 
was brought about by three interrelated shifts: the ‘activation turn’ and the move 
towards a work-first approach in UK labour market policy; the rise of New Public 
Management (NPM) and contractualism, which changed the governance system of 
the organisational field; and changes at the micro-level to the internal structure of 
Albase as influenced by the welfare-to-work quasi-market.  
 
Whilst exploring the shifting activities of Albase, the chapter focuses on welfare-to-
work contracting and argues that the organisational change experienced by Albase 
was directly influenced by the introduction of welfare-to-work contracting and the 
political ideas of “workfarism” (Jones 1996; Mead, 2001; Dostal, 2008). It 
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demonstrates how these ideas penetrated the activities of the organisation, 
particularly in terms of mandating, sanctioning, and the payment of wages for 
participants of employment programmes. The findings suggest that the reduction of 
Albase’s ILM activities may be better understood through neoinstitutional and 
resource dependency theory rather than transaction cost economics, which does not 
appear to explain the organisational changes identified. However, it is also argued 
that whilst both ILMs and welfare-to-work programmes were types of activation 
measures, the continued delivery of ILMs was restricted and discouraged due to the 
rise of contractualism and NPM administration techniques which emphasised cost 
and ideas of efficiency in the delivery of employment programmes. It is argued 
below that the ILM did not meet the requirements of a cost-efficient support option 
and therefore some elements of organisational change could be attributed to 
neoinstitutional economic explanations for change.  
 
6.1 The ILM approach as an Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP)  
Due to the emphasis on providing work experience and improving the 
employability of jobseekers, the ILM approach introduced in the UK during the 
1980s was considered part of an Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) aimed at 
moving the long term unemployed into the labour market (see Campbell, 2000; 
Finn, 2003).  Whilst this chapter will show that Albase’s activities remained within 
the broad context of ALMPs, it will also argue that the change in activities reflects 
the shift in the approach to ALMP at the UK level from the 1980s to 2010.  
 
According to Bonoli (2010) four types of ALMP can be defined based on the extent 




Figure 6.1: Four types of Active Labour Market Policy 
 
Source: Bonoli, 2010, p.441 
 
This is a useful typology for understanding the change in activities for Albase as it 
provides a way to differentiate between their ILM activities and their welfare-to-
work activities which were briefly outlined in the previous chapter. It is argued that 
Albase’s activities moved from providing ‘Occupation’ ALMP (the ILM projects), 
which according to Bonoli’s typology are weak in their promarket orientations and 
investment in human capital, towards the delivery of programmes and activities 
defined as ‘Employment Assistance’ (p.441). In this typology welfare-to-work 
programmes are considered weak in human investment (due to their limited 
investment in skills development and training), but strong in their promarket 
orientation due to the contractualist approach. It is argued in this chapter that 
Albase’s shift towards delivering activities with a strong promarket orientation led 
to a number of organisational changes.  
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In the following section it is argued that the development of the ILM model during 
the 1980s was closely aligned with the introduction of ‘workfare’ ideas (Dolowitz, 
1997). Dostal (2008, p.22) contends that, “workfare relates to a concept in which 
‘benefits are given in return for work’, thereby suggesting policies in which ‘those 
who refuse to participate in training or employment lose state benefits’ (Digby 1989, 
p.113)”. According to Lødemel and Trickey (2001) there are three core components 
of workfare policies; their compulsory character; their primary focus on work; and 
the direct targeting of clients in the lowest tier of state assistance. However, as will 
be discussed, the ILM approach delivered by Albase was not compulsory, involved 
education and skills-development and, therefore, demonstrated some ALMP and 
human development characteristics.  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s ‘workfare’ ideas became popular in employment policy 
discussions (Lødemel and Trickey, 2001) and some ideas infiltrated into the design 
of employment support funding (such as the Community Programme discussed 
below). However, Albase did not make its activities compulsory41. Instead it appears 
that the ILM programmes demonstrated a ‘human development’ approach (Bonoli, 
2010) as they were voluntary and included vocational training. Whilst its ILM 
activities remained largely voluntary in nature, the introduction in 1997 of welfare-
to-work programmes with a promarket orientation shifted the general ethos of the 
organisation towards supporting workfare ideas, including compulsory attendance 
for individuals enrolled on welfare-to-work programmes. These links between 
Albase’s activities and the political influences of the organisational field are 
discussed below, with particular attention given to the impact of the contracting 
system and quasi-market environment on the organisation as a whole and their 
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continued delivery of ILM programmes (which were mostly funded outside the 
welfare-to-work quasi-market).  
 
6.2 Shifts in the organisational field: ideas of workfare  
In the UK, the development of the ILM model was closely linked to the political 
environment in the early 1980s (Finn and Simmonds, 2003). In 1982 the ruling 
Conservative administration reconsidered the existing relationship between the 
state and job-seekers, and moved away from ideas of national planning and labour 
market regulation based on temporary job creation, and national workplace policies. 
Instead the administration favoured the introduction of the first “benefit-plus” 
programme where job seekers could receive benefit payments plus a small ‘top-up’ 
if they participated in community based work projects. This initial idea sought to 
link benefit receipt to an individual’s work-related activity whilst they continued to 
search for employment (see Howells, 1980; Gray, 1999; Tusting and Barton, 2007). 
 
Assuming that this would reduce benefit dependency (Clarke, et al, 2001) and 
increase employment levels (Tusting and Barton, 2007), the relationship between the 
state and jobseekers continued to be adapted and developed over the subsequent 
thirty years. The ideological reform of the welfare state involved a shift towards re-
conceptualisation of the role of the state in the provision of employment benefits 
from the 1980s until the mid-1990s (Clarke et al, 2001). Whilst at first glance such 
schemes seemed to offer job seekers an opportunity to gain temporary employment 
and remain job-ready, the move was arguably also part of a larger ideological shift 
towards introducing ideas of ‘workfare’ (Jones, 1996). The introduction of the 
workfare idea was part of a broader agenda that created the policy and funding 
environment in which Albase was established and predominately operated in 
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(delivering temporary employment programmes) prior to the introduction of the 
welfare-to-work market in the late 1990s (see chapter 5). 
 
Pressure for workfare reforms came from a range of influential sources from the late 
1970s until the 1990s. This included MPs such as (the then Cabinet Member) Michael 
Heseltine, and Sir Ralph Howell42 through his books on unemployment entitled, 
Why Work? (1976), Why not Work? (1991) and Putting Britain Back to Work (1995). 
Dolwitz (1997) argued that welfare models in North America and Sweden also 
provided comparative ideas which the UK Government researched and explored 
during this period. As Burton argued in the 1987 report entitled, “Would Workfare 
Work?”:  
 
“The purpose of this study is to consider the feasibility of reforming the 
administration of the UK unemployment placement, training and benefit 
system along the lines of a thorough-going workfare operation. It draws on 
experiences in other countries—specifically the USA, Sweden… and those 
elements of the present structure of administration in the UK that would 
require modification or expansion if a workfare system were to be instituted” 
(1987, p. 7, quoted in Dolwitz, 1997, p.29). 
 
The Community Programme (CP) was arguably the outcome of these workfare 
discussions and the issue of rising unemployment in the early 1980s. In 1982 
Geoffrey Howe (the then Chancellor of the Exchequer) announced the government’s 
intention to introduce an employment programme to link benefit recipients with 
work-related activity. This was arguably an important change to the policy 
environment as he sought to advance the general ideas of workfare into the practical 
                                                     
42  Sir Ralph Howell became a Member of Employment Committee appointed in 1994 and was active in the creation 
of the Right to Work/Workfare paper in 1995/1996 which proposed a number of welfare state reforms  
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administration of welfare benefits through the creation of new forms of employment 
support: 
 
“The central idea would be to give those who have been on the unemployment 
register for some time the chance to work for the benefit of their own 
community, while still getting broadly the equivalent of their benefit 
entitlement plus an addition for expenses and the like.”  (Hansard, HOC 9 
March 1982, 732 quoted in Dolowitz, 1997, p.34). 
 
The original “benefits-plus” idea faced opposition from Trade Unions (TUs), Third 
Sector Organisations (TSOs), and Local Authorities (LAs) about wage deflation 
issues and the moralities of individuals not receiving a working wage but 
undertaking a working day (Deacon, 1998). As such, the Government slightly 
reformed the original policy idea and produced the CP (Maxwell, 1990; Peck and 
Theodore, 2000).  When the CP was launched two central features were that 
“existing jobs are not replaced and that the local community derives benefit from a 
particular project” (DoE 1982, 411). Projects funded by the CP were primarily 
operated by voluntary organisations and local authorities. Private organisations 
were allowed to operate projects, provided any gain was considered secondary to 
the benefit of the community (Dolowitz, 1997; Third Sector Task Force, 2009). 
 
Through the inclusion of these caveats for the creation of and delivery of projects 
that could be funded by the CP, Maxwell, (1989) states that the government 
encouraged TSOs to design projects and apply for CP funding to create temporary 
employment positions in community projects. Due to the emphasis on community 
work and the limitations on the type of organisation that could access CP funding, 
the CP was an important financial contributor to ILM programmes across the UK 
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(Finn, 1996) and was an essential funding source for Albase43. The introduction of an 
employment programme that emphasised temporary job creation and project-based 
community work created the political and funding space for the original ILM model 
and the early activities of Albase44.  
 
The CP maintained the requirement from the earlier political ideas that benefit 
recipients work or search for work in return for welfare benefits. However, the 
delivery design for how this was administered was altered to take into account 
opposition from TSOs, LAs and TUs (Dolowitz, 1997). It was, in most cases, no 
longer a “benefits-plus” model because it had been reformed to pay the “rate of the 
job” where jobseekers could take a temporary employment position and receive a 
‘wage’, albeit partly made up of their benefit payment (Gray, 1998; Finn and 
Simmonds, 2003). In fact, in the case of Albase, the organisation received the 
equivalent financial amount of an individual’s benefit claim, which through the 
sourcing of further project funding to undertake environmental work, increased to 
represent a wage45. Participants therefore received a weekly wage (which was 
subject to tax and national insurance in the same way as employment in the labour 
market) from Albase and no longer directly received their benefit payments from 
the Department of Social Security46. As discussed later in the chapter, from the data 
collected it appears that the provision of a paid wage was an important facet in the 
development and later change in the ethos of the organisation. 
 
                                                     
43 Anon Doc 58, Anon Doc 62, Anon Doc 63 
44 Respondent Hamilton; Anon Doc 58; Anon Doc 62 
45 Respondent Hamilton 
46 Respondent Madden; Anon Doc 20 
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Alongside the introduction of the CP, early ideas of administering employment 
support and incorporating ideas of ‘workfare’ were enacted in the 1980s through the 
introduction of a number of administrative reforms to the provision of employment 
services and out of work benefits. First, the UK Government began to link the 
receipt of out-of-work benefits to new conditions, such as the introduction of 
compulsory Restart interviews in 1986 for LTU (including the introduction of 
claimant advisers later in the same year), alongside the publication of the Training 
for Employment White Paper in 1988. The White Paper called for all existing 
programmes for the adult unemployed to be combined into a single, unified 
training programme, called Employment Training (ET). This replaced a range of 
programmes, including the CP, which offered project-based training. From 
September 1988, “ET refocused resources on helping the longer-term unemployed 
and on providing training rather than temporary employment, in the hope that this 
would motivate and up-skill people to get longer-term jobs” (Tursting and Barton, 
2007, p.20). The government linked the provision of employment support and 
benefit receipt through the Social Security Act of 1989. The government also 
introduced the need for benefit claimants to show that they were ‘actively seeking 
work’ to continue to receive their benefit payments. From 1989 new claimants were 
required to complete a ‘Back to Work Plan’ and attend a review after 13 weeks 
(King, 1993; Tusting and Barton, 2007).  
 
6.3 Policy Transfer 
Some commentators, such as Burton (1988), Dolowitz (1997), and Daguerre (2004), 
have argued that the introduction of workfare ideas in the UK was a direct policy 
transfer from the USA and was a notable move away from other European 
employment models as well as the previous British welfare state design. They 
contend that the CP mimicked the USA’s Community Work Experience Programme 
(CWEP) and was not only designed as a work-for-benefit program. Although this is 
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challenged somewhat by Dostal (2008) who asserts that the similarities are limited 
to the discourse of workfare and not in policy implementation techniques. 
Nevertheless, increased conditionality for benefit recipients alongside the 
introduction of the CP signalled a move away from what was later described as a 
passive benefits system towards an active benefits system where jobseekers were 
required to undertake some activity to continue benefit receipt (Jones, 1996). 
 
Whilst the idea of workfare has attracted much attention and criticism, the 
ideological shift from benefit receipt being a ‘passive’ act to an ‘active’ act has been 
widely accepted across political parties and remains a central idea in the creation of 
active labour market programmes which aim to move individuals from welfare into 
work (Finn, 2000; Dwyer, 2004). In practice, during the early 1990s increased 
conditionality included the compulsory attendance of the long term unemployed 
(LTU) at Jobplan Workshops in 1993, and by 1996 (through the introduction of the 
Jobseekers Act of 1995), claimants had to enter into a formal contract (the Jobseekers 
Agreement) to receive Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) (The Employment Committee, 
1996, page xxi). Furthermore, the introduction of the Jobseekers Agreement contract 
between the benefit claimant and the state during this period reflected the general 
move towards using contracts as tools of administration and delivery. The contract 
specified the measures that each benefit recipient agreed to take in order to find 
work, and those who failed to demonstrate their efforts to gain employment were 
subject to penalties (Adler, 2008). By using contractual agreements welfare was 
conditional on jobseekers demonstrating appropriate ‘responsible’ behaviour 
(Wetherly, 2001), as outlined ‘The Right to Work Report’ in 1994: 
 
“People have a right to expect the highest standards of advice and service 
while they are unemployed. The taxpayer has a right to expect the 
commitment of unemployed people to make every effort to get back to work” 
(The Employment Committee, 1996, p.xxiv). 
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From this viewpoint it was argued that, “policies that seek to promote 
unconditional entitlement to public welfare benefits are seen as entrenching welfare 
dependency” (Dwyer, 2004, p.268). Furthermore, Mead (1997) argued that not only 
is conditionality both generally popular and functional but also that the imposition 
of compulsory work conditions for the recipients of state benefit effectively re-
establishes their right to be regarded as citizens. Following the Conservative 
government of the early 1990s, the Labour government elected in 1997 also 
emphasised what Sage (2012, p.359) described as the “ethic of reciprocal 
responsibility’, a quid pro quo which distributed rights and responsibilities equally 
to both government and claimant.”  Welfare reforms (including the introduction of 
the welfare-to-work quasi-market) were underpinned by the view "that rights 
offered go with responsibilities owed" (Labour Party, 1997, p.1). Arguably echoing 
the workfare discussions outlined previously. Dwyer (2004, p. 277) stated that, “in 
making the principle of conditionality central to its approach, New Labour 
endorsed the development of a welfare system in which rights to welfare are being 
superseded by lesser order conditional entitlements to social provisions”. 
 
Unlike the welfare-to-work market discussed in the previous chapter, during the 
1980s and early 1990s both the conditionality of activation and the provision of 
national support services remained within the public employment service as welfare 
services were not outsourced at this time. The Employment Service (ES) and the 
Department for Social Security (DSS) played important roles in initiating the 
transformation of the relationship between jobseekers and the state and controlled 
access to employment benefits and entitlements (Fairley, 1998, Wright et al, 2003). 
However, whilst benefit receipt and the act of ‘signing-on’ remained within the 
public sector, the CP was mainly delivered through a range of other organisations, 
chiefly training providers and TSOs (Maxwell, 1989). As such, benefit recipients that 
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volunteered onto a CP project moved from the unemployment statistics into the 
temporary employment programme funded in part by the government.  
 
The involvement of an assortment of organisations in the delivery of the CP 
provided a piecemeal arrangement of measures delivered in a small, localised 
approach (Finn and Simmonds, 2003). ILMs were not part of a national programme 
or network and figures for the extent of ILM activity during this time are somewhat 
unreliable. According to Finn and Simmons (2003, p. 25), “ILMs are developed from 
the local level with a mixture of different funding streams and this creates problems 
in measuring activity given that the nature and extent of management information 
varies considerably between ILMs”. However, collectively the services managed by 
TSOs provided employment support, temporary employment and training to a 
large number of job seekers. Figures available from Albase, which described itself at 
this time as a ‘Community Programme Agent’47, show an increase in the number of 
ILM places year on year from 1986 to 1999. Whilst many ILM projects recruited 
small numbers (up to 20), collectively the ILM programmes provided a large 
number of temporary employment positions in the locality. For example, in 1986 
Albase offered 355 Community Programme places in Greater Glasgow alone. By 
1987 this had grown to 446,48  and by 1999 to 728 places (under the CP successors-
Employment Training and Training for Work programmes). 
 
Whilst Albase was the only organisation in its locality which operated the ILM 
model in the 1980s and early 1990s, the broad activities of Albase as a provider of 
employment services were not unique. According to Maxwell (1989), the role of the 
third sector as the through-vehicle for the workfare reforms during this period 
                                                     
47 Anon Doc 57 
48 Anon Doc 57, p.1, Anon Doc 58, p.1 
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instigated a large growth of TSOs providing employment support services and 
creating temporary jobs in physical regeneration community space management, 
and public housing improvements. The funding provided through CP provided the 
original resources for Albase’s ILM activities. As such, the CP and the move towards 
a welfare and benefit system based on workfare ideas created an institutional 
environment whereby Albase were able to access resources and deliver activities 
which met the requirements of the policy context. The organisational field for the 
delivery of these programmes involved a mix of funders and public sector 
organisations.  
 
6.4 Adopting workfare principles 
Whilst TSOs were actively involved in the localised design and delivery of ILMs 
and temporary employment programmes during the 1980s, it appears that they 
were not wholly compliant with the wider politics of welfare reform. In particular 
many TSOs were reluctant to adopt workfare principles and the government 
experienced resistance from TSOs who were reluctant to participate in the increased 
conditionality based schemes, particularly those proposing mandatory attendance 
to continue benefit receipt. For example, the previous CEO of Albase argued to The 
Employment Committee in 1995 that people who are forced to work for their benefit 
are less motivated than those which volunteer because, “it is very hard to work with 
conscripts; it is much easier to work with people who actually think that they are going to 
contribute and benefit” (1998, page, xxix). Furthermore, he argued that, “if we wish to 
see people motivated to learn, to get work and to improve their qualification, then a system 
based on punishment will not achieve this” (ibid). Similarly, the Scottish Council for 
Voluntary Organisations (SCVO)49 stated that, “a workfare regime will reinforce 
                                                     
49 The SCVO is an umbrella body for voluntary organisations based in Scotland. 
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negative perceptions of Government schemes, as cheap labour and attempts to depress the 
unemployment count, and could fatally taint future schemes, no matter how innovative, for 
years to come” (page xxix). 
 
The background to the ILM model and the political environment in which Albase 
was created has been outlined in this section. It demonstrates that the organisation’s 
activities discussed in the previous chapter were associated with early attempts to 
introduce ideas of ‘workfare’ into UK employment policy. Albase’s early 
development was possible due to the focus from the governments over this period 
on benefit recipients engaging in work, and the role of TSOs in service provision. 
Whilst there are some debates regarding the extent of workfare principles in the 
administration of the CP, it appears that over time the founding ideas of rights and 
responsibilities, and active to passive citizens affected the context in which Albase 
operated ILM programmes. The second part of this chapter describes and analyses 
the reason for the decline of ILMs as a proportion of Albase’s activities and in the 
wider organisation field. The section provides the policy and funding structure of 
these employment programmes to further understand the organisational structure 
of Albase and their delivery of ILM programmes.  
 
6.5 The decline in support and funding for ILM programmes  
Albase’s ILM design and activity was affected by a number of policy changes driven 
by changes to the activation agenda at the national (and international) policy level. 
First, the ILM programme length was affected by the introduction of an activation 
approach which favoured early entry into the labour market instead of occupation 
and training approaches popular in the 1980s and 1990s. Where ILMs traditionally 
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had a set time period where individuals remained ‘on programme,’50 the workfirst 
discourse and the associated welfare-to-work programmes (and the quasi-market 
framework) encouraged providers to move individuals into the labour market as 
quickly as possible. For Albase the duration of ILM programmes was originally 12 
months, which allowed individuals to gain 12 months work experience and training 
qualifications51. Arguably it also served a wider labour market purpose for the 
government as trainees were removed from the unemployment count and as such 
the model gained political support during periods of high unemployment (see Finn, 
2002; Finn and Simmonds, 2003).  As such, drawing on Bonoli (2010) it is possible to 
argue that whilst ILMs formed part of the broad activation approach they were an 
“occupation” measure during the 1980s. Their objective was not solely to promote 
labour-market re-entry but to also keep jobless people busy in an economy offering 
few labour market opportunities, and to prevent the depletion of human capital 
associated with an unemployment spell (Finn and Simmonds, 2003). As the SCVO 
(1990) stated:  
 
“In the UK, the profusion of training and temporary-work schemes has at best 
helped the most able and motivated, and at worst merely “contained” 
unemployment” (The Employment Committee Report, p.10) 
 
The institutional environment and the norms and practices of the organisational 
field did not remain constant and, as such, shifts in ideas of employment support, 
along with an increasing demand from the labour market impacted the continued 
delivery of (and organisational growth from) ILM programmes.  
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51 Anon Doc 7; Anon Doc 28 
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According to Jones (1996) during the 1990s the UK moved towards emphasizing 
stronger work incentives and employment assistance. In particular, as part of this 
reform agenda, welfare-to-work programmes were accompanied by a discourse 
which promoted the transfer of individuals into the labour market as quickly as 
possible (Finn, 2003; Lindsay et al, 2007). Policies were introduced which sought to 
move individuals into the labour market on the understanding that for some job 
seekers, ‘work first over training first’ may produce better labour market outcomes 
(Layard, 2004).  Furthermore, in terms of social and economic benefits for 
unemployed people the idea that ‘any job is better than no job’ (Layard, 2003, p.5) 
gathered support from policy makers.  
 
In 2003, the UK government described its labour market policy as a ‘work first 
approach to moving people from welfare into work’ (DWP, 2003, p.3). This 
workfirst approach proposed moving individuals into the labour market first, and 
training or developing the individuals skills once in employment. Although this is 
not considered a correct assumption for all jobs (Bellamy and Rake, 2005), the 
principle underpinned the reforms and the subsequent availability of training 
provision to the long term unemployed (LTU) and the expected activities for 
organisations delivering employment support programmes. Consequently, the ILM 
approach operated by Albase which provided temporary, subsidised employment 
opportunities with a training component, no longer matched the needs of the wider 
policy environment and the government’s preference for workfirst policies52. Over 
time, the policy context and the funding sources were less inclined to support 
programmes which maintained human development or training focussed approach 
(Peck and Theodore, 2000; Walker and Wiseman, 2003; Dwyer, 2004; Lindsay et al, 
2007).  
                                                     
52 Respondent Sutton 
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6.6 Training provision 
Arguably, one of the reasons why the ILM approach no longer suited the policy and 
funding context of employment support policies was the emphasis on training and 
the greater resources costs in terms of government financing. The ILM model 
operated by Albase involved not only 12 months work experience and on the job 
training, but in most cases, participants would gain accredited vocational training 
qualifications53. The cost for the training was included in the overall budget for the 
ILM project paid for by one of the projects funders (see chapter 5 for a description of 
ILM funding). However, over the thirty years covered in this research not only did 
the approach towards employment support shift from the state to the ‘active’ 
individual, but also the approach to training and skills development (Wright et al, 
2003; Tusting and Barton, 2007). It is possible that this was because the provision of 
training was considered expensive and unnecessary for jobseekers, particularly 
when faster labour market (re)attachment was favoured by the government (Finn, 
2008). Whilst the training provided in many ILMs was specific to the temporary job 
that individuals were employed in (for example grounds maintenance), specific 
skills such as these were not a requirement in a workfirst approach (Walker and 
Wiseman, 2003). In workfirst systems the trainee and the employer were expected to 
bear training costs in lieu of their future economic benefits. As such specific skills 
training programmes were less attractive in this context and the jobseeker was 
encouraged to enter the labour market by accepting any job, and take responsibility 
for their own future training developments.  There was no incentive for the 
government to pay for specific skills training for most jobseekers, and funding was 
only available for generic skill training for those jobseekers further away from the 
labour markets (Lindsay et al, 2007; Sol and Westerveld, 2007; Finn, 2008).   
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Consequently, both the workfirst approach and the associated ‘rights and 
responsibilities agenda’ (Hutton, 2006) impacted on the provision of training for the 
LTU as the onus of training provision shifted from the state to the individual. The 
shift in training policy also impacted on the delivery of employment programmes as 
programme budgets for training costs were reduced (compared to ILM funding or 
human development ALMP). Furthermore, extended periods of training were not 
encouraged as employment services were expected to move individuals into any 
employment positions within the labour market as quickly as possible (Peck and 
Theodore, 2000; Finn, 2008).   
 
With the introduction of the New Deal programmes in 1999 the broader funding 
and policy environment moved towards shorter programmes of support (Webb, 
2003). In particular, the increasing demand from the labour market at the time 
meant that the political support for longer programmes dwindled and longer term 
training and experience programmes were not part of the new activation agenda. 
ILM approaches were considered a possible support option in the New Deal 
Programmes, particularly for the LTU who were not considered ‘job-ready.’ 
However, 12 month long ILMs were not considered a viable or necessary support 
option and shorter versions were incorporated into the programme by some New 
Deal delivery organisations (Finn, 2003; Finn and Simmonds, 2003). 
 
Albase directly responded to the policy and funding changes by altering their 
programmes down from 52 to 16 weeks, in line with the New Deal requirements 
and other funding sources with a preference for shorter programmes and faster 
outcomes54. The ILM model was redesigned in response to the environment as 
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managers sought to: “evaluate and re-shape our programmes in order to meet the realities 
of funding (e.g. length of programmes)”55. In this way the policy context directly 
influenced the activities of the organisation as the length of ILM programme became 
an issue for project costs as traditional ILM funders were required to pay for 
between three and 12 months project work, supervision and training alongside the 
trainee’s wages. When the length of the programme reduced from 12 months to 6 
months and in some ILMs down to 16 weeks the associated costs reduced, but the 
ILM model was still at odds with the dominant discourse of activation and policy 
demand for quicker labour market (re)entry.  As the extract below demonstrates this 
was an issue for the continuing delivery of ILMs linked to welfare-to-work 
programmes.  
 
“Changes to New Deal have meant a reduction in income, reduced training 
time for New Deal trainees and an inability to complete some aspects of the 
programme provision.” 56 
 
Arguably, the ILM model and other ‘occupation’ ALMP approaches also clashed 
with the introduction of promarket policies which sought to quickly move 
individuals into any job in the  labour market and once there encourage continued 
job progression.  External criticisms of the ILM model focused on the attitude of 
trainees who did not continue to search for permanent employment once on the 
programme (Layard, 1997b). Some Albase respondents also acknowledged that 
some job seekers who started an ILM placement viewed it as ‘real job’ so did not 
partake in job search activities until their 12 month position was completed57. As 
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such some individuals returned to claiming unemployment benefits directly after 
the 12 month period as they had not been actively seeking their next job.  
 
Furthermore, from studying the documents produced by Albase it appears that 
because the original ILM models had not been associated with moving individuals 
into employment as quickly as possible (i.e. they were occupation rather than 
workfirst programmes) they were not  originally evaluated on the numbers of 
individuals that moved into the labour market58. Finn and Simmonds (2003, p47) 
note that , “there is no standard practice for how ILMs identify and record job 
outcomes,” and in the early ILMs operated by Albase job entry targets and figures 
were not always recorded or required by the funding. Instead Albase reported on 
the numbers of individuals enrolled on their programmes, their attainment in 
regards to qualification and training, and for some funders the number of 
beneficiaries to the work undertaken on the project (such as home improvements)59. 
Whilst the later ILMs delivered by Albase in the 1990s and 2000’s did record job 
outcome, this was not one of the original purposes of the ILM model. As such, when 
workfirst ideas began to dominate employment discourse in the 1990s ILMs were 
considered unsuitable due to their weak promarket orientation and their limited 
evidence for moving individuals into the labour market (Layard, 1997a; SEU, 1999). 
Whilst this criticism was overcome to some extent during the 1990s by Albase who 
provided job search support during the latter weeks of their ILM programmes, the 
criticism continued to hinder perceptions of the ILM model within broader ALMP 
contexts (Finn and Simmonds, 2003). 
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6.7 The policy interaction between ILMs and welfare -to-work 
programmes 
In terms of broad economic policy the ILM programme might not conflict with 
welfare-to -work programmes because the ILM approach was an ALMP, as was the 
welfare-to-work approach. Furthermore, some welfare-to-work programmes 
(particularly those initiated in the late 1990s such as the New Deal Young People) 
offered ILM possibilities within their delivery design (Nativel and Sunley, 2002; 
Aiken and Bode, 2009). The election of the Labour government and the introduction 
of the New Deal programmes in 1997 replaced some of the traditional funding 
sources with sources within the New Deal framework (Webb, 2003). Some of the 
New Deal options emphasised the need to provide work experience and temporary 
employment to jobseekers, and as such, offered the possibility for providers to 
utilise the ILM approach. For example, through the introduction of the New Deal 
for Young People (NDYP) there was an opportunity to provide an ILM style 
component for younger job seekers who required work experience.60 Furthermore, 
as the extract below demonstrates, political rhetoric supported the use of ILMs as 
part of the welfare-to-work approach and some high profile Labour politicians 
visited Albase during this time61. 
 "Innovative approaches for the future will need to learn from some of the 
cutting edge work in ILMs, which provide pathways to work through 
Community based activity." (Blunkett, 2000) 
 
However, programmes such as the NDYP differed from Albase’s original ILM 
ethos.  Whilst it was more akin to policy context Albase’s programmes were aligned 
to (including a focus on training and long-term work experience) it also 
incorporated some elements of a workfirst approach as it introduced a mandatory 
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element and shortened the 12 month programme to as low as eight weeks (White 
and Riley, 2002; Finn 2003). The NDYP included a Full-time Education or Training 
(FTET) option which sought to ensure jobseekers achieved S/NVQ level 2 or 
equivalent and offered two types of programmes. The first was an eight week short 
course including a certificate on completion. The second was a course, more akin to 
the ILM model, with an education and training provider which lasted between 13 
and 52 weeks and involved work experience and led to S/NVQ level two (Bivand 
and Somerville, 2003).  
 
Albase secured the contract to deliver both the Gateway option where NDYP 
participants could select their programme options (see White and Riley, 2002; Finn, 
2003) and the NDYP FTET programmes. For a number of years in the early 2000’s, 
Albase delivered ILMs which involved NDYP funding. However, over time as New 
Deal programmes became increasingly target based and funding for the longer 
programmes was reduced, the traditional ILM approach did not suit the DWP’s 
requirements (see Jarvis, 1997).  
 
6.8 Differing policy views on human capi tal and ILM approaches.  
Some welfare-to-work policies and policy documents emphasised investment in 
human capital and ILM models were discussed in government departments and by 
Labour Party Politicians (SEU, 1999). Despite the increasing shift towards workfirst 
welfare-to-work programmes over the 2000’s (and the decline of ILMs in this 
context) support for the ILM approach remained in some policy circles and in job 
creation discussions at the localized neighbourhood level. The ILM approach, 
alongside the promotion of work experience, training and job creation ideas, 
continued to be viewed as an approach by some commentators to increase 
employment rates in particular areas in the UK or for particular labour market 
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groups. For example, the Gregg Report (2008) argued that work centred 
programmes could tackle two key barriers – lack of work experience and employer 
reluctance to hire the long term unemployed and disadvantaged.  The report argued 
that ‘the ILM model, which offers work placements along with additional support and 
assistance required to find mainstream employment, can be particularly useful as a means of 
tackling the barriers and providers should be encouraged to provide them as on option for 
support’ (p.17). The Cabinet Office’s report Real Help for Communities: Volunteers, 
Charities and Social Enterprises (2009) echoed similar ideas regarding work experience 
and the role of the third sector. It identified options such as changes in benefit 
entitlements for JSA claimants for volunteering, and work-focused volunteering 
opportunities for benefit claimants, in particular young people.  
 
More support for ILMs was provided The Houghton Report (2009), a local economic 
development paper which for an enhanced role for local authorities in tackling 
unemployment. Among a number of detailed recommendations, the report 
highlighted the need for the development of ILM-style models, designed and 
funded through localised sources. The report suggested a Challenge Fund to 
stimulate temporary jobs of benefit to the community and the local economy whilst 
also targeting the long term unemployed. The ILM model was associated with both 
a view of employment support based on long-term job creation and training and 
with ideas of addressing unemployment through localised policy approaches and 
institutions. Whilst some support for the ILM model continued throughout the 
1990s and 2000s, in reality the funding provided through the DWP over this time 
became increasingly limited for the ILM approach operated by Albase. As such, the 
national (and centralised) DWP welfare-to-work programmes were administered 
separately to the ILM discussions which became more aligned with national 
(Scottish) and regional funding policies. 
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As previously noted, whilst the welfare-to-work market developed and the DWP 
experimented with a range of contract and management frameworks, the 
involvement and possible inclusion of ILM approaches declined. The continual 
evolution of the welfare-to-work market was based on a strong activation approach 
which used an intensive job search activity model (ONS, 2002; Finn, 2011).  It 
appears that this approach provided less scope for the longer-term, training based 
ILM approach. For example, within the Flexible New Deal (FND) Phase One, there 
were two potential openings for measures based on the provision of work 
experience, albeit different from the early intentions and style of the ILMs of the 
1980s and 1990s.  
 
First, JSA claimants entering the 12 month spell on FND were required to work or 
do work-related activity for at least 4 weeks dependent on client needs. There was 
no requirement for the provider to ensure that the participant achieved a level of 
training or qualification and in many cases the participant on this route did not 
receive a wage. Instead participants received their benefits plus perhaps support for 
travel to work (if the provider wishes to provide this) (DWP, 2010c). Whilst work 
experience and job-ready ideas were still considered an important part of moving 
into the labour market, key aspects of the ILM model (such as training and a wage) 
were not maintained in mainstream welfare-to-work programmes. Consequently, 
during the 2000’s a tension existed between the supporters of the ILM approach as 
an activation measure for the unemployed, and the administration of welfare-to-
work programmes which prioritised the workfirst approach (see Gautie and Gazier, 
2003).  
 
The FND programme which was launched at the same time as DWP’s No One 
Written Off Reforming Welfare to Reward Responsibility Green Paper (DWP, 2008c). 
Both promoted the idea that individuals who completed the FND support and 
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remained unemployed and in receipt of JSA after a review, could be transferred to a 
‘community work’ programme in order to continue to receive benefit payments. The 
DWP indicated that it would contract with private, public and voluntary providers 
to pilot a number of models around mandatory full time activity in ‘community 
work’. In support of the idea that jobseekers require work habits gained from 
undertaking work experience whilst in receipt of their benefit, they stated that “We 
believe there is real value to long-term unemployed people working full time to develop their 
work habits and employability” (DWP, 2008c, p.42).  
 
However, Albase stated in an internal document that their ILM approach would not 
be compatible with the FND requirements as “there are further risks with the FND 
model that will have an effect on our ability to deliver our future Intermediate Labour 
Market (ILM) projects. FND will operate a delivery model of referring clients for work 
experience for a maximum of 4 weeks instead of the current 13weeks resulting in a potential 
change in how we deliver our ILM model.62”   
 
ILMs were replaced for a short spell by Transitional Employment Programmes 
(TEPs) which centred on shorter periods of work experience, often in private 
businesses (Finn and Simmonds, 2003), and more recently as mentioned above by 
compulsory work experience and work placement options in the FND and Work 
Programme (DWP, 2008d; DWP, 2010c). This occurred simultaneously with a shift 
in policy terminology which moved from ‘occupation’ and ‘upskilling’ to 
‘activation’ and ‘personal responsibility’ (Hutton, 2006) on the part of the jobseeker. 
Arguably, work experience and work training remained rooted in an ALMP and 
supply-side approach but the redesign of the administration and the shift in 
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discourse reflected ideas of workfarism and personal responsibility. Whilst the 
DWP and broader government policy continued to promote the benefit of work 
experience as a way of increasing the employability of long term unemployed 
jobseekers, it was also considered a necessary (and sometime mandatory) 
requirement for the continuation of benefit receipt. The DWP considered mandatory 
full-time activity a significant deterrent to continued claiming for some clients 
(DWP, 2008c), and as such it was not approached in the same vain as Albase’s 
original ILM activities which had rejected the mandatory and punitive element to 
workfare. 
 
6.9 The importance of paying a wage and using real  work experiences 
One problem for Albase was that as work experience and TEPs gained popularity in 
policy contexts, employment programme funding became directed towards 
programmes that operated in partnership with private and commercial firms and 
offered short-term experience placements (Finn and Simmonds, 2003). As such, 
ILMs which paid a wage to participants and which provided long term, publicly 
funded training options could have been considered as an unnecessary (and 
expensive) ‘luxury.’  
 
Arguably, the rise of workfarism at the national policy level reduced the support for 
ILM programmes which were based on principles of wages, work simulation, 
training and temporary job creation. Gregg (2008) argued however that workfare 
programmes would fail if they provided little or no formal training to participants. 
Echoing the human investment arguments, Gregg stated that without support or 
assistance to aid future job search or to address personal barriers to job entry, an 
individual’s labour market attachment may not be sustained. Workfare models 
which provide no emphasis on job entry are less concerned with moving 
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individuals into employment through the reduction of personal barriers, and more 
concerned with wider ideological concepts of welfare dependency are less beneficial 
to reducing long term unemployment. Whilst work experience continued to be 
considered as a relevant and useful approach for moving individuals into the labour 
market, more recent government policies emphasised shorter work experience 
periods, without an imperative for employers to offer a wage63. As such, the ILM 
which paid wages and provided training appears to be an expensive and 
unnecessary programme to fund in comparison to unpaid work experience which 
had become a mandatory component of many welfare-to-work programmes 
(Walker and Wiseman, 2003; Gregg, 2009; Ainsworth et al, 2012).  
 
The importance of work experience for unemployed people was a prominent idea in 
both welfare-to-work programmes and the ILM model. However, as already 
discussed, their ILM model faced criticisms regarding the unit cost of each ILM 
programme place, and the workfirst model prioritised labour market entry over 
human development and training programmes. It is also argued below that the shift 
towards larger welfare-to-work contracts dominated by a workfirst approach not 
only sidelined the ILM model in policy circles, but also within Albase. Arguably for 
Albase the delivery of ILMs on one hand, and the delivery of welfare-to-work 
contracts on the other clashed in two ways.  
 
First, there was a tension in terms of the organisation’s traditional activities (the ILM 
model) and the current policy view of what was an effective approach to reducing 
unemployment. Second, there was also a tension for the organisation in the 
administration of ILMs and welfare-to-work programmes and the different attitudes 
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from their funding providers towards the delivery of services. For example, within 
the organisation individuals who were registered on one of the government’s 
workfirst-based employment programmes, such as the New Deal Disabled People 
(NDDP) or the Employment Zone (EZ), would rarely be moved onto an ILM even if 
they matched the eligible criteria and may have benefitted from the involvement in 
a temporary employment position. The reason for this, as one respondent noted, 
was because “you tend to want to get them (those on workfirst programmes) a job A, as 
quickly as possible, and B, for as little money as possible. And it’s about trying to minimise 
what you would spend on them, so you wouldn’t necessarily put them into an [ILM] 
placement.64” Arguably it is evident that one of the reasons for the decline of ILMs 
may also be attributed to the different administrative processes between ILMs and 
welfare-to-work programmes. As the extract below demonstrates:  
 
“There is however a dilemma for Albase in operating an ILM in the context of 
current programmes such as Training for Work and the New Deal for Young 
People, which provide output-related funding and which are time limited.”65  
 
As outlined above, part of the reason for the decline of ILMs was that (post New 
Deal) welfare-to-work requirements did not focus on the need to provide training 
and human development measures in the design of support for the LTU.  
 
6.10 The impact of NPM and contractualism on ILM delivery 
There are also a number of other reasons why the ILM model delivered by Albase 
began to lose support in the 1990s and 2000s discussed below. The first of these was 
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the role of contractualism and the associated ‘lowest cost approach’ (Peck and 
Theodore, 2001). It is argued that this was a major factor in the decline of ILM 
programmes as they were comparatively less attractive for delivery organisations 
due to their cost. Before explicating this point further, it is necessary to discuss a 
long-standing criticism of the ILM approach - the cost per head of moving an 
individual into the labour market. Whilst some commentators (McGregor, 1999) and 
organisations such as Albase have debated these criticisms66, they arguably 
remained an impediment for ILM programmes.  
 
It is argued here that concerns regarding the cost of employment support increased 
as the organisational field moved towards competitive contracting (Finn and 
Simmonds, 2003). The impact of this shift was evident in how Albase’s management 
viewed ILM activity and the associated cost concerns from the wider environment. 
One of the tensions between the ILM approach and the workfirst approach was 
based on the perception of cost and value.  
 
According to some respondents the shift in the organisational field infiltrated 
Albase.  Respondents noted how these ideas of cost and value at times replaced the 
emphasis on local community development and regeneration. It appears to some 
that ‘good value’ became measured in terms of money and income rather than the 
redevelopment of particular neighbourhoods and sites as was the view of value in 
the earlier years of the organisation. As one respondent stated: 
 
“It’s about recognising that Flexible New Deal comes into the business and 
development teams are rightly responsible for pulling that together.  But 
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that’s...a £138 million pound contract over 5 years…The highest value of 
wider role activity you get through regeneration would be somewhere in the 
region of £300,000 to £400,000.  So if you’re a Development Executive 
working on the latter, how do I assess your performance against your peer?”67  
 
It also appears that a tension can be identified within the organisation between the 
way in which employees involved in the different employment support approaches 
(ILM and welfare-to-work) understood value. Some respondents felt that the 
tension was a fundamental issue with the shift towards quasi-markets and 
government contracts as they could not incorporate an ‘expensive’ support option 
when the, “government judges you on how much per job you are charging them68”. 
In short, the lowest cost approach and the associated decision making mindset 
excluded the ILM option in Albase’s welfare-to-work activity post New Deal. 
Regardless of policy and political views on employment assistance and training, the 
competitive contracting approach did not allow for Albase’s ILM approach to be 
easily incorporated into competitive quasi-market business models.  
 
“When you’re looking at Flexible New Deal, Into-Work contracts, and the 
New Deal, you don’t even consider an ILM. It’s not a kind of option you 
would consider, because what you do is you look at those contracts in isolation 
from the ILM. What the New Deal contracts allowed you to do was to 
continue to deliver part of the ILM, because you could put New Deal people 
on it for the work experience. When you are looking at the NDDP contract for 
example, there is no work experience. It’s a kind of, almost keep in touch 
contact basis, as is Employment Zone, so it’s a kind of fortnightly meeting 
with a personal advisor and there is no work experience element that you have 
to fulfil, so the ILM is not considered.”69 
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Traditionally the funding regime of ILMs paid the full cost of a project and as such 
EU funding and the earlier government programmes paid back the cost of 
delivering the project70. In this financial approach there was little scope for full 
financial management to be delegated to the delivery organisation and little 
opportunity for the organisation to make a surplus or profit, as was the case in 
welfare-to-work financing. Instead, bidding organisations would include a standard 
management fee (often of approximately 10%) included in their overall bid for 
funding for an ILM project which would cover their core costs71. They would also 
include the price of all aspects of their project and in negotiation with the funding 
organisation design a project where all costs were covered.  
 
As discussed in chapters seven and eight welfare-to-work bidders were assessed on 
a range of criteria which collectively met the requirements of DWP. Unlike previous 
funding relationships in welfare-to-work contracts, delivery organisations could 
manage their own programme delivery expenditure costs and make a substantial 
profit (NAO, 2005). The assessment criteria included an emphasis on the financial 
strength and ‘business-like’ behaviour of the organisation (defined and discussed in 
more detail in chapter eight), which included the organisation’s ability to 
demonstrate that it was able to manage a programme’s finances and that it had 
previously been able to deliver services and generate a surplus (DWP, 2010b; DWP, 
2010c). The DWP was able to make an assumption of their suitability in the welfare-
to-work market based on criterion such as these. As such, it was difficult for Albase 
to incorporate the ILM approach in their welfare-to-work business planning 
process. The extract below is taken from an internal report in 2007 which focused on 
the future of Albase’s activities. The author highlighted the difficulty with the ILM 
model in terms of cost in market-based contexts.  
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“The problem is that the ILM remains relatively expensive in a contracting 
world based on price and the consequence is that if Albase is going to compete 
for contracts…it will either need to change the funding model or reduce the 
cost base, especially overheads. As the market changes, this is likely to become 
more, not less, of an issue”72. 
 
The ‘expensive’ ILM model (Marshall and Macfarlane, 2000) was not suitable to the 
welfare-to-work environment based on a lowest cost approach. In this competitive 
environment the lowest cost approach not only excluded the ILM approach from the 
welfare-to-work business model but, as discussed below, it also influenced the view 
of the whole organisation. This was because the organisation’s overall accounts 
would not show a healthy growth from ILM activities which, as previously 
mentioned, did not provide the same opportunity for surplus-making. As such, 
operating ILM programmes would not provide a surplus on Albase’s annual 
accounts or assist the organisation in investing in growth. In the welfare-to-work 
quasi-market ILMs would not meet the market’s definition of innovative in terms of 
lower cost, higher return programme design (discussed in more detail in chapter 8).   
 
Furthermore, without a surplus-making aspect they would not meet the competitive 
norms (and ‘business-like’ requirements) of the welfare-to-work context (see chapter 
7). If the organisation’s activities and incomes were predominately related to the 
ILM model the delivery organisation may appear less efficient than organisations 
which operate less expensive programmes or those with more profit making 
opportunities (DWP, 2010c). Arguably, there was therefore no incentive for Albase 
to offer an ILM option to jobseekers or to design their internal activities around an 
ILM overlap with welfare-to-work activities as this would have increased their costs 
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in the welfare-to-work contracting market (and ultimately be unsuccessful in the 
bidding phase). Regardless of any advantage to jobseekers that the ILM approach 
may have brought and regardless of the organisation’s institutional tradition, it was 
unlikely that Albase would have included this option in their design and been able 
to successfully compete on lowest cost. In sum, it is argued here that such welfare-
to-work norms and ideas based on lowest-cost impacted on the continuation of ILM 
activity within Albase. 
 
6.11 Human capital versus workfirst in Albase 
For Albase, the wider policy tensions between a longer term regeneration and 
human capital approach versus the workfirst, promarket and contractualist 
orientation were played out at the micro (organisational) level. Albase’s continued 
delivery of ILMs did not interact with their new activities in the delivery of welfare-
to-work programmes, despite the early New Deal programmes offering ILM-style 
opportunities for young people and the following FND programme which 
emphasised the importance of developing work skills and experience to reduce job 
entry barriers. Albase however operated distinct divisions for the delivery of 
welfare-to-work programmes and their continued delivery and design of ILM 
activities. 
 
The delivery of ILM project did not intertwine with welfare-to-work activity and in 
most cases (excluding the early New Deals) the organisation did not link the ILMs 
to welfare-to-work programmes in the bidding and delivery design. Most managers 
within the organisation (interviewed in 2009) appeared to consider the programmes 
as distinctly separate and were aware that they were operating two different types 
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of employment support programmes; “You’ll find if you go into Albase today, they are 
running Flexible New Deal and it won’t even cross over the ILM programme at all.”73 Some 
of those working predominately within the welfare-to-work context considered ILM 
projects as somewhat outdated and discussed the growing difficulty through which 
resources could be sourced for the continuation of the model74. Other employees 
who worked in the ILM division (in particular on environmental and regeneration 
activities in local neighbourhoods) favoured the ILM model and the benefits that the 
projects brought to those involved75. Consequently, the internal divisions reflected 
the broader policy divisions, one side favouring a human capital ILM model based 
at the neighbourhood level, and the other favouring the workfirst approach 
associated with the welfare-to-work quasi-market. For Albase the organisational 
issue centred on how to manage and deliver both versions at the same time from 
two different funding and policy environments.  
 
6.12 Shifting views 
So far it has been argued that Albase’s activities were affected by the availability of 
funding sources, the accepted policy view of what unemployment support should 
provide, and the impact of contractualism on the management and administration 
of employment support programmes. The following section provides a 
consideration of what these changes meant for Albase in terms of their view on the 
politics of welfare reform and employment support. In particular, the ideas of 
mandating, sanctioning and paid work experience – key indicators of workfarism 
(see Mead, 2001; Dostal, 2008). Each are discussed in turn below. 
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The shift in the organisational field away from the ILM model towards a workfirst 
approach may have resulted in the reduction of Albase’s ILM activity. As Albase 
became more successful in the welfare-to-work quasi-market they adapted to the 
requirements of this policy context and shifted away from focussing on EU funding, 
regeneration projects, and more localised sources of income in favour of the DWP 
quasi-market. Whilst these changes may demonstrate the organisation’s ability to 
adapt to their operating environmentarguably a number of changes in the 
organisation’s approach to unemployment reflected the broader state level 
ideological shift towards a workfare and workfirst agenda.  
 
One of the most notable changes for Albase was their stance on the role of 
mandating jobseekers into employment programmes. Their original ILM models 
emphasised the importance of participants receiving a wage rather than simply their 
benefits or their benefits plus a top-up (see Finn and Simmonds, 2003). The waged 
aspect was a defining characteristic of Albase’s ILM approach which sought to make 
the experience in their temporary jobs as close to a ‘real’ job as possible76. As the 
extract below from a government policy consultation in 1997 demonstrates: 
 
“The importance of a wage cannot be overstated. If ILMs are to produce 
outputs of value to the community or industry, people need to be rewarded 
appropriately. Given that there may be insufficient money within the New 
Deal programme to pay a wage then the system must be flexible enough to 
allow local partnerships to use New Deal money as part of a package that 
can”77. 
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By 2000, in the majority of Albase’s ILM projects, the focus had shifted away from 
creating a ‘real work environment’ and did not always include the emphasis on the 
importance of paid wages. Employment policy at this time had moved towards a 
“work for your benefit” approach (DWP (2008c), and as such, there was less of a 
political requirement to provide wages for the trainees/participants. Some ILMs 
reflected the broader shifts in employment policy and instead of paying their 
participants, they offered a ‘benefits plus’ payment scheme (Finn, 1997; Peck and 
Theodore, 2000; Walker and Wiseman, 2003; DWP, 2010c).  
 
Albase’s ILM programmes traditionally offered temporary employment 
opportunities in regeneration projects which job seekers could choose to participate 
in78. Some criticisms of ILMs that recruited voluntary participants centred on the 
idea that the much higher job entry rates claimed for ILMs were heavily associated 
with the recruitment of well-motivated, if nonetheless disadvantaged individuals, 
on a voluntary basis (Finn and Simmonds, 2003). In fact, to date there is no 
evaluation evidence that ILMs are a cost-effective intervention for mandated clients 
(see Finn 2003) and the difficulty associated with differentiating between what is the 
outcome of the ILM model and what is the outcome based on the individuals 
characteristics has tended to mar the ILM evaluations which have claimed that ILMs 
offer higher job outcome rates than other types of employment support (see 
McGregor et al, 1997). Consequently, criticisms of the ILM model focussed on 
whether the overall approach was any more effective in moving individuals into 
employment than the workfirst approach (Marshall and Macfarlane, 2000). 
 
                                                     
78 Anon Doc 20 
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From the data collected it appears that the voluntary nature of ILMs was an 
important stance for Albase’s leaders during the 1980s and 1990s. Yet this stance 
altered in line with the rise of the workfare discourse in national labour market 
policies and because some welfare-to-work contracts involved a commitment 
towards mandating clients onto employment programmes. Previously, the 
organisation promoted the idea to the government that ILM programmes should 
include payments to participants for their involvement. 
 
“Perhaps the key factor, however, is the payment of a rate for the job 
allowance. It is this link between real work and payment that has established 
the credibility of Albase in the eyes of the unemployed and given them most 
self confidence. Our experience is that by breaking people out of the benefits 
system they develop the skills to manage their own budgets and also a 
determination not to move back onto benefits.” 79 
 
Although within Albase’s ILM activity there remained a limited involvement in 
mandating clients on ILM programmes, overall the organisation became more 
acceptable of mandatory practices for the delivery of employment programmes. In 
2005, their response to a government consultation document reflected this: 
 
“It would therefore be wrong to assume that compulsory participation in work 
focussed support will incite a hostile response from claimants; for some people 
this may actually provide the impetus they need to instigate a return to the 
labour market….Mandatory programmes can be helpful in terms of 
incentivising people who have been economically inactive for a long time and 
who are demoralised, isolated or lacking in confidence.” 80 
 
                                                     
79 Anon Doc 7, 1997 
80 Anon Doc 17,  2005 
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The change in the organisation’s stance on both the use of paid wages and the 
mandating of clients appears to reflect broader societal and policy ideas rooted in 
the workfare discourse which had become dominant during the 1990s and during 
the organisation’s development. It is argued here that the internal employees who 
managed the remaining ILM programmes may have maintained some of the 
original ethos regarding mandating individuals onto employment programmes. 
However, the out-facing communication from Albase shifted to match the dominant 
workfirst views of the welfare-to-work field81. Within seven years the organisation 
changed their ‘public view’ (i.e. on their external communication) on the role on 
mandating and compulsion in the delivery of employment support as the extract 
below demonstrates.  
 
“We welcome the extension of compulsion from February 2005, to people who 
have been on incapacity benefits for up to three years and we would suggest 
that this should precede the introduction of mandatory participation for all 
but the most severely disabled claimants when reform is introduced in 
2008.”82 
 
The reduction in the number of ILMs in the organisation (as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter) reveals a broader shift in the activities and approach of Albase. 
With the reduction of ILM activity as a proportion of the organisation’s activity 
there was a clear shift in focus from the earlier mission of Albase which focussed on 
getting people into jobs and on environmental or community regeneration83. 
Employees interviewed in 2009 revealed that the organisation’s attitude towards 
creating projects aimed at achieving both regeneration and employability had 
changed. For example, one respondent felt that previously, “we got the balance of that 
                                                     
81 Respondent Campbell; Respondent Collins; 
82 Anon Doc 17, 2005 
83 Anon Doc 62; Anon Doc 63 
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wrong.” S/he went on to add that, “what we’ve been in danger of doing is, having lovely 
fences and lovely back courts, fantastic regeneration projects, but we don’t actually plonk the 
people that put them there into employment.  So that’s been an education…and that 
continues to be a discussion, a dialogue, across the company.84”  
 
As the organisation became more dependent on the welfare-to-work contracts in the 
early 2000’s instead of ILM funding, the view on the appropriate support for 
unemployed individuals changed. An external report produced in 1999 stated that: 
 
“The strength of the service [from Albase] is the combination it offers of real 
paid work along with skills training and vocational guidance and counselling, 
using a holistic approach that takes into account the particular difficulties of 
those who have suffered unemployment and adverse life circumstances. 
Trainees’ motivation is also enhanced by being able to see their efforts helping 
to regenerate their own areas and communities”85.  
 
However, over time the organisation shifted its view on employment away from 
promoting the long term development approach of the ILM model based on 
training, experience and human development towards the dominant workfirst 
approach of welfare-to-work contracts. By 2004, Albase stated whilst competing for 
DWP funding that, “we adopt a work first approach from day one: our aim is to move our 
clients into the job of their choice as quickly as possible.”86  
 
                                                     
84 Respondent Doyle 
85 Anon Doc 26, 1999, p.229 
86 Anon Doc 1, p.3 
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6.13 The impact of cost-efficiency ideas on ILM provision    
This shift in the mind-set of the organisation to prioritise the employment outcome 
over the community or environmental development outcome could be attributed to 
the changing focus of employment programme funding which became increasingly 
concerned with the final job outcome over the activity and support involved (Freud, 
2007; Freud 2010). Some respondents directly attributed the change in Albase’s 
focus to the changes in the policy and funding environment. As one respondent 
stated:  
 
“Supporting and punting a product when the world changes is also 
nonsensical, and that’s where we need to be lighter of foot in approach, and be 
clever about, and just think a little bit in clear and simple terms”87.   
 
The respondent suggests that the organisation’s approach to moving individuals 
into employment should not have been complicated by the ILM approach and the 
overlapping policy areas when welfare-to-work contracting offered greater rewards 
for the organisation without the complexity of EU funding, numerous partnerships 
and the limited profitability of local ILM regeneration projects. Arguably, this 
suggests that the importance of improving neighbourhoods and social spaces 
became less important for Albase due to the emphasis on employment outcomes 
over regeneration and community development. Instead attention was directed 
towards improving its ability to deliver workfirst and contractualist activities as 
discussed in much greater detail in chapter seven.  
 
                                                     
87 Respondent Doyle 
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6.14 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the decline of Albase’s ILM activities which were 
introduced in chapter five. It demonstrated that whilst these activities overlapped 
during the start of the welfare-to-work quasi-market, the ILM approach became less 
feasible in the funding and policy environment and by the mid-2000’s Albase’s main 
activity was the delivery of welfare-to-work programmes. 
 
The chapter traced the history of Albase’s activities and used Bonoli’s (2010) Active 
Labour Market Policy distinctions to frame the shift in job search and support. By 
using this as a framework it was evident that Albase’s activities continued to centre 
on the provision of employment support, the administrative, political and economic 
context affected the type of activities delivered. The chapter argued that the change 
in employment support activities was intrinsically linked to the organisational field 
as national employment policy became less focussed on training and work 
experience provision and more concerned with workfirst and less expensive 
contracted employment support.  
 
In these discussions there was a detailed consideration given to the concept of 
workfare and it was demonstrated that whilst workfare ideas were active in the 
field during the 1980s and 1990s Albase did not support or provide mandatory 
activities, unpaid work experience, and sanctioning measures on jobseekers. 
However, with the introduction of the welfare-to-work quasi-market some of these 
features typical of workfare policies were displayed in the data collected from 
Albase. Arguably in order to access welfare-to-work resources there was a shift in 
organisational position on these key issues of employment support.  
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Building on chapter five the findings here suggest that the demise of support for the 
ILM in the organisational field pushed actors in Albase to find alternative resources 
for its traditional activities. There was some overlap in the early welfare-to-work 
programmes and Albase successfully adapted some of the ILM model to some of the 
welfare-to-work programmes, however this was only possible in welfare-to-work 
programmes which stipulated a work experience of temporary employment option, 
and which also included funding to cover this. Is welfare-to-work programmes 
which did not stipulate temporary employment, it was more difficult for Albase to 
adapt the ILM programmes due to the workfirst approach and the outcome 
payments based on moving individuals quickly into employment. This led to an 
internal division in terms of the structure, management and activities included in 
the delivery of programmes on one hand from the ILM approach and on the other 
the welfare-to-work programmes. 
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C HAP TER  7  -  S HI FT I NG S TRU C TU RES  
A ND WAY S O F O RG A NIZ I N G 
ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND 
BECOMING ‘BUSINESS-LIKE’ 
The previous chapter argued that the demise of the ILM funding and the 
introduction of welfare-to-work programmes which suited the activities of Albase in 
the late 1990s facilitated a shift in Albase’s activities. It is argued in this chapter that 
the welfare-to-work quasi-market that developed post-1997 became increasingly 
divergent from the organisational field which Albase had previously operated in. In 
particular, the DWP’s expectations of their delivery partners created a set of new 
rules and regulations which Albase had to comply with to continue to gain 
resources from this policy area and funding source.  
 
This chapter focuses on how, between 1999 and 2010, key organisational 
characteristics of Albase (structure, activities, management style and financial 
management) changed to become more ‘business-like.’ It is argued throughout this 
chapter that due to the administration of resources via the welfare-to-work quasi-
market Albase experienced this type of organisational change. Whilst the 
organisation remained a charity limited by guarantee88, operationally core activities 
and behaviours shifted towards the required characteristics of the welfare-to-work 
quasi-market. The chapter demonstrates that as the institutional environment 
shifted towards NPM and market-based initiatives it became increasingly important 
for Albase to demonstrate that they shared characteristics with private organisations 
and that they had become more ‘business-like’ in order to gain resources.  
                                                     
88 Anon Doc 60, 2010 
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The purpose of this chapter is to understand how and why Albase changed in order 
to better understand how the changes at the institutional-level may affect a third 
sector organisation delivering employment services. It is structured as follows. It 
begins by identifying what ‘business-like’ meant in the welfare-to-work context, and 
how this was constructed in the Department of Work and Pensions’ (DWP) 
documents from 1999-2010.  
 
Through the case-study fieldwork and the wider analysis of major DWP policy 
documents and market information texts a number of key characteristics are 
identified which outline what ‘business-like’ meant in welfare-to-work contracting 
and the consequent tensions experienced by Albase who, it is argued, changed 
inline with these environmental rules and norms. These findings suggest that the 
DWP created a legitimate organisational form for the quasi-market using resource 
acquisition processes, competition regulations, and formal accreditation processes. 
In effect, the emphasis on the DWP’s concept of ‘business-like’ appears to 
demonstrate coercive isomorphism and resource dependency theory may be best 
suited to explain the momentum and extent of the change processes discussed.  
 
Following this section the chapter demonstrates that Albase’s organisational change 
process over this time presented a number of organisational design, identity and 
managerial issues. Alongside the emphasis on becoming more commercially 
minded and demonstrating financial strength, the chapter contends that 
involvement in this quasi-market environment encouraged Albase to adopt 
‘business-like’ practices and adapt to an environment which (it is argued) gave 
preference to private-sector characteristics. The adaptation process created a 
number of tensions within Albase, and as such, it is suggested in this chapter that 
the change processes undertaken in Albase were part of a strategy to gain 
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legitimacy in their organisational environment and not part of a rational-economic 
model.  
 
7.1 Constructing ‘business-like’ 
It is argued here that over the time period covered in this chapter (1999-2010) the 
UK government, through its welfare-to-work reforms, encouraged both private 
sector organisations and TSOs to become partners in their new service delivery 
framework. When commencing each new tendering process for a programme the 
government proclaimed the virtues of both the financial management and flexibility 
of the private sector, and the service knowledge and expertise of the third sector 
(DWP, 2006b; DWP, 2008d). In welfare reform documents it was claimed that, ‘these 
organisations can bring a distinctive approach to service delivery, based on their 
specialist knowledge, experience and skills’ (DWP, 2006b, p.74), and that ‘they can 
also offer more scope for innovation, developing new and creative ways of working 
with customers’ (DWP, 2007a, p.7). The government also claimed that the welfare-
to-work quasi-market was not a transfer of public to private, but a pragmatic policy 
that would ensure services were provided by organisations with expertise and who 
were best suited to meeting the needs of jobseekers (DWP, 2006b; Hutton, 2006).  
 
Whilst the quasi-market was originally set-up by the Labour government at the 
same time as policies to promote third sector involvement in public service 
contracting (see Carmel and Harlock, 2008; Alcock, 2009), after the 2010 general 
election the Conservative led coalition government continued with the development 
of the welfare-to-work quasi-market.  Chris Grayling, the Minister for Work and 
Pensions, also continued to emphasise the role of both private sector organisations 
and TSOs as delivery partners in their welfare arrangement.  
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“There is a unique opportunity to combine the best of the third sector, the 
voluntary sector and the private sector to reinvigorate our welfare-to-work 
system” (Grayling, 2010, no page number). 
 
This chapter contends however that whilst it appears that at the policy level both 
TSOs and private sector organisations were encouraged to compete for contracts in 
the welfare-to-work quasi-market, the administration of the programmes (through 
contracts in a quasi-market system) emphasised terms and ideas associated 
predominately with private sector organisations. Whilst arguably some of these 
ideas were present in the late 1990s when the quasi-market was developing, 
overtime the DWP increasingly emphasised ideas of performance management, 
earning profits, and quantitative measurements of performance (see Frumkin and 
Galaskiewicz, 2004). For example, within the guidance for bidding organisations for 
the FND there was an emphasis by the DWP on the need for partners to display 
“commercial acumen” (DWP, 2008a, p.18) above all else, and suppliers were, 
“required to deliver provision from premises that are of a high standard and offer a 
professional, business-like environment” (DWP, 2008d, p.46, emphasis added). 
Similarly, in a speech made in 2010 in an event for welfare-to-work providers David 
Freud, the Minister for Welfare Reform, emphasised the coalition government’s 
support of market mechanisms and business methods.   
 
“We will free you from the pressures of political tinkering so that you can get 
on with the job, making the most of your own experience and business 
practices” (Freud, 2010) 
 
The administration of welfare-to-work programmes within the quasi-market system 
also emphasised the use of business tools such as ‘strategic planning processes’ and 
‘market analysis’ (DWP, 2010b). The DWP required all bidders to demonstrate their 
‘Business Continuity Strategy’ (DWP Provider Guidance Document, no date, p.32), 
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and guidance provided to TSOs about public service contracting stated that they 
must, “demonstrate a long-term business plan/strategy, outline business processes 
to encourage efficiency and effectiveness, and demonstrate access to finance” 
(Scottish Executive, 2003, p.13).  From market documents and information provided 
to organisations seeking resources in the welfare-to-work quasi-market, it appears 
that providers which met the DWP’s concept of ‘business-like’ were deemed 
legitimate.  
 
As mentioned previously in chapter five, as the quasi-market developed and grew 
between 1999 and 2010, these organisational requirements expected of providers 
also increased. The most recent phase of quasi-market development (The Work 
Programme) emphasised the importance of supplier’s financial capability and the 
payment schedule for the contracts was based on payments-by-results method and 
required substantial upfront capital (NAO, 2012a). In the aforementioned speech by 
David Freud, he emphasised the importance of business characteristics for 
delivering welfare services. 
 
“We [the government] will need well-capitalised and well-resourced groups 
that are prepared to take up the challenge of competition” (Freud, 2010, no 
page number). 
 
The DWP produced guidance shortly afterwards which emphasised provider’s 
capital and resource levels, “to ensure that bidders that proceed have sufficient 
resources to successfully deliver the contract with a minimum risk of failure”…and, 
“to ensure that bidders have a sufficient size to sustain minimum contract values 
and an outcome focussed payment model” (DWP, 2010b, p.11).  The DWP and the 
government required providers to possess a number of organisational 
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characteristics in order to successfully gain resources in their tendering system for 
welfare-to-work programmes.  
 
In the “Expected Provider Capabilities” list which was included in the DWP 
Commissioning Strategy (DWP, 2008a) the DWP outlined what characteristics 
delivery partners should be able to demonstrate. These supplier capabilities were 
also a requirement at the FND phase one bid stage (DWP, 2008d) and the 
subsequent Work Programme (DWP, 2010c). In the Commissioning Strategy the 
DWP also introduced the separate “Provider Capabilities Framework” and stated 
the specific capabilities and requirements that “make up a high-performing supply 
chain and an effective prime contractor” (DWP, 2008a, p.15). These characteristics 
were used by the DWP to “contract, inspect, manage and intervene on the basis of 
these capabilities and requirements” (DWP, 2008d, p.30). Similarly, the ‘Evaluation 
Criteria’ (DWP, 2010c, p.10) included in the bidding documents for the Employment 
Related Support Services Framework (ERSS-the framework for the pre-bidding 
round of the Work Programme) outlined the preferred characteristics of DWP 
suppliers based on their ability to meet a number of desired requirements which 
would demonstrate how capable the organisation was of fulfilling the needs of the 
DWP (DWP, 2010b). It is argued here that as these features were required to access 
resources in the quasi-market, organisations which possessed them were considered 
legitimate by the DWP and the wider welfare-to-work quasi-market. 
 
The provider requirements have been combined in Table 7.1 below, and grouped 
into four dominant themes. The table demonstrates that providers were required to 
possess a number of characteristics and attributes, however the required capabilities 
are skewed towards the first two; finance and resources and contract and 
performance management.  
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Table 7.1: The DWP’s provider requirements 
 
Source: DWP, 2008d; DWP, 2010b 
 
The following part of this chapter focuses specifically on the first two characteristics 
(finance and resources, and contract and performance management) from Table 7.1. 
It is argued these requirements became coercive isomorphic pressures for Albase. It 
appears that the DWP requirements exerted pressures on Albase to adapt to the 
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changes enacted in the organisational field in order to enter and then maintain their 
involvement in welfare-to-work contracting.  
 
7.2 Contract and performance management: Targets and indicators  
In welfare-to-work contracting there was an emphasis on organizing the quasi-
market system through the use of targets and indicators, and in order to operate in 
this environment Albase had to accept and adapt to these regulative and 
competitive pressures. These pressures occurred in a number of ways as discussed 
in this section. 
 
In the tendering stage contracts were designed with specific minimum target 
requirements (see DWP, FND presentation, no date). Targets and indicators also 
became fundamental tools in the design and regulation of the welfare-to-work 
market. For example, the contracting stage for FND phase one introduced Critical 
Success Factors (CSF), which the DWP considered as the core requirements for 
programme success. Suppliers were required to meet these CSF which included 
meeting or exceeding; “Short Job Outcome Targets (a jobseeker completing 13 
weeks in paid employment) as agreed in their contract; Sustained Job Outcome 
targets (26 weeks in paid work) agreed in their contract; ensuring every customer 
received a level and type of support appropriate to their individual needs, suppliers 
delivering a service that represents value for money and a step-change 
improvement in performance compared with previous programmes; and suppliers 
delivering high quality provisions to all customers in line with the DWP Quality 
Framework” (DWP, 2008d, p.15).  
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Target setting and target attainment tools were also used by the DWP to create 
competition in the quasi-market as organisations which did not meet their targets 
could lose their contract or service payments. Provider competition was a central 
feature in the quasi-market system, as the extract below displays: 
 
“Multiple provider arrangements will test whether competition between 
providers, when dealing with the same client group in the same labour market, 
will produce better performance” (ONS, 2002, p.2).  
 
The need to measure performance and communicate results with organisations in 
the organisational field through performance league tables became a significant 
aspect of the market structure and supplier relationship. The aim was to encourage 
competition between delivery organisations based on the rationale that providers 
who were exposed to competition would perform better (Flecker and Hermann, 
2010), and non-performing delivery organisations would be pushed out of the 
quasi-market if they failed to innovate and improve (NAO, 2012a; WPC, 2012). The 
DWP’s approach to monitoring the market included the introduction of the Star 
Rating System (SRS). The SRS was introduced as a “supplier performance tool” to 
score, compare and rank providers within the market as they delivered a DWP 
contract (four stars was the highest score, and one star the lowest). It was based on 
three Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): job outcomes, quality, and contract 
compliance. However, it was weighted heavily towards job outcomes (70%), with 
Quality (20%) and Contract compliance (10%) contributing only a small amount of 
affect the overall Star Rating Score (DWP, 2008d, p.36). The DWP also broadened its 
role in the quasi-market to include standard-setting, purchasing excellence and 
contract management, and used targets as the measurement tool to achieve this. In 
effect, the DWP created a competitive system based on awarding contracts and 
resources using quantitative performance measurement regulations and DWP 
quasi-market specific accreditation standards.  
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In this organisational field targets were not only part of the contract monitoring 
process, they were also used as a way to reduce costs by encouraging bidders to 
increase their target aspirations to secure the contract.  For example, for the Work 
Programme bidders were required to discount their bids in order to offer better 
value for money (DWP, 2010c). The DWP’s approach linked discounting to 
performance based on the opinion, “providers will have to secure high levels of 
performance in order to justify a high level of discount” (NAO, 2012a, p.31). As the 
DWP both monitored and audited providers based on target performance, the 
government (through the quasi-market and the welfare-to-work contracts) placed 
great emphasis on providers working towards pre-defined measurable targets.  
 
“Whilst the baselines set out our national expectations, we expect bidders to 
look at the local labour market and submit, what their analysis determines is a 
realistic and stretching expectation for the area.  Bidders will be required to 
justify performance offers within the bid and the Department will assess that 
justification” (DWP, 2008d, p.93). 
 
The DWP bidding guidance included a number of management practices it 
expected providers to adopt to demonstrate that all providers could meet targets 
and adhere to reporting and monitoring rules. In order act as a DWP supplier 
organisations needed to demonstrate that they possessed the required management 
systems which included, “rigorous self-assessment and effective action planning” 
(DWP, 2010c, p.24). Similar features were outlined in the DWP Quality Framework 
which required suppliers to, “undertake continuous self-assessment and action 
planning; monitoring and review; external inspection; and sharing of good practice” 
(DWP, 2012, p.31). The Quality Framework directed organisations to undertake 
“Independent External Inspection, Learning and Development Plans, Continuous 
Self-Assessment and Development Planning, Management and Review” and to 
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demonstrate a commitment to develop and share good practice. To borrow from 
Scott (2008, p.53) it appears that due to the emphasis on targets and indicators to 
control and organize transactions in the welfare-to-work quasi-market the DWP 
acted “as rule maker, referee and enforcer.” 
 
The following section builds on the idea that predetermined targets and 
quantitative-based measurement standards created a coercive framework in this 
policy context. It contends that the administration of resources in the quasi-market 
centred used the target attainment approach to develop a payment-by-results 
exchange system which increased competitive pressures.   
 
7.3 Payment-by-Results 
This section begins by discussing the types of payment approaches used in public 
sector out-sourcing. It then focuses on the impact on Albase of the funding approach 
used by the DWP. 
 
Payment-by-outcome was a broad term to refer to a form of performance 
management where providers were paid on the basis of outcomes rather than effort 
(see Cumming, 2011). The approach was a form of performance contracting and was 
a key policy instrument in the NPM approach to public service reform.  In the UK 
this was known as payment-by-results (a phrase preferred by the current 
Conservative led coalition government) and replaced the term outcome-based 
commissioning, which was the favoured term by the previous Labour Government 
(Sturgess et al, 2011). In practice there was arguably little difference in the 
approaches used by either administration in the context of welfare-to-work and the 
term payment-by-results is used here for all relevant welfare-to-work programmes 
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regardless of their political association. According to (Finn, 2011a) payment-by-
results played a key part of the reforms to the administration of employment 
programmes as it was used to direct and measure the performance and financial 
reward of contractors who were able to meet the short-term targets outlined by the 
DWP. In this format payment-by-results was employed in conjunction with 
performance contracting; that is, it was associated with a public sector commissioner 
purchasing specified outcomes from an independent or semi-independent provider 
from the public, private or third sector (see Behn and Kant, 1999).   
 
Welfare-to-work providers received two main types of funding; performance linked 
and non-performance linked (see Webb, 2003; Beale, 2005). Performance linked 
funding triggered a payment to the contractor once an agreed milestone was 
achieved by the job seeker, most commonly the move into the labour market. In 
some contracts there were also payments if the individual maintained in the labour 
market over a specified time period. For example, in the UK Employment Zones if 
providers ensured jobseekers retained work for both 13 weeks and 26 weeks they 
were eligible for outcome payments. In addition, they were also required to obtain 
work for a certain percentage of jobseekers referred to them in order to be eligible 
for a bonus award (Webb, 2003).  In the Work Programme job seekers must remain 
in work for up to two years for providers to receive the bulk of their performance 
linked payments89 (see Bruttel, 2005).  
 
The second type (non-performance funding) was often a lower value than 
performance linked payments and was awarded when the individual registered 
with the organisation (known as an attachment or referral fee). In the New Deal 
                                                     
89 Anon Doc 15 
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contracts the provider also received on-programme fees once the individual had 
been with the organisation for a specified period of weeks (Finn, 2000; Damm, 2012). 
The non-performance payments were seen by Albase as a crucial part of its business 
plan as it provided the funding for overhead and running costs during the contract 
delivery phase, particularly in the earlier programmes (the New Deal and 
Employment Zone). Non-performance funding was also considered beneficial to the 
DWP’s contracting-out efforts as the payments helped attract providers to compete 
in the market90.  
 
7.4 Types of contractor’s payments  
Over time the bulk of contractors’ payments became increasingly weighted towards 
performance linked payments (DWP, 2010e). This development was most evident in 
the Work Programme which adopted an ‘invest-to-save’ approach required 
providers to finance a substantial proportion of the up-front costs of service 
provision, with reimbursement being made later out of identified savings to the 
Treasury (Freud, 2009; Freud, 2010).  Three types of performance linked incentive 
approaches can be identified which were used in the design of welfare-to-work 
contracts; thresholds, distance travelled and milestones. 
 
 ‘Thresholds’ were strict standards in which providers receive no reward until a 
certain level of achievement was reached, such as 30% of the contract population 
(Sturgess et al, 2011). Although the threshold approach was not used on its own in 
the UK, it appears that the broad threshold principle framed much of the welfare-to-
work contracting as providers who did not meet their targets at specified dates 
could lose their contracts or a percentage of their referrals (NAO, 2012a). Whilst 
                                                     
90 Respondent Madden; Respondent Sutton; Anon Doc 1 
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Sturgess et al, (2011) contend that thresholds had the advantage of setting high 
standards and increasing competitiveness, the approach has been associated with 
delivery issues such as creaming and parking where providers prioritise service 
users in order to meet the minimum threshold requirements(see Struyven, and 
Steurs, 2004; Finn, 2008; Koning and Hendrich, 2010; Finn, 2011).   
 
With ‘distance-travelled’ standards, the aim was to reward incremental 
improvement and the approach was often associated with programmes working 
with those furthest from the labour market which advocated the use of distance-
travelled standards (Sturgess et al, 2011). In such programmes providers were 
rewarded for improving an individual’s employability, rather than for labour 
market attachment rates. Employment programmes that used this approach tended 
to work with health-benefit claimants and used condition management based 
programmes (see Barnes and Hudson, 2006). The ‘milestones’ approach also 
rewarded intermediate outcomes for progress made against a distance-travelled 
measure or for outputs on route to a primary outcome (Sturgess et al, 2011).  
 
Milestone payments tended to be associated with programmes which were 
designed to measure progress such as a payment for the completion of a training 
course. Broome (2002) suggests that milestone payments served to motivate 
providers to work with disadvantaged clients who may not have met the final 
standard but would nevertheless have achieved some of the benchmarks and trigger 
a payment. In some cases they provided early evidence of performance and thus 
helped commissioning bodies to overcome problems of under performance 
(Sturgess et al, 2011). For example, in the FND programme, providers received 
payments when jobseekers were placed in a job and then when they remained in 
work for 13 weeks, even though the primary focus was on ensuring that clients 
remained in employment for 26 weeks (see Mulheirn and Menne, 2002). Arguably, 
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these milestones were considered valuable enough to the DWP to reward, perhaps 
because they provided evidence of cost savings. The approach was also used to 
reduce performance risk for providers or to assist them in dealing with cash flow 
problems.  In practice between 1999 and 2010 welfare-to-work programmes 
involved a mixture of incentive options as part a continual ‘adaptive contracting’ or 
‘market testing’ approach (Webb, 2003; Beale, 2005; Finn, 2010).  
 
7.5 Contractualism and management behaviour  
Whilst attention has been given by academics and commissioning bodies to 
problems associated with provider behaviour in terms of gaming and the incentive 
strategies (Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008; Davies, 2008; Finn, 2008), much less has 
been directed towards the discussions of the management behaviour within 
organisations that operate in a payment-by-results market (see Macmillan, 2010 for 
a review). So far it has been argued that the DWP’s approach to administering 
welfare programmes was based on targets and indicators as tools to create 
competition and efficiency from delivery organisations. The inclusion of these tools 
demonstrates that the DWP and the government prioritised particular 
organisational qualities, such as management systems and approaches designed 
around target attainment and measurement. The following section contends that the 
use of performance based outcomes by the DWP created a quasi-market where 
delivery organisations operated in a normative framework guided by NPM 
approaches to service delivery. The quasi-market involved regulative pressures to 
meet the DWP’s provider characteristics, and alongside the competitive pressures 
from the performance based contracting the quasi-market facilitated isomorphic 
changes in Albase. Before a discussion of the other field level rules and 
characteristics expected of providers, the following section explores how Albase 
adapted to the target based approach created by the DWP in welfare-to-work 
contracting. 
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7.6 Albase- incorporating new management systems 
Albase designed and implemented organisational processes and management 
systems in line with the field level rules, regulations and expectations outlined 
above. For example, by 2005 Albase stated in documents that as an organisation it 
managed and organized its activities through systems based on target measurement 
and attainment. In the extract below Albase refers to two regulation processes 
created by the DWP in the early 2000’s.    
 
“We place the highest emphasis on continuously reviewing the quality of our 
provision. All provision will be delivered in line with the JCP Quality 
Framework and will be subject to self-assessment against the Common 
Inspection Framework.”91  
 
Resource acquisition was dependent on Albase demonstrating that it met the DWP’s 
expected requirements. All delivery organisations were required to demonstrate in 
their bids that they possessed the capacity to collect and report on targets (DWP, 
2008). In order for Albase to participate in welfare-to-work contracting they were 
required to employ individuals with contract management skills, update their IT 
systems to meet the recording requirements, and design front-line services designed 
around target-attainment. Albase adopted management techniques such as the use 
of measurable case-loads for personal advisers and front-line employees, and work 
patterns for those working with job seekers were changed to include weekly and 
monthly individual and team goals92. Whilst some existing employment positions 
were affected by these organisational changes in order to delivery welfare-to-work 
                                                     
91 Anon Doc, Doc 12, 2005 
92 Anon Doc 1; Anon Doc 6; Anon Doc 15 
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contracts Albase created a number of new employment positions and team which 
worked in the specified way93. 
 
Albase adhered to and promoted the DWP’s expectations of contract management, 
as visible in the extract below from a tender document. The author described in the 
bid how Albase would manage the proposed contract, which included the use of a 
number of key ‘business-like’ ideas such as KPIs, the creation of a programme 
manager position, and management practices based on performance targets. These 
organisational features were not present in earlier bidding documents to other 
funding bodies94. 
 
“On a day to day basis the programme manager will have responsibility for 
meeting all key contractual performance targets and standards of service. We 
will appoint a performance manager who will head up our team of 
employment consultants and will also head up our employer engagement 
strategy…Each of our employment consultants will have a narrow range of 
KPIs around job entry, job retention, client engagement, and into work 
account management”95  
 
From analysing the quasi-market documents a vital part of the quasi-market system 
was based on delivery organisations demonstrating their ability to manage 
payment-by-results contracts. The duration and size of the contracts awarded by the 
DWP depended on two performance related factors. First, the decision was based on 
an organisation’s performance expectations- the target they outlined they would 
meet in their tender document. Second, in some programmes, contract value also 
                                                     
93 Respondent Beattie 
94 Respondent Hamilton 
95 Anon Doc 6, 2003, p.22. 
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depended on performance achievements during the contract period (DWP, 2008d; 
DWP, 2010c). For example, in some programmes such as the Multiple Provider 
Employment Zone (MPEZ), the DWP could transfer part of the contract value from 
one provider to another if one was not meeting their performance expectations 
(NAO, 2012a; WPC, 2012). As such all contract holders, including Albase, were 
required to incorporate (new) employment positions such as contract managers into 
their organisational structures to meet the reporting needs of the contracting system. 
A similar system was applied in the Work Programme were guidance to providers 
stated that: 
“One of the tools we [the DWP] will use to manage provider performance and 
achieve best value for money (VFM) is the use of random allocation Market 
Share Shifting to drive competition between providers in live running. This 
will enable us to move referrals, and so potential earnings, if a provider is not 
meeting performance standards” (DWP, 2012b, p.7). 
 
Albase adapted its internal processes and systems to meet these external 
requirements. As visible in the extract below, one respondent clearly stated that 
they felt changes at the institutional-level during the 1990s and 2000’s now required 
TSOs to become more business-like. 
 
“I think there’s been a move over the last 10 or 15 years to push organisations 
much more on the need to have proper performance indicators and processes 
for monitoring and evaluating… In that way, governments get value for 
money and I don’t see a problem in that at all. And I think the voluntary 
sector has woken up to that evaluation. The private sector does it so if we 
don’t do it then we can’t be as involved”96 
 
                                                     
96 Respondent McStay 
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This extract suggests that individuals within Albase accepted the requirements in 
their organisational field as ‘legitimate’ and, as displayed in the discussion below, 
sought to demonstrate that Albase possessed them in order to access resources. An 
impression was gained during the fieldwork that the discussion of the use of targets 
and indicators did not involve an economic rationale in terms of an internal 
assessment of the organisation’s actions and output in terms of operational 
efficiency, as neoinstitutional economic theorists would suggest (Menard, 2005). 
Instead, employees created new tasks and processes in Albase in response to 
understanding the quasi-market’s regulatory and competitive requirements.A 
further example is outlined below. When required to discuss how they would 
manage performance and quality control in a tender document, the author for 
Albase wrote that they would adopt contract management behaviour which would 
demonstrate their capability to control supply-chains and meet DWP expectations. 
This included creating a new position in the organisation of a ‘client liaison officer,’ 
and suggests that Albase not only adhered to DWP processes but also adopted them 
as their own approach to managing relations with others in the organisational field. 
 
“We will set minimum standards for all providers in line with our own 
performance targets. Our client liaison officer will monitor the performance of 
all of our providers on a daily basis. We will regularly monitor health and 
safety and programme compliance and will penalise providers who do not 
meet our standards by reducing their referrals. We will also work to build the 
capacity of our providers by providing help with self-assessment of their 
provision and best practice workshops.97” 
 
Internal management practices were also implemented which demonstrated that the 
organisation had the characteristics to meet the requirements of the quasi-market. 
For example, in 2008 one of Albase’s new key performance indicators was to 
                                                     
97 Anon Doc 1, p.20 
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“achieve a level 4 DWP star rating”98, and the organisational development plan for the 
same year was based on targets, indicators and outcomes99 (a relatively new 
approach for Albase according to one respondent who mentioned a complete lack of 
performance monitoring processes a few years earlier100). One respondent described 
the new processes which had been implemented to meet the requirement for target 
and performance management systems. This respondent stated that in practice it 
involved the introduction of new “weekly recording information” which was designed 
through the “performance and management committee” in order to “track out numbers 
and produce weekly and monthly reports101.” The respondent stressed the importance of 
“getting these systems right” as the DWP audit team regularly undertook visits and 
arranged meetings in order to check on the processes in place and the numbers 
recorded in the contracts.  
 
However, the respondent quoted above also stated that these new processes did not 
just cover the (audited) FND contract but they had been implemented across the 
organisation. This suggests that the processes and rules within the welfare-to-work 
market which Albase’s management team had identified as important in welfare-to-
work contracting had also been implemented in other parts of the organisation 
working in different activities and/or policy contexts where the processes were not a 
regulatory requirement. Consequently, it appears that the changes enacted in the 
organisation were not simply in response to the resource exchange with the DWP. 
Instead,  internal processes and the way work was organized changed due to 
normative perceptions on what was the correct way of organizing. 
 
                                                     
98 Anon Doc 23, 2008, p.26. 
99 Anon Doc 24, 2008 
100 Respondent McStay 
101 Respondent Somers 
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“We developed that across everything the business does.  It doesn’t just cover 
FND, and it doesn’t just cover employability.  It covers criminal justice work, 
regeneration and sustainability”102 
 
7.7 Quantitative reporting in funding programmes 
It is also worth noting at this point that whilst targets and indicators were key 
components in the administration of the welfare-to-work quasi-market it was not 
the only public service area to prioritise targets in the management process. NPM 
reforms were enacted across all policy areas which Albase operated in. Quantitative 
reporting based on targets had gradually become the dominant tool to access 
funding in other policy areas such as regeneration and employment programmes, 
and EU and local government funding sources which had also adopted a broad 
NPM approach (see Bachtler and Mendez, 2004). Some respondents stated that 
target and indicators ‘crept’ into the organisation throughout the late 1980s and 
1990s through Albase’s involvement in funding from these sources103. For example, 
some ILM funding sources, such as Training for Work (TfW) funds, introduced the 
‘targets’ based management approach to Albase prior to their involvement in 
welfare-to-work. TfW was an employment programme which sought to increase the 
skills levels of unemployed people. As mentioned in chapter five, Albase used TfW 
funds in some of the ILM projects, but it was also used for a range of local 
employment support programmes throughout Scotland (see Canning, 1998; Raffe et 
al, 2010).  
 
Some respondents from Albase felt that the involvement in activities which required 
a target and indicator mindset was a useful stepping stone towards the contract 
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culture of welfare-to-work and the payment-by-results model that followed104.This 
was because during this transformational phase Albase was able to develop internal 
approaches to achieve and manage targets without the financial pressure of the 
payment-by-results model. Respondents felt that staff had also become accustomed 
to this style of working and that there was a steady growth of working towards 
targets as the organisation won more target-centred programmes. Respondents 
identified TfW funding (in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s) as an important step 
towards understanding the New Deal requirements (the contract was secured in 
2000), and subsequently the Employment Zone contract (in 2002)105.  
 
Through TfW Albase experienced working with funders who used target setting 
processes with contractors and a small element of payment-by-results for meeting 
set targets106. There was a gradual shift in management practice towards delivering 
to prescribed targets, albeit originally only for a small percentage of their activities 
during the 1990s and into the 2000s. As some of the funding sources used in ILMs 
had targets attached and had begun to adopt more NPM style mechanisms to 
administer their funds, it appears that Albase gradually adapted to the workings of 
the target culture107.  
 
However, it is argued here that prior to the introduction of the welfare-to-work 
quasi-market, other funding streams did not exert the same pressures nor emphasise 
the need for organisations to be more ‘business-like’ in terms of commercial 
characteristics and financial capacity. For example, TfW was aimed predominately 
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106 Anon Doc 36, 2009 
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at TSOs and not private sector organisations so it was not dominated by ideas of 
business and competition efficiencies or the requirement for up-front investment. 
Albase was a TfW provider for over 15 years108 and through this time it did not 
enact as many ‘business-like’ changes as it did in a relatively short period between 
2005 and 2010.  The target approach adopted by funders did not affect Albase’s 
internal structure and management systems prior to the quasi-market. Furthermore, 
whilst contract monitoring was based on targets, and resource acquisition required 
the identification of targets, previous policy areas had not used a ‘lowest cost’ target 
based approach as is evident in welfare-to-work contracting.  As the extract below 
demonstrates employees within the organisation identified a difference in the 
organisational field due to the introduction of competitive market forces.  
 
“Changes to public procurement and to the employment and welfare ‘market’ 
mean that Albase is increasingly operating in a competitive environment, and 
so demonstrating the value of what we do is ever more important.109”  
 
This is an important caveat in the development of Albase as it appears that the 
organisation’s gradual adaptation to the welfare-to-work rules and regulations over 
a number of years enabled some organisational learning in terms of output 
reporting. In this respect, the involvement in other target-centred policy areas 
helped Albase to adapt to the requirements of the welfare-to-work quasi-market 
and assist in accessing resources from the early welfare-to-work programmes.  
 
                                                     
108 Anon Doc 38, 2005 
109 Anon Doc 24, 2008, p.1 
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7.8 Organisational design and EU funding  
Despite an increasing amount of Albase’s resources coming from target-centred 
programmes, the predominant way of working (the ILM model) and the cultural 
set-up of Albase had, however, originally developed towards meeting the needs of 
the reporting and recording systems of EU funds110 As outlined in chapter five EU 
funding had previously comprised the majority of Albase’s income and it was an 
important funding component in much of its employment, environmental and 
regeneration projects111. Unlike welfare-to-work contracts, EU funding did not 
follow a payment-by-results approach and target reporting was not a fundamental 
part of the management processes. Instead it was based on specific objectives and 
outcomes of each project. As one respondent stated: 
 
“ILM wasn’t as target driven, although there would be targets set in relation 
to European funding etc. You didn’t get paid on targets so, if you put your 
claim in at the end of the year and you didn’t achieve your targets there 
wasn’t really very much said about it. So you kind of just get money again for 
the next year, it didn’t really matter.112”  
 
Conversely, since the introduction of welfare-to-work contracts Albase became 
more target focussed with advisors and those working on specific contracts 
organized and managed to meet predetermined targets as dictated by the contracts, 
and regulations dominant in the organisational field. For example, in contrast to the 
respondents view on the ILM funding above, the FND Invitation to Tender (ITT) 
document stressed that suppliers must, “focus strongly on performance” and that 
contracts had to be managed using the “Contract Management Framework (CMF), 
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which incorporated monthly analysis of management information, performance 
management, quality assessment and customer satisfaction feedback” (DWP, 2008d, 
p.34).  
 
The transition from one approach to the other was not a clear-cut process. Albase 
continued to operate a number of different programmes, funded by a range of 
organisations, some adopting a target-centred approach, and others continuing with 
approaches more akin to EU funding systems. As such, since 1999/2000 Albase 
operated internal processes of both funding approaches. This contrast in 
administrative arrangements for Albase created an organisational tension as the 
management in some departments funded by more target-led programmes differed 
from the reporting systems and management in other departments. However, 
Albase’s adaptation of internal procedures towards targets increased as Albase 
became more dependent on resources from the welfare-to-work quasi-market and 
there was a shift from one approach to the other. 
 
“We probably became a bit more results driven because a bigger percentage of 
our funding was then results orientated, so you became more dependent on 
it”113. 
 
The extract above suggests that the impact of the welfare-to-work quasi-market was 
not restricted to the parts of the organisation involved in this context, but as 
welfare-to-work resources became the largest part of Albase’s income ideas from 
welfare-to-work began to affect all the activities and processes within the 
organisation. Consequently, it appears that the influence of the exchange process in 
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welfare-to-work quasi-market was more than the influence of previous exchanges. 
Whilst previous target reporting assisted Albase to adapt to performance 
contracting,  these exchanges only led to the adoption of new reporting methods 
and did not create new ways of organizing across the rest of the organisation like 
welfare-to-work contracting did. The following section looks at how regulative and 
competitive pressures in the quasi-market impacted on Albase’s approach to 
financial management.  
 
7.9 Finance and Resources: ‘earning income’  
Alongside the use of targets, the DWP’s approach to organizing the welfare-to-work 
quasi-market placed great emphasis on the idea that competition between delivery 
organisations would encourage innovation and improve service delivery (ONS, 
2002; WPC, 2012). Through the tendering processes delivery organisations 
competed to secure a contract which would enable them to generate surpluses. That 
is, the design of the quasi-market and the contracts advertised allowed 
organisations to generate profits in the delivery of welfare services on the 
assumption that profit generation would support delivery improvements as 
businesses sought to increase the profits they could produce from their contract. As 
contracts included targets and minimum standards, the DWP’s assumption was that 
services would be maintained and improved because organisations sought to 
maintain their contracts for income and increased profits (NAO, 2012b; WPC, 2012). 
 
Arguably, moving away from grant based funding towards the idea of ‘earned 
income’ is one of the fundamental features associated with TSOs in public service 
markets (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004). Arguably, in the welfare-to-work 
market ‘earning income’ and generating surplus was one aspect of operating in a 
more ‘business-like’ way.  As the extract below demonstrates, senior managers in 
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Albase identified the competitive pressures in the organisational field as an 
explanation for why the shift towards earning income and developing in this way 
was a positive move for Albase.  
 
“In the past five years or so we have moved from grants dependency to 
contested contractual income. We are competing against large private, often 
multi-national companies and are holding our own in terms of quality of 
service and value for money. This journey reflects that of the larger social 
enterprise sector in moving from a relatively unknown concept to one of the 
most exciting models for business development in Scotland today”114.  
 
As such, this section argues that a key way in which Albase became more ‘business-
like’ involved financial management reform. This is because in comparison to 
previous employment and regeneration programmes involvement the welfare-to-
work quasi-market required Albase to overhaul their financial operations and the 
way that they managed cash-flows115.   
 
Prior to the introduction of competitive contracting in welfare-to-work programmes 
Albase were largely dependent on resources for ILM programmes which were 
administered in two ways. The first was through service-level agreements (SLA’s) 
with local authorities and housing associations where the ‘principal’ contracted the 
‘agent’ to undertake specified work tasks (see Sanderson, 2001). The second main 
way in which Albase received funding for its activities was through a Full Cost 
Recovery (FCR) approach which is discussed in more detail below.  
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FCR is the principle by which TSOs, “are paid not only for the direct costs they 
incur by providing a service – for example staff salaries – but also for the indirect or 
overhead costs associated with delivering the service such as office space, 
information technology support and other support costs” (NAO, 2005, p.2). FCR 
covered the costs associated with the delivery of a project or service and this 
approach was the dominant funding method in Albase’s environment during the 
1980s and 1990s. Arguably, the FCR approach was not designed for organisational 
profit or surplus making (in comparison to welfare-to-work funding). In the report 
‘Working with the Third Sector’ (NAO, 2005, p.9-10), three types of financial 
relationship based on the principle of FCR between public sector bodies and third 
sector organisations were outlined: 
 
I. A “shopping” relationship – where a purchaser designs a specification for a 
service it requires or is statutorily obliged to provide, and seeks a supplier to 
provide that service; 
II. A “giving” relationship – where the funder provides support towards a 
specific project or in support of the organisation’s general objectives; and 
III. An “investing” relationship – where the funder provides support towards a 
specific internal organisational change, such as an enhancement in a third 
sector organisation’s managerial capacity.  
 
Whereas many employment support programmes had previously been delivered 
through grant-based funding116, the welfare-to-work quasi-market matched the 
definition of a ‘shopping relationship’ because of the use of the competitive 
procurement procedures and contracts previously discussed. Fundamental to 
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shopping relationships was the opportunity for commissioners to compare a 
number of service offers from potential delivery partners and chose the one which 
they preferred (NAO, 2005). That decision involved a consideration of price, or 
value for money, and as such, for Albase to win a contract it needed to be able to 
compete on these terms. The NAO stated that the move from giving/investing 
relationships to shopping relationships was problematic as TSOs were designed for 
and more experienced in the original administrative approach. The NAO argued 
that one of the main problems was that, “the main responsibility for ensuring the 
full costs of the specification are met falls on the provider (in this case, the third 
sector organisation)” (NAO, 2005, p.9), rather than on the principal.  
 
In contrast, in giving and investing arrangements both the scope of the project and 
the costs of meeting it were discussed between funder and recipient during the 
project design phase and full costing of a project was the basis for funding decisions. 
As such, partner organisations delivered a project fully aware of the costs involved 
and with an expectation of a full reimbursement for delivering a service or project. 
Arguably the ILM model worked in this way and once the project had been 
established all the costs involved in its delivery were covered in the funding 
arrangements with commissioning bodies (and the SLA agreement). As such, using 
the NAO definition of funding arrangements it appears that the organisational field 
shifted from being based on a giving-relationship to a shopping-relationship. This 
institutional-level transformation created new pressures on Albase to change their 
approach to accessing and using financial resources. This is because the shopping 
relationship which underpinned welfare-to-work contracting emphasised market 
based competitive systems and for Albase, it invoked major internal restructuring 
over a period of approximately ten years. In this time their financial and 
management systems shifted from being predominately designed for the ILM 
model towards the shopping relationship requirements.  
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The NAO (2005) contends that shopping relationships replaced previous giving or 
investing relationships in many policy contexts. As outlined in the NAO diagram in 
Figure 7.1 below (NAO, 2007), whilst surpluses may not have been possible due to 
the FCR principle, it is unlikely that grant based relationships would have placed 
the TSO at a serious risk of making an irretrievable loss. However, due to the price-
based mechanism the shopping relationship did create situations where TSOs could 
deliver services at a loss if their programme management or the competitive process 
led to an organisation securing a contract they could not afford to deliver. Thus in 
welfare-to-work contracting, the move from one approach (FCR) to the other (quasi-
market) may have shifted operational responsibility, risk and financial management 
out of the public sector commissioning organisation and onto Albase. 
 
Figure 7.1: The Relationship between the type of funding and the 
application of Full Cost Recovery 
 
Source: NAO report, 2007, p.10 
 
As previously noted, as the quasi-market replaced the previous grant-based systems 
in the wider environment in which Albase operated, Albase experienced a 
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transitional period where they moved from an organisational structure serving one 
funding relationship, to developing internal structures to meet the needs of the 
other. For a period of time the organisation operated financial procedures and 
business-strategies for each type of approach and sought to manage and understand 
the requirements of both funding approaches.  
 
7.10 Generating surpluses to fund organisational change  
Despite operating a number of other projects which continued with the previous 
financial arrangement, over a period of eight years (between 2001-2009) Albase was 
able to gradually adapt their financial systems to the welfare-to-work requirements 
outlined previously117. Albase successfully won a number of welfare-to-work 
contracts, was able to earn income, and in some contracts it generated a large 
surplus118. The organisation used the surplus to invest in internal development in 
parallel to the on-going changes in the welfare-to-work market119. The impression 
gained during the fieldwork period was that without the surpluses generated in 
some of the earlier welfare-to-work contracts (such as the Employment Zone and 
New Deal contracts), Albase would not have been able to implement the required 
internal changes to continue in the welfare-to-work market. 
 
However, a number of tensions can be identified in the data collected arising from 
these changes.   For example, some documents demonstrate that employees raised 
concerns about the impact of this shift on organisational development. In a 
document from 2008 it was stated that, “the implementation of FCR is vital if social 
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enterprise are to deliver effective services, as it is longer term funding and the need to 
recognise that social enterprises’ sustainability depends on the ability to generate a surplus. 
A clear commitment to move towards FCR would ensure that social enterprises can receive 
the costs of essential central service such as financial, IT, Human Resource and other 
essential management services to ensure that they operate professionally and effectively.120”  
 
Concerns also centred on whether they could successfully move from a negotiated 
FCR approach towards a shopping relationship where it was required that overhead 
costs were factored into the competitive price offered in the bid. The transition 
period involved a learning and adaptation phase where managers were concerned 
with adapting to the new relationship without increasing the risk of organisational 
failure121. For example, in an Albase document in 1997 it was stated that in order to 
adapt to the New Deal programme arrangements, “heavy investment will be required 
in staff training and better quality materials and training programmes122.”  
 
Furthermore, one respondent felt that the shifting payment schedule instigated 
more than an alteration to the organisation’s financial processes. They felt that it 
was significantly altering the organisation’s identity as staff and board members 
started to use ‘surplus’ figures as a measurement of organisational success. The 
respondent felt that this caused a major tension in the organisation’s identity, and as 
visible in the quote below, questioned whether the business-like requirements of the 
welfare-to-work market were suitable for TSOs. 
 
                                                     
120 Anon Doc 8, 2008 
121 Respondent Sutton 
122 Anon Doc 7, 1997 
 267 
“So you have to look at it and say, is Albase going in the direction where its 
turnover is increasing and it looks healthy? That is what the underlying 
trading position is, but are its mission and values being eroded by following a 
government policy that’s been designed for the big Sercos of the world- it 
hasn’t been designed for the smaller organisations123”  
 
Other responses highlighted the impact of the shopping relationship on how the 
organisation viewed potential contracts. Here, it appears that targets and the 
potential to generate a surplus redefined the framework for service delivery.  For 
example,  
 
“The contract doesn’t drive you, the contract gives you a set of rules under 
audit and compliance. It gives you an agreement about a performance 
expectation and it leaves you to get on with it. So, you then do a calculation 
that says, if I get X number of people in the door, and I get Y amount of them 
in a job, which I keep for 13 or 26 weeks, that will give me A, B and C. I do 
that calculation that says I need to get 35% of people who walk through the 
door, a job, and keep them a job for 6 months, then I will make surplus of 
that124”  
 
Whilst the respondent felt that the contract didn’t drive the organisation, arguably 
the framework influenced the way in which the organisation approached service 
delivery design as outlined below. From the data collected it appears that in 
Albase’s previous activities (the ILM model) the organisation identified social issues 
and created a project proposal with a funder based on the activities they would offer 
alongside the anticipated outcomes of the project. In many projects Albase 
participated in discussions with funders, and other relevant agencies during the 
design phase. The cost of the project was factored into the design, and many ILM 
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programmes included a core fee to cover some organisational costs. Due to the fact 
the relationship with the commissioning organisation (such as the EU or the Local 
Authority) was akin to a ‘giving relationship,’ generating a surplus and managing 
the surplus during the project delivery phase was not an over-riding outcome for 
Albase.  
 
7.11 Designing employment support services 
However, the contracting process in the welfare-to-work quasi-market reversed the 
activity design process for Albase. Targets and surplus options were prioritised and 
identified before the design of the services to be delivered in the actual programme. 
These factors (price and targets) created which are termed here as ‘operational 
boundaries’ for Albase. ‘Operational boundaries’ refers to the decision-making 
process and the pre-defined parameters from the quasi-market and contractual 
norms and rules. For example, the decision making process for Albase in welfare-to-
work contracting focussed on what it could afford to offer and what targets they 
could achieve. Once these parameters had been identified it appears that the 
organisation would then break down aspects of the bid requirement. This process 
has been simplified and grouped into four (interrelated and non-linear) categories 
here (presented in Figure 7.2).  
 
The first group, ‘delivery facilities’ focuses on the physical requirements for contract 
delivery, the second group ‘contract management’ covers how Albase approached 
their bid including the use of sub-contractors, the amount and type of audit 
requirement, and who and how much support options and partners they would 
work with.  The third group, ‘job-seeker services’ includes the options to move 
individuals into employment such as the provision of training, access to support 
courses, whether a work experience element would be included in their bid and so 
 269 
forth. Finally group four includes the management of the front-line services 
including the number of personal advisors, the frequency of contact, the case-loads 
of advisors and so forth. It is important to note that these groups weren’t exclusive 
but it appears that they were bounded by the parameters outlined in the contract 
which were interpreted by the organisation’s senior management into a framework 
for their bid. The process for ‘working-up’ the bid involved feedback loops at 
numerous stages between departments working on different areas of the bid, and 
ultimately to the overall framework based on finance and targets125. 
 
Figure 7.2: A simplified version of Albase’s service delivery design 
approach in performance-by-results led welfare-to-work contracts 
 
                                                     
125 Respondent Bonnar; Respondent Doyle; Anon Doc 16; Anon Doc 77 
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Consequently, over time the DWP (through their administration of welfare-to-work 
programmes) not only prioritised particular organisational forms, but also 
particular processes that organisations used to determine service provision. Whilst 
the findings here do not suggest that all welfare-to-work providers adopted the 
approach used by Albase, it appears from the information gathered here that the 
contracting processes and the rules, norms, and regulations within the system 
created the environment where leaders within Albase decided that their approach 
was ‘best practice’126.  
 
7.12 Professionalizing human resources 
This section argues that Albase’s approach to human resource management 
experienced a noticeable shift from the 1980s to 2010. Part of the process of how 
Albase sought to become more ‘business-like’ involved a shift in their approach to 
the recruitment of, and required skill-set of employees. This section identifies a 
number of changes which reflect the shift in Albase’s activities from an ILM 
provider to a welfare-to-work provider. It is argued that the changes required of 
employees is due to the targets culture of the organisational field which required 
different skill-sets from employees working at the front-line (advising and 
supporting jobseekers) and in leadership positions (enacting organisational change), 
than had been required in the previous funding and operating arrangements.  
 
The shift from predominately operating and delivering the ILM model towards the 
welfare-to-work approach impacted on the organisation’s recruitment preferences. 
                                                     
126 Anon Doc 15, 2010 
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Whereas the purpose of the ILM approach was to provide work experience and 
temporary employment to move individuals to the labour market, the requirements 
of the welfare-to-work field promoted the use of welfare-to-work specialists.  Over 
time the organisation moved away from temporary staff linked to ILM projects and 
the ILM employees (or ‘trainees’ as they were previously known127), towards 
permanent staff (see chapter five). Many staff in the 1980s and 1990s possessed skill-
sets based on their knowledge and experience of EU funding, regional employment 
policy, practical manual skills (i.e. they were supervisors on ILM projects) and the 
administrative skills required for EU funding schemes. Similarly, their posts were 
often project-linked and once the funding for a project finished, employment 
positions ceased to continue at the organisation. As the extract below demonstrates:  
 
“I think the traditional way of working in Albase was…get money for a 
project, that project in itself would then be the money that would recruit staff 
to run it, temporary employees if it was doing that, carry out the project and 
then the project would finish.128”  
 
To become more business-like Albase adapted its HR strategies and business 
planning strategies to move away from employing temporary staff linked to specific 
projects and allocated funding, to full-time staff required to gain experience in 
welfare-to-work contracting and contract management. Full-time employees, with a 
different skill-set to that under the previous policy arrangement, were required to 
develop the organisational capacity and knowledge base required by the 
competitive market context129. Front-line employees (who may have had fixed-term 
contracts linked to a welfare-to-work programme) were required to have previous 
                                                     
127(although not all temporary staff were ILM trainees or ex-ILM participants) 
128 Respondent Hamilton 
129 Anon Doc 1, pages 14-16 
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experience with assisting jobseekers, and the ability to work in a target130 based 
culture. As evidence from a tender document demonstrates: 
 
“Our high standards of delivery in all of our activity are the result of the 
quality of our staff. We will recruit talented and committed staff, ideally from 
a commercial recruitment background131.”  
 
Similarly, the extract below from a New Deal contract in the early 2000’s outlined 
how the organisation was implementing management and cultural changes 
associated with what the author considered to be the preferential approach by the 
DWP.  
 
“Our working style is more typical of that found in a sales or marketing 
environment. By making these working practices central to our delivery, and 
by recruiting commercially experienced recruitment professionals who thrive 
in a high volume target driven environment we will be able to deliver jobs at a 
level significantly above the local, regional and national average132.”  
 
From the data collected it appears that due to the need to progress the 
transformation into a welfare-to-work organisation, Albase sought to employ 
experienced recruitment staff (as seen in the quote above), and retain through 
offering permanent contracts. The following extract summarises the way the change 
process in Albase involved an emphasis on managerial practices and recruitment 
processes associated with managerialist ideas outlined in chapter one. 
                                                     
130 For example, some front-line staff had previously worked in private sector recruitment firms 
131 Anon Doc 1, 
132 Anon Doc 2, p.4 
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“We will recruit the best staff and adopt commercial performance 
management working practices in order to successfully move a high number of 
our clients into jobs, we will adopt a range of commercially oriented 
performance management working practices, more commonly found in sales 
and marketing environments. By making these working practices central to 
our delivery, and by recruiting commercially experienced recruitment 
professionals who thrive on working in a high volume target driven 
environment, we are confident in our ability to deliver jobs at a level 
significantly above the local, regional and national averages” 133  
 
The transition from the arrangement prior to the welfare-to-work contracts to the 
organisation portrayed in the extract above was not simple. The background 
information in chapter five outlines how, over time, Albase shifted from employing 
temporary project based employees, towards an organisation where the majority of 
employees were on full-time contracts, which were less programme specific than 
previous arrangements. However, this shift created a major change in HR 
management, and some complications. As the extract below demonstrates, senior 
management respondents appeared to be aware that by employing the majority of 
staff on full-time contracts there would be times when Albase would struggle 
financially to cover the costs.  
 
“It gets more complicated every year, I think…We had a meeting this 
morning talking about the transition from contracts, current DWP contracts 
finishing next year, in the lead up to the Work programme, and in theory, we 
have a gap of 3 months, or could have a gap as much as 3 months, where we 
don’t have funding for projects before the Work Programme starts, assuming 
we are running the Work Programme.  So, what do we do for those 3 months?  
Do we pay everybody off and then re-recruit them?  Or do we keep them, try 
and keep as many staff as we can and we use them in different things?  I think 
the obvious thing to do is the latter, to keep staff.  So, in terms of actual 
                                                     
133 Anon Doc, Doc 1, p.3 
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business planning and budgeting, how you do the annual plan and budget, it 
is never going to be fixed134”  
 
This transition from temporary, fragmented project staff into a ‘coherent 
organisation’ with core functions over an approximate eight year period during the 
2000’s posed two main difficulties for the organisation; financial resource 
management, and staff retention. First, in order to employ individuals on longer-
term or permanent contracts the organisation required ‘loose’ funding. That is, 
funding that was not allocated to a specific time-limited project such as an ILM 
funded by ESF. The ‘loose funding’ could cover employee costs when Albase was 
not in receipt of specific project or contract funding. Second, in order to attract and 
retain the staff required to compete against the larger multinational organisations, 
Albase offered full time, permanent contracts to a number of ‘core staff’. One 
respondent described core staff as those employees who worked in departments 
central to the organisation’s existence, i.e. they were not employed in the delivery of 
projects of programmes as such, instead they worked in function areas such as HR, 
finance, bid-writing and development, and PR - departments ‘shared’ by all the 
project teams135. These employees were paid for out of contract surplus, or from 
funding for organisational development from TSO resources.136  
 
7.13 Management challenges 
When the organisation was close to the completion of one contract and prior to the 
award of another (if they have been successful in winning a tender), respondents 
identified management challenges. Maintaining and resourcing core staff continued 
                                                     
134 Respondent  Somers 
135 Respondent Somers 
136 Anon Doc 54, Anon Doc 55, Anon Doc 56; Respondent Somers 
 275 
to consume Albase’s resources at times when there was no certainty on future 
income. This challenge has always  (to some extent) been an issue for Albase137, 
however in the welfare-to-work organisational field there was not only uncertainty 
about short-term income, but in the case of payment-by-results contracts, there were 
resource uncertainties for a longer period as money had to be generated from target 
attainment to cover these core functions and employees.138  
 
The transition from project based funding to payment-by-results contracting also 
impacted on the financial budgeting approach of the organisation. As the history of 
Albase was based on projects with little ‘profit’ making opportunities (i.e. the 
programmes used a FCR approach) previous budget planning involved the 
identification of an annual budget which when agreed by the board, became the 
boundary for the upcoming years’ activities. Respondents stated that over a short 
period of time the organisation moved towards a more fluid approach to financial 
budgeting to take into account the uncertainty of the funding environment. 
 
“So the whole thing is very complex and has to be managed, monitored and 
managed properly.  So we need to know, you know, we need to be able to take 
decisions quickly if the case, just describing the transition time, if we decide to 
keep the staff on and you know, being to make a loss, then we need to review 
that and know what we are doing.  So it is a big managing a complex financial 
world that we are in139.”   
 
The shift from project based ILMs towards a business-like welfare-to-work model 
brought up issues regarding the organisation’s ability to attract “professional” staff.  
                                                     
137 Respondent McMahon 
138 Respondent Somers; Anon Doc 15 
139 Respondent Somers 
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Issues about staff capacity and professionalism occurred throughout Albase during 
the transition from the ILM delivery organisation to a ‘business-like’ welfare-to-
work organisation. It is argued here that creating a new organisational structure and 
responding to the requirements of the welfare-to-work organisational field required 
the services of skilled professionals in leadership positions in the organisation. 
Albase experienced a period of major restructuring of the higher-level managerial 
positions (in the early 2000’s) and a turnover of staff from those which had been 
with the organisation from the start (including the resignation by and replacement 
of the founding CEO and a number of other department heads140).  
 
The need for skilled professionals in leadership positions also generated internal 
demand for more professionalization throughout the organisation. The impression 
gained from the ethnographic research and from some respondents was that 
particular professions were required so that new systems could be established and 
overseen on an ongoing basis. Respondents suggested that this was necessary in 
order to comply with the expectations of the outside professional consultants and 
funders.  
 
“We will recruit the right kind of staff and adopt commercial performance 
management working practices. Although our practices and approach would 
rival any private sector recruitment agency.” 141 
 
The move towards becoming more ‘professional’ affected the day to day work of 
employees. Alongside the changes outlined above, there was a move towards more 
                                                     
140 Anon Doc 83; Anon Doc 84; Anon Doc 85 
141 Anon Doc 2, p.3 
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“flexible staff”142 in terms of the work they did in regards to applying for and 
securing external resources. This meant a shift away from staff funded and working 
purely on a project with specified funding (as was the case for ILMs), to staff 
working across the organisation with a responsibility for accessing and finding new 
contract markets143. As such, throughout the 2000’s the development and funding 
staff were increasingly required to understand a range of policy contexts, 
procurement and bidding processes, and be able to adapt the organisation’s 
activities to secure external resources from a range of resource contexts. There was a 
shift within the organisation towards development staff with experience in 
employability and tender writing and the perceived future needs of the business.  
 
“I suppose what I’ve done…I’ve not kicked people out the business, but where 
there has been natural sort of turnover, where people have left the development 
team…people that have come into the development team have an 
understanding that there’s a flexibility about it, and that we’ve selected people 
on that basis.  But also, if they have a CV, then it’s a CV that can make a 
business impact and that has been around employability.144  
 
The managerialist approach for service delivery prescribes that organisational 
culture focuses on leadership, human resources and ‘staff empowerment’ (see Peters 
and Waterman, 1982). For a short time in the mid 2000’s as part of the change 
process Albase was experiencing in response to the quasi-market environment a 
more traditional managerialist approach was used. This was based on organizing 
the behaviour of front-line staff not on the basis of their professional affiliation, their 
third sector ethos of helping other people, or their previous arrangement within 
Albase, but by, “motivating our staff by engaging them in the process of objective setting 
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and through linking their performance to pay increases145.” This approach had not been 
used in previous activities, and it was arguably only an approach adopted due to 
the emphasis on targets and competition in the welfare-to-work quasi-market. From 
the data collected it was not evident that Albase continued with this approach as 
front-line employees at the time of this research did not receive performance related 
pay (although all worked towards ‘people-into-jobs’ targets146).  
 
7.14 Adopting the language of contractualism 
A number of aspects can also be identified regarding how Albase’s approach to 
assisting job seekers may have become more permanently influenced by the 
managerialism of the welfare-to-work organisational field. Firstly, in welfare-to-
work activities the job seeker or the welfare ‘beneficiary,’ was portrayed as a 
‘consumer,’ ‘client’ or ‘customer.’147Albase adopted these key terms from the 
welfare-to-work programmes into the organisation’s terminology. For example, in 
tender documents Albase stated that, “we will adopt a client-centred approach to 
New Deal delivery148”, identified, “client related problems149”, and stated that, 
“success is attributable to the attention paid to building relationships with 
employers, understanding their needs, and matching our clients to their job 
opportunities.150” Arguably, this NPM terminology contrasted with Albase’s 
previous EU funding applications where ‘beneficiary’ was more commonly used.151 
However, an impression which was gained during the data collection was that over 
                                                     
145 Anon Doc 1, p.16 
146 Respondent Murdoch 
147 Respondent Campbell; Respondent Doyle 
148 Anon Doc 1, p.2, emphasis added 
149 Anon Doc 13, 2000, p.23, emphasis added 
150 Anon Doc 6, p.2, emphasis added 
151 Anon Doc 2 
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time just as ideas regarding the use of targets and indicators became ‘legitimated’ 
(Suchman, 1995), so did managerialist terminology. It appeared as though a number 
of managers had adopted a managerialist way of working (Aiken and Bode, 2009) 
and organizing in welfare-to-work contracts. For example, in meetings bid writers 
and senior managers regularly used phrases such as, ‘customer journeys’ and ‘client 
target attainment,152’ which reflected the instutitionalised terminology in the 
welfare-to-work organisational field.    
 
Collectively, over time a number of apparently managerialist processes and systems 
were incorporated into Albase in response to the organisational field and the 
perceived requirements of the quasi-market contracting system. This included the 
use of managerialist terminology and phrases, a shift in terms of human resource 
policies and employee experience, and the incorporation of new ways of organizing 
which included ‘earning income’  and target attainment.  
 
7.15 The influence of private contractors 
The final section of this chapter focuses on how Albase was promoted and marketed 
and how this changed due to its involvement in welfare-to-work contracting. It is 
argued that the DWP’s emphasis on welfare-to-work organisations demonstrating 
that they were ‘business-like’ affected the way the organisation communicated with 
other organisations in their environment, and the way in which the organisation 
portrayed itself. Before discussing these issues it is worth briefly recapping on the 
some of the information from chapter five regarding the types of organisations 
involved in the welfare-to-work quasi-market.  
                                                     
152 Anon Doc 15 
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As discussed in more detail in chapter five, as the quasi-market developed from 
1997-2010 it became increasingly dominated by large, often multi-national private 
sector organisations. In short Albase’s involvement in the late 1990s and early 2000’s 
included limited competition with private sector organisations other than specialist 
welfare-to-work providers such as A4E and Reed in Partnership. Gradually, as the 
value of the contracts grew different types of private sector competitors entered or 
increased their role in the market. This included multinational welfare-to-work 
organisations such as Ingeus, or large contract management organisations such as 
G4S and Serco.  
 
It is argued below that due the increased role of private sector organisations (which 
appeared to be aligned with the DWP’s concept of business-like), when Albase 
rebranded in the mid-late 2000’s it was influenced by these competitive pressures to 
conform to the dominant and arguably expected welfare-to-work delivery 
organisation image. There is not room in this thesis to discuss how the ideas of 
welfare-to-work image became dominant in the field, or whether other 
organisations also adopted to approach implemented by Albase. However, in terms 
of the change narrative of Albase, it appears that there were isomorphic pressures in 
the rebranding process as discussed in more detail below.   
 
7.16 Publicity and communication 
Prior to Albase’s involvement in welfare-to-work contracting it was engaged in the 
delivery of ILM programmes and regeneration activities in local neighbourhoods 
throughout Scotland. When delivering local ILM programmes Albase tended to 
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release ‘good news’ stories into local and regional newspapers (such as, the Paisley 
Advertiser, and the Scottish Herald)153. 
 
Figure 7.3: Example of a 'good news’ story 
 
Our report, ‘Algerians unheard of since deportation’, depicted the plight of, among others, 
Gordana Vasic who was having difficulty finding a job which would utilise her linguistic 
and librarian skills (October 26). 
I am happy to report that, after a year on Albase’s employee status programme, where 
unemployed people are given training, work experience, and a real wage, Gordana has 
found a job with the University of Strathclyde Library which matches her skills. 
Her success in finding suitable employment offers hope to other refugees trying to 
integrate into Scottish society; that, with a considerable amount of hard work, it is 
possible to find a job that matches the skills and experience they amassed in their native 
countries. 
 
Source: ‘Matching Skills’ Herald Newspaper, 1995 
 
According to respondents these stories displayed the value of the organisation’s 
activities to the local community and attracted ILM trainees into their 
programmes154. However, becoming more ‘business-like’ required Albase to also 
create a ‘brand image’ and promote itself to others within the welfare-to-work 
market155. Whilst some local stories continued to be published, according to 
respondents Albase’s communication team shifted their attention to the national 
press and welfare to work industry156. Respondents felt that marketing the 
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155 Anon Doc 86  
156 Respondent Collins 
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organisation to the welfare-to-work industry would attract partners and promote 
the organisation to politicians, competitors and supporters. They stated that the aim 
was to portray Albase as a ‘leading welfare to work organisation’157. As such, an image 
of Albase was portrayed of a large, professional business, capable of delivering the 
larger contracts required in public service markets. Arguably, the rebranding sought 
to shed and discourage perceptions of the organisation as a ‘charity’, and promote 
ideas of associated with ‘social enterprise’ such as contract management, 
employment knowledge and innovation. 158 
 
 Albase promoted its image as an experienced delivery organisation through 
welfare-to-work events and advertising aimed at the industry audience159. This 
approach differed from local and regional news stories which were aimed at service 
users (i.e. unemployed people and local communities). In particular their strategy 
for marketing the organisation in the welfare-to-work quasi-market differed from 
the ILM approach which focussed on politicians and policy makers at the local 
(Local Authority level) and funders across the region160. Table 7.2 outlines the 
changes which occurred in Albase’s communication efforts. The extract below 
summarises the way in which Albase had moved from a local to national audience.   
 
“So we had gone from being in the Paisley Advertiser or the Kilmarnock 
Standard, to being on Panorama, BBC 6 o’clock News, Radio 4 World at One 
Today programme, BBC Scotland.161” 
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Purpose Audience Methods 
Funding requirement Funders: EU office, LA, 
Scottish Government 
departments  
Press release in 
local papers,  
 
Promote local work Local politicians Booklets, 
‘Good news’ 
stories 




















(competitors and partners) 
TV slots 
Increase perception of 









If we compare these two approaches Albase may have shifted its marketing strategy 
in response to their environment and their changing activities. Whereas their earlier 
approach may have reflected the history of the organisation as a local grass roots 
organisation, working close to and assisting local people, Albase’s approach during 
the 2000’s may have reflected the organisation’s response to the DWP’s expectations 
from delivery organisations in terms of the organisational capacity, structure and 
ability. It may have also reflected what some employees perceived as a successful 
organisational image in their competitive environment. Respondents stated that the 
aim was to create an image of one whole organisation instead of the localised 
‘project-based’ structure it had naturally developed through the delivery of ILM 
programmes and separate policy funding streams. One respondent felt that had 
changed in order to give one brand and one image of the whole organisation to 
promote and increase the profile.  
 
“You can’t tender for those kind of contacts and play with the very big 
providers, such as the A4E’s, Working Links and various other people, if you 
don’t have a profile.162” 
 
7.17 Restructuring and branding 
Respondents talked about the need to restructure the organisation to be branded as 
‘one vehicle’ rather than in terms of the project or department they worked in163. 
This appears to be due to the perceived pressures from the welfare-to-work 
organisational field and the competitive element of this environment as respondents 
discussed the need to show a united and larger organisation to the DWP in order to 
increase their chances of gaining funds. Albase increased its PR and 
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communications team and they, along with senior employees actively rebranded the 
organisation164. From around 2005 there was a gradual increase in stories and 
publicity aimed at an audience outside of the immediate delivery area (central 
Scotland).  This was targeted at key decision makers, partners and competitors 
throughout the UK165. Respondents emphasised the importance of expanding the 
reach of their marketing work to include government agencies and individuals 
based in London.  
 
“If you go to BBC online and you get a story on there, that’s equivalent to 
£120 000 worth of free advertising each day it is on there.  And that’s the, 
what you have to keep bearing in mind, online is a perfectly legitimate angle.  
One story that we did, the BBC online put it on and it was on there for 7 days.  
And I counted on the hits that it did, and it had nearly 800 000 hits on that 
story.  Now you are never going to get that on the readership of The Herald or 
The Scotsman or The [Scottish] Sun, you are just not going to get that.”166 
 
A possible explanation for the shift in PR, image and marketing experienced by 
Albase is put forward here. Albase’s main activities were previously funded 
through EU grants and other sources of public sector income received through 
‘giving relationships.’ For Albase prior to the welfare-to-work market there were 
two groups of target audience: 1) the user/client/beneficiary, 2) the donor/funder. In 
previous FCR programmes advertising a project or service to job seekers and the 
general public was a condition of funding, particularly for EU funded projects 
which emphasised the need to widely advertise the outcome of EU spending in local 
communities. However, in the welfare-to-work market the requirement to advertise 
their services to jobseekers was minimised as Jobcentre plus assigned individuals to 
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contracted delivery organisations through a random allocation process (Millar, 2001; 
Grenberg, et al, 2005).  
 
Furthermore, some contractual arrangements discouraged delivery organisations to 
advertise their services to jobseekers. For example, for the FND the DWP stated that 
“suppliers can produce material for customers but not for the purposes of customer 
recruitment” (DWP, 2008d, p.321). The customers in the welfare-to-work 
programmes were not the users (i.e. jobseekers) as they were unable to choose their 
own service provider. It appears that because the DWP was the customer in this 
exchange relationship Albase shifted its behaviour to target the DWP and other 
associated resource providing organisations with branding and marketing exercises. 
One possible reason for Albase’s shift in marketing strategy therefore may have 
been because the organisation was seeking to match the rules and regulations of the 
organisational field, rather than maintain its previous approach. In the welfare-to-
work quasi-market there was no incentive for Albase to continue to advertise to 
jobseekers and service users. 
 
7.18 Seeking legitimacy 
According to Suchman, (1995) this behaviour could be attributed to the 
organisation’s desire to gain legitimacy in their organisational field. He argues that, 
“legitimacy affects not only how people act toward organisations, but also how they 
understand them. Thus audiences perceive the legitimate organisation not only as 
more worthy, but also as more meaningful, more predictable and more trustworthy 
(p.575). As Meyer and Rowan (1991, p.50) put it, “organisations that…lack 
acceptable legitimated accounts of their activities…are more vulnerable to the 




“Brand is important, protecting and enhancing your reputation is always 
important… We play in a much bigger game now since we became a 
contractor, because we have gone onto the next level.  And if we want to 
retain at that level, and not slip back down, we have got to be as clever as 
everyone else.”167  
 
In order to expended resources on features such as brand and marketing resources 
were acquired through profit generation or through capacity building programmes. 
Albase’s involvement in the New Deal and Employment Zone in the early 2000’s 
provided ‘surpluses’ which they used to reinvest in departments such as the 
marketing and communication team.168 However, expending these expenses 
alongside the requirement for Albase to advertise to others (rather than the 
beneficiaries of their services) may clash with the mission, objectives and purpose of 
some TSOs. In terms of organisational change and in regards to marketing and 
image, Albase was replicating what employees perceived was the required 
organisational type.  
 
Albase adapted to the requirements of the welfare-to-work market and adopted 
characteristics and processes which made them appear more ‘business-like’. 
Arguably, part of the reason for using the social enterprise terminology was to assist 
in portraying the organisation as a commercially experienced and organized unit169. 
However, if we question some of their activities and behaviour, it appears as though 
part of their decision-making remains rooted in a traditional TSOs context rather 
than private sector business rationality. For example, a number of employment and 
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regeneration activities did not make a surplus, and some consistently had difficulty 
in attracting follow-on funding.170 When asked whether making a surplus from a 
contract was an organisational requirement when bidding for resources, a number 
of respondents felt that it was important in welfare-to-work, but less important in 
the localised or original projects171. 
 
“The board has given the SMT (senior management team) and finance some 
direction in that as there has been flexibility with it in the past.  Finance have 
said to me, well it’s not actually providing surplus, not what we’d hope for, 
however we recognise that, and we want to continue.  For example, it could be 
sustaining an existing service, which then sustains permanent staff or 
supports regeneration.”172 
 
7.19 Becoming a social enterprise 
This final section briefly discusses one aspect of organisational change for Albase, 
the shift from being a ‘charity’ to a ‘social enterprise.’ It is argued here that part of 
becoming more business-like for Albase involved adopting the language and 
concept of ‘social enterprise173’.  Social enterprise has been described as “blurring the 
boundaries between non-profit and profit” (Dart, 2004), and this seems particularly 
apt in the context of welfare-to-work and the market requirements outlined by the 
DWP.  
 
Albase heightened its social enterprise identity in the mid-2000’s. From the data 
collected this occurred through regularly emphasising in press releases, official 
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publications and in tender documents that it is a ‘social enterprise’174. It is 
questionable whether at this point the all employees of the organisation fully 
accepted that it had fundamentally. For example, despite winning welfare-to-work 
contracts since 1999 in 2005 it still referred to itself as a charity on internal 
documents. Notably some employees also compared its performance to other 
charities rather than social enterprises or private contractors in the welfare-to-work 
field175.  It began to move away from identifying itself as a charity (as is its legal 
status) and towards adopting the term ‘social enterprise’ on most of its outward 
facing documents such as the website, annual accounts and policy consultation 
responses176. Some respondents felt that this was due to the evolution of the 
organisation, whilst other felt that it needed to distance itself from the ‘idea of 
charity.’ 
 
“Albase is not grant dependent, it is income dependent in contracts. It earns 
its money from output. And if it doesn’t have the output it doesn’t get paid. 
Whereas, I think, the majority of organisations that the SCVO represent are 
grant aided. They are very different, well Albase is very, very different.”177  
 
As outlined earlier in the chapter one key characteristic which differentiates a 
charity from a social enterprise is the emphasis on earned income, an idea 
synonymous with ideas of business “trading” and generating surplus. Earning 
income through delivering services on behalf of the public sector, or earning income 
through charging for a service or product appears to have moved the organisation 
away from traditional resource acquisitions based on grant funding. Grant funding 
(alongside charitable giving) are resource strategies considered as defining 
                                                     
174 Anon Doc 35; Anon Doc 73; Anon Doc 74; Anon Doc 88; 
175 Respondent McMahon 
176 Anon Doc 92; Anon Doc 93 
177Respondent McMahon 
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characteristics of charitable and community based organisations (Anheier, 2005) and 
are considered to be the opposite to ideas of earned income and financial 
independence (see Pearce, 2003). According to the respondents from Albase they 
viewed themselves as a social enterprise because “nearly 70% of income is, ‘earned’ 
or contractual in nature178,” and due to their change in operating activities from a 
local regeneration organisation to a public sector contracting business179. Arguably, 
the policy environment and wider policy understanding of the term ‘social 
enterprise’ was part of the reason for the transition.  
 
“You become defined as a social enterprise which is almost a for profit social 
entity. It is not profit distributing, it is profit making. It has got to make a 
profit for reserves and reinvestment purposes. You have to act and think as a 
private sector business and that is why it is social enterprise. It is enterprise 
with a social purpose.”180 
 
In a newspaper article from 2009 CEO3 is quoted as saying that Albase’s success in 
welfare-to-work contracting can be linked to the way in which it was able to 
develop into a social enterprise with the required organisational characteristics to 
meet the DWP’s requirements. 
 
"I think it is very important for social enterprise. It demonstrates that we can 
compete with large multi-national private businesses on quality, price and 
delivery," (anon doc 88)  
 
                                                     
178 Respondent Somers 
179 Respondent Campbell 
180 Respondent McMahon 
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The shift from portraying itself as a charity or an Intermediate Labour Market 
organisation, to a social enterprise is discussed in more detail in chapter eight. 
 
7.20 Summary 
This chapter has focussed on the managerial and structural changes which occurred 
in Albase since the introduction of the welfare-to-work quasi-market in 1997. It 
began by arguing that whilst the DWP promotes both TSOs and private sector 
organisations in policy documents, the administration of welfare-to-work 
programmes has included a number of quasi-market rules, regulations and 
organizing features which are more aligned with typical private sector 
characteristics. Through a detailed discussion of the quasi-market documents which 
demonstrated the DWP’s emphasis on ‘business-like’ features, it was argued that 
the payment schedule prioritises two sets of characteristics; finance and resources, 
and contract management and performance. Furthermore, as resources and contract 
attainment became weighted towards these characteristics, it was argued that the 
DWP bestowed legitimacy on the organisations which demonstrated these features 
in the contract competition process. 
 
The chapter considered these two features in more detail and identified the 
importance of the payments-by-result mechanism in creating the ‘business-like’ 
concept. The use of this payment approach increased competition and risk for 
Albase and arguably this aspect of the contracting system, which requires on 
upfront capital, further demonstrates that the system was designed with preference 
for private sector qualities.  
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Albase adapted to these rules, regulations and legitimating processes in the 
organisational field by establishing new managerial processes, in particular through 
controlling and managing activities through the use of targets. It was noted that 
some of these processes extended beyond the reach of welfare-to-work programmes 
and similar systems were established in areas of the organisation without the same 
organisational requirements. It was suggested that this transfer of managing ideas 
supported ideas of isomorphic behaviour and legitimacy. It was also noted that in 
terms of the ability to change Albase’s experience demonstrated a transitional 
process due to the use of target based management in other funding sources. 
 
It was argued that the contract management characteristic required by the DWP led 
to new roles and employment positions in the organisation, and new ways of 
organizing work activities. The change was attributed by respondents to the rues 
and regulations of the field, and not to the economic rationality of actors. Daily, 
monthly, and annual reporting became a new aspect of the workplace and was 
directly attributed to the influence from the quasi-market. 
 
Attention was given in this chapter to the emphasis on competition in the quasi-
market and the idea of earning income. It was demonstrated that earning income 
was a core characteristics of the quasi-market and is rooted in NPM ideas of 
competition and innovation. The shift in the field from FCR to a shopping 
relationship was considered in more detail and how Albase adapted to this shift was 
covered. During the transformational period identified in chapter five it appears 
there was a gradual adaptation to the shopping relationship approach but this 
became more difficult as welfare-to-work contract values and competition with 
larger organisations increased.  It was noted that Albase required financial 
investment in internal processes to shift to the new financial planning processes and 
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questions of whether missions and values would erode in this process were raised 
by some respondents. 
 
The control aspect of the contracting system and service design was also 
highlighted. It was identified that for Albase this created new operational 
boundaries in terms of how services were designed and that targets and financial 
regulations were considered as the controlling boundaries in the new systems. 
Consequently, adaptations to the quasi-market rules and regulation appeared to be 
part of a rational-economic choice to reduce transaction costs and economic risk, 
and could also be attributed to the coercive isomorphic nature of the tendering and 
contracting process. 
 
In order to manage the new organisational field, Albase undertook a number of 
organisational changes. This included professionalizing human resource processes 
and there was evidence that these changes included an emphasis on commercial 
qualities, recruitment background and target driven environments (section 7.2.2). It 
was noted that this adaptation to the contracting environment led to led to more 
employees working on permanent contracts, and an increase in staff core staff which 
created cash flow difficulties if contracts finished. Transition from fragmented staff 
to ‘coherent’ staff and resource uncertainties for these costs, and this may suggest 
that the changes demonstrate mimetic isomorphism as the leader of Albase sought 
to demonstrate and possess the same organisational qualities as competitors.  
 
It was also argued that the change processes meant that different skill sets were 
required for the leadership team and the employees in the development team. There 
was also evidence of a shift in the way performance was measured for these 
employees with an emphasis on contract value and income generation for Albase. 
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Whilst there was some evidence that Albase had implemented performance based 
payments in the delivery of welfare-to-work contracts, this appeared to be a 
temporary approach in the mid 2000’s which did not continue. However, all front-
line staff worked to people into jobs targets.  
 
Finally, the changes which occurred in the way actors within Albase communicated 
with others in the organisational field suggest that there had been a shift from 
focussing on communicating with jobseekers (and local actors) to competitors and 
resource holders in the quasi-market. This may suggest that resource dependency 
theory and idea that Albase was trying to influence others within the field to 
maintain and gain resources, has some relevance in explaining the change process.  
However, there was also some evidence of mimetic isomorphism in terms of how 
the image of a professional welfare-to-work provider was imagined and created. An 
issue which will be discussed in more detail in chapter eight is the concept of social 
enterprise in the change process and how the adoption of this term may 
demonstrate Albase’s efforts for resource diversification. However, this chapter 
highlighted how Albase’s rebranding process involved shifting terminology from 
ILM or charity to social enterprise in an effort to be considered as an efficient and 
more business-like organisation. Arguably, the shift was more than a discursive one 
due to the associated structural and operational changes implemented in the efforts 
to be considered as business-like, and may therefore be part of a legitimacy seeking 
strategy.  
 
Throughout the chapter it was demonstrated the organisational change process 
appeared to be in response to the concept of ‘business-like’ and the importance this 
concept played in the allocation of resources and power (in terms of the prime-
contractor model) by the DWP. In sum, the transformation phase in which Albase 
became less associated with its previous structural and organisational arrangements 
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and processes arguably occurred due to isomorphic pressures from the DWP. 
However, there also appears to be some strength  the resource dependency 
arguments, and whilst transaction cost theory does not seem to explain this 
transformation overly well, some aspects of change (such as the transformation of 
the service design process) appear to be part of a rational-choice model to reduce 
costs and risks associated with DWP exchanges.  
 
Thus far the thesis has outlined the change processes and transformation of Albase 
in terms of its activities, structure and managing processes. Bringing together the 
findings here with those in chapter six it appears that due to the need to find new 
resources to replace ILM activities which became less favourable in the 
organisational field, Albase became heavily involved in welfare-to-work funding. 
This created an exchange relationship with the DWP, and as demonstrated in 
chapter five, over time it became dependent on funding from this source. Whilst the 
welfare-to-work funding originally suited Albase’s traditional employment support 
activities, as it became more market orientated it created a number of organisational 
change demands for Albase.  Albase adapted to DWP requirements which 
increasingly emphasised ‘business-like’ behaviour. Albase therefore became more 
‘business like’ and emphasised the concept of ‘social enterprise’ over charity, actors 
incorporated new processes in order to gain resources and legitimacy within the 
market. It appears that the extent of these changes suggests that Albase experienced 
resource dependency in the welfare-to-work quasi-market relationship.  
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C HAP TER  8  -  O R GA NISA TI O NAL  
C HA NGE   
ISSUES AND TENSIONS 
The purpose of chapters six and seven was to answer the research questions and 
explore how involvement in the welfare-to-work quasi-market impacted on the 
activities and structure of Albase. This chapter discusses some of the issues that 
Albase experienced as changes were enacted in the organisational field, in particular 
contract based changes introduced by the DWP. The aim of this chapter is to explore 
these issues and draw on the theoretical framework to understand why Albase 
changed in the way it did and what problems and issues were negotiated. It is 
anticipated that the discussion of these issues and tensions will help explain the 
pressures in the organisational field and further understand some of the change 
processes.     
 
This chapter is comprised of a number of sections. The first focuses on the issue 
Albase faced regarding business planning and adapting to a contracting 
environment based on payments-by-results. The second section discusses the 
decision for Albase to become a ‘prime provider’ when the quasi-market was 
reformed in 2008 due to the amendments suggested in the DWP’s Commissioning 
Strategy (2008).  Moving on from these discussions (and drawing on neoinstitutional 
economics) the chapter will then focus on the cost of market involvement and 
identifies three types of costs: market participation costs; business acquisition costs; 
and traditional transaction costs. There is a discussion of how these costs affect 
market involvement and the perceptions of organisational change. Drawing on a 
discussion of resource dependency, the final section reflects on the impact of 
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welfare-to-work quasi-market involvement on resource diversification efforts and 
suggests the impact this had on the change processes Albase experienced.  
 
8.1 Business planning with income uncertainty 
As outlined in chapters five and seven, Albase delivered a number of welfare-to-
work contracts which involved varying levels of the payment-by-results approach. 
This section focuses on how Albase adapted to the recommendations of the report 
by David Freud (the then special advisor to James Purnell MP the then Secretary of 
state for Work and Pensions), “Reducing Dependency, Increasing Opportunity: 
Options for the Future of Welfare-to-Work” (DWP, 2007c).  As previously 
mentioned in chapter seven, the report suggested three amendments to the 
contracting system:  
 
1. Payment-by-results:  
Based on an ‘AME/DEL switch’ process the paper argued in terms of public sector 
financial management - that the funding for employment programmes could be 
achieved through benefit savings. Providers could be paid (DEL) based on the 
savings they make to social security payments (AME).  
 
2. A top tier of prime providers:  
To reduce the number of contracts managed by the DWP the prime providers 
would be responsible for supply chains in their contract area.  
 
3. Larger contracts:  
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It was proposed that contracts be expanded to cover larger geographical areas, and 
more benefit recipient groups such as a range of health benefit claimants, lone 
parents and ex-offenders.  
 
Arguably, the modifications were designed to reduce the transaction costs for the 
DWP associated with designing, tendering and managing a large number of 
complex contractual relations (NAO, 2012). Similarly, as Oster (2000) previously 
suggested in relation to public sector contracting, the change in governance 
structure may have also offered an efficiency gain as the state sought to off-load 
tasks into the less political and more single-minded corporate sector. However, 
changes to the administration of market mechanisms as outlined above also 
impacted on the accessibility of public service markets for delivery organisations 
such as Albase. 
 
The DWP’s Commissioning Strategy (2008) put the Freud recommendations into 
practice and the design of the Flexible New Deal (FND) programme (phase one) was 
the first welfare-to-work programme which incorporated the new arrangements in 
the quasi-market. The FND phase one contract was the largest (with the most 
emphasis on payment-by-results) of the contracts Albase secured. Whilst the move 
towards a payment-by-results model for the quasi-market was viewed by the DWP 
as the best way to pay providers for their service delivery work (Freud, 2009), for 
Albase the model presented a number of issues.  
 
First, due to the way in which contracts were administered, business planning and 
future growth became more difficult to plan and manage during the contracting 
phase. It is argued here that this was particularly acute in regards to the larger 
contracts, such as the FND and the subsequent Work Programme (see chapter five 
for details on the welfare-to-work programmes), which included an expected five 
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year contract length and which were accompanied by longer procurement processes 
lasting up to 18months (Harari, 2010; WPC, 2012). The programme design resulted 
in increased levels of uncertainty for Albase as the programme centred on the Freud 
recommendations and meant that the expected income (the total contract value) was 
unclear during the business planning stage. This made forward planning of 
business development difficult, particularly when managers in Albase were trying 
to invest in internal functions to “build capacity”181. For example, Albase secured a 
FND phase one contract in 2009, which was originally valued at £138 million, based 
on an anticipated 90,000 customer volume. However, due to a revision of the 
referral volumes after one year, the contract was re-valued at approximately 
£80million over the 5 years.182 This was also an issue with the EZ contract (despite 
the inclusion of milestone and on-programme or non-performance linked payments 
discussed in chapter seven) where it was reported in Albase’s management meeting 
in 2006 that the programme was not providing the expected income:  
 
“The Employment Zone is now fully embedded and has produced £1.3million 
of additional income over 2005, although this has been largely surplus-neutral 
since the numbers of clients flowing through the zone have been much smaller 
than we were led to believe would be the case by the DWP.”183  
 
However, as the FND was much larger than the EZ contract, and because it did not 
include as many milestone payments, the level of uncertainty was increased. A 
problem with the payment-by-results policy for Albase was the lack of transparency 
of referral figures outlined at the tender stage and how it translated into income 
during contract delivery. This presented an extra risk consideration for the longer 
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contracts such as the five year FND phase one programme. This is because upfront 
delivery costs meant that during the first year there was an increased necessity that 
the referral numbers translated into actual jobseekers, and then that some of these 
jobseekers entered employment184. During this time the organisation experienced 
maximum financial exposure as money was expended on service provision based 
on service user number predictions and on anticipated job-entry payments. The 
organisation termed this a ‘depth of risk issue,’ during the first year of the FND 
contract due to this extra degree of risk.185   
 
A second and related issue that affected Albase’s financial planning was the 
payment timing. The payment-by-results model required each contractor to invest 
its own money in the earlier years of the contract and only ‘hit even’ and then make 
a surplus in the latter years of the contract186. Arguably, this also increased the 
length of risk exposure for Albase. For the 5 year FND model the organisation 
expected that the cash flow would not become positive until approximately three 
years into the contract, with surplus expected in the final 20-24 contract months187.  
This was described as a ‘length of risk’ issue where Albase would be exposed to risk 
for a number of years as the early stages of the majority of services required for 
contract delivery were self-funded188. As such, programmes such as the FND (and 
the Work Programme contract which Albase did not win) required each provider to 
“cash and pump189,” a large amount of up-front capital. The design relied on both 
the availability of capital in the early stages and the possibility of more cash during 
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187 The FND was cancelled in 2010 when the Coalition government took over and FND contracts only lasted until 
2011 rather than 2014 as expected. 
188 Respondent Doyle 
189 Respondent Bonnar 
 302 
the delivery stages if the business plan and expected referrals and job entries were 
not achieved as planned. In the words of one respondent, “you really need deep 
pockets in order to do that190.” It was the perception from some of the respondents 
that the financial risk was intensified for TSOs (such as Albase) which were required 
to find the cash flows necessary to fund the early parts of the contract and to 
maintain service delivery during the contract lifetime191. As the extract below also 
demonstrates there was awareness within Albase that involvement in the welfare-
to-work contracts would involve an increase in organisational risk in terms of 
finance and contract management: 
 
“To compete for large-scale contracts requires organisations to have sufficient 
capacity and capability for contract management and to shoulder significant 
risk.”192 
 
An underlying principle of the payment-by-results approach was to reduce the costs 
of delivering a service by only paying for those where a saving has been made (i.e. 
paying for employment support in the anticipation of reducing future, more 
expensive, out of work benefit payments as seen in the Work Programme) (see 
Freud, 2010; NAO, 2011). To select a contract winner, providers put forward a 
performance target or offer which outlined the number of jobseekers they would 
move into the labour market and ultimately what benefit savings they would make 
for the treasury (Freud, 2009). In order to win the contract and provide the lowest 
priced bid, each organisation offered the most competitive performance target 
(Cumming, 2011). For example, whilst the commissioning body may have suggested 
a minimum target of 30%, after receiving the bids the DWP may have then chosen 
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whether to award organisation A the contract worth £20m offering 35% 
performance target or organisation B  who claimed that for £20m they would get 
40% of people into employment. In this most basic example, during the tender 
phase the bidder decided on a performance figure which they considered as 
achievable in terms of delivery cost, their knowledge of the labour market, and 
knowledge of the delivery areas. The performance offer device aimed to ensure that 
the contract winner was the organisation who claimed to achieve the required 
targets for the largest proportion of the client group, and therefore at the financial 
best value.  
 
8.2 The performance rate and winner’s curse  
However, according to Sturgess et al, (2011, p.36) this approach had the potential to 
cause ‘winner’s curse,’ which occurs where the winner submitted a price or service 
package that it was not able to deliver or assumes risk that it was not capable of 
managing (Sturgess et al, 2011, p.36). This was possible because many of the welfare-
to-work contracts required the bidding organisation to state their performance rate 
(expressed as a percentage) of the target group identified in the tender document, 
which may have been based on a service or client group which was unfamiliar to 
the organisation and/or the commissioning body (Mulheirn and Menne, 2008; DWP, 
2010c; Sturgess et al, 2011; Damm, 2012). This issue had previously occurred in 
welfare-to-work contracting. For example, in the UK’s Pathways to Work 
programme (PtW), the DWP established the standard for clients remaining in work 
at 26 weeks, while providers competed to set their own monthly targets for numbers 
of job and sustained job outcomes. The conclusion was that contracts were signed at 
levels of performance that were unachievable as providers were unable to supply 
the numbers of outcomes anticipated, and thus faced severe cash-flow problems 
(see Hayllar et al, 2010; Cumming, 2011). According to Finn (2010, p.298) the 
problem was that the design of the programme had led providers to ‘bid low and 
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promise high.’ As such Sturgess et al, (2011) have discussed the problem of ‘winners 
curse’ as an outcome of an underestimation of realistic service needs and the 
associated costs. 
 
From exploring Albase’s experience it appears that the performance offer decision 
was a complex one due to a number of factors, but predominately due to the 
competitive framework in which it operated. Arguably the DWP preferred stretched 
performance offers which would lead to cost saving innovation in the market 
(Savas, 1989; WPC, 2012), and go further to address their public policy issues. 
Albase experienced competitive pressures within the quasi-market through 
provider discussions which influenced the perceived minimum performance rate 
put forward in rival submissions193. As such, the DWP’s strategy increased the risk 
associated with meeting the performance targets produced by this competitive 
tendering process.  
 
Albase generated their performance rate through the consideration of a number of 
factors such as the local economy, client group labour market rates, their 
relationships with employers, and their experience with the client group194. The 
competitive pressure created by the need to put forward a better performance rate 
than other organisations was an added factor that increased the performance rates 
declared.  In practice, whilst competing delivery organisations avoided discussing 
performance rates with each other it was possible to get an approximation of 
competitors’ offers during discussions in the tendering stage either through 
networking events or official partnership discussions. For example, during sub-
contractor discussions for one welfare-to-work programme with Working Links, 
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A4E and Work Directions (welfare-to-work competitors), Albase received 
performance offers and figures that these organisations required sub-contractors to 
deliver. Albase were able to identify a “performance zone” through “number 
crunching” and an approximate performance target for each bid. Albase could 
estimate that, “people [other contractors] were going kind of roughly between 45 
and 55% of people into jobs” and could factor this into the decision for their 
performance offer195. Whilst increased performance offers through competition may 
have been an intended outcome for the commissioning body (as it may have created 
service innovations by providers desperate to meet their inflated performance 
rates), for Albase it created unknown business delivery and management problems 
during the bidding phase as offers were not wholly based on service delivery 
expectations196. The DWP and the NAO also published concerns about provider 
capabilities to meet competitive performance targets:  
 
“It is possible that one or more providers will get into serious financial 
difficulty during the term of the contract. The unprecedented performance and 
cost propositions expected by the Department and offered by prime contractors 
mean that it is highly likely that one or more will struggle” (NAO, 2012a, 
p.9) 
 
Due to these issues a tension can be identified which occurred within Albase 
between delivery departments and bid writing departments. From the data 
collected it appears that this tension occurred where there were competing agendas 
influencing the performance figure put forward. In Albase this meant that difficult 
decisions were required when the delivery team identified a lower performance rate 
than the development team197.  This may have been because the delivery team were 
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aware that they would have the responsibility to achieve the future performance 
target and therefore suggested a performance outcome based on their front-line 
experience, having previously or recently delivered a similar contract with the client 
group. In contrast, the development team had attended presentations by the DWP 
which stressed the importance of higher performance offers, attended meetings with 
competitors, and feared the possibility of being outbid by rivals. Observation and 
discussion with employees created an impression that development employees 
were more aware of the institutional environment and competitive pressures198.  
 
There were also individuals within the organisation (such as the finance director 
and the CEO) who had a responsibility to ensure that activities undertaken by the 
organisation were cost-neutral at worst, but were ideally producing a surplus that 
could be reinvested in the organisation199. There was a management tension as 
managers wanted Albase to succeed in winning the contract and remain active in 
the quasi-market, albeit aware that this involved increasing the potential for risk 
and failure. As such the performance target decision was not purely based on the 
cost of delivering the required services to the DWP as outlined in the contract, but 
was influenced by the competitive behaviour of others within the quasi-market 
(alongside the availability of labour market knowledge, and the perception of 
business gains and risks). As such, a number of difficult internal business 
management decisions regarding the performance offer were required.  As one 
respondent stated: 
“It’s not simply we can’t, even if we wanted to be realistic and say, we choose 
20% performance because we think that’s all we can get this current market 
place.  20% output based funding doesn’t actually give you a business”200. 
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The impact of competitors within the organisational field exerted competitive 
pressures which affected internal operations and organisational financial 
management. By focussing on the decision making process for the performance 
offer three operational concerns regarding the associated financial risks of the 
contract are visible: a) winning the contract but not achieving the targets; b) winning 
the contract, achieving the targets, but not making enough surplus to reinvest in 
future contracting processes; and c) not winning the contract and therefore missing 
a resource opportunity which may have then hindered future contract awards. 
Arguably, and discussed in more detail later in this chapter, the level of dependency 
and commitment to the resource context affected the extent of risk attached to 
Albase’s decision making. As Albase continued to operate in this contracting 
environment it adapted its internal structures in an attempt to reduce the risks 
involved.  
 
Managers in Albase reacted to the competitive pressures of the field and sought to 
reduce risks by reorganising departments. There appeared to be interplay between 
the organisational learning process of the payments-by-results model over time (in 
the 2000’s) and the “internal connectedness based on whether the structure of the 
organisation was fit for purpose”201. For example, during the New Deal and 
Employment Zone contracting phases the bid writing team (based in the 
development department) operated separately from the delivery teams (the front-
line staff and existing programme managers who reported on their target success). 
This stemmed from the history of the organisation as a project-based delivery 
organisation where each department was closely linked to a project and funder, and 
worked quite distinctly from other departments (see chapter five for descriptive 
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details of Albase’s structure during this time). In response to the concern that the 
development team may successfully win a contract which the front-line team could 
not deliver (in other words ‘winners curse’), senior managers restructured the 
organisation and brought the responsibility for the management of development 
and delivery under the same manager to reduce the risk of failure:  
 
“I don’t want to be caught by someone saying, you’re winning contracts but 
they’re undeliverable.  So it looks good for you in March but we look terrible 
in October”202. 
 
It is argued here that the reorganisation of these departments was a response to the 
payment-by-results contracting approach which had presented a new organisational 
challenge to Albase.  In order to reduce the risks associated with the requirements of 
each contract and performance offer, the managers in the organisation adapted the 
internal structure203. The development team was one of a small number of ‘core 
departments’204 servicing all the activities of the organisation, but it was subsumed 
under the leadership of the senior manager responsible for delivering the large 
welfare-to-work contracts (whilst other managers had responsibility for smaller 
employment programmes, environmental activities, and ILM activities). As such, 
the payments-by-results and performance offer policy affected the organisational 
structure, management processes and approach to resource acquisition, which led to 
an organisation designed towards a set-up more suited to the DWP contracting 
environment than other policy areas and resource supplies. Arguably, Albase was 
directing its attention and resources towards creating an organisational structure 
best suited to the welfare-to-work quasi-market.  
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8.3 Albase as a ‘prime provider’  
Along with the move towards a payment-by-results model the DWP changed the 
structure of the market and introduced a “prime provider” model in 2008. The idea 
was to award contracts to large organisations at the regional level, which in turn 
would award sub-contracts to smaller, specialized, local service providers (DWP, 
2010b). The move towards a model based on prime providers was intended to 
reduce the numbers of contracts that the DWP directly oversaw, and as a 
consequence was expected to “reduce administrative complexity and costs for the 
Department” (WPC, 2009, section 37). In order to avoid the emergence of 
monopolies and to ensure competition, the contracting rules stipulated that there 
ought to be at least two prime contractors in operation in most regions (Vegeris et al, 
2010). The market reforms introduced for the FND by the previous Labour 
government were continued by the Coalition government through the introduction 
of the Work Programme which expanded on the earlier prime contractor idea by 
amalgamating a number of FND contracts into regional ‘lots’ across the UK (DWP, 
2010c). In the DWP’s Commissioning Strategy (DWP, 2008a, p.2) the government 
claimed that the Work Programme prime-contractor model would lead to the 
creation of a strong market structure in which 80% of the Department’s business 
would be conducted with a “stable core of reliable providers” led by prime 
contractors at the regional and sub-regional level.  
 
Due to the performance-by-results model (discussed in more detail in chapter 
seven), the scoring mechanism for the ERSS Framework205 was weighted towards 
rewarding organisations with supply chain management experience, access to large 
financial resources and contract performance knowledge. Potential providers were 
                                                     
205 The ERSS Framework was a pre-Work Programme bidding evaluation round for prime providers. It is discussed 
in more detail in chapter five. 
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assessed through the introduction of a “growth capacity model”, “acid ratio” and 
“debt ratio” in an attempt to assess the financial capacity of bidding organisations. 
This approach emphasised financial performance and contract management as, “the 
appropriate mechanisms…to continually drive up performance” (DWP, 2008a, 
p.42). The DWP’s action to identify prime contractors based on their financial 
capabilities was arguably a move away from claiming to use independent providers 
for their superior client knowledge and innovation (as was stated during the New 
Deal and Employment Zone phases) towards a use of providers for risk transference 
and contract management cost reduction for the DWP.  These changes impacted on 
Albase’s change process.  
 
One of the key operational changes associated with the creation of the prime 
contractor supply chain was the increased discretionary approach in the sub-
contracting arrangements of prime providers (Vegeris et al, 2010; WPC, 2012). In 
practice the prime contractor tendered for a contract and inclusive in their bid was 
the role subcontractors would play in the delivery of services within the specified 
location. It was the responsibility of the prime contractor to design the involvement, 
relationship and the separate legal agreements with subcontractors in their bid 
(DWP, 2010c; WPC, 2012). As such the DWP only made a contractual agreement 
with the prime contractor and expected the prime contractor to manage their supply 
chain relations, performance and complaints (WPC, 2012).  
 
Respondents from Albase stated that the quasi-market had developed into an 
arrangement that they perceived as less suitable to TSOs: 
 
“We are working in a multi-billion pound global industry. It is not about 
voluntary sector companies like Albase at grassroots level feeding through to 
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politicians, who pick up the baton and start to shape it through the civil 
service. Those days are gone.”206 
 
Respondents also stated that the consolidation of contracts within the quasi-market 
threatened their funding opportunities, despite the organisational changes they had 
enacted to become more, ‘business-like’ (see chapter seven) in the previous years. 
They discussed a fear of losing the market position in 2010 due to competition from 
different types of organisations and the emphasis from the DWP on particular 
organisational characteristics:  
 
“We have gone from 300 or 400 providers in the UK to 30. And of that 30 
there are 20 who are not of any significant size, there are 10 who are 
reasonably good, some very big, but out of that 10 there are 4 or 5 who are 
massive.”207 
 
Respondents considered the changes as a ‘middle-market squeeze208’ and some 
stated that they did not know exactly where this would leave them as they felt the 
DWP was creating a system that would attract large multinational organisations 
with large financial backing:  
“That we were in a position where there was likely to be a sort of, middle 
market squeeze on welfare-to-work.   But FND was the first programme that 
the government openly wanted to attract new providers, and it appeared they 
were trying to attract American, Australian and other European or Dutch 
mainly… So we realized that there was a potential to get squeezed in the 
middle.”209   
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Another respondent noted that changes to the quasi-market were not as favourable 
as when Albase had first entered the market, or when it was delivering the welfare-
to-work contracts in the early 2000’s: 
 
“You get Capita, you get all these really big organisations, and Sercos, it 
wouldn’t be Albase then, it wouldn’t even be A4E. It would be about the 
global businesses taking it over… [The] government would have a big cost 
base off their books and moved into the private sector.”210 
 
There were concerns from some Albase employees prior to the introduction of the 
FND that the market was moving towards a preference of larger private sector 
organisations in the role of prime providers:  
 
“An increasing emphasis is being placed on large-scale ‘national’ providers as 
a procurement preference and this could act against us. At this point it is not 
clear if we are seen as sufficiently ‘large’ enough to be a preferred 
organisation.”211 
 
It is argued here that due to the concern regarding the required size of contractors 
the move towards the prime contractor role may have increased the importance of 
organisational growth and development. Whilst chapter seven argued that Albase 
became more business-like, it is suggested here that the introduction of the prime 
contractor model increased the perceived need for quicker and greater changes in 
Albase.  
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Albase competed in the prime contractor role at the FND phase (and latterly in the 
Work Programme tender). This decision was made by senior employees as they felt 
that as an organisation Albase had already successfully developed to the needs of 
the DWP and the quasi-market212. Whilst arguably Albase’s managers were required 
to incorporate greater changes to the organisation due to the changes in the 
contracting system, the prime contractor approach was stated as their preferred 
option for the organisation’s future.   In part this was due to a number of perceived 
negatives associated with the sub-contractor role that respondents discussed. 
Drawing on resource dependency arguments it appears that there was an awareness 
of the potential for new power dynamics (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1977) in the supply-
chain model:  
 
“The debate with the board was could we fit into that [revised quasi-market 
structure] as a prime contractor, or should we accept that bigger players were 
coming in, and our role was a subcontractor?  Now, part of that was a 
financial consideration, but it was also - can we control the contract?  And if 
we accept for FND phase one that we are squeezed as a sub, down to the 
subcontractor level, then it would be difficult to get out of that.  So we chose to 
bid as a prime contractor.”213 
 
The decision was based on resources and on issues of control and financial risk. 
Based on their understanding of the current market arrangements and the future 
quasi-market arrangements under the prime contractor model, managers perceived 
that their decision was to choose between remaining a, “small player in a reasonably 
specialised employability area or go along and compete with the bigger guys…win a couple 
of those big contracts and fight the battle there.214” It appears that there was an 
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awareness of the risks involved in becoming a prime contractor in terms of financial 
uncertainty which was assessed in opposition to the risks involved with being 
under the control of a private sector prime contractor215. As one respondent said, 
“financially, it was quite a risky strategy, but also it was quite risky not to go for it as 
well.216” Respondents also stated that the role as a subcontractor would be 
detrimental to the organisation’s development and continued transformation into a 
“competitive public service delivery organisation217”.  
 
Respondents also noted concerns about managerial and employee ‘de-skilling’ if the 
contract management role was no longer their responsibility218. The decision that 
was made did not just apply to the FND contract in 2008. It was also associated with 
how senior employees understood the welfare-to-work environment and how much 
choice they wanted for future welfare-to-work programmes based on the 
investment they had previously made in the organisation’s management capacity219.  
Arguably, these choices were influenced by an understanding of the development of 
the prime contractor model in future tendering rounds. Respondents mentioned 
their concerns regarding the impact of being a subcontractor on the organisation’s 
approach to welfare-to-work programme content and the design of services for job 
seekers.   
 
“In discussions with various other potential prime contractors, we realised 
that we had the potential to lose control of how we delivered the programmes if 
we went with them.  One competitor, for example, was very clear that they 
had a 4 stage delivery process, that over a year you had a customer for 3 
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months and then you passed it on.  The baton changing model as we called it.  
And they were fixed on that, you know, this is the way they would work.  And 
they had never, at that stage, won a welfare-to- work contract.  So, I am using 
them as an example, but there was a risk that if you went with another prime 
contractor you had to do it their way.”220   
 
Actors in Albase may also have been aware of the ‘informational advantage’ (Ben-
Nur, 2002) that prime contractors for the FND would have in future welfare-to-work 
contracting, and feared that becoming a sub-contractor at this point would limit 
their ability to try to become a prime contractor in future tendering events.  As the 
extract below demonstrates:  
 
“It was also the fact that the prime contractor, had we been a subcontractor, 
would be controlling the financial side of the contract, possibly the IT, 
probably performance management.  And therefore, we would lose the 
capacity in those areas, to manage those aspects ourselves.  And at the time we 
had an investment plan to improve our IT, our internal organisational 
capacity processes to manage contracts, because we were managing other 
contracts, and we were managing other supply chains, where we had 
experience of performance managing other subcontractors.”221 
 
8.4 Perceptions of risk 
Arguably, the main issue appears to centre on perceptions of risk. The emphasis on 
uncertain performance based funding (see chapter seven), alongside the use of 
large, high risk contracts created a number of funding issues for Albase. However, 
for Albase the threat of a loss of power and control of their services was considered 
equally risky in terms of their continued organisational development and the 
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availability of future opportunities as a prime provider if they were move to the 
subcontractor level. Respondents from Albase felt that the subcontractor level could 
not offer the same surplus generating options or the same opportunities for 
organisational investment222 (DWP, 2010b).   
 
However, the prime contractor model introduced a number of new core costs for 
Albase. The bidding system required subcontractors to negotiate and adapt their 
services to fit the needs of each bidding prime contractor in their operating area. It is 
argued here that whilst transaction costs were reduced for the DWP as they had 
fewer relationships and contracts to maintain (Bruttel, 2004; NAO, 2011), transaction 
costs increased for delivery organisations. From the data collected this may have 
been associated with the individualised supply chain and programme design of 
each prime contractor. Using the data collected from Albase these costs are grouped 
into three categories; business acquisition costs, market participation costs and 
transaction costs associated with managing a contract. The acknowledgement of 
these costs and organisational developments highlights the complexities in welfare-
to-work quasi-market involvement for Albase, and the way in which new ways of 
organizing were adopted in order to comply with the institutions and organisations 
controlling resources in the organisational field.  
 
8.5 Contract related costs 
Drawing on neoinstitutional economics, the cost implications of any contractual 
agreement are most commonly discussed under the banner of ‘transaction costs’ 
(Scott, 2008).  From this perspective, transaction costs are an important component 
of any contracting process and their implication in public service markets is a key 
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factor in government efficiency debates (Freud, 2011).  As outlined in chapter three, 
transaction costs are essentially the management cost (in this case inclusive of risk 
and upfront capital) associated with either internally producing the service or 
buying it through contracting the “comparative costs of planning, adapting, and 
monitoring task completion under alternative governing structures” (Williamson, 
1981, p.552-553).  
 
It is argued here that contracting out the delivery of welfare-to-work programmes 
initially created transaction costs based on the writing of specifications and 
contracts, evaluation of tenders, publicising the call for tenders, providing 
information and responding to enquiries from possible contractors, and negotiating 
the final contract with the winning tender for the DWP. There were also the on-
going audit and compliance costs of ensuring that the delivery organisation fulfilled 
the contract requirements (WPC, 2012).  It was openly stated in a number of 
government documents that the rationale for the move towards a payment-by-
results and prime-contractor model was to reduce the DWP’s transaction costs (see 
NAO, 2011; NAO, 2012b). Drawing on transaction cost arguments, the DWP’s 
reduction of contracts and exchange relationship was considered a necessary change 
to ensure that the transaction costs of the quasi-market system were reduced. As 
without quasi-market reform the problem of transaction costs (and the budgetary 
impact) may have negated any financial benefits of contracting-out the delivery of 
welfare-to-work programmes and therefore received less political support for the 
contracting-out approach (NAO, 2012b; WPC, 2012).  
 
The shift towards the payment-by-results model (where payments to providers 
were assessed against the future savings of benefit payments to the job seekers) 
arguably tipped the balance towards contracting-out. This was because, as 
demonstrated below, the cost of service provision and the success of achieving the 
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policy goal were transferred to the external provider. It appears that the DWP’s 
prime contractor format was also an attempt to reduce transaction costs that were 
incurred by the organisation through the arranging and monitoring of numerous 
contracts and organisations (NAO, 2011; NAO, 2012b). The move towards a top-tier 
of prime providers meant that the DWP was only directly responsible for a small 
number of contracts and in theory this reduced its transaction costs. 
 
According to Coase (1937) and Williamson (1981, 1996) two prominent transaction 
costs theorists, commissioning organisations (in this case the DWP) will experience 
an increase in transaction costs from issues of limited information and uncertainty 
as parties to a transaction cannot fully predict all possible future scenarios and as 
such, they cannot fully specify contracts. From this position, pre-contract 
preparation and post-contract oversight (high transaction costs) was required to 
mitigate vendor opportunism and improve compliance. This has included the 
creation of new audit and regulatory functions as the quasi-market developed in 
response to concerns regarding fraud and performance measurement (DWP, 2008a; 
Grayling, 2012). For example, the DWP introduced Merlin standards teams, with 
responsibility for monitoring provider relationships, and ‘provider assurance teams’ 
with responsibility for interrogating providers’ behaviour during contract 
delivery223 (DWP, 2012c; NAO, 2012b). The procurement process for programmes 
such as the Flexible New Deal (18 months) and the Work Programme (6 months + 
ERSS 3 months) involved much preparation and information gathering for bidding 
organisations in the pre-contract stage (NAO, 2012a).  In a report by the National 
Audit Office (NAO, 2012a) it was estimated that performance monitoring for the 
Work Programme would cost the DWP at least £8.6million.  
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It is argued below that as the DWP moved towards a supply-chain model some of 
these costs were passed on to the prime contractors. For the organisation that won a 
prime-contractor tender the transaction costs incurred during the process not only 
included an extended pre-contract period inclusive of bidding documents, 
negotiations with commissioning bodies, partners and competitors, including 
research and development of services to match the expectation of the tender (DWP, 
2008a), but also the audit and compliance of sub-contractors within their supply 
chains (WPC, 2012).  Whilst some private sector organisations were familiar with 
these responsibilities and costs from other policy areas, such transaction costs were 
new to many organisations involved in employment support or the welfare-to-work 
market (NAO, 2005). Some of these costs were new to Albase despite their welfare-
to-work experience. Albase engaged in a period of organisational ‘learning on the 
job’ to adapt to these requirements224 during the transformation period outlined in 
chapter five. From the data gathered at Albase there were a number of costs 
involved in the welfare-to-work quasi-market competition. Using the research into 
Albase, three types of costs associated with resources expended by provider 
organisations have been identified; 1) market participation costs, 2) business 
acquisition costs, 3) traditional transaction costs.  Each is discussed in turn.   
 
8.6 Market participation costs 
Market participation costs increased because each organisation was required to 
expend more resources on gathering competitor information, matching competitor 
innovations, and marketing their own product or services to commissioning bodies 
and other institutions or actors associated with the welfare-to-work environment225. 
A number of costs are identified here which were indirectly associated with 
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acquiring contracts and it is argued that these costs can be attributed to the need for 
competing organisations to meet the norms and expectations of the quasi-market. 
For example, Albase invested in “Central Business Support Services” such as HR, 
Finance, IT and Marketing functions to ensure that the organisation’s development 
reflected the requirements of the broader welfare-to-work market.226 There were also 
costs associated with keeping informed of the work of others in the market and 
arranging meetings, attending conferences, joining official networks and member 
groups such as the Employment Related Services Association (ERSA)227. An 
impression was gained during the fieldwork that there was no guarantee that these 
costs would be recovered228. 
 
There were two main areas where Albase dedicated resources to market 
participation. First, one of the biggest changes for Albase was the staffing 
implications involved with market participation costs. The organisation sought to 
improve HR systems to, “ensure that Albase is an employer of choice,229” which 
included the creation of new policies such as a ‘Conflict of Interest Policy’, a 
‘Whistle Blowing Policy’, and an ‘Equal Opportunities policy’, revised maternity 
and paternity leave arrangements and updating recruitment policies, to ensure “the 
continued good reputation of Albase, which is vital in terms of a sustained market 
position and growth230”. A new pay policy and grading structure was introduced in 
2008-2009 to develop the organisation’s ability to attract and maintain staff in the 
welfare-to-work quasi-market. The organisation also expanded its core staff 
numbers and moved towards employing more staff on permanent contracts instead 
of temporary contracts as they had previously (see chapter five).  These efforts 
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appeared to be the outcome of concerns that the organisation required experienced 
and dedicated staff that otherwise may have been attracted to competitors if they 
did not improve employment policies231  
 
Market participation costs also involved employee resources in terms of time and 
financial resources involved in generating and maintaining relationships with both 
partners and competitors and in gathering the required information to make 
competitive decisions. Alongside the increase in employees with duties and 
responsibilities dominated by the welfare-to-work quasi-market, one respondent felt 
that DWP contracts involved, “much employee time dedicated to keeping an eye on the 
environment232.” 
 
The second key area where Albase invested resources was their IT and business 
systems. There was a perceived need from senior management for investment in IT 
systems to ensure that the organisation’s processes complied with the DWP’ 
requirements and that they mimicked the IT facilities offered by competitors233. For 
example, Albase launched an Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
development plan in 2006/2007 to “streamline our systems and information flows 
between departments.234 ” In the following three years Albase also secured over 
£1million of computer software, “migrated to cloud computing, and implemented a 
substantial and complex Information Security Plan to fulfil DWP 
requirements…[and] moved to the use of Customer Relationship Management 
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(CRM) software to manage FND phase 1 with 15 subcontractors”235. As the extract 
below demonstrates, in 2010 it was stated in an internal-facing document that the 
rationale for this investment of resources was to increase Albase’s chances of 
gaining welfare-to-work income. 
 
 “In order to position Albase for future growth and deliver on the strategic 
financial and social objective set, detailed financial analysis has resulted in an 
up-front investment requirement over the next 3 years.”236 
 
Market participation costs were required to fulfil the basic quasi-market entrance 
requirements by the DWP and the expenditure on key organisational systems was 
implemented by Albase in order to meet these requirements. The second set of costs 
outlined below was additional to this expenditure. 
 
8.7 Business acquisition costs  
Albase had to satisfy a number of DWP requirements during the tender process in 
order to qualify to deliver to a welfare-to-work programme (DWP, 2010c).  
Arguably, as the contract values increased and the DWP passed more 
responsibilities to delivery organisations with each new major welfare-to-work 
programme, the information required during the tender stage increased. 
Information was required from a range of Albase’s internal departments such as the 
finance and development teams, the existing programme contract managers and the 
senior management employees. From the data collected these internal resources 
were involved in the bid preparation process for the majority of the 12 month 
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tendering period for the larger contracts237. As previously mentioned in chapter 
seven, employees in the development department were required to possess bid 
writing experience to understand the requirements of the tender and where possible 
demonstrate previous success238. This led to an increase in employees working in the 
department and a move towards hiring more core staff on permanent contracts 
which enabled the development and retention of staff with welfare-to-work 
experience.   
 
Investment in the organisation’s financial planning resource was also a key aspect of 
the bidding process. It appears that this was due to the need to display to the DWP 
advanced internal financial processes as the contract sizes increased over time239 
(DWP 2008d; DWP, 2010c). Prior to the FND programme each organisation was 
required to provide their accounts and prove that they were financially solvent. 
However, they were not required to go into any great detail and as such, one 
respondent described earlier financial requirements as simple “tick box processes240.”  
The FND required a more “rigorous financial assessment241” as it involved providers 
supplying financial information including the current year forecast, future budgets, 
and annual accounts (DWP, 2008d).  The DWP undertook a financial assessment 
which involved benchmarking organisations against DWP pre-agreed standards 
designed to ensure provider viability. This enabled the DWP to provide contractors 
with a ‘growth limit’, a maximum amount that each contractor could apply for.  
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For the FND competition Albase was informed that they could grow at a maximum 
of £19million per annum (although post-contract these figures were not 
constrained)242. The DWP concentrated only on DWP contracts so the growth figure 
only referred to the organisation’s turnover growth in relation to DWP contracts243. 
As such, for Albase it excluded growth from sustainability, regeneration and other 
employability activities. Albase adapted to the increased financial requirements 
associated with the increase in size and value of the FND and Work Programme 
(WP) contracts by spending resources on the hiring of accountants, consultants and 
financial project managers244.  
 
8.8 Traditional transaction costs  
The DWP were not the only organisation to experience traditional transaction costs 
associated with audit and compliance. Once the bidding organisation was successful 
in winning a welfare-to-work contract the organisation had to fulfil the contract 
requirements which involved the cost of contract management (including post-
tender negotiations); service delivery (through arrangements with sub-contractors); 
finance; claims and compliance; reporting to DWP teams; internal audit and 
monitoring; personnel and payroll functions; staff employment and recruitment 
policies;  and the health and safety of staff and clients (DWP, 2008d; DWP, 2010b; 
DWP, 2010c).  Contractors also had to design and implement management 
arrangements with subcontractors or partners, which in Albase’s case, was often 
through the use of service level agreements involving quality performance 
standards, record keeping and reporting expectations and financial arrangements245.  
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The audit and compliance costs included the collection of information from service 
users, ensuring that all data collection processes complied with data standards and 
in Albase’s case, an overhaul of their internal audit processes to mirror those of the 
DWP246.    
 
Respondents said that the attention to audit was, “pretty small, but it started growing 
dramatically” with the onset of larger welfare-to-work contracts247.   Whilst the 
organisation sought to invest in improving audit processes as required by the DWP, 
one respondent said that they felt that, “government contracts are littered with 
bureaucracy248.”  For example, contractors were required to ensure that programme 
administration paper work was complete (such as New Deal time sheets and 
personal advisor documents), and that job seekers were provided with the correct 
information and certificates, all of which had to be regularly evidenced by advisors 
and administrators (Millar, 2000; Finn, 2010) . Due to the requirements set out by the 
DWP, Albase invested in the development of a centralised system for programme 
administration and financial claims to process the required paperwork for the DWP 
contracts in a manner acceptable by DWP audits: 
 
“Our centralised approach to programme management, administration, 
claims and reconciliation has resulted in exemplary Financial Appraisal and 
Monitoring audits over each of the last three years, with a financial claw-back 
of less than 0.1%.”249 
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This resulted in Albase investing HR resources into developing an audit and 
compliance team that over time grew quickly from 3 to 14 people across the 
business250, working on a range of DWP contracts. According to the NAO (2012b), to 
mitigate against fraudulent behaviour teams within the delivery organisation had to 
be separated between those achieving an outcome and those reporting it. Albase’s 
audit team had responsibility for keeping up to date with regular changes 
introduced by the DWP who were, “continually reorganising themselves and changing 
their regions and contract managers251.” They also invested in a new document 
management system, which enabled the scanning, management, storage and 
distribution of paperwork to allow the organisation to forward and share 
information with local JCP Offices, “expediting the delivery of critical 
information.252” The DWP introduced a number of IT modifications for the 
collection of management information and performance outcomes from welfare-to-
work programmes in the late 2000’s which providers also had to comply with 
(NAO, 2012b; WPC, 2012).  
 
Internal reports directly mentioned the need to adhere to government formats, such 
as “this report is presented in a format that aligns better with the EFQM Business 
Excellence Framework” and, “substantial and complex Information Security Plan approved 
by DWP253.” References to recognised industry standards such as the Scottish 
Quality Management Systems (SQMS), Membership of Quality Scotland and 
Investors in People, and demonstrating that internal staff were trained ‘EFQM 
assessors’254 also appeared to be a necessary component of the tender process and all 
increased the transaction costs for the provider organisation.  Internal documents 
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appeared to show that the organisation spent time and resources adhering to DWP 
contracting expectations and changing internal processes to mirror the DWP’s, 
which one respondent felt meant that the organisation did not have the choice to 
design their own processes as the DWP requirements were most important:  
 
“So actually, what you had to do was, internally, you had to build your 
internal structure to mirror that nature of those external contracts. Which is 
stupid because you get no kind of, sum of the parts because everybody is doing 
their own thing.”255  
 
In comparison to business acquisition and market participation costs these 
transaction costs were often covered in the service fee of the associated contract. 
Nevertheless, the organisational learning and resource required to meet the 
expectations of the DWP were an essential aspect of successfully securing and 
managing DWP contracts:  
 
“We thought they [compliance, quality and risk processes] existed, I mean, 
don’t say they didn’t exist, they did exist to some extent within the 
management processes we had, but they certainly weren’t tight enough, they 
weren’t transparent enough.  And we couldn’t assure the DWP…so their 
Provider Assurance team, which is a sort of, quality audit if you like, came in 
and spent 3 weeks with us.  So they went to the level of detail that was about 
checking every file and making sure that somebody had ticked a box off, 
checked it and could report that.  So it is all these double checking stuff, which 
does become bureaucratic, you have got to watch that doesn’t take over.  But 
that’s what they want.  And if you want to get in the game with them, to run 
the contracts for them, you have got to do that.”256  
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Albase’s involvement in the welfare-to-work market reveals the financial costs 
associated with the acquisition of contracts and resources. Table 8.1 below 
summarises the three types of costs identified above. 
 
Table 8.1: Three types of contract related costs 
Market participation costs Business acquisition costs Transaction costs 
Core staff Bid writing team Audit systems 
Business investment Bid writing process Contract management 
Partners and competitor 
knowledge 
Financial capacity Compliance reporting 
Policy awareness and 
marketing 
Leadership resource  
 
8.9 Barriers to quasi-market involvement 
The increase in these costs for competing providers highlights the complexity of 
issues of market participation. First, both market participation and business 
acquisition costs were expended without any guarantee that contracts would be 
secured and costs recovered from the service fee257. Similar to the payment-by-
results difficulties, expenditure on these unsecured investments may increase the 
financial risks associated with welfare-to-work contracting. Whilst the DWP has 
reduced its transaction costs, involvement costs for providers have arguably 
increased. Second, the need to invest in market participation and business 
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acquisition costs detracted time and finances from developing other business areas 
and investment in organisation-led developments. Some respondents felt that 
Albase had been susceptible to activity drift as internal resources and profit from all 
programmes became directed towards developing processes to comply with the 
welfare-to-work quasi-market. As the two extracts below demonstrate: 
 
“I think that having the Flexible New Deal just sucks in thinking time and 
energy from the management teams.”258  
“All the energy gets pulled, the centre of the organisation’s income gets pulled 
to these big programmes.”259 
 
There were implications for ensuring welfare-to-work competitiveness was 
maintained. Arguably, the size of the costs outlined previously and the amount of 
resources expended, committed the organisation to the welfare-to-work market and 
future developments. Moving to other policy delivery areas became more difficult 
and at each tendering stage the decision to leave the market became more difficult, 
despite the increase in financial risks associated with the payment-by-results 
model260. This may have been because the organisation’s leaders had already 
invested heavily in the market and in their organisation to ensure that Albase 
became ‘market facing’261 in terms of structure and staff responsibilities. 
 
It became more important to maintain relationships and to continue to secure 
welfare-to-work contracts in order to sustain (or increase) income levels. 
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Organisations involved in the delivery of DWP contracts for a longer period of time 
and those which had developed an exchange relationship with the DWP would 
have had an advantage in the competitive tendering for welfare-to-work 
programmes compared to new market entrants. As such, according to 
neoinstitutional economics Albase’s experience would have given it a competitive 
advantage (Williamson, 1995; 1997). This suggests that as the quasi-market 
developed and became more competitive and instigated greater organisational 
change, Albase’s managers would have remained involved in the quasi-market 
competitions to retain market advantage. Maintaining the market involvement 
could have led directly to resource and informational advantage gains over future 
competitors at a later contracting phase. This meant that Albase’s investment in 
internal development was more likely to be in line with the requirements of the 
DWP as not investing in key areas of the organisation and subsequently not 
winning a contract, may have impacted on Albase’s ability to bid for future 
contracts. Competitors with contracts would have continued to invest in their 
organisation’s relationships, at a cost which Albase would not have been able to 
match.  
 
Arguably, without an income stream during the bidding phase Albase would have 
been unable to afford the necessary resources (market participation and business 
acquisition costs), to maintain and progress its involvement in the quasi-market and 
develop future competitive bids. The high costs associated with entering the 
welfare-to-work market in phases three and four led to higher entry barriers. 
However, the investment in DWP requirements (the resources involved in 
becoming more business-like) also increased the exit barriers for Albase once they 
had been involved in the quasi-market for some time, as they were unlikely to 
relinquish the costs already expended. Drawing on neoinstitutional economics it can 
be argued that because Albase invested in the costs involved with quasi-market 
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participation, and because it became more ‘business-like’ it  became committed to 
the market.  
 
8.10 Commitment  
The level of commitment to the market is also important as the barriers to entry and 
exit bring into play issues of power asymmetries (Dietrich, 1994). Managing these 
power relations which accompanied market commitment created a number of 
micro-level tensions within Albase. First, the organisation control over their front-
line employment support content was reduced. Albase was involved in the design 
of employment programmes in the ILM model (see chapter six). The organisation 
engaged in problem solving in local neighbourhoods, and learns and shares social 
problems surrounding unemployment with local agencies. As such, the organisation 
would feed back to other policy makers and agencies involved in employment 
support, and engage in idea generation for future programmes and policies. As 
such, respondents felt that the organisation had a reputation as a ‘thinking 
organisation262’ due to the links this created with a number of policy makers and 
politicians who sought to learn from their innovative approaches to employment 
support. Respondents noted that the culture of the organisation was affected when 
the welfare-to-work contracts replaced the decreasing EU funds. Some respondents 
noted that during the transformation period in the 2000’s (including a leadership 
change when the founding CEO1 left the organisation and was replaced by the 
CEO2) Albase experienced a shift from a ‘thinking’ organisation to a ‘delivery’ 
organisation: 
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“We were about delivery, delivery, delivery. I actually think that is really bad 
for an organisation … it is not just about stacking, racking people into work. 
You have to be thinking about regeneration policy, social policy, welfare 
policy…If you are not a thinking organisation, you are a bit one dimensional. 
And I think what’s happening with lots of organisations, is they are getting 
driven into a very sanitized one dimension thought process with 
government.”263  
 
Despite such negative perceptions of the impact of the welfare-to-work quasi-
market on the culture of the organisation, actors in Albase continued to seek 
resources from the quasi-market arrangement. It is argued that this was due to the 
commitment to the quasi-market and because it became increasingly committed to 
this resource context as it expended resources and invested in internal systems in 
order to meet the requirements. As such this led to a shift in the activities, structure 
and management approach of the organisation.  
 
8.11 Resource diversification 
In this section it is argued that Albase were not only committed to the market but 
also displayed resource dependency tendencies. It argues that resource dependency 
was a risk for Albase as having just one (or a few) funding sources meant that if 
funding was withdrawn or became inaccessible then the organisation was likely to 
struggle. Organisations which exclusively depend on one or few resource providers 
are likely to experience their constraining influences (Palmer and Randall, 2002), it is 
possible that the reasons for the extent of organisational change in Albase to the 
DWP requirements can be associated with issues of resource dependency. However, 
organisations can try and manage resource dependency through diversifying 
income streams (Kramer, 1981) and there is some evidence that Albase has sought to 
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do this whilst continuing to deliver welfare-to-work programmes. Consequently, 
following the discussion of dependency is an analysis of Albase’s attempts to 
diversify resources.   
 
It is argued in this section that resources available through devolved policy areas 
(through the Scottish Government) were a key aspect of Albase’s resource 
diversification strategy. In fact, whilst devolved funding provided resources to 
develop third sector organisations, it also provided alternative employment 
support, regeneration and environmental funding which Albase sought to access as 
part of its diversification strategy. The section concludes by considering the 
limitations of the resource diversification strategy employed, and the difficulties 
associated with acquiring resources from a number of sources, including goal 
conflict (DiMaggio, 1986b), and financial costs associated with issues of commitment 
and transaction costs outlined previously.  
 
As outlined in chapter three the fundamental assertion of resource dependence 
theory is that, “the key to organisational survival is the ability to acquire and 
maintain resources” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, p. 2). Drawing on Froelich (1999 
p.248), “the degree of dependence experienced by an organisation is determined by 
the importance and concentration of resources provided. Organisations that rely on 
few sources for vital inputs become highly dependent on and beholden to those 
providers for survival.” Furthermore, resource scarcity results in multiple 
organisations competing for the same or similar sets of scarce resources, leading to 
competition and uncertainty.  
 
Albase became dependent on DWP resources and when these became scarcer, it 
incorporated organisational changes in order to access contracts, even though the 
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required changes possessed a number of issues already discussed in chapter seven 
and earlier in this chapter. It is argued here that resource dependency occurred over 
a number of years as ILM programmes gradually declined and DWP contracts 
became more financially rewarding. Whilst Albase continued to deliver some ILM 
activities throughout the research period (1983-2010), from approximately 2000 the 
main income and activities operated by Albase involved the delivery of welfare-to-
work programmes (as outlined in chapter five). Where the ILM programmes 
involved a range of funders from different agencies and government departments, 
welfare-to-work contracts were administered by a single government department. 
As such, the move from delivering projects with multiple funding sources to 
delivering welfare-to-work contracts from the DWP (at times) may have created 
issues of resource dependency for Albase.  
 
Before further discussion of this point it is worth noting that in this case resource 
dependency was a variable state as Albase’s numerous activities and funding 
partnerships continually changed over the time period studied. However, the main 
argument presented here is that DWP income was much greater than other sources, 
the surplus was an important resource feature of DWP contracts, and as already 
mentioned Albase became dependent on the surplus for organisational 
development in order to access future DWP contracting. Therefore, whilst Albase 
was not completely and solely dependent on DWP funding, it was arguably the 
most influential and important funding for the organisation post 2000.  
 
During the data collection process there were a number of indications of the 
importance of DWP funding for the on-going operations of Albase. Furthermore, 
there were open conversations between employees, the management, and the board 
about resource dependency. In the extract below the respondent states that the 
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number of income streams and customers (the funding source) reduced during the 
transformation period:   
 
“I remember one time you probably had 60 income streams from different 
projects and about 130 customers. You are probably down to 10 income 
streams with 4 customers now.”264 
 
Whilst the process of moving towards DWP funding and away from the ILM model 
took a number of years, it appears that a crucial resource dependency issue occurred 
between 2005 and 2007. Whilst Albase was involved in the welfare-to-work quasi-
market and contract delivery since 2000, in 2005 they still delivered a number of 
ILM and local employability programmes. In 2006 approximately £7.6million (37.5 
per cent of all income in the year), could be attributed to the Employment Zone, 
New Deal, and New Deal Disabled People contracts265.  Although some evidence 
existed that there was not too much of a concern about this arrangement266, in terms 
of the impact on organisational change it was arguably a factor in the change 
process experienced since Albase’s involvement in welfare-to-work contracting.  At 
this point Albase continued to receive income from other sources than the DWP, but 
this was starting to decline. Within two years the organisation’s management and 
financial employees became concerned about how much of the financial income 
could be attributed to DWP contracts:  
 
“We want to make sure we’re less dependent on DWP and employability, and 
we want to make sure we get a more balanced spread across the business...”267 
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In 2010 the organisation continued to demonstrate concern about resource 
dependency: 
 
“In recent years the majority of income has been earned from employability 
services, and a significant source of this has been generated from DWP 
contracts and whilst this is likely to continue to be a major income source for 
the organisation within employability, the strategy aims for growth in the 
other areas of business to ensure there is not dependency on single sources of 
income.”268 
 
Analysis of Albase documentation and interview responses revealed that resource 
diversification was a concern and strategies were created to try and reduce the 
dependency on the income from the DWP in order to create a “more balanced 
portfolio.269” By this point (2010) Albase had already undergone the change 
processes outlined in chapter seven, and it appears that some senior managers had 
acknowledged the increasingly competitive welfare-to-work quasi-market270. By 
creating a resource diversification strategy, Albase may have been attempting to 
reduce resource dependence and maintain its autonomy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Thompson, 1967). Arguably, rather than relying on a narrow set of resource sources, 
Albase sought to buffer itself with activities and income where it could exercise 
greater control over the stability and predictability of income.  
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8.12 Access to alternative resources 
It appears that Albase’s ‘buffer’ was based on three alternative resource tactics 
associated with public funding which was devolved to the Scottish Government. 
First, they continued to deliver some ILM activity using devolved funding. Whilst 
this was a smaller percentage of their income and activities than previous years it 
was a somewhat consistent resource stream. Second, they drew on Scottish 
Government funding to build organisational capacity which assisted Albase to 
acquire welfare-to-work funding, but also to develop alternative revenue streams. 
Actors also focused on funding aimed at the third sector. Finally, they sought to 
make new relationships with private sector organisations by building on their image 
as a social enterprise with third sector contacts and experience in Scotland. Each of 
these approaches is discussed below to demonstrate how Albase attempted to 
influence or exert some control over their financial income. 
 
First, they continued to deliver ILM activity using devolved funding. In Chapter 
Seven it was argued that a number of factors had led to the decline in support for 
ILMs.  This chapter argued that due to the rise of workfarism, contractualism and 
the quasi-market model, ILMs became less financially viable for Albase. It was also 
noted that the decline in funding occurred despite the support of some influential 
commentators such as Gregg (2008) and the interest of political actors such as 
Houghton (2006) who both produced reports which supported the ILM model as an 
appropriate support approach. However, one area in which ILMs received some 
practical funding and policy support was in the devolved policy streams by the 
Scottish Government. The support of the Scottish Government enabled Albase to 
continue a relatively small percentage of its ILM activities. Whilst these projects did 
not generate surpluses in the way that DWP programmes did (see chapters seven 
and eight), Albase operated a somewhat diversified financial portfolio which 
arguably slightly reduced their dependence on DWP contracts.   
 338 
 
Second, in the time period covered in this research, policy areas related to welfare-
to-work programmes (such as social security, economic planning and welfare 
reform) were centralized and the responsibility of the UK government.  The Scottish 
Government was however responsible for a number of policy streams which 
included the provision of policies aimed at reducing unemployment or which 
sought to improve local economies (Carlisle, 2010; Keating, 2010; McCarthy, 2010) . 
Devolved policy streams which were beneficial to Albase included regeneration, 
social exclusion, skills and training, neighbourhood renewal, housing, and the 
environment (Scottish Government 2011). All of these streams were associated with 
the ILM model and the programmes Albase operated.  
 
Albase also accessed resources from these devolved policy areas to develop 
specialist or localised employability programmes271. In chapter six it was argued that 
one of the problems Albase faced in regards to the continuation of ILM projects was 
the UK government’s shift in the approach to the provision of training and skills 
development for jobseekers.  However, Albase was able to continue some ILM 
activity through accessing training funding from Scottish Government sources. For 
example, whilst training funding was reduced in the national agenda, the Training 
for Work (TfW) programmes remained operational by the Scottish Government. 
Albase also developed separate training support programmes (such as in-work 
training) funded through Scottish Agencies (such as Skills Development Scotland) 
which provided small amounts of alternative revenues272. Whilst TfW did not 
provide all the funding required for complete ILM projects, if other sources could be 
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found (such as EU funding and resources from Housing Associations) it was a 
valuable source of funding.273  
 
Devolved policies affected the delivery of localised employment support through 
the development of policies and funding options aimed at supporting the 
development of the social economy and the use of TSOs in public service delivery 
(Scottish Government 2008; Alcock, 2009; McTier et al, 2012). The support of TSOs is 
arguably a political orientation regarding the contracting-out process (Keating, 
2010). Albase was able to benefit from the political ideas which were active at the 
devolved policy level and although this cannot be discussed in great detail in this 
thesis, consideration is given to one particular policy area which impacted on 
Albase’s resource diversification options.  
 
One of the key policy adaptations which ensured the continuance of some ILM and 
local employment initiatives appears to be based on the use of a policy tool called 
‘Community Benefit Clauses’. The Scottish Government’s ‘Community Benefit 
Clause’ (CBC) policy was introduced to affect public procurement and impact on 
training, employment and investment in a local community in anticipation that this 
would assist longer term regeneration (Scottish Government, 2008). The clauses 
were intended to be used as a tool to ensure public sector spending.  The Local 
Government in Scotland Act 2003 (Scottish Executive, 2003b) conferred, “well-
being” powers on local authorities meaning that public service contracts could 
include legal provision to address local social and environmental considerations. 
Public procurement was still obliged to meet the requirements of EU procurement 
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rules and general EU law; in particular, clauses should not cause direct or indirect 
discrimination” (Scottish Government, 2011b, no page number).  
 
CBCs were arguably a policy tool aimed at increasing the regeneration of deprived 
areas through directing resources and influencing contractor behaviour. It was 
proposed by the Scottish Government that CBCs were a pragmatic approach to 
ensuring successful community benefit programmes which “can lead to the 
permanent employment of formerly non-working people leading to a positive cycle 
of experiences for these people” (Scottish Government, 2008, p.5). CBCs were also a 
way in which the Scottish Government directed resources towards the third sector 
and its regeneration and employment priorities. Albase supported the use of CBCs 
as they provided revenue opportunities for the remaining neighbourhood and ILM 
project work. As the extract below demonstrates:  
 
 “Procurement processes/social clauses are critical if social enterprises are to 
be given the opportunity to participate in public service delivery. Critical to 
this is a wider definition of “value” without a sole emphasis on cost as the 
main indicator.” 274  
 
In 2005 Albase reported that funding from Local Authorities had gradually reduced 
over the previous three years, but it had been matched by an increase in funding 
from Housing Associations275. Albase also continued to access funding for housing 
based ILMs through maintaining and creating contacts with Housing Associations 
(HAs), which used CBCs in their procurement of construction projects276.  This shift 
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reflected the changes to housing policies in Scotland during this time and the 
transfer of housing from local government organisations to a range of HAs (see Daly 
et al, 2005). These changes impacted Albase in two ways. First, these wider 
governance issues regarding the transfer of social housing affected the 
organisation’s decision making and encouraged decision-makers towards DWP 
resources as local government housing resources became less accessible and more 
fragmented during the transfer process. However, the second impact of the transfer 
on Albase was that new relationships were created with HAs which created funding 
opportunities from non-DWP sources. As outlined in the extract below:  
 
“Funding from LA [local authority] sources has steadily reduced, from 30% 
in 2002, to 18% in 2003, and 14% in 2004.The reduction is concurrent with 
an increase in income from Housing Associations and Communities Scotland 
which made up 11% in 2004, compared with 7% in 2003 and in 2002 only 
3%”277 
 
Regeneration funds were often made available to HAs and these new relationships 
provided alternative revenue strategies for ILM programmes, or for new local 
regeneration or employability programmes278.  Funding from the Scottish 
Government aimed at regeneration and social inclusion activities could be accessed 
through HAs or through CBCs to provide some funding for the creation of or 
continuation of a small number of ILM programmes279.  
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8.13 Devolved funding for implementing organisational change  
It is argued in this section that Albase also drew on Scottish Government funding to 
build organisational capacity. This funding assisted Albase to acquire welfare-to-
work funding, and also enabled Albase to develop alternative revenue streams. It 
appears that Albase focussed on TSO funding and the concept of the social economy 
to improve their likelihood of gaining this resource. The extract below provides an 
indication of the diversification strategy that employees in Albase considered 
possible through the use of funding aimed at TSOs:  
 
 “There is a strong view throughout the management team that there is a 
significant opportunity to develop a social enterprise arm to our business, and 
provide capacity building support to other social economy organisations by 
providing core services, in line with [Scottish] Government objectives.  A 
business plan will be developed during 2010 specifically for this area of the 
business. The aim is to generate income of £0.5m per annum from social 
economy services by 2013.”280  
 
It is argued here that actors in Albase focussed on its image as a ‘social enterprise’ in 
order to create a position for itself within this policy context. In particular, Albase 
sought to demonstrate that because it was a social enterprise it could offer more 
than private sector organisations. Arguably, this approach enabled the organisation 
to draw on a broader social perception of the legitimacy of social enterprises in the 
delivery of public services: 
 
 “As we are not profit driven, we can focus resources on the more difficult to 
reach customer groups such as the long term unemployed, lone parents, people 
with addictions and the homeless; resources which private sector organisations 
                                                     
280 Anon Doc 77, 2010 
 343 
might divert to shareholders. We have proven by our performance that our 
approach works.”281  
 
Some respondents (interviewed prior to the Work Programme bid) felt that along 
with the history of the organisation, being a social enterprise helped it to win 
mainstream welfare-to-work contracts during the early phase of the market: 
 
“I think that the fact that we are a social enterprise helps us win the 
employability contracts.”282   
 
Some respondents also felt that the value of promoting the organisation as a social 
enterprise was their ‘unique selling point’ (compared to private sector bidders), and 
that it enabled Albase to straddle a number of policy areas and funding bodies283.For 
some respondents the concept of ‘social enterprise’ was not just a view on how the 
organisation was legally structured (i.e. without shareholders), it was arguably a 
normative position accompanied by resource opportunities: 
 
“And what our [unique selling point] USP was…that we are a social 
enterprise.  And that is how we rebranded.”284  
 
Respondents from Albase felt that it operated in a field where there were few social 
enterprises. Arguably, they considered it a USP only because they were regularly 
competing against private sector organisations in welfare-to-work contracting. It 
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would possibly not be considered in the same way if they were still predominately 
competing for ESF funding where there were strict eligibility criteria (i.e. private 
sector organisations or those with specified turnovers were not eligible to apply) 
and their competitors would be other non-private sector organisations (i.e. charities, 
other TSOs and public sector bodies). 
 
Respondents commented that the perception from Albase’s partners and funders of 
the concept of ‘social enterprise’ was important. It appears that this was because the 
concept offered possible income sources from organisations which preferred to 
contract to non-private sector organisations. For example a HA included in its 
contracts to private sector construction contractors a CBC which prescribed bidders 
to work with local social enterprises. Similarly, as the extract below demonstrates, 
actors in HAs may have also chosen to contract work to social enterprises rather 
than private sector organisations: 
  
“For example, we have major repairs programmes, cycle maintenance 
programmes etc, where you are spending significant sums of money each year. 
So it might be  the case of saying, well actually, we want to take the painting 
contract and we want some sort of social enterprise to deliver it for us.”285 
 
Consequently, Albase’s positioning as a social enterprise enabled the organisation to 
attract resources from alternative policy areas. Arguably, for Albase it was beneficial 
to make the discursive and narrative shift from a charity to a social enterprise. The 
shift in the policy environment to promote out-sourcing and the use of social 
enterprises as delivery partners enabled the organisation to accept and benefit from 
the generic positive image of social enterprise. Albase adopted the associated image 
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of a ‘social enterprise’ published from other sources without having to publish their 
own extra material to project an image of contract management and financial 
proficiency.  
 
8.14 Access to funding through the social enterprise concept  
So far the discussions have focused on the accessibility of funding for social 
enterprises (i.e. through Community Benefit Clauses) and the above discussions 
focused on how Albase used the concept of Social Enterprise as a way of attracting 
resources in a competitive environment. Below it is argued that the concept of Social 
Enterprise was also used to increase resource diversification as Albase ‘carved out’ a 
role for itself within the third sector policy context. As an extract from a publicity 
document demonstrates: 
 
“Albase considers itself to be a prime example of the potential for Social 
Enterprise development in Scotland, and we believe that we can play an active 
role in promoting the wider development of the sector.”286  
 
As outlined above, a variety of alternative resources existed for the organisation, 
although none as lucrative as welfare-to-work contracts. In recent years Albase 
moved towards representing the sector, whereby it acted as a key example within the 
sector of ‘what works’ and promoted this idea.287 Whilst it is not suggested here that 
Albase used the social enterprise concept purely to gain resources or legitimacy in 
other funding environments, it appears that the approach opened-up a new area of 
resource opportunities, notably from private organisations seeking to access the 
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third sector as customers. As such, Albase became involved in supporting the 
exchange between private sector organisations and TSOs because the third sector 
was seen as a marketplace of consumers and customers requiring resources such as 
IT and infrastructure. Albase offered itself as connected, it supported the idea of 
TSO organisational change, and it appears it encouraged others in the third sector to 
adopt change processes288. An example of this is the recent relationship with a 
multinational organisation, which has been given the pseudonym Multi-tech, in the 
extract below: 
 
“So, rather than working with a council this time, we’re working with Multi-
tech … But their rationale is slightly different… They are not investing in 
this and saying, by doing good things there’s a broad impact that helps our 
profile and brand.  This is more about them supporting the third sector as a 
market and recognising Albase’s position within that market, and thinking 
that that’s the strongest partnership they can have.” 289 
 
Albase also applied for the Scottish Government’s Capacity Building Fund which 
funded internal IT improvements in 2008; and the contract for the delivery of a 
Scottish Government funding programme for the TSO capacity building in 2011. By 
2010 the organisation had identified the prominence of social enterprise funding 
and activities more broadly in public sector outsourcing and actively incorporated 
social enterprise activity as a key part of the business plan. In this way it appears 
that the concept of ‘social enterprise’ was not simply an identity for external 
audiences. It is argued here that drawing on the concept acted as a resource 
strategy. Drawing on resources aimed at social enterprises or targeting the third 
sector as a marketplace enabled Albase to achieve some resource diversification. As 
the extract below demonstrates: 
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“The Scottish Government announced a significantly increased budget for 
social enterprises generally and a new £30 million investment fund. 
Discussions are focusing on scaling up activities that meet the Government’s 
objectives, a series of longer-term development opportunities, and an 
investment package for improvements to property, business systems and 
research and development.”290  
 
Albase employees attempted to exercise some control over their resource 
opportunities from third sector funds by emphasising their social enterprise 
credentials and despite their involvement in public service contracting with private 
sector organisations, it was a key organisation in the third sector in Scotland. 
Managers pursued a strategy which coupled the organisation with the concepts of 
‘third sector’ and ‘social enterprise’. For example, when Albase were awarded a 
contract or grant this was portrayed not simply a success for Albase, but for the 
whole of the third sector. As the extract from a newspaper below demonstrates;   
 
“CEO3, chief executive of Albase said the announcement was a vote of 
confidence in the social enterprise sector, and would involve the creation of 
some 200 jobs within the group itself to handle the five-year contract. "I think 
it is very important for social enterprise. It demonstrates that we can compete 
with large multi-national private businesses on quality, price and delivery."291 
 
Albase also aligned itself with member organisations and umbrella groups that 
supported the social enterprise image. This included the membership of sector and 
issue based groups which arguably became an important way through which the 
organisation created networks with others within the third sector and maintained 
                                                     
290 Anon Doc 97 
291 Anon Doc 27  
 348 
and enhanced the image of their ‘social value’292. The extract below is from a 
discussion about the Social Enterprise 100 event:  
 
“The SE100 was about collaboration between lots of different social 
enterprises to put on an event...We have actually mentored a number of other 
organisations who have been putting events together.  We are assisting in 
some later awards ceremonies later in the year, and we will be advising on 
that.  So it is about collaborative collaboration in the social enterprise 
sector…It is taking on that from the inspiring social enterprises, inspiring.  It 
is about helping other social enterprises en route to success.” 293 
 
Another method which Albase utilised to develop its social enterprise identity and 
its legitimacy as a leading social enterprise was through the Social Accounting 
process (for further information see Mook, Quarter and Richmond, 2003). Social 
Accounting is a way through which firms can report on their environmental and/or 
social activities294. The Social Accounting process provided the organisation with 
support to their claims that they were different to private sector organisations, 
possessed values other than financial, and demonstrated ‘adding the social’ to 
enterprise295. Arguably it detracts from the profit-making aspect of its work and 
operating rationale, supported the USP, and enhanced its social claims. However, 
Albase’s employees were also aware of the economic value to social accounting in 
the competitive contracting environment and used the social accounting process to 
support resource acquisition from all aspects of their organisational field: 
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“Producing our first set of Social Accounts is a useful first step towards fully 
expressing our value in a context where we are increasingly competing with 
large, profit orientated and at times multi-national organisations. Our unique 
selling point is the added value of what we do, and it is vital that we are able 
to demonstrate this in an objective and verifiable way. Central to Albase’s 
strategy and vision is improving the way in which we operate, ensuring that 
we provide the best quality service for our clients as well as being a partner 
and employer of choice”296. 
 
8.15 Diversification limitations 
Options for diversification included a reconsideration of the ILM model based on  
historical experience, partnerships and relationships. It appears that employees 
considered this a plausible option as it would not require overly expending 
resources which entering a new market or policy context would297. Senior 
management also considered increasing Albase’s environmental activities and 
growing this arm of the business298.  
 
However, despite the concerns about limited resource streams, action to rectify this 
through resource diversification was overshadowed by the need to allocate 
organisational resources (staff and financial resources) to the acquisition of welfare-
to-work funding. For example, in 2007 Albase prioritized acquiring more immediate 
funding opportunities from the FND ahead of investing in a diversification 
strategy299: 
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“Before Flexible New Deal came out Albase’s strategy was to be less 
dependent on DWP type contracts, and start to kind of grow the business 
around regeneration and sustainability…because at that point employability, 
DWP type contracts, were probably something like 50% of the funding and 
the other two areas were split into maybe 25/25300.” 
 
Due to the possible benefits and surplus that could be obtained through the FND301, 
and arguably because of the investments already made in welfare-to-work 
contracting, Albase prioritized welfare-to-work developments over resource 
diversification.  As the extract below demonstrates: 
 
“Flexible New Deal came along and, resource wise, kind of, stamps all that 
out because you’ve only got a resource that you can concentrate on a certain 
area, so probably the opposite happened [than diversification]. We became 
more dependent on DWP type contracts, even within the employability 
section itself, the majority of the money was then coming from DWP type 
contracts.”302 
 
So whilst (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) argue that revenue diversification has 
dependence reducing properties, producing and achieving diversification required 
internal resources to be reallocated away from DWP exchanges and towards other 
policy contexts. Funds would have been required to develop and cultivate 
relationships and gain information about new resources. Therefore, it appears that 
diversification strategies brought additional constraints. Albase weighed-up the 
anticipated benefits of diversification against the costs involved at this point in time. 
Drawing on Froelich (1999) diversification costs may also be limited because the 
maintenance the dependency relationship (Albase’s reliance on DWP funding) was 
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also expensive. As discussed in section 8.2, this income stream required 
considerable management effort for continued success in welfare-to-work 
contracting competitions.  
 
As discussed in chapter five, Albase operated a number of activities at the same 
time as the delivery of DWP contracts. Some of these were in policy contexts such as 
the environment (the provision of environmental and energy advice services); 
justice (through the delivery of specialist employment support for ex-offenders); 
and regeneration (including the continuation of some ILM activities). Over time 
Albase was involved in relationships with a number of external funders associated 
with these projects. These included (but were not limited to) government agencies, 
such as Scottish Enterprise or Skills Development Scotland; local government 
organisations; housing associations; and other charitable groups. Whilst these 
networks and relationships enabled Albase to deliver a range of activities and 
receive income from sources other than the DWP, each relationship involved 
resource expenditure as funding bodies had a variety of needs and demands which 
had to be accommodated to sustain the exchange relationship. According to Froelich 
(1999), satisfying the criteria of one provider may preclude satisfying another and 
resulting goal conflicts and organisational tensions can be difficult to manage 
(DiMaggio, 1986b). Consequently, it is argued here that diversifying resources 
whilst being involved in the welfare-to-work quasi-market posed a number of 
predominately resource based difficulties for Albase. 
 
8.16 Summary 
This chapter has focussed on the tensions and difficulties Albase experienced whilst 
adapting to their institutional environment. The first section considered how Albase 
adapted to the payment-by-results aspect of the quasi-market and discussed the 
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difficulties with adapting to income uncertainty. It argued that Albase was in a 
position where it expended resources without certainty of income as welfare-to-
work contracts became centred on outcome based payments and Albase expected to 
make a surplus in the latter years of the larger contracts. The outcome of this 
arrangement for Albase was an increase in concern regarding financial risk. Due to 
the limitations for TSOs (and Albase in this instance) in accessing capital (compared 
to private sector organisations), Albase’s exchange relationship with the DWP 
became less favourable than previous welfare-to-work programmes in the early 
2000s.  
 
The shift towards a risk based business-planning process suggests that Albase had 
not influenced the principal (DWP) and been able to influence the exchange 
relationship in their favour over the last ten years of market participation. Resource 
dependency theory offers this relationship as a power based interaction and as such 
it appears that Albase became less powerful in the exchange relationship as the 
structure shifted towards a system less appealing.  
 
This brings to the fore questions regarding why Albase remained involved in a 
system which increased risk and was less favourable. It was argued here that 
because costs were already expended in previous contracting rounds Albase was 
committed to the market and this affected the decision to remain involved. 
Furthermore, it was suggested that because resources were tied up in the 
involvement in welfare-to-work contracting, Albase was unable to develop and 
invest in diversifying its resource base. Thus, it became more committed to and 
dependent on the welfare-to-work contracts. It was also argued that Albase had 
experienced isomorphism and adapted to the DWP requirements which affected the 
senior manager’s decision to remain involved in, and incorporate more changes, in 
order to remain in the quasi-market. 
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This chapter also highlighted how Albase continued to deliver some ILM activity 
funded through devolved policy areas. The diversification strategy employed by 
Albase focused predominately on Scottish Government funding sources for 
employment, regeneration, and social enterprises.  
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C HAP TER  9  -  C O NCL US I O N  
 
This research was based on an analysis of organisational change in a TSO given the 
pseudonym ‘Albase.’ Albase is an organisation which delivers employment support 
programmes in Scotland and Northern England. It participated in an ESRC funded 
CASE studentship programme in partnership with the University of Edinburgh. The 
findings in the thesis are the outcome of this arrangement.   
 
This chapter draws together the main arguments and critical reflections from this 
research. It provides a summary of the previous chapters and the main arguments 
which have been put forward. It is structured as follows. The first section discusses 
the policy context and research area. The research questions are revisited and the 
theoretical framework is described. The following section draws together the 
findings from the empirical chapters. The third section of this chapter focuses on the 
theoretical framework and the theories are discussed in turn with a consideration of 
the strengths and weaknesses in this research. The final section revisits the main 
aims of the thesis and discusses the theoretical, methodological and empirical 
contribution of this work. The chapter concludes with a note on future research 
agendas based on the findings produced here. 
 
9.1 Policy context 
The introduction of the Labour government’s welfare reform agenda in the late 
1990s aimed to change two things from the existing policy arrangement in the UK. 
The first and by far the most well researched and discussed aspect of welfare reform 
centred on activating benefit claimants and increasing the numbers moving into the 
labour market (Campbell, 2000; Scott, 2006). The employment programmes which 
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were introduced to realise this aim were known as welfare-to-work programmes. 
The second part of the reform agenda focussed on the administration of welfare 
policies. The government shifted the provision and delivery of welfare services and 
employment support from the state to a quasi-market arrangement involving 
public, private and third sector organisations. The new arrangement was based on 
contracts, competition and payment-by-results (Finn, 2005b; Bredgaard and Larsen 
2007). The institutional framework included a new government agency, the 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), which was created to bring together the 
responsibility for employment support and social security benefit payments. It was 
also given the responsibility to administer contracts through the creation of a quasi-
market system through which welfare-to-work contracts were administered (Finn, 
2000).  
 
Both third sector and private sector organisations have been involved in the quasi-
market since 1997.  The welfare-to-work quasi-market includes a large number of 
private sector organisations, and a range of third sector organisations. In 2008 it was 
estimated that 600 organisations were involved in the delivery of a DWP welfare-to-
work contract (Armstrong et al, 2010). Despite the fast growth of this policy area 
and the volume and value of the welfare-to-work programmes which have been 
administered through it, little research has been published on how TSOs have 
adapted to the new quasi-market governance arrangements. This thesis sought to 
explore this aspect of welfare reform and public service out-sourcing. 
 
In chapter two the critical review of the literature demonstrated that there was very 
little empirical research focussing on the delivery organisations involved in the 
welfare-to-work quasi-market. From a review of the publications by the DWP it was 
argued that the literature on welfare-to-work programmes has predominately 
focussed on the impact on jobseekers and governance systems and not on the 
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delivery organisations involved in the quasi-market. The academic literature was 
also limited on this aspect of welfare reform, and in terms of the contracting system 
existing literature was restricted to discussions of how contracted organisations 
partake in ‘gaming behaviour’ (Courty and Marchke, 1997; Bredgaard and Larsen, 
2008; Finn, 2011). The behaviour of providers has occupied the attention of many 
academics concerned with welfare-to-work contracting (both in the UK and in 
similar market based arrangemgents in Australia and the Netherlands- see 
Considine 2003; see Bredgard et al, 2005, Grub 2006; Jahn and Ochel, 2007).  
 
Similarly, in research focussed on the third sector none had considered the welfare-
to-work quasi-market in detail. Drawing from a broader range of literature on TSOs 
in public contracting contexts a number of themes were identified. For example, the 
use of markets in the provision of public services led to delivery organisations 
becoming more commercially orientated and the large scale ‘marketisation’ of TSOs 
(Dart, 2004, p.414). Others noted that TSOs dependent on public service contracts 
are ‘forced’ by the government to conform to its norms of bureaucratic behaviour 
(Schmid, 2003, p.319-320).   
 
The review also found that whilst there was an extensive amount of literature on 
TSOs in public service contracting contexts, there was a tendency in third sector 
focussed research to focus on mapping and identifying organisational types by 
employing survey methods or comparative case studies. In welfare-to-work 
literature researchers mainly employed document analysis and policy level 
comparative methods in their efforts to better understand the contracting and quasi-
market process. Where research employed a single case study method, it tended to 
contribute to management literature and present  change processes in a ‘how-to’ 
approach, focussing on individual agency and implementing change, rather than 
looking at the institutional level and identifying the drivers of organisational change 
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from a contracting environment (Austin and Carnochan, 2002). Whilst there is still 
little published on the UK welfare-to-work quasi-market and the organisations 
involved, since this research project commenced in 2008 there has been an increase 
in interest from academic and research sources. To date, they have noted that the 
involvement of TSOs in the quasi-market constitutes an empirical blind-spot 
(Macmillan, 2010; Damm, 2012). It was the aim of this thesis to produce findings 
which could fit into the empirical gap- a study of a TSO in the welfare-to-work 
quasi-market which employed a longitudinal single case study strategy in order to 
explore organisational change.  
 
The thesis was based on the following research questions: 
 
1. How and why has Albase’s core activity (the delivery of ILM programmes) changed and 
adapted to the introduction of competitive contracting into the organisational field? 
 
2. To what extent has the introduction of a competitive contracting environment affected 
organisational change (structure, culture, ways of organizing)? 
 
9.2 Empirical findings 
The thesis included a theoretical framework which explored the use of an 
‘adaptational mechanism’ (Barnett and Carroll, 1995, p.217) approach to understand 
organisational change in Albase whilst it was involved in the welfare-to-work quasi-
market. The three theories which were included in the framework were; 
neoinstitutional sociology; resource dependency theory; and neoinstitutional 
economics. The decision to adopt this framework was based on two main factors. 
First, in 2008 at the start of the research programme very little was known about 
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how the quasi-market functioned and the relationships, behaviour, and even types 
of organisations involved. There was no existing research where the object of the 
study was a TSO operating in this context. As such, the main aim of this thesis was 
to provide an exploratory research study. The three theories proposed had already 
been drawn on in some research in the wider literature and one of the aims of the 
case study strategy was to explore the possible theoretical prisms for this policy 
context and type of research strategy.  
 
The second factor which affected the theoretical framework decision came from the 
literature review. A number of previous studies have drawn on two or more of 
these theories to explore issues of third sector organisational change. The inclusion 
of neoinstitutional economics was justified on the basis that the quasi-market 
context has been discussed in terms of the economic rational-choice theory, and on 
the belief that organisations and markets are embedded in an institutional 
framework. It was anticipated that including an economic perspective to 
understanding organisational change within this framework may provide 
alternative explanations for change more suited to this policy context. As so little 
was known about the welfare-to-work quasi-market, and the organisational change 
process in Albase, it was anticipated that this theoretical approach may offer an 
exploratory outcome. The strengths and weaknesses of each theoretical position are 
discussed separately later in this chapter along with a consideration of the outcome 
of employing this theoretical framework.  
 
This research was conducted using a qualitative mixed methods case study strategy. 
The recorded fieldwork took place over two years period and involved interviews 
with twenty employees, the collection of 150 internal documents and external-facing 
documents, and 20 years worth of accounting texts. It also included an ethnographic 
research period. The research covered 27 years of Albase (1983-2010). The decision 
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for the timeframe was based on an epistemological position on the concept of 
‘organisation’ and ‘change’ as discussed in chapter four. The adopted view was that 
organisations are composed of processes and are always changing. The natural state 
of organisations is to change, that is, there is not a fixed state. Therefore with this is 
mind, the research sought to explore whether the changes enacted whilst Albase 
was involved in the delivery of welfare-to-work programmes significantly differed 
from the processes and behaviour which was visible prior to the welfare-to-work 
quasi-market. In effect, did the welfare-to-work quasi-market alter the change path 
which Albase may have been on if it was not delivering welfare-to-work 
programmes and did it impact on how the organisation was previously arranged. 
Change, therefore is viewed in relation to the institutional environment, or as 
conceptualised here, the organisational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
 
As noted in the literature review chapter there is an empirical blind spot in terms of 
the academic knowledge on TSOs in welfare-to-work policy. There does not appear 
to be other studies on welfare-to-work policies in the UK which have accessed and 
analysed the quantity and quality of data on one welfare-to-work delivery 
organisation as used in this study. Therefore, the uniqueness of the depth of data 
which was collected from Albase suggests that this research is an important 
contribution to the existing knowledge in both the welfare-to-work field and the 
literature on third sector organisational change more generally.  It is also anticipated 
that the research findings will be of use to individuals within Albase, as this 
research has also produced a historical document on the development of the 
organisation.  
 
Problems around data collection processes in organisations are a popular topic in 
organisation studies (see Buchanan and Bryman, 2009). In this research project the 
data collection process was not as straight forward as anticipated during the design 
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phase, despite the uniqueness of the research arrangement with Albase. As 
mentioned in chapter four, there were limitations in terms of the accessibility of 
historical records from within Albase, and at times there were difficulties arranging 
interviews with respondents and gathering the desired information due to the 
workload and activities occurring in the organisational field. In practical terms some 
of the difficulties were related to the changes in the CASE studentship arrangement 
when the supervisor from Albase left the organisation (prior to the data collection 
stage). Shortly afterwards the research department was restructured and the 
responsibility for the CASE studentship was not transferred to another member of 
staff creating a 9 month period where there was no supportive access to 
respondents. Once a new arrangement was made it was possible to undertake the 
fieldwork, albeit much later in the PhD programme than anticipated.  
 
In terms of the research context, the complexity of the range of funding 
relationships, partners, activities and alternative employment support programmes 
was overwhelming, and drawing together an accurate longitudinal map of how the 
funding activities had changed over time was not possible as not all programmes 
had been as well recorded as others. Similarly, as outlined in chapter five, prior to 
the consolidation period much of Albase operated in distinct units and projects, or 
even in separately constituted organisations. This increased the data collection 
difficulties and in future research on similar TSOs researchers may need to increase 
the data collection and analysis period in the research timetable.  It is believed that 
the strength of the exploratory approach in this research project is the breadth of 
data and competing explanations which were considered whilst answering the 
research questions. However, data handling and analysis complexities also 
transpired as the project progressed.  
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This research is the first longitudinal case study of organisational change in a 
welfare-to-work delivery organisation in the UK. Furthermore, the theoretical 
framework and the way this was operationalised through the use of a mixed 
methods strategy appears to be a novel approach to exploring welfare-to-work 
organisations, and organisational change in general. The thesis used a time period 
from 1983-2010 to explore the impact of the welfare-to-work quasi-market in 
relation to organisational change process which occurred in Albase prior to the 
market. This has not been done in the context of organisational change and the 
impact of public sector markets. It provides a holistic understanding of the way the 
organisation changed taking into account the institutions and agents in the 
organisational field.  
 
Chapters five, six, seven, and eight of this thesis presented the empirical research 
findings. Chapter five presented a descriptive outline of the organisational change 
experienced by Albase from 1983-2010. It described the traditional activities of 
Albase and discussed the Intermediate Labour Market (ILM) model which was a 
popular approach to managing unemployment during the 1980s. The ILM model 
involved the creation of temporary employment positions predominately in 
environmental, housing, and regeneration projects. The rationale of the model was 
that long term unemployed jobseekers required an extended period of work 
experience and training. The model replicated real work place practices such as 
discipline and wage payments. Albase’s ILM programmes were funded via a range 
of public sector and EU funding schemes and employment positions generally 
lasted 12 months, although this became shorter when the ILM model became 
intertwined in welfare-to-work funding in the late 1990s and 2000s.   The chapter 
outlined how key features of Albase changed over the time period. It described the 
shift in activities from ILM projects to welfare-to-work programmes as the main 
activity which Albase was involved in. It demonstrated how the financial aspect of 
Albase had experienced change over time. It also demonstrated that from this 
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financial analysis it appears that Albase experienced financial difficulty prior to the 
introduction and involvement in welfare-to-work programmes and that for a 
number of years in the early welfare-to-work contracts Albase was able to generate 
more income than had previously been possible in the ILM approach. This 
information was used later in the thesis to argue that Albase became resource 
dependent, and that this dependency expedited the structural and managerial 
change processes.  
 
Following this chapter, chapter six, seven and eight, sought to consider the change 
process in relation to the organisational field. Chapter six discussed the decline of 
Albase’s ILM activities. It demonstrated that whilst these activities overlapped 
during the start of the welfare-to-work quasi-market, the ILM approach became less 
feasible in the funding and policy environment and by the mid-2000’s Albase’s main 
activity was the delivery welfare-to-work programmes. The chapter traced the 
history of Albase’s activities and used Bonoli’s (2010) Active Labour Market Policy 
distinctions to frame the shift in job search and support. By using this as a 
framework it was evident that whilst Albase’s activities continued to centre on the 
provision of employment support, the administrative, political and economic 
context affected the type of activities delivered.  
 
The chapter argued that the change in employment support activities was 
intrinsically linked to the organisational field as national employment policy 
became less focussed on training and work experience provision and more 
concerned with workfirst and less expensive contracted employment support. Using 
this approach provides an extra element to traditional arguments of mission-drift 
whereby researchers have identified whether TSOs activities and outcomes shift in 
response to environmental pressures. What we can see from this chapter is that 
Albase adapted its traditional activities to its environment. In terms of its mission, it 
 364 
did not drift, it continued to provide employment support services for long term 
unemployed jobseekers.  
 
However, through a consideration of the organisational field it became evident that 
the shift in Albase’s activities was fairly substantial in terms of the way services 
were delivered, the length of support and type of training offered, and the ways in 
which jobseekers were viewed by actors within Albase. As such, the longitudinal 
change process approach appears to penetrate into the way activities and services 
change and discover shifts which a survey method approach may not. For example, 
the accounts included the mission statement, and although the section was mildly 
changed over time, it consistently stated that Albase supported jobseekers into 
employment. A survey of CEOs which asked whether the mission had formally 
changed on documents, whether their activities had shifted or their client group, 
would not reveal the nuances of change which this longitudinal exploratory case 
study approach has. Chapter six provides a valuable insight into the processes 
involved in organisational change and the way that Albase experienced pressures 
and undertook adaptational processes in response to the environment. Chapter 
seven benefits from the insight of the previous chapter and focused on how Albase 
became more businesslike. This chapter sought to answer research question two.  
 
In these discussions there was a detailed consideration given to the concept of 
workfare and it was demonstrated that whilst workfare ideas were active in the 
field during the 1980s and 1990s Albase did not support or provide mandatory 
activities, unpaid work experience, and sanctioning measures on jobseekers. 
However, with the introduction of the welfare-to-work quasi-market some of these 
features typical of workfare policies appeared to be displayed in the data collected 
from Albase. It appears that in order to access welfare-to-work resources there was a 
shift in organisational position on these key issues of employment support.  
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As the object of this study was the experience of Albase, this chapter provided a 
different view of the relationship between ILM programmes and welfare-to-work 
programmes. The findings could contribute to existing discussion of the role of job 
creation programmes in welfare-to-work and contractualist contexts (Gregg, 2008; 
Houghton, 2009).  
 
Building on chapter five the findings here suggest that the demise of support for the 
ILM in the organisational field pushed actors in Albase to find alternative resources 
for its traditional activities. As there was some programme overlap in the early 
welfare-to-work contracts Albase successfully adapted some of the ILM model to 
some of the welfare-to-work programmes. However, this was only possible in 
welfare-to-work programmes which stipulated a work experience of temporary 
employment option, and which also included funding to cover this. Is welfare-to-
work programmes which did not stipulate temporary employment, it was more 
difficult for Albase to adapt the ILM programmes due to the workfirst approach and 
the outcome payments based on moving individuals quickly into employment. This 
led to an internal division in terms of the structure, management and activities 
included in the delivery of programmes on one hand from the ILM approach and on 
the other the welfare-to-work programmes. 
 
The purpose of chapter seven was to answer research question two. This chapter has 
focussed on the managerial and structural changes which occurred in Albase since 
the introduction of the welfare-to-work quasi-market in 1997. It began by arguing 
that whilst the DWP promotes both TSOs and private sector organisations in policy 
documents, the administration of welfare-to-work programmes has included a 
number of quasi-market rules, regulations and organizing features which are more 
aligned with typical private sector characteristics. Through a detailed discussion of 
the quasi-market documents which demonstrated the DWP’s emphasis on 
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‘business-like’ features, it was argued that the payment schedule prioritises two sets 
of characteristics; finance and resources, and contract management and 
performance. Furthermore, as resources and contract attainment became weighted 
towards these characteristics, it was argued that the DWP bestowed legitimacy on 
the organisations which demonstrated these features in the contract competition 
process. 
 
The chapter considered these two features in more detail and identified the 
importance of the payments-by-result mechanism in creating the ‘business-like’ 
concept. The use of this payment approach increased competition and risk for 
Albase and arguably this aspect of the contracting system, which requires on 
upfront capital, further demonstrates that the system was designed with preference 
for private sector qualities.  
 
Albase adapted to these rules, regulations and legitimating processes in the 
organisational field by establishing new managerial processes, in particular through 
controlling and managing activities through the use of targets. It was noted that 
some of these processes extended beyond the reach of welfare-to-work programmes 
and similar systems were established in areas of the organisation without the same 
organisational requirements. It was suggested that this transfer of managing ideas 
supported ideas of isomorphic behaviour and legitimacy. It was also noted that in 
terms of the ability to change Albase’s experience demonstrated a transitional 
process due to the use of target based management in other funding sources. 
 
It was argued that the contract management characteristic required by the DWP led 
to new roles and employment positions in the organisation, and new ways of 
organizing work activities. The change was attributed by respondents to the rues 
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and regulations of the field, and not to the economic rationality of actors. Daily, 
monthly, and annual reporting became a new aspect of the workplace and was 
directly attributed to the influence from the quasi-market. 
 
Attention was given in this chapter to the emphasis on competition in the quasi-
market and the idea of earning income. It was demonstrated that earning income 
was a core characteristics of the quasi-market and is rooted in NPM ideas of 
competition and innovation. The shift in the field from FCR to a shopping 
relationship was considered in more detail and how Albase adapted to this shift was 
covered. During the transformational period identified in chapter five it appears 
there was a gradual adaptation to the shopping relationship approach but this 
became more difficult as welfare-to-work contract values and competition with 
larger organisations increased.  It was noted that Albase required financial 
investment in internal processes to shift to the new financial planning processes and 
questions of whether missions and values would erode in this process were raised 
by some respondents. 
 
In order to manage the new organisational field, Albase undertook a number of 
organisational changes. This included professionalizing human resource processes 
and there was evidence that these changes included an emphasis on commercial 
qualities, recruitment background and target driven environments (section 7.2.2). It 
was noted that this adaptation to the contracting environment led to led to more 
employees working on permanent contracts, and an increase in staff core staff which 
created cash flow difficulties if contracts finished. Transition from fragmented staff 
to ‘coherent’ staff and resource uncertainties for these costs, and this may suggest 
that the changes demonstrate mimetic isomorphism as the leader of Albase sought 
to demonstrate and possess the same organisational qualities as competitors.  
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It was also argued that the change processes meant that different skill sets were 
required for the leadership team and the employees in the development team. There 
was also evidence of a shift in the way performance was measured for these 
employees with an emphasis on contract value and income generation for Albase. 
Whilst there was some evidence that Albase had implemented performance based 
payments in the delivery of welfare-to-work contracts, this appeared to be a 
temporary approach in the mid 2000’s which did not continue. However, all front-
line staff worked to people into jobs targets.  
 
Finally, the changes which occurred in the way actors within Albase communicated 
with others in the organisational field suggest that there had been a shift from 
focussing on communicating with jobseekers (and local actors) to competitors and 
resource holders in the quasi-market. This may suggest that resource dependency 
theory and idea that Albase was trying to influence others within the field to 
maintain and gain resources, has some relevance in explaining the change process.  
However, there was also some evidence of mimetic isomorphism in terms of how 
the image of a professional welfare-to-work provider was imagined and created. An 
issue which will be discussed in more detail in chapter eight is the concept of social 
enterprise in the change process and how the adoption of this term may 
demonstrate Albase’s efforts for resource diversification. However, this chapter 
highlighted how Albase’s rebranding process involved shifting terminology from 
ILM or charity to social enterprise in an effort to be considered as an efficient and 
more business-like organisation. Arguably, the shift was more than a discursive one 
due to the associated structural and operational changes implemented in the efforts 




Throughout the chapter it was demonstrated the organisational change process 
appeared to be in response to the concept of ‘business-like’ and the importance this 
concept played in the allocation of resources and power (in terms of the prime-
contractor model) by the DWP. In sum, the transformation phase in which Albase 
became less associated with its previous structural and organisational arrangements 
and processes arguably occurred due to isomorphic pressures from the DWP. 
However, there also appears to be some strength  the resource dependency 
arguments, and whilst transaction cost theory does not seem to explain this 
transformation overly well, some aspects of change (such as the transformation of 
the service design process) appear to be part of a rational-choice model to reduce 
costs and risks associated with DWP exchanges.  
 
Thus far the thesis has outlined the change processes and transformation of Albase 
in terms of its activities, structure and managing processes. Bringing together the 
findings here with those in chapter six it appears that due to the need to find new 
resources to replace ILM activities which became less favourable in the 
organisational field, Albase became heavily involved in welfare-to-work funding. 
This created an exchange relationship with the DWP, and as demonstrated in 
chapter five, over time it became dependent on funding from this source. Whilst the 
welfare-to-work funding originally suited Albase’s traditional employment support 
activities, as it became more market orientated it created a number of organisational 
change demands for Albase.  Albase adapted to DWP requirements which 
increasingly emphasised ‘business-like’ behaviour. Albase therefore became more 
‘business like’ and emphasised the concept of ‘social enterprise’ over charity, actors 
incorporated new processes in order to gain resources and legitimacy within the 
market. It appears that the extent of these changes suggests that Albase experienced 
resource dependency in the welfare-to-work quasi-market relationship.  
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The final chapter focussed on the tensions and problems which Albase faced in 
adapting to the welfare-to-work quasi-market. It suggested that the payment-by-
results aspect of the quasi-market increased risk and uncertainty. It was argued that 
Albase expended resources without certainty of income as welfare-to-work 
contracts became centred on outcome based payments and Albase only expected to 
make a surplus in the latter years of the larger contracts. Due to the limitations for 
TSOs (and Albase in this instance) in accessing capital (compared to private sector 
organisations), Albase’s exchange relationship with the DWP became less 
favourable than previous welfare-to-work programmes in the early 2000s. This 
aspect of the contracting process may be particularly interesting to those academics 
interested in the composition and dynamics of the quasi-market as it suggests that 
over time the market has become more suited to private sector organisations. This 
point is discussed in more detail in the future research section of this chapter.  
 
The shift towards a risk based business-planning process suggests that Albase had 
not influenced the principal (DWP) and been able to influence the exchange 
relationship in their favour over the last ten years of market participation. Resource 
dependency theory offers this relationship as a power based interaction and as such 
it appears that Albase became less powerful in the exchange relationship as the 
structure shifted towards a system less appealing. This brings to the fore questions 
regarding why Albase remained involved in a system which increased risk and was 
less favourable. It was argued here that because costs were already expended in 
previous contracting rounds Albase was committed to the market and this affected 
the decision to remain involved. Furthermore, it was suggested that because 
resources were tied up in the involvement in welfare-to-work contracting, Albase 
was unable to develop and invest in diversifying its resource base. Thus, it became 
more committed to and dependent on the welfare-to-work contracts. It was also 
argued that Albase had experienced isomorphism and adapted to the DWP 
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requirements which affected the senior manager’s decision to remain involved in, 
and incorporate more changes, in order to remain in the quasi-market. 
 
This chapter also highlighted how Albase continued to deliver some ILM activity 
funded through devolved policy areas. The diversification strategy employed by 
Albase focused predominately on Scottish Government funding sources for 
employment, regeneration, and social enterprises.  
 
9.3 New institutional space 
What has been discovered through this research is that the shift from 
commissioning employment support for the ILM projects and the in-house delivery 
of support by the employment service, to the contract based quasi-market created a 
new institutional space. This space was dominated by the DWP which controlled all 
the resources. As these resources were administered in a competitive contracting 
system based on outcome payments, and which measured performance through 
targets the administrative shift created isomorphic pressures for Albase. These 
pressures were mainly transported through the contracts directly, but also via the 
processes involved in tendering, competing and negotiating its position within the 
quasi-market structure. It appears that the outcome was a shift in the way Albase 
managed its activities and how it was internally organized in terms of teams, 
departments, and responsibilities.  
 
The way actors interpreted the demands from the DWP and the interaction with the 
transaction costs in the decision-making for service provision was bound by the 
wider governance rules in the quasi-market. Organisational change became 
interlinked with quasi-market demands and Albase became more like the DWP’s 
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concept of ‘business-like.’ Whilst the growth in financial income was viewed as a 
positive outcome for Albase’s leaders, the surplus became a necessity. The 
requirements of the quasi-market ensured that Albase’s surplus was continually 
reinvested in its organisational processes and systems to meet the institutional 
requirements. The continued investment in these systems committed Albase to the 
market and diversification efforts were less well resourced. Whilst some 
respondents stated that the surplus helped fund other less profitable areas of 
activity, the dominant ideas of welfare-to-work permeated beyond the welfare-to-
work departments and became the dominant ideas of how to organize across the 
organisation. There was a constant interplay with the quasi-market which affected 
how changes were put in place. Planned growth and change was often responsive to 
the quasi-market requirements. As such when new welfare-to-work programmes 
(such as the FND and Work Programme) introduced minimum size requirements, 
or further shifted to outcome payment schedules, Albase increased the speed of 
adaption in order to continue to compete, despite concerns of risk, cash-flow 
difficulties, and a tension in management and HR pressures.  
 
9.4 Theoretical contribution 
The following section revisits the theoretical framework to reflect on the 
contribution of the three theories.  
 
 Neoinstitutional sociology 
Throughout the empirical chapters it was suggested that some of the changes 
experienced by Albase were attributed to pressures in their environment. Some of 
the pressures were financial but it was argued in chapter seven and eight that some 
were cultural. It appears that neoinstitutional sociology was able to identify 
isomorphic pressures in the organisational field and how these interacted with the 
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change processes in Albase. There was evidence of coercive isomorphism in terms 
of the competitive framework and the way in which delivery organisations were 
forced to abide by DWP regulations in order to compete. This appeared to lead 
Albase’s managers into a change process which prioritised the regulations created 
by the DWP. Competition was also a leading influence on the creation of mimetic 
isomorphism. The uncertainty within the organisational field due to the types of 
new competitors and the continue changes introduced to contracting processes by 
the DWP arguably encouraged Albase’s leaders to adopt an adaptation process 
based on a perceived understanding of what a welfare-to-work provider should 
look like. As the discussion of HR and publicity shifts demonstrated (chapter seven) 
the concept of mimetic isomorphism could explain the strategy employed by 
Albase. Similarly, as discussed in chapters seven and eight there was a shift towards 
the concept of ‘social enterprise.’ It appeared that the change processes reflected 
ideas of legitimacy and dominant ideas of ideal types in terms of TSOs competing in 
quasi-market contexts.   
 
There appeared to be little to suggest that normative isomorphism was a strong 
pressure in Albase’s experience. Whilst there was some evidence that employees 
had needed particular skills such as change management, or contract management 
skills, there did not seem to be any influence from cross-organisation professions or 
of the influence of previous knowledge gained from education and training. This 
isomorphic pressure was not as evident as the coercive and mimetic. It may be an 
area for future research, particularly because part of the contracting-out agenda 
involves the transfer of public sector employment into the third and private sectors.   
 
 Resource dependency theory 
Resource dependency theory is a popular approach to exploring organisational 
change in TSOs. Returning to the hypotheses presented in chapter three, resource 
 374 
dependency theory does not provide as much detail on the change processes as the 
other two theoretical positions. Arguably, this is because in the context of the quasi-
market the power-based relationship is not solely between the principal and the 
agent. In fact, from the data collected here whilst resource dependency did appear 
to explain the extent of change in terms of why Albase became committed to 
becoming business-like, it does not give enough attention to the competitive 
dynamics of the quasi-market structure.  As outlined in chapter seven and eight, a 
number of organisational changes appeared to be the result of decision makers 
within Albase responding to competitive performance offers, increasing risk, and 
competitive pressures.  
 
Chapter six demonstrated that ILM programmes were transformed in order to 
attract and maintain resources from external parties, although some of the key 
features such as the provision to pay a wage and the voluntary nature remained key 
positions for Albase.  The ILM programmes were adapted to match the funding 
framework of the welfare-to-work programmes such as the New Deal programmes. 
However, key organisational changes in terms of structure and management 
processes are less well explained through this theory.  
 
 Neoinstitutional economics 
Through this lens it became evident that the welfare-to-work contracts acted as 
policy tools for administering and controlling the behaviour of delivery 
organisations. Contracts in this policy context were used as devices to coordinate 
organisations within the quasi-market. The emphasis from this perspective of the 
role the DWP played in managing opportunistic behaviour provides an interesting 
insight into the organisational change process and the impact of welfare-to-work 
contracting. Albase’s change process became determined by the institutional 
framework in which it was embedded. Managing decisions, risk, service delivery 
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and even the diversification strategy were bound within the quasi-market which 
had the role of a ‘governance structure’ on those operating within in.  
 
It was identified that for Albase this created new operational boundaries in terms of 
how services were designed and that targets and financial regulations were 
considered as the controlling boundaries in the new systems. Consequently, 
adaptations to the quasi-market rules and regulation appeared to be part of a 
rational-economic choice to reduce transaction costs and economic risk, and could 
also be attributed to the coercive isomorphic nature of the tendering and contracting 
process. 
 
An original contribution from this research is the idea that previous and anticipated 
transaction costs actually increase commitment and dependency in the welfare-to-
work context. Neoinstitutional economic research which has focussed on the 
principal in the exchange relationship has tended to suggest that high transaction 
costs reduces the commitment to a market based arrangement. However, from 
focussing on the agent (Albase) it appears that the market participation, transaction 
and business acquisition costs increases the commitment to future market 
exchanges, and reduces resource diversification opportunities. Much has been 
written on transaction costs for the DWP and ‘gaming’ as an outcome of contracting, 
but less has been written on the exchange relationship and third sector 
organisations.  
 
One public policy tension which becomes visible from using the neoinstitutional 
economics approach centres on how to monitor public services and ensure delivery 
organisations provide services to all referred jobseekers without an increase in 
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transaction costs that exclude or limit the involvement of TSOs, or changes them 
into other types of hybrid organisations (Billis 2010)? 
 
By reflecting on the theoretical framework involved it appears that this type of 
research can benefit from a framework drawing on a range of (somewhat 
interrelated) perspectives. This is because of this hybrid institutional setting which 
the quasi-market appears to represent. There are important insights from the 
approach adopted; first, it appears that Albase’s change process can be attributed to 
resource dependency (decline of ILM funding) and that there appears to be some 
evidence of isomorphic changes mainly due to the mimetic and coercive pressures 
from the DWP.  
 
There also appears to be some evidence that due to the uncertainty of moving into 
this new area of work in the early 2000s Albase adopted processes from others in the 
environment. As such, whilst resource dependency theory speaks to why and how 
an organisation may become dependent on a resource and concludes that the 
organisation can be coerced into changing, the process of changing and what the 
organisation changes into or to look like is better explored through neoinstitutional 
sociology- the cultural and isomorphic aspects in particular. However, there is value 
in considering the exchange relationships in terms of transaction costs and 
contracting institutions as this provided an explanation of why Albase continued to 
change when the exchange became less favourable. It offered the explanation of 
commitment and dependency and the quasi-market operates a governance structure 
where transaction cost exchange patterns are dominant. It was the intention to 
adopt an exploratory theoretical framework as the limited existing literature did not 
offer a testing option, and there was not enough known about the welfare-to-work 
quasi-market when this research began. 
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9.5 Future Research 
It is anticipated that the findings from this research can contribute to the discussions 
of the role and impact of contracting-out on third sector organisations. There are 
also a number of possible future research agendas that can be identified from the 
work presented here. First, one of the interesting and unanticipated findings from 
this research was the role of devolved funding both in terms of how this interacted 
with employment support policy that remains centralised, and how devolved 
funding sources provided Albase with resource diversification options (see chapter 
nine). The argument was made that because Albase had other funding options 
outside of the quasi-market, it could utilise these to develop internal systems and 
remain competitive in the quasi-market. It could also use devolved funding sources 
as alternative revenue streams and as such in theory Albase was less dependent on 
the DWP funds than if the devolved funding was not available. This raises a 
question of whether devolved funding reduced the rate of change for Albase and if 
devolved funding had not been available, would Albase have become more 
‘business-like’ than it already had? Without the resources aimed at the social 
economy, would Albase have emphasised its social enterprise image without third 
sector dedicated income sources? Do third sector organisations in England for 
example, experience organisational change in the welfare-to-work context the same 
way Albase did? Future comparative research may shed light on how TSOs adapt to 
quasi-market systems by drawing on other non-marketised policy areas.  
 
Similarly, there is room for more research to look at the interplay between 
contracting-out and quasi-market rules and regulation regarding competition, and 
the politics of public service delivery in devolved contexts. How does devolved 
funding and political ideology at the regional level affect organisational 
development and competition in quasi-markets operating at the UK level? There is 
room for some further exploration into this aspect of the welfare-to-work quasi-
market. There appeared to be a tension between the DWP’s market regulator role 
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and its efforts to increase competition in the bidding stage for regional and local 
contracts, and the public policy context where part of the rationale for contracting 
out suggests that TSOs have community histories, local knowledge, and better out-
reach to disadvantaged groups.  
 
The second future research area of interest is whether there are a number of ‘myths’ 
in this organisational field? By ‘myths’ I refer to unchallenged and unevidenced 
statements of how the quasi-market operates and how competition and contracting-
out impact on service delivery. The first ‘myth’ of interest is the role of TSOs in 
public service contracting and the added benefit that they can bring. What the 
research suggests here is that the TSOs are transforming in order to compete. The 
findings here impact on the debates briefly mentioned in the literature review 
regarding ‘types’ of third sector organisations. What type of TSO was Albase? What 
type has it become? Has it become more like a private sector organisation, a public 
sector organisation, or a new hybrid form? Whilst some of this discussion has been 
covered in this thesis in chapter seven, there is much more that could be explored. It 
was argued that Albase become more like the DWP’s concept of ‘business-like’ due 
to the regulatory isomorphic pressures, but how have other organisations 
responded and is there any convergence? Can a new ‘type’ of organisation be 
identified in this policy context? Similarly, do all the TSOs which have remained 
active in the welfare-to-work quasi-market consider themselves social enterprises? 
Are private sector organisations faced with the same coercive isomorphic pressures 
from the regulatory environment and the transaction costs involved in the 
competitive contracting?  
 
The second research area based on the idea of policy ‘myths’ may focus on the idea 
of improved efficiency due to the use of a quasi-market system. This thesis has been 
able to demonstrate that welfare-to-work involvement was resource intensive. 
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Whilst the existing literature has often discussed the ways in which delivery 
organisations cream and park jobseekers (Bruttel, 2004; Struyven and Steurs, 2004; 
Jahn and Ochel, 2007) in order to make as much profit as possible, it has not directly 
discussed the expenditure involved in market competition and contract delivery. 
Chapter eight’s insight into the transaction costs involved in the market opens up a 
new avenue for understanding welfare-to-work contracts. At the present time the 
DWP expenditure on welfare-to-work programmes has not been analysed to 
differentiate between service delivery expenditure, and quasi-market costs. Further 
insight into the costs involved in competition, market involvement, and contract 
management for both the DWP and the organisations involved would add 
substantially to the wider debates of efficiency and waste in public service delivery.  
 
Finally, the story of Albase’s experience in the welfare-to-work quasi-market raises a 
number of questions regarding the regulation and rules which the DWP has 
introduced over time whilst attempting to reform the quasi-market (and as argued 
in chapter eight) reduce their transaction costs.  The shifts towards payment-by-
results and the prime contractor model invoked changes within Albase which were 
(arguably) uncomfortable and required quick implementation. Respondents 
recognised risk and growth problems, and although Albase qualified to compete for 
the Work Programme as it had met the minimum turnover requirements, it is 
interesting how the rules and regulations of the market became more suited to 
multi-national and large contract management organisations rather than an 
organisation such as Albase with over 20 years employment support experience. 
Future research from a neoinstitutional sociologist perspective may focus on the 
interactions within the quasi-market between different types of providers, the DWP, 
and the public policy decision makers. This may provide a fruitful research area to 
explore competitive and institutional isomorphism.  
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9.6 Contribution to the literature 
This thesis was based on a single-case study of a third sector organisation delivering 
welfare-to-work programmes in the UK. It sought to explore the organisational 
field, and the impact that changes to the administration of employment 
programmes had on Albase’s activities, structure and ways of organizing. Using a 
novel theoretical framework and a qualitative mixed methods data collection 
strategy this research was able to contribute to the wider discussion on the impact of 
public service markets on TSOs. It found that Albase did experience organisational 
change and that this change was directly related to the rules and regulations of the 
welfare-to-work quasi-market. The requirements of the DWP appeared to affect the 
way in which managers in Albase designed and controlled the day-to-day delivery 
of employment services. It also found that the competitive pressures in the quasi-
market and the uncertainty that respondents identified influenced how Albase 
changed and the way it introduced systems and processes which would make 
Albase look like and act like competitors in the organisational field. It was argued 
that the changes were enacted in an effort to gain legitimacy and resources, and that 
the resource pressure was due to the decline in funding and political support for the 
ILM model, and the increasingly expensive costs associated with welfare-to-work 
contracting. The thesis has provided an original insight into the welfare-to-work 
quasi-market and the change process of Albase.  
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APPENDIX ONE 
All respondents have been renamed and anonymised and accompanied by basic 
details on each respondent’s position within Albase and their time at the 
organisation. Details are limited to ensure respondent confidentiality. 
Table 9.1: Anoymised table of interview respondents 
Respondent Anon name Role in Albase Time at Albase 
1 Sutton Senior manager More than 10 years 
2 Campbell Mid-level manager More than 15 years 
3 Doyle Mid-level manager More than 15 years 
4 Madden Employee Less than 5 years 
5 McMahon Senior manager More than 5 years 
6 Somers Senior manager More than 10 years 
7 Quinn Employee More than 5 years 
8 Hamilton Senior manager More than 15 years 
9 McStay Senior manager More than 10 years 
10 Collins Senior manager Less than 5 years 
11 Delaney Employee Less than 5 years 
12 Thomson Employee Less than 5 years 
13 Bonnar Senior manager More than 5 years 
14 Beattie Senior manager More than 5 years 
15 Evans Mid-level manager More than 5 years 
16 Stein Employee More than 15 years 
17 Lennox Mid-level manager More than 15 years 
18 Murdoch Mid-level manager More than 5 years 
19 Connelly Senior manager More than 10 years 
20 Dalglish Employee More than 15 years 
21 McClair Employee More than 5 years 
22 McGhee Employee More than 15 years 
23 Morris Employee Less than 5 years 
24 Aitken Employee Less than 5 years 
25 Miller Senior manager Less than 5 years 
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Table 9.2: List of Anonymised Documents with analysis categories 
Anon Ref Category Sub-Category Year 
Doc 1 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender n.d. 
Doc 2 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2005 
Doc 3 External Facing Document Scottish Funding Source 2004 
Doc 4 External Facing Document Regeneration Funding 2002 
Doc 5 External Facing Document Scottish Funding Source 2006 
Doc 6 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2004 
Doc 7 External Facing Document Consultation response 1997 
Doc 8 External Facing Document Consultation response 2008 
Doc 9 External Facing Document Published study 2007 
Doc 10 External Facing Document Published study 1997 
Doc 11 External Facing Document Published study 2007 
Doc 12  External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2005 
Doc 13 External Facing Document Regeneration Funding 2000 
Doc 14 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2006 
Doc 15 Ethnographic notes Welfare-to-work tender 2010 
Doc 16 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2009 
Doc 17 External Facing Document Consultation response 2005 
Doc 18 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2005 
Doc 19 External Facing Document Published study 2005 
Doc 20 Ethnographic notes Marketing 2010 
Doc 21 External Facing Document Published study 2004 
Doc 22 External Facing Document Published study 2000 
Doc 23 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2007 
Doc 24 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2008 
Doc 25 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2007 
Doc 26 External Facing Document Published study 1999 
Doc 27 External Facing Document Published study 1993 
Doc 28 External Facing Document Published study 1999 
Doc 29 External Facing Document Published study 1996 
Doc 30 External Facing Document Published study 2009 
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Doc 31 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2004 
Doc 32 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2007 
Doc 33 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2005 
Doc 34 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2005 
Doc 35 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2007 
Doc 36 External Facing Document Funders report 2009 
Doc 37 Internal Facing Document Organisational document 2009 
Doc 38 External Facing Document Funders report 2005 
Doc 39 External Facing Document Marketing 2008 
Doc 40 External Facing Document Funders report 2006 
Doc 41 Internal Facing Document Organisational document 2006 
Doc 42 Internal Facing Document Organisational document n.d. 
Doc 43 Internal Facing Document Organisational document n.d. 
Doc 44 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2005 
Doc 45 External Facing Document Published study 1997 
Doc 46 External Facing Document Accounts 1999 
Doc 47 External Facing Document Accounts 2000 
Doc 48 External Facing Document Accounts 2001 
Doc 49 External Facing Document Accounts 2009 
Doc 50 External Facing Document Accounts 2002 
Doc 51 External Facing Document Accounts 2003 
Doc 52 External Facing Document Accounts 2004 
Doc 53 External Facing Document Accounts 2005 
Doc 54 External Facing Document Accounts 2006 
Doc 55 External Facing Document Accounts 2007 
Doc 56 External Facing Document Accounts 2008 
Doc 57 External Facing Document Accounts 1986 
Doc 58 External Facing Document Accounts 1987 
Doc 59 External Facing Document Accounts 2009 
Doc 60 External Facing Document Accounts 2010 
Doc 61 External Facing Document Published study 2001 
Doc 62 External Facing Document Accounts 1988 
Doc 63 External Facing Document Accounts 1989 
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Doc 64 External Facing Document Accounts 1990 
Doc 65 External Facing Document Accounts 1991 
Doc 66 External Facing Document Accounts 1992 
Doc 67 External Facing Document Accounts 1993 
Doc 68 External Facing Document Accounts 1994 
Doc 69 External Facing Document Accounts 1995 
Doc 70 External Facing Document Accounts 1996 
Doc 71 External Facing Document Accounts 1997 
Doc 72 External Facing Document Accounts 1998 
Doc 73 Internal Facing Document Organisational document n.d. 
Doc 74 External Facing Document Published study 2007 
Doc 75 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2006 
Doc 76 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2009 
Doc 77 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2010 
Doc 78 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2008 
Doc 79 External Facing Document Accounts n.d. 
Doc 80 External Facing Document Consultation response 2007 
Doc 81 External Facing Document Marketing 2010 
Doc 82 External Facing Document Organisational document 2000 
Doc 83 External Facing Document Organisational document 2001 
Doc 84 External Facing Document Organisational document 2002 
Doc 85 External Facing Document Organisational document 2003 
Doc 86 External Facing Document Organisational document 2003 
Doc 87 External Facing Document Marketing 1998 
Doc 88 External Facing Document Marketing 2009 
Doc 89 External Facing Document Marketing 1998 
Doc 90 External Facing Document Marketing 1997 
Doc 91 External Facing Document Marketing 1997 
Doc 92 External Facing Document Consultation response 2008 
Doc 93 External Facing Document Consultation response 2010 
Doc 94 External Facing Document Marketing 2009 
Doc 95 External Facing Document Marketing 2010 
Doc 96 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2001 
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Doc 97 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2008 
Doc 98 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy n.d. 
Doc 99 External Facing Document Funders report 2005 
Doc 100 External Facing Document Funders report 2006 
Doc 101 External Facing Document Funders report 2007 
Doc 102 External Facing Document Funders report 2008 
Doc 103 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2007 
Doc 104 External Facing Document Funding tender 2002 
Doc 105 External Facing Document Funding tender 2002 
Doc 106 External Facing Document Funding tender 2005 
Doc 107 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2005 
Doc 108 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2004 
Doc 109 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2004 
Doc 110 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2004 
Doc 111 External Facing Document Scottish Funding Source 2005 
Doc 112 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2005 
Doc 113 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2005 
Doc 114 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2005 
Doc 115 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2007 
Doc 116 Internal Facing Document Organisational document 2007 
Doc 117 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2007 
Doc 118 Internal Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2007 
Doc 119 Market Document Welfare-to-work tender 2006 
Doc 120 Internal Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2005 
Doc 121 Internal Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2005 
Doc 122 External Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2005 
Doc 123 Internal Facing Document Welfare-to-work tender 2005 
Doc 124 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2002 
Doc 125 External Facing Document Scottish Funding Source 2004 
Doc 126 External Facing Document Scottish Funding Source 2002 
Doc 127 External Facing Document Scottish Funding Source 2004 
Doc 128 External Facing Document Scottish Funding Source 2004 
Doc 129 External Facing Document Funders report 2006 
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Doc 130 External Facing Document Funders report 2006 
Doc 131 External Facing Document Funders report 2006 
Doc 132 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2006 
Doc 133 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2006 
Doc 134 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2005 
Doc 135 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2004 
Doc 136 External Facing Document Scottish Funding Source 2004 
Doc 137 External Facing Document Marketing 2006 
Doc 138 Internal Facing Document Organisational document 2008 
Doc 139 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2008 
Doc 140 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2008 
Doc 141 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2007 
Doc 142 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2001 
Doc 143 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2002 
Doc 144 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2003 
Doc 145 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2007 
Doc 146 Market Document Welfare-to-work tender 2008 
Doc 147 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2009 
Doc 148 Internal Facing Document Business Strategy 2007 
Doc 149 External Facing Document Published study 2005 




Table 9.3: Income from DWP Contracts 2005-2010 (used in Figure 5.4 
Programme/Year (£m) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Employment Zone 1.65 2.21 2.97 3.45 3.26 3.44
New Deals 4.09 5.41 7.38 5.74 5.55 3.72
FND 2.76 11.97
ESF 3.83 3.82 2.70 0.25 0.39 0.76
Total 9.57 11.44 13.04 9.43 11.96 19.88  
 




1986 264                  254                     10                      
1987 403                  376                     27                      
1988 537                  -                      -                    
1989 493                  -                      -                    
1990 442                  336                     106                    
1991 503                  356                     147                    
1992 560                  394                     166                    
1993 567                  382                     185                    
1994 719                  461                     258                    
1995 740                  476                     264                    
1996 789                  524                     265                    
1997 801                  545                     256                    
1998 820                  549                     271                    
1999 835                  559                     276                    
2000 1,004              636                     368                    
2001 871                  567                     304                    
2002 968                  636                     332                    
2003 1,107              741                     366                    
2004 1,054              653                     401                    
2005 949                  528                     421                    
2006 830                  399                     431                    
2007 766                  352                     414                    
2008 542                  168                     374                    
2009 573                  153                     420                    
2010 871                  355                     516                    
Employee Information
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1986 780,446                205% 1,601,759              
1987 2,052,015             198% 4,063,188              
1988 2,091,919             190% 3,977,635              
1989 2,734,623             181% 4,960,672              
1990 4,238,895             172% 7,295,278              
1991 5,008,088             165% 8,271,030              
1992 5,819,153             160% 9,329,683              
1993 5,808,282             156% 9,041,586              
1994 8,868,922             152% 13,461,312           
1995 13,465,020          148% 19,874,069           
1996 8,523,519             143% 12,219,706           
1997 12,610,935          140% 17,674,088           
1998 14,078,605          138% 19,428,389           
1999 16,627,432          135% 22,449,928           
2000 16,656,074          131% 21,757,263           
2001 15,292,895          127% 19,423,876           
2002 17,042,408          125% 21,311,442           
2003 19,535,479          122% 23,887,210           
2004 19,762,938          119% 23,533,380           
2005 20,079,687          115% 23,127,008           
2006 20,299,353          112% 22,649,386           
2007 21,731,000          108% 23,575,298           
2008 16,858,000          104% 17,612,489           
2009 20,759,048          105% 21,765,567           











(funding £) Total Income (£)
Income from 









(funding £) Total Income (£)
1986 598,193             182,253                780,446               23% 205% 1,227,709            374,049                1,601,759            
1987 1,193,444         858,571                2,052,015            42% 198% 2,363,135            1,700,054            4,063,188            
1988 1,635,556         456,363                2,091,919            22% 190% 3,109,893            867,742                3,977,635            
1989 2,678,878         55,745                  2,734,623            2% 181% 4,859,550            101,123                4,960,672            
1990 2,927,256         1,311,639            4,238,895            31% 172% 5,037,904            2,257,374            7,295,278            
1991 3,333,998         1,674,090            5,008,088            33% 165% 5,506,213            2,764,817            8,271,030            
1992 4,694,906         1,124,247            5,819,153            19% 160% 7,527,209            1,802,473            9,329,683            
1993 4,585,618         1,222,664            5,808,282            21% 156% 7,138,300            1,903,286            9,041,586            
1994 7,063,188         1,805,734            8,868,922            20% 152% 10,720,556          2,740,756            13,461,312         
1995 7,412,577         6,052,443            13,465,020         45% 148% 10,940,798          8,933,271            19,874,069         
1996 7,871,402         652,117                8,523,519            8% 143% 11,284,801          934,905                12,219,706         
1997 6,067,771         6,543,164            12,610,935         52% 140% 8,503,915            9,170,173            17,674,088         
1998 7,021,177         7,057,428            14,078,605         50% 138% 9,689,181            9,739,207            19,428,389         
1999 7,481,238         9,146,194            16,627,432         55% 135% 10,100,974          12,348,954          22,449,928         
2000 8,179,935         8,476,139            16,656,074         51% 131% 10,685,171          11,072,092          21,757,263         
2001 7,478,649         7,814,246            15,292,895         51% 127% 9,498,813            9,925,063            19,423,876         
2002 8,659,859         8,382,549            17,042,408         49% 125% 10,829,108          10,482,334          21,311,442         
2003 9,460,806         10,074,673          19,535,479         52% 122% 11,568,299          12,318,911          23,887,210         
2004 7,859,774         11,903,164          19,762,938         60% 119% 9,359,289            14,174,091          23,533,380         
2005 6,432,712         13,646,975          20,079,687         68% 115% 7,408,949            15,718,059          23,127,008         
2006 4,325,226         15,974,127          20,299,353         79% 112% 4,825,952            17,823,433          22,649,386         
2007 4,623,000         17,108,000          21,731,000         79% 108% 5,015,351            18,559,946          23,575,298         
2008 3,681,000         13,177,000          16,858,000         78% 104% 3,845,745            13,766,744          17,612,489         
Inflation Adjusted (to 2011 Prices)
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Table 9.7: Financial information and ratios (used in Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10) 
Year Current Assets (£)
Current 
Liabilities (£) Current Ratio Year






1998 7,907,098                      5,762,953          1.37                  1998 13,067,022                     12,866,954     1.02                   
1999 9,430,471                      7,785,999          1.21                  1999 16,443,579                     17,247,258     0.95                   
2000 5,936,444                      5,967,393          0.99                  2000 16,584,897                     17,545,843     0.95                   
2001 5,336,489                      6,464,064          0.83                  2001 15,505,838                     15,189,449     1.02                   
2002 5,622,499                      4,438,579          1.27                  2002 16,787,514                     16,543,470     1.01                   
2003 4,895,946                      3,610,462          1.36                  2003 19,259,132                     19,283,148     1.00                   
2004 5,879,075                      4,668,944          1.26                  2004 19,140,928                     19,384,396     0.99                   
2005 6,434,933                      4,683,437          1.37                  2005 19,810,374                     19,694,610     1.01                   
2006 6,580,768                      3,949,065          1.67                  2006 20,030,167                     19,768,473     1.01                   
2007 7,772,000                      3,286,000          2.37                  2007 21,695,000                     20,368,000     1.07                   
2008 6,053,000                      2,146,000          2.82                  2008 16,924,000                     17,648,000     0.96                   
 
Item
Trading Income (total 
incoming resources) Trading Costs
Trading cost 
ratio
1998 13,067,022                     12,866,954         1.02                   
1999 16,443,579                     17,247,258         0.95                   
2000 16,584,897                     17,545,843         0.95                   
2001 15,505,838                     15,189,449         1.02                   
2002 16,787,514                     16,543,470         1.01                   
2003 19,259,132                     19,283,148         1.00                   
2004 19,140,928                     19,384,396         0.99                   
2005 19,810,374                     19,694,610         1.01                   
2006 20,030,167                     19,768,473         1.01                   
2007 21,695,000                     20,368,000         1.07                   
2008 16,924,000                     17,648,000         0.96                    
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APPENDIX THREE 

















Source: Author’s impression gained during fieldwork, not based on quantitative data. 
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